the significance of noting some of the problems in Kant and Hegel is that a good deal of the attack on the  John Lockean and enlightenment sort of democracy stems from these two philosophers. ''Woke'' is Marx with blacks and pedophiles being substituted for the working class.  

take a look at this paper from Brian Caplan which throws a wrench into all German philosophy after Kant --sine it demolishes the entire foundation of Kantian and Hegelian Philosophy in a few simple paragraphs 

 
 
 
An Enquiry Concerning Hume's Misunderstanding 
 
 
	Bryan Caplan 
	Tu 3-4 
	Phil 122 
	Question #1 

1. Introduction 
Remarkably, it is possible to sum up David Hume's vital  
assumptions about reasoning in a single proposition: Reason does  
NOTHING except locate the presence or absence of contradictions.   
This paper will attempt three tasks: first, to show the textual  
support for my interpretation; second, to explain how Hume's  
skepticism about induction depends on this assumption; and third, to  
briefly argue that Hume's basic assumption is wrong. 

2. Textual Support 

Whenever Hume wants to show that reasoning cannot support  
something, he uses the same argument: the alternative is not a  
contradiction.  "The contrary of every matter of fact is still  
possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is  
conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if  
ever so conformable to reality.  We should in vain, therefore,  
attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.  Were it demonstratively  
false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly  
conceived by the mind."1  Suppose that we try to use reason to  
establish any matter of fact.  Hume says that our effort is futile,  
because the alternative is conceivable.  But if the alternative is  
conceivable, then it is not a contradiction, because contradictions  
are inconceivable.  But reason can refute something only if it is a  
contradiction.  Hence, reason can never establish any matter of fact. 
Hume liberally repeats this argument throughout his works on  
epistemology.  When he denies that reason justifies the law of  
cause-and-effect, he says, "That there are no demonstrative  
arguments in this case, seems evident; since it implies no  
contradiction, that the course of nature may change."2  The  
argument is the same as above: An alternative is conceivable;  
contradictions are not conceivable; and reason can only demonstrate  
that something is false if it is a contradiction.  Hence, reason cannot  
establish the law of cause-and-effect. 

Hume uses the same argument in A Treatise of Human Nature.   
"There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we  
consider the objects in themselves.  Such an inference wou'd amount  
to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and  
impossibility of conceiving any thing different."3  Once again, Hume  
notes that he can conceive of one object without a second object.   
Since no contradictions are conceivable, this is not a contradiction.   
And since reason does nothing but locate the presence or absence of  
contradictions, reason cannot establish a connection between any  
two things.  Later in the Treatise, Hume makes the argument still  
more explicit: "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable  
argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any  
pretended demonstration against it."4  Conceivability implies the  
absence of a contradiction, and the absence of a contradiction  
implies that reason has nothing to say on the matter. 

To cement my interpretation, let us turn to Hume's Abstract of  
a Treatise of Human Nature, where he repeats the argument.  "The  
mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and  
indeed any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is  
possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a  
demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a  
contradiction.  There is no demonstration, therefore, for any  
conjunction of cause and effect."5  As always, his argument flows  
from the conceivability of an alternative, to the absence of a  
contradiction, to the forced silence of reason on the question.  "What  
is demonstratively false implies a contradiction; and what implies a  
contradiction cannot be conceived."6 

Hume could hardly be more explicit.  In all three works, he uses  
precisely the same argument.  And this argument rests on a crucial  
assumption about reason and reasoning: namely, that reason does  
nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions.   
While Hume may be open to interpretation on some points, the  
textual support for my claim is quite solid: it spans at least three of  
his epistemological works, and appears repeatedly in each.  The next  
section explains in detail why this assumption about reasoning  
matters. 

3. The Crucial Assumption
 
Let us formally state the argument that Hume uses above in  
order to see why his assumption crucially supports his view that we  
never have any reason to believe any matter of fact. 

1. The alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable. 

2. If something is conceivable, then it is not a contradiction. 

3. Reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence  
of contradictions. 

Therefore, reason has nothing to say about any matter of fact;  
if a proposition concerns matters of fact, reason can neither support  
nor refute it. 

It is hard to doubt premises #1 and #2.  We can indeed  
conceive of alternatives to any matter of fact.  And it seems like a  
basic feature of a contradiction that it is inconceivable.  (Try to  
conceive of a circular square.  Now try to conceive that gremlins  
exist.  Notice the difference?)  Premise #3 is therefore the crucial  
step in the argument -- and Hume's most central assumption about  
reasoning. 

How does the above argument relate to Hume's argument that  
we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact?   
I shall briefly but formally state Hume's argument against induction,  
then see how it relates to his central assumption about reasoning. 

1. All knowledge comes either from observation or reason. 

2. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can't come from  
reason, because the alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable  
and therefore implies no contradiction. 

3. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can be derived  
from knowledge of observed matters of fact only if the law of  
cause-and-effect is known. 

3a. Reason cannot establish the law of cause-and-effect,  
because the alternative is conceivable and therefore implies no  
contradiction. 

3b. Observation alone cannot establish the law of cause-and- 
effect, because this is itself an unobserved matter of fact, so the  
argument would be circular. 

Therefore, we never have any reason to believe any unobserved  
matter of fact. 

