Since too much stuff is falsely called Torah it occurs to me to make a short list of what counts as authentic Torah. [As the Rambam wrote Just like there is no adding or subtracting from the Written Law so there is no adding or subtracting from the Oral Law. The Rambam goes into this in his letters. 

So the list is the two Talmuds and the Halachic midrashim and agadic midrashim. 

Mechilta, Sifra, Sifrei, Midrash Raba, Midrash Tanhuma, Eliyahu Raba, Eliyahu Zutra, Tosephta, the shor mesechtot printed in the end of the Villna Shas.

But I would have to include in the commandment to learn Torah the commentaries, though not actually "Torah" still they are a part of "learning Torah."

But even in later commentaries, there is some point where things cease to be Torah and start to be Fraud.[Of course that was the reason for the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication.]

messiah son of joseph

 

The whole subject messiah son of joseph does not seem important to me. That is to say: Torah is about good character. 

But for information: the idea of messiah son of joseph can best be seen in the book of the Gra called "Kol HaTor" קול התור

At any rate, Torah is not a cult of personality. It is devotion to God. No one else. See tehilim 18 verse 2.You see there that King David  was putting his hopes in God, not people.

 The Gra explained that every word of Torah is worth as much as all the other commandments put together. He brings this from the Yerushalmi.The Yerushalmi says the mishna תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם refers to every word of Torah.

[You can ask if the same idea applies to Mathematics and Physics according to the opinions that Math and Physics are included in the commandment to learn Torah. See Rambam laws of Learning Torah where he divides the learning time into the Oral Written Law and Gemara and adds the things called Pardes are included in Gemara. We see  in the beginning of the Mishna Torah that Pardes refers to the subjects of Physics and Metaphysics. And in the Guide he says so openly in the introduction

But this group of Rishonim [Ibn Pakuda, Binyamin the Doctors, Rambam etc] include Metaphysics and I do not know what that would mean for today. In their time this meant Plato Aristotle Plotinus. Al Kindi, and Ibn Rushd. But today? I guess this would include Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson. 

[The main thing in Torah and Metaphysics is to know what to exclude. In philosophy I would exclude everything after Kant, Fries and Hegel. In Torah I would exclude everything after the end of the Talmudic period --as the Gemara says itself "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the time when one can decide a halacha" רבינא ורב אשי סןף הוראה

So it is not a surprise to me when one midrash contradicts another.

Someone asked me about difficult issues in faith issues. You might have noticed these yourself. My answer to this has been the "dinge an sich [Things in themselves]. That means this: There are areas where reason can venture into, even without empirical evidence.  These are areas of possible experience. [For example Math.]But there are also areas where reason tries to venture into that it has no access to. and when it tries to get in, it comes up with self contradictions. [e.g. Is the universe infinite? If yes how can any length not have an end? And if it is finite then what limits it?] So that is my general approach to spiritual issues. They are all dinge an sich, and thus outside the realm of human or even pure reason. So it is not a surprise to me when one midrash contradicts another. I say that is to be expected. And if there would not be contradictions, that in itself would be a problem, Trying to insert Reason into spirit is a mistake, and thinking about these things makes people insane.

 Reason integrated with Faith --Athens and Jerusalem was a great achievement of the Middle Ages.

So you can see how faith without philosophy leads to absurd results. But philosophy without faith also tends to lunacy.

So the question is how to get the right balance. I think that Kant, Kelley Ross [based on the Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson] and Hegel are the best when it comes to philosophy.

That is to say: people that came before Kant all seem to have some sort of difficulties with either pure reason or empirical evidence.  Spinoza and Leibniz were great, so were John Locke and Hume. But each system has problems. To me it seems the best solutions are in Kant, Leonard Nelson and Hegel.

But philosophy after these three took a nose dive. To show this I recommend Robert Hanna's books showing how Analytic Philosophy misunderstood Kant and went off into directions not very well thought out. As for Continental philosophy the same goes. As John Searle puts it : "Twentieth century philosophy is clearly false". 

The point of philosophy is to see the big picture. What is it all about? But the idea that Natural Science needs philosophy is not so absurd as it sounds. After all there are tons of pseudo sciences nowadays tha masquerade as legitimate science. E.g. Psychology.  It is by definition pseudo science since there is no conceivable observation that could falsify it. Climate science is another doozy.  

 In the religious world, it is thought that if you can change the words, then you can change the reality. How do you see this? Well, one example is idolatry. If you can call worshipping dead people "going to kivrei tzadikim (graves of  tzadikim) that somehow changes the reality.

Magic to force God to do your will, you no longer call it "magic" rather "yichudim" unifications. And that is somehow supposed to change the reality.

But this is not confined to the religious. In California you call prisons "houses of corrections." They are not houses of corrections. Nobody gets corrected. They get imprisoned. And usually come out much worse. So perhaps we should call them houses that take mild criminals and turn them into hardened criminals.

mobile phone and wireless radiation"

 The truth about mobile phone and wireless radiation"

Zohar was written in the Middle Ages.

In the Nefesh HaChaim of Rav Chaim of Voloshin you can see the importance of learning Torah. [That is in the last part, part 4, of that book. ]

And this message was received by me loud and clear in Shar Yashuv in NY. And even until today I hold by with this message. But I consider that "learning Torah" is limited to what we actually know to be the Written and Oral Law. You can't just add what you want, just your own personal thoughts, write them in Hebrew and then call it "Torah". Which means the 99.9% of what is called "Torah" nowadays is deception. 

What is the Written Torah? That is clear-the Old Testament. The Oral Torah is also clear. The books written after the destruction of the Second Temple --at which time the entire Oral Law was collected and edited by the sages of the Mishna and Gemara. So what comes later can not be called the Oral Law. However, some of what comes later can be included in a secondary way when it is just commenting on the two Talmuds or Midrashim. But not when some jerk makes up his own "stuff" and calls it "Torah."

Zohar was unknown until the time of Moshe DeLeon. He claimed it was from R. Shimon ben Yochai.. But so what? What would you say if the Talmud was unknown until the Middle Ages, and then someone claimed they had discovered it? Would it now be thought to be the Oral Law? Of course not.