Let us now cross-examine these two formal arguments, and  
see why Hume's assumption about reason (premise#3 in the first  
argument) is crucial for his second argument to work.  Interestingly,  
it is actually used twice in the second argument - in premises#2 and  
3a.  Premise #2 claims that we cannot come to know about  
unobserved matters of fact just by reasoning about them.  Why?   
Because the contrary to every matter of fact is conceivable,  
conceivable things are not contradictions, and reason does nothing  
except locate the presence or absence of contradictions.  Premise  
#3a claims that we cannot come to know the law of cause-and- 
effect just by reasoning about it.  Why?  Because the contrary of the  
law of cause-and-effect is conceivable, conceivable things are not  
contradictions, and reason does nothing except locate the presence  
or absence of contradictions. 

So Hume's basic assumption about reasoning is absolutely  
crucial at both steps.  Suppose someone had a different theory of  
reasoning. Hume's argument would fall apart.  A critic could accept  
everything else that Hume says, but claim that reason does more  
than merely locate the presence or absence of contradictions.   
Perhaps we use reason to directly justify our beliefs about  
unobserved matters of fact.  Or perhaps we use reason to justify the  
law of cause-and-effect (major premise), coupled with our  
knowledge of observed matters of fact (minor premise), to justify  
our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact (conclusion).  In either  
case, Hume's problem of induction dissolves. 

Only if reason is as weak as Hume says would his skepticism  
about induction follow.  But Hume never proves the weakness of  
reason.  Instead, he accepts the weakness as a basic premise,  
claiming that no one denies it:  "[W]hatever we conceive is possible,  
at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration  
takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a  
contradiction.  And this is a principle, which is generally allowed by  
philosophers."7  Since his conclusions differ so radically from those  
of earlier philosophers, Hume should have considered that they might  
not accept the same conception of reason.  At the very least, he  
should have argued for his position, instead of just asserting that,  
"To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its  
possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration  
against it."8  But is it?  Only if we accept Hume's view of reason in  
the first place, according to which reason does nothing except locate  
the presence or absence of contradictions.  How would Hume  
convince someone who didn't already agree?  I don't think that he  
could. 

4. An Alternative Conception of Reason 

Consider the claim: Circular arguments are invalid.  Think  
about it for a while.  You can see that it is true -- but how?  Even  
though Hume himself uses this principle in his argument, we could  
never justify it on his principles.  The denial is not a contradiction.   
We can at least conceive that "Some circular arguments are valid" is  
true.  But at the same time, this principle is not a mere matter of  
fact.  Once we grasp the principle, we see that it is true always and  
everywhere; moreover, we grasp it by the mere operation of thought.   
Or consider the claim: The argument ad hominem is a fallacy.  Again,  
the denial is not a contradiction; yet we grasp that it is universally  
true with the mere operation of thought. 
I think that these two claims are convincing counter- 
arguments to Hume's conception of reason.  Reason does more than  
merely discover the presence of absence of contradictions.   
Frequently, we justify necessary truths just by thinking about them;  
and sometimes, the opposite of these necessary truths is still  
conceivable and hence not a contradiction.  What is so amazing about  
this claim?  It just turns out that Hume underestimates the power  
of reason when he limits it to locating the presence or absence of  
contradictions. 

I probably won't convince anyone in so brief a presentation.   
But at least let me raise some doubts in the minds of convinced  
Humeans.  Hume claims that reason cannot justify the law of cause- 
and-effect.  I think that it plainly does.  We grasp that "Circular  
arguments are invalid" and "The argument ad hominem is false" by  
the pure operation of thought, even though their opposites are  
conceivable and hence not contradictions.  I say that we justify the  
claim "Every effect has a cause; the same cause always produces the  
same effect"  in exactly the same manner. Namely, we think about  
the claim; and if we are sufficiently intelligent, open-minded, and  
intellectually honest, we immediately see its truth. 

5. Conclusion 

Hume assumes that reasoning can do nothing except locate the  
presence or absence of contradictions.  Moreover, his argument that  
we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact  
crucially depends on this unproven assumption.  For if reason could  
do something more than locate the presence or absence of  
contradictions, we could use reason to justify our claims about  
unobserved matters of fact.  Reason might directly give us a reason  
to believe unobserved matters of fact; or, reason might give us a  
reason to believe the law of cause-and-effect, which coupled with  
immediate observations would give us a reason to believe  
unobserved matters of fact.   

I have not proved that this alternative conception of reason is  
correct.  But we should at least consider it.  Not only do the  
examples in the section four tend to support it; but it is also the  
most likely escape route from the long list of absurd conclusions  
Hume's premises imply.  No one accepts Hume's conclusions in  
practice; it is time to question his theory as well. 
 
Notes 

1: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,  
pp.15-16. 
2: ibid, p.22. 
3: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp.86-87. 
4: ibid, p.89. 
5: David Hume, Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, pp.13- 
14. 
6: ibid, p.17. 
7: ibid, p.14. 
8: A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., p.89. 

nahman tulchiner was a student of Rav Natan who was a student of Rav Nahman of Breslov. He wrote down the talks of Rav Nathan and printed them. That became the "Collection of Halachot". He used to repeat softly to  himself under the words that Rav Nathan was saying so a to help him concentrate, [I also have found this idea to be helpful when I am listening to a lecture]

Berkley made some good criticisms on Aristotle's theory of perception. [see Thomas Reid.] However this question seemed to have led philosophy down a never ending rabbit hole starting with Kant. After Kant there were numerous attempts to bridge the Mind Body gap. One very good attempt  is the approach of the school of intuitionists. This seems good to me because it avoids one fallacy of Hume--that reason can only tell about contradiction based on definitions. And these critiques of Berkley and Hume formed the basis of all Philosophy subsequent to Kant. [Taking away the false assumptions of Hume, topples the whole structure of German philosophy]

The Intuitionists (Prichard, Ross, Michael Huemer) hold we have direct aware of reality, not just of what is confined between out two ears  and that reason can do more that perceive contradiction --it can know universals  

 It does not help anything in the USA to point out that the Left is advocating forces of chaos because that that is the whole point. They do not want power for queers, or woke, or blacks. They want whatever can and will help to bring chaos so that that they can step in and take power. It is a page out of Lenin's playbook.

 i went into Breslov and there was a fellow who I explained my views about government faith and reason in short and so I thought to bring a bit of that here.

But the subject is complicated. It starts with saadia gaon. faith and reason were firmly established in his book  Faiths and Doctrines. and this balanced approach was universal during the Middle Ages. The Enlightenment broke this bond. You could be for faith or reason but not both. Then Kant came along and found a road that cuts reason off from reality. This I found to be unreasonable until I discovered the Kant Friesian school.

As for government, John Locke is the model for the American Constitution while Rousseau for the French. Hegel recoiled from the French and tried to find a different approach but also came out with a totalitarian kind of model. In the trajectory  of ideas Kant also is not far from the French either.   Rather it i the Friesian modification of Kant that I think is a valid development from John Locke as one can see in the Friesian school of Kelley Ross

 I just can not see why the ultra religious in Israel do not want to serve in the IDF. Except perhaps that the ultra religious even before there was a state of Israel did everything they could to stop it. I guess it just snowballed from there.

I can not imagine any halachic reason for them not to serve. Learning Torah --while it i the most  important of all commandments-does not provide an exemption from doing any commandment. הכל יוצאים למלחמת  מצווה אפילו כלה מחופתה

87 year old Jewish woman from Poland.

 i saw a story today in a newspaper about an 87 year old woman from Poland. At four years old she and her family were in a ghetto. But at some point her family realized they needed to escape so they got out and went around to the local village asking for refuge. Every door they knocked on was slammed in their face until they reached one farm family who took them in their attic for two days and then because of the danger the farmer moved them to the upper part of the barn where they stayed for 2.5 years. Then when the Nazis were closing in, the farmer told them they needed to leave the barn and go into the forest. They were there for  a few days, but starvation drove the mother and one son to go back into the village and ask for a piece of bread. Then this daughter who stayed nearby to watch saw her mother and brother gunned down by one anti-semtite farmer. Then she and her remaining brothers went back to the original famer and he took them in again until the end of the war.

Of course, if that farmer who took in this Jewish family had been discovered, it would have been an immediate death sentence for him and his family. Be kind.

Medicine was medieval and a lot of it still is.

In the Conversations of Rav Nahman [of Breslov] is brought a long tired against doctors. But Rav Aryee Kaplan pointed out that this was  written when even oxygen was unknown. Medicine was medieval, It was all about balancing the four elements. However the same warning of Rav Nahman still applies today There procedures that are time tested and well known. These are okay. But new experimental things are not. My parents warned me not to take any medicine that has not been on the market for at least 50 years.

Medicine is still all about "balancing the four elements" except they use a different terminology in order to hide what they are doing: i.e., correcting chemical imbalances

 Even though to just say the words of what you are studying does not take the place of in depth learning "Iyun", I still think it is important. You can see this in the LeM of Rav Nahman vol I section 74 where he specifically goes into the importance of in depth learning/iyun. This clearly is not meant to disagree with Conversations of Rav Nahman  76 [Sichot HaRan section 76].

And though Rav Nahman meant this for learning of Gemara, it also applies to Math and Physics.

[I have mentioned before that these are called "secular" by mistake. They are not secular, but rather the wisdom of God embedded in the Work of Creation.] you can see this most of all in Mishna Torah of the Rambam laws of Talmud Torah chapter 3 where he brings the law to divide one's learning into three parts: (1) Tenach [Old Testament.] (2) Oral Law (Mishna). (3) Gemara and the Rambam  adds there  "in the category of Gemara are the subjects brought in the first four chapters of Mishna Torah". [Physics and Metaphysics.]

Those four chapters are Aristotelean Physics and Metaphysics

Rambam laws of Robbery 9. Bava Metzia 15 [בבא מציעא ט''ו]

Let's say you have a  case that someone stole a field, then sold it, and then went and acquired it from the owner. The Rambam holds the one who bought it from the thief  now acquires it automatically מה זכה הלוקח מן הגזלן כל זכות שתבוא לידו [Bava Metzia 15] even if the buyer knew it was stolen. Most other Rishonim disagree and hold that if the buyer knew it was stolen, then he does not acquire the field. To the Gra this is the reason for the law in the Shulchan Aruch that if the thief  does not subsequently buy the field (and thus it is taken from the buyer and given back to the owner). then the buyer must get paid back by the thief.  And if the thief has no money then the buyer collects from any property that the thief had but sold (משועבדים).  This is ok if the buyer did not know it was stolen. He is not at fault, and so ought to be paid back.  But what if he did know? Why should the people that bought unrelated property from the thief suffer.  That is the exact point of the Gra. Collecting from that sold property of the thief in fact does not apply. However Rav Shach points out that the Rema disagrees with this, since he has no comment on the Shulchan Aruch that the buyer gets paid back even from sold property [thus also if he knew that it was stolen], and yet brings the other rishonim that if the buyer  knew, then in the case the thief bought the property from the original owner, then the buyer does not acquire the field.\Rav Shach does answer this question on the Rema, but I am having a hard time seeing the answer. [The problem with the bill of sale that the thief gave to the buyer when they both know the field was stolen is it is "forged from within" מזויף מתוכו. It can not be considered a loan when it say openly that document of a sale. And thus the buyer should not be able to get paid for his loss from property that the thief had but sold (משועבדים).