Besides that עם כל דא [translation of עם כל זה although] was invented by Ibn Tibon.[Although in the time of R. Shimon ben Yochai was אף על פי או אף על גב] So the fact that עם כל דא  is all throughout the Zohar shows it was written in the Middle Ages.

    

[This is not meant to dismiss the great mystics, Avraham Abulafia, the Remak Moshe of Cordoba and Rav Isaac Luria. And even if the Ari and Remak got inspiration and ideas from the Zohar that does not contradict their own authentic mystic visions.] 

doctors. While I was in Uman and had a need for doctors, God brought me to very good doctors. Both in the local city hospital and also in the County Hospital. [bolniza rayona].

 Rav Nahman of Uman has a whole section against doctors in Conversations of the Ran perek 50.  And this is good advice. However there are exceptions. For some reason, while I was in Uman and had a need for doctors for all sorts of problems, God brought me to very good doctors. Both in the local city hospital and also in the County Hospital. [bolniza rayona].

pfizer-inoculations

 https://rumble.com/vqx3kb-the-pfizer-inoculations-do-more-harm-than-good.html

Robert E Lee always changed his strategy

 I think I have figured out the approach of Robert  E Lee. He never said as much but looking at the battles of the Civil War I begin to see a pattern. It is this: Robert E Lee always changed his strategy --on purpose. He knew the Union generals had studied at West Point and knew very well all the different chess moves. For that very reason General Lee made sure to change his strategy at every  turn. If one time it was a straight phalanx then the next time her reversed it.[Eg the second battle of Manassas.]  Take a look and you will see that the one thing that was predictable was that he was unpredictable. He meant to keep the Union generals off balance.  

This is one of the major reasons that General Grant saw right away when he became the head of the Army of the Potomac that the only possible way to defeat Lee was by shear numbers. Without that, the Confederates would predictably win at every turn. [At the beginning of the war, the South predictably won at every battle. Only around when Grant took charge, things turned around.] 

I should say here that the whole thing seems sad to me. I can not see that freeing the slaves was legal or legitimate. It just unleashed a fifth column against the USA that has been trying to destroy Constitutional Government ever since then.  

תמורה י''ט ע''א. אבי עזרי הלכות תמורה פרק ד' הלכה ז'' ואבי עזרי פסולי מקודשים פרק ד' הלכה ט''ז, זבחים פ''ה ע''ב

\
מבוא. כבשה בהריון. האם הוולד הוא חלק מהאם? הנושא הזה עולה בגמרא. יש לנו מקרה שמישהו הקדיש כבשה קרבן אשם, וזה לא יכול להיות. בעוד קרבן חטאת הוא נקבה, קרבן אשם הוא זכר .ויקרא ה'. אבל נניח שהכבשה לא הייתה הרה בזמן הקדשה ואז נכנסה להריון. ואז היא וצאצאיה נשלחים למרעה עד לקבלת פגם כלשהו ואז נמכרים ובכסף הבעלים קונים כבשה זכר להיות קרבן אשם. אבל נניח שהכבשה הייתה בהריון באותה תקופה. ואז אם היא תלד כבש זכר שיכול לשמש קרבן אשם לדעת ר' אלעזר. החכמים לעומת זאת חולקים ואומרים שהחוק הוא שהם נשלחים למרעה ונמכרים. רבינא אומר שהסיבה לר' אלעזר היא שהולד אינו נחשב חלק מהאם. אז ההקדשה חלה על הוולד. אבל הרמב''ם מחזיק בדין כמו החכמים שהכבשה וולד זכרה נשלחים למרעה וכן שהוולד אינו חלק מהאם

תמורה י''ט ע''א. העניין הוא כך: למה וולד של נקבה שהקדשה לפסח בטעות יש לפדות במקום להביאו כשלמים? אתה יכול לשאול למה זו צריכה להיות בעיה? תשובה: אנו גורסים כי הוולד לאו ירך אמו. אז כשהוא מכריז על האם כקרבן פסח [למרות שנקבה לא יכולה להיות קרבן פסח], הקדושה צריכה להתיישב על ולד שהיא מעוברת עמו עכשיו. אני רוצה להזכיר שלמרות שאנו מחזיקים את הוולד לאו ירך אמו, זה לא לגמרי כך. כי אם זה יהיה כך, ההכרזה על האם לא היה קשור לוולד וזה היה "חולין" [לא קדוש כלל]. תשובה לבעיה הנ"ל. משהו יכול להיות לו קדושת הגוף ועדיין לא להתאים למזבח. אז לוולד יש קדושת הגוף, אך עדיין אינו יכול להביאו כקורבן ולכן יש לפדות אותו. (ירעה עד שיקבל מום ואז נפדה אגב מומו.) איך אתה רואה את העיקרון הזה? מר' עקיבא ור' יוחנן שבהמה בעלת מום, אם העלתה על המזבח בשוגג, אינה יורדת. אבל אם בא המום קודם שנתקדשה, יורדת. זה חל על נקבה שהקדשה להיות קרבן עולה גם, למרות שיש לה קדושת הגוף, עדיין היא יורדת.. לפיכך: משהו יכול להיות קדוש קדושת הגוף ועדיין לא מתאים למזבח. החלק הקשה של זה הוא הולד של פסח נקבה. למרות שהאם לא יכולה להיות נקרבת, היינו חושבים שהוולד צריך להיות נקרב. זה המקום שבו הרעיון שהזכרתי למעלה. ההקדשה של האם אינה יכולה להיחשב כבלתי רלוונטיים לוולד, שכן אם כן, הוולד יהיה חולין. אז במובן הזה הוולד הוא כמו בהמה שיש בה מום ואז התקדשה. (כלומר שיש פגם בעצם ההקדשה.) אז למרות שיש בו קדושת גוף. אין מביאים אותו כקרבן