[I should mention that a loan with a document gets paid back even from sold property that was sold after the loan was made; But not from a verbal loan. So in our case, the reason the buyer should be paid back from sold property is because there is a document of sale. But if that document is invalid because both the their and the buyer know that the field does not belong to the thief, the document should be considered invalid.]

 ___________________________________________________________________________

Let's say you have a  case that someone stole a field, then sold it, and then went and acquired it from the owner. The רמב''ם holds the one who bought it from the גזלן now acquires it automatically מה זכה הלוקח מן הגזלן כל זכות שתבוא לידו [בבא מציעא ט''ו] even if the buyer knew it was stolen. Most other ראשונים disagree and hold that if the buyer knew it was stolen, then he does not acquire the field. To the גר''א this is the reason for the law in the שלחן ערוך that if the גזלן  does not subsequently buy the field (and thus it is taken from the buyer and given back to the owner). then the buyer must get paid back by the גזלן.  And if the גזלן has no money, then the buyer collects from any property that the thief had but sold (משועבדים).  This is ok if the buyer did not know it was stolen. He is not at fault, and so ought to be paid back.  But what if he did know? Why should the people that bought unrelated property from the גזלן suffer.  That is the exact point of the גר''א. Collecting from that sold property of the גזלן in fact does not apply. However רב שך points out that the רמ''א disagrees with this, since he has no comment on the שלחן ערוך that the buyer get paid back even from sold property [thus also if he knew that it was stolen] and yet brings the other ראשונים that if the buyer  knew then in the case the thief bought the property from the original owner, then the buyer does not acquire the field.\רב שך does answer this question on the Rema, but I am having a hard time seeing the answer. [The problem with the bill of sale that the גזלן gave to the buyer when they both know the field was stolen is it is "forged from within" מזויף מתוכו. It can not be considered a loan when it say openly that document of a sale. And thus the buyer should not be able to get paid for his loss from property that the thief had but sold (משועבדים).

However רב שך can answer and say that then even if the buyer did not know the field was נגזל the document should also be considered "forged from within" מזויף מתוכו. And yet the שלחן ערוך decided that the buyer can get paid back from property that the גזלן sold.

[I should mention that a loan with a document can be repaid even from sold property that was sold after the loan was made (משועבדים); But not from a  loan בעל פה . So in our case, the reason the buyer should be paid back even from sold property is because there is a document of sale. But if that document is invalid because both the גזלן and the buyer knew that the field does not belong to the גזלן, the document should be considered as invalid.]

 _

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נניח שיש לך מקרה שמישהו גזל שדה, ואז מכר אותו, ואז הלך ורכש אותו מהבעלים. הרמב''ם מחזיק את מי שקנה ​​אותו מהגזלן עכשיו רוכש אותו אוטומטית. מה קנה הלוקח מן הגזלן כל זכות שתבוא לידו [בבא מציעא ט''ו] אפילו אם הקונה ידע שהוא נגנב. רוב ראשונים חולקים וגורסים שאם הקונה ידע שהוא נגזל, אזי הוא אינו רוכש את השדה. לגר''א זה הטעם לדין בשלחן ערוך שאם הגזלן לא יקנה אחר כך את השדה (וכך הוא נלקח מהקונה ומוחזר לבעלים). אז הקונה חייב לקבל תשלום בחזרה על ידי המוכר. ואם אין לגזלן כסף, אז גובה הקונה מכל נכס שהיה לו אבל מכר (משועבדים). זה בסדר אם הקונה לא ידע שהוא נגנב. הוא לא אשם, ולכן צריך להחזיר לו. אבל מה אם הוא כן ידע? למה האנשים שקנו נכס לא קשור מהגזלן צריכים לסבול? זאת בדיוק הנקודה של הגר''א. גבייה מאותו נכס שנמכר של הגזלן למעשה אינה חלה. אולם רב שך מציין שהרמ''א חולק על כך, שהרי אין לו הערה על השלחן ערוך שהקונה מקבל תשלום אפילו מנכס שנמכר [וכך גם אם ידע שהוא נגנב] ובכל זאת מביא את הראשונים שאם הקונה ידע אז במקרה שהגנב קנה את הנכס מהבעלים המקורי, אז הקונה לא רוכש את השדה. רב שך אכן עונה על שאלה זו ברמ"א, אבל אני מתקשה לראות את התשובה . [הבעיה בשטר המכירה שהגזלן נתן לקונה כששניהם ידעו שהשדה נגנב היא שהוא "זיוף מבפנים" מזויף מתוכו. זה לא יכול להיחשב כהלוואה כאשר זה אומר בגלוי כי הוא מסמך מכירה. ולפיכך לא יוכל הקונה לקבל תשלום על הפסדיו מנכס שהגנב אך מכר (משועבדים

אולם רב שך יכול לענות ולומר שאז גם אם הקונה לא ידע שהשדה הוא נגזל יש לראות במסמך גם "מזוייף מבפנים" מזויף מתוכו. ואף על פי כן החליט השולחן ערוך שהקונה יכול לקבל כספו בחזרה מהנכס שמכר הגזלן

אזכיר כי הלוואה עם מסמך ניתנת להחזר גם מנכס שנמכר לאחר מתן ההלוואה (היינו ממשועבדים); אבל לא מהלוואה בעל פה. אז במקרה שלנו, הסיבה שהלוקח יכול לגבות אפילו מנכס שנמכר היא בגלל שיש מסמך מכירה. אבל אם מסמך זה פסול כי הן הגזלן והן הקונה ידעו שהשדה אינו שייך לגזלן, יש לראות המסמך כפסול

With the Rambam and Saadia Gaon, Aristotle gained prominence. [Ibn Gavirol was Platonic]. But the problem with Aristotle was that there is no "form" of the fire that gets into the head to make us know what "hot" is. And as Kelley Ross pointed out, DNA  became understood as a way for plants to grow into their final form a different from the forms of Aristotle. So some new thinking became needed to understand Torah in the light of more modern questions. The difficulties of a reconciliation between Reason and Faith  need a different approach. One might just go back to Plato  and Neo-Plato [Plotinus].

 

I am not absolutely completely against kabalah. A lot depends on when and how  and what. For example I hold strongly with the Ari --Isaac Luria and with a few other mystics like Rץ Avraham Abulafia. Even the Zoharת I hold like Rav Yaaov Emden that studied its authenticity, and came to the conclusion that some parts of it were derived from ancient sources, while a lot was written during the Middle Ages [as you can see easily from the phrase "im kal da" עם כל דא (although) a translation of עם כל זה which was invented by Ibn Tibon

In fact, the different great mystics after the Ari I learned a lot from, Rav shalom sharabi, rav yakov abukazeira, the Gra and Moshe Chaim Lutzato 

Ultra religious Jewish teaching is derived from the teachings of Shabtai Zvi and Natan the false prophet.

 The importance of musar [books on Torah ethics written during the middle ages] is that without it it is impossible to gain any sort of correct idea of what the values of Torah are. What you get without musar is religious fanaticism or an array of  assorted delusions.

 The Middle Ages were much more rigorous in defining Torah values.

One reason for this that books of Torah ethics during the middle ages were logically derived from the Oral Law [Talmud] and Written Law. Books that were written later generally are derived from mysticism. some of that might be ok to some degree. But most often it is derived from the teachings of shabtai zvi and Natan the false prophet. I do not like to go into this in detail but the material is readily available to anyone who want to look up the sources.

[Once mysticism gets mixed with Torah, things tend to go downhill.  ]

 

"the gods that avenge parents"

 It is unfortunate that fathers have been getting negative press since Freud gained in popularity [May his name be blotted out]. It is to me no wonder that Rome rose to power. and until this very day, we are living in shadow of that colossus--because from the very foundation of Rome, fathers. were honored. [as per the twelve tablets].

This in particular you can see in the very event that caused Rome to become the sort of political system that they had--to refused to have a king, but rather two consuls that were elected by the people, and could hold office only one year.

[The elections were by the people, but consuls still could be elected only from the patricians until later in the Republic.]

The event was Lucretia  whose father was the king , Servius. It all started when Tarquin too power and became absolute ruler. He was married with a daughter of Servius who road over the bones of her father in a chariot. Later a son of Tarquin raped Lucretia who committed suicide in response. Brutus [not the same one] swore that. by "the gods that avenge parents".there would never again reign a king in Rome, and to wipe out the entire family of Tarquin. 

 One of the lessons I learned from my son Izhaak [aka nachman] i learning in depth. And I have been trying to concentrate on that. But I can see that in math and physics  every chapter builds on the previous chapter. Thus just to review one chapter a lot of times does not help. so I reached a sort of compromise of lot of review on one chapter but also go back to all the previous one. --every day one chapter back. But also to do "bekiut" to have some sessions of just saying the words in order and going forward.  

Faith and reason. In both there needs to be a sifting out of the chaff and leaving the pure wheat. And in this they work together. Reason can tell us what is reasonable to believe in. And faith can tell us what starting axioms can be used to start the reasoning process. 

In both faith and reason there are tons of garbage that need to be sifted out and thrown out. In both there are tons of pure garage for every small seed of truth. That is the reason I have been emphasizing Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and physics and math. This has been in the hope that people would get the idea of concentrating on the pure inner core of Torah and the natural sciences.

In philosophy I have mentioned Leonard Nelson for the same reason. [Leonard Nelson did not actually agree with Otto to use immediate non intuitive knowledge to justify faith. He was using it to justify the 12 categories of Kant.   I mean to say that the things in themselves are not knowable by reason but we can know the categories of where when how and what as starting axioms.  We can reason about them because they fall under the category of conditions of possible experience, ]   These are I admit Kantian categories but Kant I feel is unavoidable. While in the Middle Ages--for Saadia Gaon, Josef Ibn Pakuda, Maimonides Aristotle was the highest peak  of Reason still there are difficulties that need to be worked out. The problem in Aristotle are two that I know of: the contradiction about universals in the Metaphysics [I forget the issue of  hand but it was mentioned in Marc Cohen's article on Aristotle in the Stanford Encyclopedia] and the problems noted by Bishop Berkeley and also in Thomas Reid .      