מידע רקע: קרבן פסח יכול להיות רק זכר. אז נניח שמקדשים נקבה לקרבן פסח והיא יולדת זכר. זה אחד מהסוגיות שבהן הרמב''ם קשה להבין. הנושא הוא זה. הרמב''ם פסק דין שאם הכבשה האם הרה או לא, הכבש שנולד נפדה.  זה לא כמו ר' אלעזר שאמר במקרה שהיא הייתה בהריון בזמן שנתקדשה, ניתן להביא את הכבש שנולד כקרבן שלמים. ורבינא אומר סיבת ר' אלעזר היא ולד לאו ירך אמו. אז בהחלט נראה שהסיבה שחכמים אמרו שאין להביא את הוולד היא שהם מחזיקים את הכבש בבטן האם נחשב כחלק מהאם. אולם הרמב''ם החליט כמו חכמים בתמורה י''ט ע''א, אבל גם שהכבש שטרם נולד נפרד מהאם. זה נראה כסתירה. רב יצחק זאב מבריסק אומר לענות לרמב''ם אפשר לומר שחכמים מסכימים שהוולד אינו חלק מהאם. אבל שבדיוק כמו כשהאם עדיין לא הייתה בהריון ואז הפכה לכזו, אז הולד נגרר יחד עם הקטגוריה שלה, כדי להיפדות. אז הם אומרים אותו דבר גם כשהיא כבר הייתה בהריון. רב שך שואל את השאלה שזה ברור שלא כמו הדעה שהוולד הוא לא חלק מהאם. הוא מנסה למצוא תשובה אחרת לרמב''ם, שהעובדה שאפשר לקדש את האם הכבשה רק מבחינת ערכים כספיים, זה מה שגורם לכך שגם הכבש שטרם נולד נגרר עם זו, שצריך פדיון

תמורה י''ט ע''א. The issue is the וולד of a נקבה שהוקדשה לפסח בטעות

Introduction. A Sheep is pregnant. Is the וולד part of the mother? This issue comes up in the גמרא. There we have a case someone dedicated a כבשה (female sheep) to be a guilt offering , which it can not be. While a sin offering is female, a guilt offering is male.ויקרא ה.  But let's say the כבשה (female sheep) was not pregnant at the time it was dedicated, and then became pregnant. Then she and her offspring are sent to pasture until the get some defect and then sold, and with the money the owner buys a male sheep to be used for his guilt offering. But let's say the sheep was pregnant at the time. Then if she gives birth to a male sheep, that male sheep can be used for a guilt offering in the view of ר' אלעזר /R. Elazar. The חכמים/sages however disagree and say the law is  they are sent to pasture and sold. רבינא/Ravina says the reason for ר' אלעזר/R Elazar  is the וולד offspring is not considered part of the mother. So the dedication applies to the infant. But the רמב''ם/Rav Moshe ben Maimon holds the law is like the חכמים/sages that the sheep and her male offspring וולד are sent to pasture and also that the וולד offspring is not part of the mother.

 תמורה י''ט ע''א.  The issue is the וולד of a נקבה שהוקדשה לפסח בטעות  must to be redeemed instead of being brought as a שלמים? You can ask why should this be a problem? Answer: we hold that the וולד לאו ירך אמו. So when he declares the mother to be a פסח קרבן [even though a female can not be a פסח], that holiness ought to settle on the וולד שהיא מעוברת עמו עכשיו. I want to mention that even though we hold the וולד לאו ירך אמו, that is not totally so. For if it would be the the declaration on the mother would have nothing to do with the וולד and it would be "חולין"[not sacred at all.] Answer to the  above problem. Something can have קדושת הגוף [holiness of the body] and still not be fit for the altar. So the infant has קדושת הגוף [holiness of the body] but still can not brought as a sacrifice and so must be redeemed. How do you see this principle? From ר' עקיבא and ר' יוחנן that a animal with a מום, if brought up on the altar by accident, does not come down. But if the מום came before it was sanctified, it comes down. This applies to a נקבה שהוקדשה להיות קרבן עולה also, even though she has holiness of body, still she comes down.. Thus: Something can have קדושת הגוף and still not be fit for the altar. The difficult part of this is the וולד הפסח.  Even though the mother can not be נקרב, the וולד should be. That is where the idea that I mentioned up above. The faulty consecration of the mother can not be thought to be irrelevant to the וולד, since if so, the וולד would be חולין. So in that sense the וולד is like an animal that שיש בו מום and then was consecrated. (I mean that there is a defect in the very act of consecration.) So even though it has holiness of body it is not brought as a sacrifice. 

Background information:  קרבן פסח can only be a male. So let's say one consecrates a female for a קרבן פסח and she gives birth to a male. This is one of those issues  where the רמב''ם קשה להבין. The issue is this. The רמב''ם decided the law that if the mother sheep was pregnant or not, the sheep that was born is sold. [The money is then used to bring a peace offering].  This is not like ר' אלעזר who said in the case she was pregnant (at the time of consecration), the born sheep can be brought as a peace offering. And רבינא says the reason for ר' אלעזר is the וולד לאו ירך אמו. So it certainly looks that the reason the sages said the וולד can not be brought is that they hold the sheep in the womb of the mother is considered as part of the mother. Yet the רמב''ם decided like the sages in תמורה 19, but also that the unborn sheep is separate from the mother. This looks to be a contradiction. רב יצחק זאב מבריסק says to answer the רמב''ם we can say the חכמים agree that the וולד is not part of the אם. But that just like when the mother was not pregnant yet and then became as such, then the וולד is dragged along with her category, to be sold and the money used to buy a peace offering. So they say the same thing even when she was already pregnant.רב שך asks the question that this clearly not like the opinion that the וולד is not part of the mother. He attempts to find a different answer for the רמב''ם that  the fact that the mother sheep could only be sanctified as far as monetary values goes, that is what causes the unborn sheep also to be dragged along with that.

Here the Rambam seems to be at odds with the Gemara. It would be simpler to say that the sages hold the unborn sheep is part of the mother.  But the Rambam is interested in the law, and so  here he is wondering what R. Yohanan would answer for the sages.  And he has a reason to say the law is like R. Yochanan, that the unborn sheep is not a part of his mother. 

We know how Ravina explains the argument between the sages and R. Elazar. But how would R Yochanan explain it? Clearly he would not say that the sages disagree with him. So we come to this idea of Rav Shach that the act declaring the mother sheep to be Passover offering which can only mean monetary value must transfer to the unborn sheep also.

\
מבוא. כבשה בהריון. האם הוולד הוא חלק מהאם? הנושא הזה עולה בגמרא. יש לנו מקרה שמישהו הקדיש כבשה קרבן אשם, וזה לא יכול להיות. בעוד קרבן חטאת הוא נקבה, קרבן אשם הוא זכר.ויקרא ה' אבל נניח שהכבשה לא הייתה הרה בזמן הקדשה ואז נכנסה להריון. ואז היא וצאצאיה נשלחים למרעה עד לקבלת פגם כלשהו ואז נמכרים ובכסף הבעלים קונה כבשה זכר כדי קרבן אשם. אבל נניח שהכבשה הייתה בהריון באותה תקופה. ואז אם היא תלד כבש זכר שיכול לשמש קרבן אשם לדעת ר' אלעזר. החכמים לעומת זאת חולקים ואומרים שהחוק הוא שהם נשלחים למרעה ונמכרים. רבינא אומר שהסיבה לר' אלעזר היא שהולד אינו נחשב חלק מהאם. אז ההקדשה חלה על הוולד.

תמורה י''ט ע''א. העניין הוא וולד של נקבה שהקדשה לפסח בטעות יש לפדות במקום להביאו כשלמים? אתה יכול לשאול למה זו צריכה להיות בעיה? תשובה: אנו גורסים כי הוולד לאו ירך אמו. אז כשהוא מכריז על האם כקרבן פסח [למרות שנקבה לא יכולה להיות קרבן פסח], הקדושה צריכה להתיישב על ולד שהיא מעוברת עמו עכשיו. אני רוצה להזכיר שלמרות שאנו מחזיקים את הוולד לאו ירך אמו, זה לא לגמרי כך. כי אם זה יהיה ההכרזה על האם לא היה קשור לוולד וזה היה "חולין" [לא קדוש כלל] תשובה לבעיה הנ"ל. למשהו יכול להיות קדושת הגוף ועדיין לא להתאים למזבח. אז לוולד יש קדושת הגוף, אך עדיין אינו יכול להביא כקורבן ולכן יש לפדות אותו. איך אתה רואה את העיקרון הזה? מר' עקיבא ור' יוחנן שבהמה בעלת מום, אם העלתה על המזבח בשוגג, אינה יורדת. אבל אם בא המום קודם שנתקדשה, יורדת. זה חל על נקבה שהקדשה להיות קרבן עולה גם, למרות שיש לה קדושת הגוף, עדיין היא יורדת.. לפיכך: משהו יכול להיות קדוש קדושת הגוף ועדיין לא מתאים למזבח. החלק הקשה של זה הוא הולד של פסח נקבה. למרות שהאם לא יכולה להיות נקרבת, הוולד צריך להיות. זה המקום שבו הרעיון שהזכרתי למעלה. ההקדשה של האם אינה יכולה להיחשב כבלתי רלוונטיים לוולד, שכן אם כן, הוולד יהיה חולין. אז במובן הזה הוולד הוא כמו בהמה שיש בה מום ואז התקדשה. (כלומר שיש פגם בעצם ההקדשה.) אז למרות שיש בו קדושת גוף אין מביאים אותו כקרבן.

Translation results

כאן נראה שהרמב''ם עומד בסתירה לגמרא. יהיה יותר פשוט לומר שחכמים גורסים שהוולד שטרם נולד הוא חלק מהאם. אבל הרמב''ם מתעניין בדין, ולכן כאן הוא תוהה מה יענה ר' יוחנן לחכמים. ויש לו טעם לומר הדין הוא כר' יוחנן, שהוולד אינו חלק מאמו. אנו יודעים כיצד רבינא מסביר את הוויכוח בין החכמים לר' אלעזר. אבל איך ר' יוחנן יסביר את זה? ברור שלא יאמר שחכמים חולקים עליו. אז הגענו לרעיון הזה של רב שך שהמעשה שהכריז על האם הכבשה כקרבן פסח שמשמעותו רק ערך כספי, חייב לעבור לוולד שטרם נולד.

Temura 19. My answer to the difficulty in the Rambam. I can not tell if this is what Rav Shach intended in order to answer the question or Rav Isaac Zev of Brisk. But at any rate, this is the answer that occurred to me as I was going to and back from the sea.

Introduction. A Sheep is pregnant. Is the baby sheep part of the mother? 

This issue comes up in the Gemara Temura 19. There we have a case someone dedicated a female sheep to be a guilt offering -which it can not be. While a sin offering is female, a guilt offering is male.(Leviticus 5). But let's say the sheep was not pregnant at the time it was dedicated and then became pregnant. Then she and her offspring are sent to pasture until the get some defect and then sold and with the money the owner buys a male sheep to be used for his guilt offering. But let's say the sheep was pregnant at the time. Then if she gives birth to a male sheep that can be used for a guilt offering in the view of R Elazar. The sages however disagree and say the law is the same as above. They are sent to pasture and sold. Ravina says the reason for R Elazar is the infant sheep is not considered part of the mother. So the dedication applies to the infant. But the Rambam holds the law is like the sages that the sheep and her male offspring are sent to pasture and also that the offspring is not part of the mother.

 I am freezing cold from the sea. But I was thinking about the subject in Temura 19 on the way back.  So I thought I should write down this thought while it is fresh in my mind..The issue is how can the unborn sheep of a female pesach/passover sacrifice have to be redeemed instead of being brought as a peace offering.

You can ask why should this be a problem? Answer: we hold that the unborn is not part of the mother. So when he declares the mother to be a pesach [passover sacrifice] [even though a female can not be a pesach], that holiness ought to settle on the unborn infant sheep.

Answer to the  above problem. Something can have קדושת הגוף [holiness of the body] and still not be fit for the altar. So the infant has קדושת הגוף [holiness of the body] but still can not be brought as a sacrifice and so must be redeemed.

How do you see this principle? From R. Akiva and R.Yochanan that an animal with a defect --if brought up on the altar by accident, does not come down. But if the defect came before the consecration, it comes down. This applies to a female burnt offering also --even though she has holiness of body, still she comes down.. Thus: something can have קדושת הגוף [holiness of the body] and still not be fit for the altar.

The difficult part of this is the infant sheep has no defect. So even though the mother can not be brought as a sacrifice, the infant should be. 