 In the middle ages there was an acceptance of the importance of faith and reason. This you can see in the parable of the king in the Guide for the Perplexed. There is a country and city of a king and palace. In this parable there are different levels of closeness with the king. Those outside the country are barbarians. Those that live in the country are those with proper laws. There are even people in the capital city that are closer to the king. Those that are near the palace are the 'Talmudim" those that learn and keep the Talmud. Those that are in the palace of the king are the physicists. Those that are in the inner chambers with the king are the prophets.

This same approach can be seen in the Obligation of the Hearts.

Rambam laws of theft chapter 1 halacha 15

  Rambam laws of theft chapter 1 halacha 15: when a thief  has broken an object or it has gone down in value by itself, we do not evaluate the loss in value for a thief, but rather  the value the whole object and pay back double of what it was worth. \The Raavad writes "Even though 'We do not evaluate for a thief', that is for the main value, but for the double we do evaluate as is the law for a robber."  

The Raavad says the law of the thief and the robber are the same in terms of the main value. [The robber does not pay double]. And we already know the law for both the thief and the robber is they pay back according to what the object was worth at the time of the theft or robbery, not the time he is standing before the court. So the Raavad must mean that for the double we evaluate at the time of standing before the court. But the Rambam already wrote this in chapter 1 law 14. And the Raavad knows this. So he must be understanding the Rambam means to pay back cash for the whole value, while the Raavad holds one can pay back in whatever is worth money for the double.

I mean to  say that the Raavad understands the Rambam to intend like the Yerushalmi  that the thief pays back whole vessels or money while the Raavad himself hold that only refers to the main value but for the double he can pay back whatever is has monetary value.

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רמב''ם  הלכות גנבה פרק א' הלכה ט''ו  when a גנב  has broken an object or it  went down in value by itself, we do not evaluate the loss in value the for a thief, but rather  the value the whole object and pay back double of what it was worth. \The  ראב''ד writes "Even though 'We do not evaluate for a thief', that is for the main value, but for the double we do evaluate as is the law for a robber."  

The ראב''ד''   says the law of the thief and the robber are the same in terms of the main value. And we already know the law for both the thief and the robber is they pay back according to what the object was worth at the time of the theft or robbery, not the time he is standing before the court. So the  ראב''ד must mean that for the double we evaluate at the time of standing before the court. But the רמב''ם already wrote this in   הלכות גנבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד'. And the  ראב''ד knows this. So he must be understanding the רמב''ם means to pay back cash for the whole value, while the  ראב''ד holds one can pay back in whatever is שווה כסף for the double.

I mean to  say that the ראב''ד understands the  רמב''ם to intend like the ירושלמי  that the thief pays back כלים שלמים or money while the ראב''ד himself hold that only refers to the main value, but for the double, he can pay back whatever is has monetary value.

רמב''ם הלכות גנבה פרק א' הלכה ט''ו כאשר גנב שבר חפץ או שהוא ירד בערכו מעצמו, אין אנו מעריכים את הפסד הערך, אלא את הערך של כל החפץ ומחזיר כפול ממה שהיה שווה. הראב''ד כותב "אף על פי שאיננו מעריכים לגנב, זה על הערך העיקרי, אבל על הכפל אנו מעריכים כדין שודד,

. הראב''ד אומר שדין הגנב והגזלן זהים מבחינת הערך העיקרי. [[השודד לא משלם כפול]] וכבר ידוע לנו הדין הן לגנב והן לגזלן הוא שמחזירים לפי מה שהיה שווה החפץ בשעת הגניבה או הגזל, לא הזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית הדין. אז הראב''ד חייב להתכוון שלכפל אנו מעריכים בזמן עמידה בפני בית המשפט. אבל כבר כתב את זה הרמב''ם בהלכות גנבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. והרב''ד יודע זאת. אז הוא בטח מבין שהרמב''ם מכוון להחזיר מזומן עבור כל הערך, בעוד שהראב''ד מחזיק אפשר להחזיר בכל מה שהוא שווה כסף עבור הכפל\

כוונתי לומר שהראב''ד מבין את הרמב''ם שהוא מהתכוון כמו הירושלמי שהגנב מחזיר כלים שלמים או כסף בזמן שהראב''ד עצמו מחזיק שזה מתייחס רק לערך העיקרי, אבל לכפל הוא יכול להחזיר כל מה שיש לו ערך כספי

my little booklet on Bava Metzia chapter 8 and chapter 9  I am putting in the link to my booklet for people who might like to learn it. But this little paragraph here I just added today.

I absolutely regret that the whole idea of deep learning in Tosphot is almost forgotten. But it is nothing that I can do on my own.  It takes a sort of talent plus IQ to be able to see the depths of the Tosphot. I could see this in Shar Yashuv, but I certainly was no where near getting to that myself. And later I saw this again when I was learning with David Bronson.