I want to mention that even though we hold the unborn is not part of the mother, that is not totally so. For if it would be the case that the declaration on the mother would have nothing to do with the baby sheep, then it would be "hulin"[not sacred at all.] [So instead we say it has enough connection to the mother in so far as if he says this animal is a passover sacrifice, that holiness settles on the unborn baby sheep as well.]]

The faulty consecration of the mother can not be thought to be irrelevant to the infant sheep since if so the infant would be secular. So in that sense the infant is like an animal that and a defect and then was consecrated. (I mean that there is a defect in the very act of consecration.) So even though it has holiness of body it is not brought as a sacrifice.

Background information: A Passover offering can only be a male. So let's say one consecrates a female for a Passover offering and she gives birth to a male. 

This is one of those issues  where the Rambam seems to contradict the Gemara directly. Yet there are ways of answering for him.

The issue is this. The Rambam decided the law that if the mother sheep was pregnant or not, the sheep that was born is sold.[The money is then used to bring a peace offering].  This is not like R. Elazar who said in the case she was pregnant (at the time of consecration), the born sheep can be brought as a Passover offering. Ravina [in Temura page 19 side a] says the reason for R Elazar is the sheep that has not been born yet is thought to be separate from the mother. So it certainly looks that the reason the sages said the born sheep can not be brought is that they hold the sheep in the womb of the mother is considered as part of the mother.

Yet the Rambam decided like the sages in Temura pg 19, but also that the unborn sheep is separate from the mother.

This looks to be a contradiction. Rav Isaac Zev [son of Rav Chaim of Brisk] says to answer the Rambam we can say the sages agree that the unborn sheep is not part of the mother, [in spite of the clear implication of the Gemara]. But that just like when the mother was not pregnant yet and then became as such then the unborn is dragged along with her category--to be sold and the money used to buy a peace offering. So they say the same thing even when she was already pregnant.

Rav Shach asks the question that this clearly not like the opinion that the unborn is not part of the mother. He attempts to find a different answer for the Rambam. --that  the fact that the mother sheep could only be sanctified as far as monetary values goes, that is what causes the unborn sheep also to be dragged along with that.

music file z58

 z58 C Minor  z58 nwc

Not a good idea to conquer Taiwan

I do think people have a right to what they have earned and worked for. So the whole premise of communism I see as false. --that anyone who has more stuff than me has to have exploited someone to get it.

On the other hand I can see that there is exploitation. So it makes sense to me that Russia and China would have become communist --in order to get to the right balance. When the overlords were just too abuse, there had to be someway to push back. But the trouble is what works in one place might not work elsewhere. Just because communism was seen as solution to China's troubles in the 1900's, that does not mean that it is a good idea to conquer Taiwan and force it to be part of China's totalitarian system. 

A Passover offering can only be a male. So let's say one consecrates a female for a Passover offering and she gives birth to a male. This is one of those issues where the Rambam seems to contradict the Gemara directly.

A Passover offering can only be a male. So let's say one consecrates a female for a Passover offering and she gives birth to a male. 

This is one of those issues  where the Rambam seems to contradict the Gemara directly. Yet there are ways of answering for him.

The issue is this. The Rambam decided the law that if the mother sheep was pregnant or not, the sheep that was born is sold.[The money is then used to bring a peace offering].  This is not like R. Elazar who said in the case she was pregnant (at the time of consecration), the born sheep can be brought as a Passover offering. Ravina [in Temura page 19 side a] says the reason for R Elazar is the sheep that has not been born yet is thought to be separate from the mother. So it certainly looks that the reason the sages said the born sheep can not be brought is that they hold the sheep in the womb of the mother is considered as part of the mother.

Yet the Rambam decided like the sages in Temura pg 19, but also that the unborn sheep is separate from the mother.

This looks to be a contradiction. Rav Isaac Zev [son of Rav Chaim of Brisk] says to answer the Rambam we can say the sages agree that the unborn sheep is not part of the mother, [in spite of the clear implication of the Gemara]. But that just like when the mother was not pregnant yet and then became as such then the unborn is dragged along with her category--to be sold and the money used to buy a peace offering. So they say the same thing even when she was already pregnant.

Rav Shach asks the question that this clearly not like the opinion that the unborn is not part of the mother. He attempts to find a different answer for the Rambam. --that  the fact that the mother sheep could only be sanctified as far as monetary values goes, that is what causes the unborn sheep also to be dragged along with that.

Here the Rambam seems to be at odds with the Gemara. It would be simpler to say that the sages hold the unborn sheep is part of the mother.  But the Rambam is interested in the law, and so  here he is wondering what R. Yohanan would answer for the sages.  And he has a reason to say the law is like R. Yochanan, that the unborn sheep is not a part of his mother. 

We know how Ravina explains the argument between the sages and R. Elazar. But how would R Yochanan explain it? Clearly he would not say that the sages disagree with him. So we come to this idea of Rav Shach that the act declaring the mother sheep to be Passover offering which can only mean monetary value must transfer to the unborn sheep also.  

the idea of learning Torah as being the highest ideal.

 I think is a sad fact that people do not have the idea of learning Torah as being the highest ideal. This is an essential approach of the Litvak world [based on the Gra]. But I have wondered about how this fits with other aspects of Torah. For example, attachment with God? Or other things in Torah which seem to be prime values. 

One is the land of Israel. That is after all an open verse [in Deuteronomy in the section called the Section on Fear.] "Do all these commandments in order that you should come to the Land and dwell in the Land."

Also the sages of Musar pointed out that great importance of good character. This comes even before the commandments as it says to walk in His ways and to keep his  commandments. The first thing in the verse comes first in preference as we see in the seven types of fruit that the Land Of Israel was praised for. 

Plus, I have also noted that the command to learn Torah is wider than is thought [because to some Rishonim it includes Physics and Metaphysics]. And it more narrow than what it thought because as the Rambam says Just like there is no adding or subtracting from the written Law so there is no adding or subtracting from the Oral Law. "That means the only things that are authentic Torah are the Old Testament the two Talmuds, and the various midrashei Halacha an Midrashei Agada. So anything written after about 500 AD does not count as Torah.  

defending Taiwan.

 There is a kind of difference between democracies. While I can see the importance of supporting democracy, that does not mean the same thing everywhere. So to give one example I can see the importance of defending Taiwan. Some might object because of the USA involvment in Vietnam. But that is not the same thing as defending South Vietnam. (It was about as a corrupt democracy as one could imagine. Thar is exactly why many people in South Vietnam supported the North.) Others might object to the USA involvment in Afghanistan. But defending Taiwan is not same thing as trying to create a Democracy in Afghanistan.

 

[ I am referring to the problem that China seems intend on conquering Taiwan like it did Hong Kong. What is it that I have against  Communism? It is that not everyone that claims to be exploited has been exploited. Some have and some have not. If you attribute validity to anyone who claims to have been exploited, you end up with the way the USA is becoming nowadays.]

Even though there is a lot of great insights and advice in the books of Rav Nahman, still there area few areas where there is a problem. The idea of "graves of the righteous" seems to be problematic.

 Even though there is a lot of great insights and advice in the books of Rav Nahman, still there area few areas where there is a problem. The idea of "graves of the righteous" seems to be problematic. See the Nefesh Hachaim of Rav Chaim of Voloshin [a major disciple of the Gra] that one that intends to tie his soul with even the greatest of saints is doing idolatry. 

There is some aspect of "being connected with the soul of a tzadik" that is a problem. And even more so the soul of a saint who has died.

The reason is there is a sort of "kelipa" [force of uncleanliness] that is attached to people that have died. {Normally this is called the "angel of death".} So we hope the souls of our loved ones who have passed on have found a better world to exist in. But in this world, there is a sort of uncleanliness that is attached to the dead. You might take a look at the Book of Numbers to see this and also in the Mishna Seder Taharot, tractates Kelim and Tents. 

On the other hand there is plenty of advice in the books of Rav Nahman that I find to be indispensable. sine qua non. [Private talking with God, method of learning, etc.] 

To Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam there is an aspect of math and physics which come under the category of "Learning Torah."

 To me it seems that the IUT Inter- Universal Teichmuller Theory and also the Scholze Langland's Program connection between Geometry and Algebra are important advances.  But I do not have anything to say about either since I am involved in trying to study both.  [That is even though recently I decided to quit the study of the Langland's program in order to have a bit more time to look into IUT.

Why is this important? u might ask. Answer: To Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam there is an aspect of math and physics which come under the category of "Learning Torah."

This is seen in Chovot Levavot Gate of Behina chapter 3, and in the Mishna Torah concerning the idea of dividing one's learning time into three parts. And right there the Rambam says "the things called Pardes [ field of fruit trees] are included in Gemara" and he defined "Pardes" in the first four chapters of Mishna Torah as Physics and Metaphysics. There however, it is possible to mistake his intension. But In the Guide for the Perplexed his intension is much more clear.

[I am starting to see that Shinichi Mochizuki's IUT is built on a lot of previous results that I need to work through.]]

a decree that is not accepted by all Israel has not validity

Ezra made a decree not to give the first tithe to the tribe of Levi (but rather to the kohanim priests) because they did not come with him to Jerusalem. This decree was ignored as there are plenty of places in the Gemara where maasar [tithe] was given to a Levi. That includes the famous event of Rabban Gamliel and his friends were on a ship and he separated the first tithe to give to R. Yehoshua who was a Levi.

This fits well with the law stated in the Gemara that a decree that is not accepted by all Israel has not validity. Even is so even though at first it was thought that the decree was accepted, and then the courts went out and checked and saw that people did not in fact accept it.

The implication for us nowadays is that we ought to concentrate on keeping the laws of the Torah which are divine, and be aware that much of what people think are obligatory decrees from the later sages are no longer applicable since most of Israel do not abide by them.  [That is the case even though the religious imagine that only they are Israel and everyone else is a goy.]

But even though Forward to Kant looks like a very good development, still I would be more happy if Hegel was included

 There is a movement in Philosophy to get back to basics. Back to Kant. Or "Forward to Kant" as Robert Hanna puts it. Very different from the Post Kantians. But also not taking Fries and Leonard Nelson into account. But at least the destitute Analytic Philosophy about words is over. The sooner the better.

Still there is still the tendency to see Kant as being all about the human mind, not about access to the ground of Being-as a way to get beyond us humans into what is actually the basis of actual reality.

But even though Forward to Kant looks like a very good development, still I would be more happy if Hegel was included. (And why is it that there are no more Right Hegelians? To me this looks odd since the simple reading of Hegel I think is a kind of modification of Plotinus.

the vaccine is concerned I think it intends to reduce world population

 As far as the vaccine is concerned I think it intends to reduce world population from seven billion to five billion. And probably much lower. I do not see it (or them) as having any medical value at all. All Covid is is a mild cold. And the vaccines do nothing to reduce it except to make people sick from the vaccine.

Gemara in Zevachim pg 6a. גמרא בזבחים ו ע''א.

 There seems to be some sort of inherent difficulty in the We say the inheritors of a sacrificial animal can do exchange only if they own it. But they can not own it in its monetary value because we know the flour offering can only be brought if it is owned by one person and not two, and the inheritors can bring the flour offering that they have inherited. So we say they own the sacrifice only in so far as forgiveness of sin. This looks like the opinion ''light sacrifices are the money of Heaven.'' But the Gemara also brings the same kind of verse for the second tithe and there the inheritors can do "hilul" to have the value of the tithe settle on money, and that has to be because of a special verse that includes them, but not because they own it in terms of forgiveness of sin.

[This is a question that Rav Shach asks on the Raavad but it seems to fall on the Gemara itself.]

The only answer I can see is maasar sheni is secular while light sacrifices are the money of Heaven.

_________________________________________________________________________________

 There seems to be some sort of inherent difficulty in the גמרא in זבחים ו ע''א. We say the יורשים of a בהמה המקודשת לשם קרבן can do תמורה only if they own it. But they can not own it in its monetary value because we know the מנחה can only be brought if it is owned by one person and not two, and the inheritors can bring the flour offering that they have inherited. So we say they own the קרבן only in כפרה. This looks like the opinionקדשים קלים הם ממון גבוה.'' But the גמרא also brings the same kind of verse גאול יגאל for the מעשר שני and there the יורשים can do "חילול" to have the value of the tithe settle on money, and that has to be because of a special verse המיר ימיר  that includes them, but not because they own it in terms of כפרה. This is a question that רב שך asks on the ראב''ד but it seems to fall on the גמרא itself. The only answer I can see is מעשר שני is ממון הדיוט  while קדשים קלים ממון גבוה.