But it has nothing to do with the so called ''pin test.''  Most people that imagine that they understand Tosphot have no idea of what Tosphot is saying.  Part of the reason is that learning in depth largely means learning Reb Haim of Brisk and the general achronim that came after him up until Rav Shach. And that kind of "global learning" is great. That means getting into the depth of the Gemara as compared with the Rambam which often apparently disagree, but with great ingenuity the achronim often find a way to show that the Rambam is not really disagreeing with the Gemara, but understanding it in an uncommon way. This is worthy and great in itself, but one unexpected result is it leaves  people not knowing the depths of Tosphot,

I spent a lot of time learning  the achronim before Reb Chaim and that was helpful because they do look into Tosphot. But the learning of the Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua is uncommon. and even then it is rarely understood.

 I am a bit surprized that the herem of the Gra [that is, his signature on the famous letter of excommunication published in Villna] is so widely ignored. I mean to say that if people  do not pay attention to the law of the Torah--that I can understand though I can not agree. But if people  are interested in keeping Torah, why would ignoring that herem be considered to be ok? 

Now perhaps in previous generations, it was not so obvious. But nowadays it ought to be clear.--worship of dead corpses [even if they want to call the corpse a "tzadik"] ought to be easy to see that that has nothing to do with Torah.

The pretense of Torah is not Torah, no matter how many people that can be fooled. [ I learn and hold very much with Rav Nahman because I believe that the herem was not relevant to him. There was a book that contained  all the five herems and testimonies gathered that I read in a library in the old city of Jerusalem. According to what  the herem aid, Rav Nahman would not be included    ]

 the only reason to get married commitment and for having children. It doe not make sex holy not even allowed. For in Torah law sex with an unmarried woman i allowed. That is the  law of pilegesh.

For good children, I think sex ha to be Friday night after midnight. see the sidur of yaakov emden for this subject in detail 

bastard [ממזר]

A bastard [ממזר]is born from sex that is with guilt of Karet [כרת].  It has nothing to do with marriage.

An example would be a woman that is married to one man and then has sex with another, or any of the types of karet in Viyakra (Leviticus) 18 and 20. [There is an exception of nida [menstruating'--seeing blood  ] who is under penalty of karet and yet one born from a nida is not a bastard ]

There is an opinion of R. Akiva who holds a bastard can come from sex is merely prohibited by a prohibition, .but that is not the law.

 Guilt of Karet is a kind of prohibition that gets the death penalty if done on purpose in front of two witnesses or has to bring a in offering if done by accident. [e.g. idolatry]

sex with an unmarried woman is not prohibited at all Tothe Rambam it just i lacking a positive command of getting married. But to most Rishonim it is not prohibited at all.

see Chronicle I chapter 2. verse 46

[But I can see good reasons to be married in term of commitment..That is it tends to reinforce mutual  commitment. But it does not make sex holy ]

To the Rashbam [Bava Metzia 96] לרש''י ולרא''ש גנב יכול להחזיר רק כלים שלמים או בכסף. לרשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו]

 To Rashi Tosphot and the Rosh a thief can pay back only with whole vessels or money. To the Rashbam [Bava Metzia 96] even with anything that is worth money. But we also have a law that אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object. [That is the object that was stolen and broken according to the time it was stolen]. To the Rashbam it looks that this must mean one evaluate the object at the time he stands before the court. But to Rashi and the Rosh the meaning of "one does not evaluate" is to pay back whole vessels, for if one could   evaluate then he could give back teh broken pieces and jut pay for the damaged part.

However the Rambam might hold like the Rosh and Rashi  or like the Rashbam. But in any case, he holds the law "one does not evaluate" and the law of how the thief must pay are not related because he holds one does not evaluate refers to what value the object lost by being broken,--not the whole object and what it was worth.. I have written about this in my little book on Bava Metzia but I see Rav Shach  is explaining the subject according to the Rambam that the two laws are unconnected. At any rate, it is hard to see the difference between אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object or one does not evaluate the worth of the damage. The reason is the only way to evaluate the worth of the damage is by seeing what the object was worth at first before the damage. . 

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 To רש''י תוספות and the רא''ש a thief can pay back only with whole vessels or money. To the רשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו] even with anything that is worth money[שווה כסף]. But we also have a law that אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object. [That is the object that was stolen and broken according to the time it was stolen]. To the רשב''ם it looks that this must mean one evaluate the object at the time he stands before the court. But to רש''י and the רא''ש the meaning of "אין שמין לגנב" is to pay back whole vessels, for if one could   evaluate then he could give back  broken pieces and  pay for the damaged part. However the רמב''ם might hold like the רא''ש and רש''י  or like the רשב''ם. But in any case, he holds the law "one does not evaluate" and the law of how the thief must pay are not related because he holds ''אין שמין לגנב'' refers to what value the object lost by being broken,,not the whole object and what it was worth..  רב שך  is explaining the subject according to the רמב''ם that the two laws are unconnected

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לרש''י ולרא''ש גנב יכול להחזיר רק כלים שלמים או בכסף. לרשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו] אפילו בכל דבר ששווה כסף אבל יש לנו גם חוק שלגנב לא מעריכים את ערך החפץ. [זה החפץ שנגנב ונשבר לפי הזמן שנגנב]. לרשב''ם נראה שזה מכוון שמעריכים את החפץ בזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית המשפט. אבל לרש''י ולרא''ש פירוש "אין שמין לגנב" הוא להחזיר כלים שלמים, שהרי אם היה אפשר להעריך אז הוא יכול להחזיר חתיכות שבורות ולשלם על החלק הפגום. אולם הרמב''ם עשוי להחזיק כמו הרא''ש והרש''י או כמו הרשב''ם. אבל בכל מקרה, הוא מחזיק בדין "אין מעריכים" ודין איך הגנב משלם אינם קשורים כי הוא מחזיק ''אין שמין לגנב'' מתייחס לאיזה ערך החפץ איבד בשבירה,,לא כל החפץ ומה שהיה שווה.. רב שךמסביר את הנושא לפי הרמב''ם ששני החוקים לא קשורים. בכל מקרה, קשה לראות את ההבדל בין "אין שמין לגנב" לא מעריכים את ערך החפץ או לא מעריכים את ערך הנזק. הסיבה היא שהדרך היחידה להעריך את שווי הנזק היא לראות מה היה שווה החפץ בהתחלה לפני הנזק. .