נראה שיש איזה קושי מובנה בגמרא בזבחים ו ע''א. אנחנו אומרים שהיורשים של בהמה המקודשת לשם קרבן יכולים לעשות תמורה רק אם הם הבעלים שלה. אבל הם לא יכולים להחזיק אותו בערכו הכספי כי אנחנו יודעים שאפשר להביא את המנחה רק אם הוא בבעלותו של אדם אחד ולא שניים, והיורשים יכולים להביא את מנחת הקמח שהם ירשו. אז אנחנו אומרים שהם הבעלים של הקרבן רק בכפרה. זה נראה כמו הדעה שקדשים קלים הם ממון גבוה. אבל הגמרא מביא גם את אותו סוג של פסוק גאול יגאל עבור מעשר שני ושם היורשים יכולים לעשות חילול [כדי שערך המעשר ייקבע בכסף], וזה חייב להיות בגלל פסוק מיוחד המיר ימיר שכולל אותם, אבל לא בגלל שהם הבעלים שלו מבחינת כפרה. זו שאלה שרב שך שואל על הרב''ד, אבל נראה שהיא נופלת על הגמרא עצמו. התשובה היחידה שאני יכול לראות היא מעשר שני זה ממון הדיוט בעוד קדשים קלים ממון גבוה.

Ukraine-Russia

 There is some aspect of the Ukraine-Russia subject that is inherently ambiguous.

When I first got to the Ukraine I was more than shocked to discover that no one was happy about the fall of the USSR. No one. They may have not liked totalitarianism [which the USSR was], but they liked chaos even less. The West however turned a deaf ear to the attempts of the Ukraine to join the West. Probably because of the well known tendencies. Even after being there for some period [that I think was long enough for me to gain some familiarity with the situation], I still have little idea of what the West should do. And besides that, as David Bronson [my learning partner] mentioned to me once, it seems that Russia is becoming more of a  bastion of Western Values even more than the USA. 

But still it is hard to know, since the political part of Ukraine still openly is trying to integrate with Europe and the USA.

One thing is clear, the people and the politics are two very different things. 

The situation in most Ukrainian cities was such that after the USSR, and you asked people when was better, they almost always said things were better in the time of the USSR. But like the time of the civil war of the Whites against the Reds, neighbors would kill each other when they thought their neighbor was on the other side. {I knew the people this happened to.} So even if people would prefer to be back to the way things were during the USSR, they dare not say so openly. --Except to someone like me that they knew would not tell their neighbors about their feelings. There however were exceptions--people that told me if Russia would show up there, they would take a rifle and shoot them.

So what you have is a sort of Hidden Civil War--hidden because it is unknown and hidden from public view. And the Russians were well aware of this from at least back to around 2012.

אהיה אשר אהיה. I will be that I will be. (In King James it is "I Am")

 אהיה אשר אהיה.  "I will be that I will be" is future tense. (In King James, it is "I Am") Unfortunately, this is thought to be present tense. If Being would be God, then this would make sense. But we see in Plotinus that Being is only the last Emanation of God. God is far above Being.

אהיה אצלו שעשועים is not a counter example. It means "I will be by Him delight daily." There is no reason to say it is present tense.  Not that it is wrong to concentrate on Being. But that is not the same as God. It is the lowest manifestation of God.

Gemara Zevachim pg 6. זבחים ו 'ע''א

 I was contemplating that difficult piece in Rav Shach that I mentioned a few days ago.

It occurs to me what the problem is. Let me first bring the gemara. We want to know why one inheritor can do exchange and two can not. And we bring a verse to show that. Then we ask from masar sheni (the second tithe) where we have the same sort of verse and yet two inheritors can do exchange the fruit for money and then when they get to Jerusalem they exchange the money for local fruit and eat it there.. We show that the inheritors of the animal dedicated for sacrifice are joint owners in terms of forgiveness of sin but not monetary value. That can not apply to maasar sheni where there is no relevance to forgiveness so they both can do hilul. 

The question of Rav Shach is from Torat Kohanim [which is something like the Tosephta--a book of tenaim but not included in the Mishna]. There the same idea about maasar sheni is brought and the Raavad explains it in two ways. One that maasar sheni is owned by the owners. The other is that i is owned by heaven. 

So the question Rav Shach is asking is clear. If that teaching [braita] in Torat Kohanim is like the opinion maasar sheni is secular  then that Gemara in zevachim which is apparently going like the opinion light sacrifices are the money of heaven is asking according to a different opinion.

At least the question is clear. The answer? I think Rav Shach is saying that this Gemara hold light sacrifices are the money of heaven and maasar sheni is secular. This does no appear openly in Rav Shach but it is the only way I can make sense of his answer.

__________________________________________________________________________

זבחים ו 'ע''א

 We want to know why one יורש can do תמורה and two can not. And we bring a verse to show that.המיר ימיר. Then we ask from מעשר שני where we have the same sort of verse גאול יגאל, and yet two יורשים can do חילול. We show that the יורשים of the בהמה dedicated for sacrifice are joint owners in terms of כפרה but not ממון. That can not apply to מעשר שני where there is no relevance to forgiveness so they both can do חילול. The question of רב שך is from תורת כהנים. There the same idea about מעשר שני is brought and the הראב''ד explains it in two ways. One that מעשר שני is ממון הדיוט. The other is that  is ממון גבוה. So the question רב שך is asking is clear. If that teaching  in תורת כהנים is like the opinion מעשר שני is ממון הדיוט  then that גמרא זבחים ו ע''א which is apparently going like the opinion קדשים קלים ממון גבוה is asking according to a different opinion. At least the question is clear. The answer? I think רב שך is saying that this גמרא מחזיקה קדשים קלים ממון גבוה and מעשר שני is ממון הדיוט. This does no appear openly in רב שך but it is the only way I can make sense of his answer.