 The religious world bears only a superficial resemblance to Torah. But at least  those that follow the Gra get most things right. But not all.  They learn Torah in depth and love Torah for it's own sake.  They are aware that good character [to be a mensch] is the essence of Torah--. But by ignoring the herem [letter of excommunication] of the Gra, they tend to fall into the same Dark Side trap. [Sitra achra]

[I admit that I could be wrong about my particular liking of Rav Nahman of Breslov in that he might be thought to be in the category of te excommunication of the Gra. But I tend to believe that he stands outside of it. In fact I have seen that the Litvak world in general considers him to be a great tzadik.]

first night of pesach

 Next Tuesday night should be the first night of Pesach according to the approach of the gemara in Sanhedrin page 10 side b.--that is you go by the conjunction of the moon with the sun on the same longitude.[not the same latitude also because that would be  lunar ellipse]. And that is the first opinion of Tosphot over there. But if you go by the gemara in Rosh Hashana, there it is clear you go by the time when you can see the new moon, and that would be a day later. [That is the gemara that Tosphot bringc to argue on that first opinion. [ But in my opinion,  that Gemara in Sanhedrin disagrees with the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]  But none of that has anything to do with the calendar. All this means is if there would be a court that had authentic semicha from Sinai then they would go by one of these opinions the conjunction or when they see the new moon

 A lot of people that present themselves as ""talmidei hachamim" are actually from the dark side but there is a way to be rescued from them. That is by inviting true Torah scholars into one's home. That is--at any rate, what I gathered today by reading the Le.M. (Lekutei Moharan) of Rav Nahman of Breslov vol I chap 28in the local Na Nach place

Even though I hold that the basic absolute Litvak path is correct and important, there are some issues where I disagree...e.g. the Land of Israel, the of Israel, the approach to Rav Nahman, the calendar, the herem of the Gra, sitting in kollel(1) Living in Israel is important as stated by all rishonim.(2) the state of Israel also is important.(3) Rav Nahman was an important tzadik-- but the insane world of Breslov is different story, [and most of his advice is good and true, but some of it was given to individual people and not meant for everyone.(4) The herem of the Gra is certainly still valid. but due to my reading of the several herems that were issued in Villna, I do not think they apply to Rav Nahman.(5) The calendar was never instituted by Hillel II. If it had been, why would the Gemara have been silent about it?(6) Kollel is a hard issue to determine. My own path goes with the opinion that one should learn Physics and Math and make a living doing that. But those that learn Torah all day in the great Litvak Yeshivot are also doing well.

 Among some mediaeval authorities, learning physics and metaphysics  is important, e.g. Chovot Levavot, Rambam, ibn Gavirol and the commentaries on the Guide who were also Rishonim [mediaeval authorities]. But later Musar [Ethics] books tended to leave that out. You must have noted this in the Ramchal. so when Rav Israel Salanter  took up the goal of reintroducing and revitalizing Musar, this emphasis was lost. My own experience was to be part of the great Musar yeshiva, the Mir in NY. But eventually, I did not find anyplace for me, so I depended on the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities] like Rambam to begin  Physics studies at NYU. [But that was interrupted]. However, I think the whole issue comes down to what is known as a ''מחלוקת ראשונים'', [an argument among mediaeval authorities]. אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים that is what the gemara says about an argument among tenaim. --''these and those are the words of the living God.''

[[the issue goes back to the geonim- saadia on one side [with ibn pakuda's chovot levavot ] and hai gaon on the other.]

 The news media reports what Ukrainian commanders in the field say to them--as if that has any connection with reality, Right! I am sure the Russians are beaten with their nuclear submarines off the coast of California and New York right now. Right. Keep up the self delusion.

People are sadlly unaware of the facts on the ground and under the sea, They mistake Russian restraint for  weakness.  Just like the last attempt to cripple the Russian economy which just boomeranged  backwards to cripple the economy of the USA and strengthen the ruble. People have no idea what they are dealing with. .

The religious world is based patrician against plebian the upper class superior beings against the common folk.

The religious world  is based patrician against plebian the upper class superior beings against the common folk. But it is in the interest of the patrician to hide this dynamic.     The problem with the religious is that they imagine that they are keeping Torah. The addition of endless rituals have of course, no root in Jewish Law. But more so, two of the major requirements of Torah are Monotheism which means belief in God alone, not the endless parade of phony "tzadikim". Another is Midot Tovot [good character]which means to be a mensch, not a backbiter. Not to be   forcing secular Jews to pay for their kollels against their will. They can make this happen by the form of government in Israel, but that does not mean secular Jews give willingly. And that comes under the category of "Hamas" [Yes, it is the same word] which means to force someone to give you money against their will. For example, to take something from someone and then offer to pay for it.