זבחים ו'ע''א

 אנחנו רוצים לדעת למה יורש אחד יכול לעשות תמורה ושניים לא. ואנחנו מביאים פסוק להראות את זה .המיר ימיר. אחר כך אנחנו שואלים את מעשר שני איפה יש לנו אותו סוג של פסוק גאול יגאל, ובכל זאת שני יורשים יכולים לעשות חילול. אנו מראים כי היורשים של הבהמה המוקדשים להקרבה הם בעלים משותפים מבחינת כפרה אך לא ממון. זה לא יכול לחול על מעשר שני שבו אין רלוונטיות לסליחה אז שניהם יכולים לעשות חילול. שאלת רב שך היא מתורת כהנים. שם מובא אותו רעיון על מעשר שני והראב''ד מסביר אותו בשני אופנים. אחד שמעשר שני הוא ממון הדיוט. השני הוא ממון גבוה. אז השאלה שרב שך שואל ברורה. אם ההוראה ההיא בתורת כוהנים היא כדעת מעשר שני הוא ממון הדיוט אזי שגמרא זבחים ו' ע''א שהולך לכאורה כדעת קדשים קלים ממון גבוה שואל לפי דעה אחרת. לפחות השאלה ברורה. התשובה? אני חושב שרב שך אומר שהגמרא מחזיקה קדשים קלים ממון גבוה ומשר שני זה ממון הדיוט. זה לא מופיע בגלוי ברב שך אבל זו הדרך היחידה שבה אני יכול להבין את התשובה שלו.

  

  

one is not supposed to intend to be connected with dead people.

You can see in the Mishna Seder Purity that there is a certain kind of uncleanliness that emanates from a dead body. This is called father of fathers of uncleanliness. In fact you can see in the Book of Numbers  that this is the most severe type of uncleanliness that there is. All other types are fathers of uncleanliness or the derivates.

[I spent a lot of time on this while at Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY but I have forgotten most of it.] But even though I have forgotten most of this subject, it does occur to me to mention that there really is no reason to go to graves of the righteous. 

In Torah, one is not supposed to intend to be connected with dead people. This is well explained in the Nefesh HaChaim of Rav Chaim of Voloshin [a major disciple of the Gra.]] Rather, one is supposed to intend to be connected with God. To intend to be connected with the dead is an extremely disgusting sort of idolatry. 

Rav Avraham Abulafia from the Middle Ages

If one looks at Rav Avraham Abulafia from the Middle Ages you will see he held that Jesus was "the seal of the sixth day." [Clearly a reference to the idea of messiah the son of Joseph.] 

However, this does not imply much along the lines of Christian theology. Already Saadia Gaon noted the two basic issues in which Christians got the whole thing wrong. One is that one can be a great tzadik and still not be God. But there are many levels of tzadikim. The greatest are thought to be the patriarchs, Moshe [Moses], Aaron Joseph and David. These are all thought to be souls of Emanation. [But not the only ones. ]And Emanation is something like a cup of water flowing forth and down. That is the Light of God flows forth from him in Adam Kadmon, Akudim, Brudim Nekudim until Emanation. So all these worlds are pure Godliness--in that there is no division between them and God Himself. Even though they are all very far from God and not God himself. So souls of Emanation also are pure godliness but not God.

This applies to Jesus also.

And clearly there are plenty people who have souls whose root is much lower. They might be from Creation, Foundation or Action.[Asiah].

Another issue is "bitul HaMitzvot"--i.e. that Christians think Jesus came to say that the commandments of the Torah no longer are applicable-which contradicts what Jesus said openly about this very issue.

And further, they think Jesus came to disagree with the Oral Law. That also contradicts what Jesus said openly in Mathew chapter 23. "The Scribes sit on the seat of Moses and so everything they say to do that you must obey and do..." And then he goes on to say a very clear fact that the religious tend to be hypocrites. But there were some of the Pharisees that were evil and hypocrites just like today. That does not mean all. Nor does it imply a lack in Torah, not the Oral or Written Law. 

Most of what passes for "Torah" is false.

 Most of what passes for "Torah" is false. The way you know this is by the Mishna in Sanhedrin [perek Chelek] where it lists those who have no portion in the next world. Then there is added to this category "he who reads outside books." The Rif and Rosh both explain "outside books"  as books that give explanations of Torah  that are not from the sages of the Mishna and Gemara.

[What are books of Chazal (the Sages) that explain verses of the Old Testament? The Midrash. e.g. Midrash Raba. Tanchuma, Sifrei Sifra, Mechilta, etc.]

Therefore most of what passes as "Torah" nowadays thus comes under the category of "outside books". 

So outside books do not refer to Natural Sciences. Rather this refers specially to books that claim to be books of Torah but give different explanations from what is brought in the Midrash and Gemara.

"devakut" [attachment with God]

There is an aspect of attachment with God that is not understood in  philosophy. This is the advantage of the Friesian School of thought that has an approach that sees that attachment with God is in the node of value that is all content but no form.

It is a lack in philosophy that does not see "devakut" [attachment with God] this as a legitimate area of value. However a lot of religious inspiration is from the Dark Side.

So I can see the point of avoiding the issue. However I would like to suggest that devekut is a valid area of value.  

[There is an area of value that is all form, no content like logic. Another that has less form and more content. Math which can not be reduced to logic as per Godel. Other areas like music have more content and less for. You can go on until devekut which is all content and no for,

most of what passes today as "Torah "is in fact Torah of the Dark Side.

 You can see in the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov [vol I .perek 33] that there is such a thing as "Torah of the Sitra Achra (Evil Realm.)" And most of what passes today as "Torah "is in fact Torah of the Dark Side.  And even further, you can see in the LeM that there are many teachers of Torah who are demons. תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאיים. So to me it makes no sense to listen to the idiots that spout out what they think is "Torah".

Either you get the real thing--learn authentic Torah at a Litvak Yeshiva based on the Gra, or nothing at all.

my earnest hope to merit to walk in his holy ways of learning and keeping Torah and trust in God.

 Gra. I thought to take away the name of the Gra from my blog because I can not really claim to be representing his approach or walking in his ways. But that does not mean I do not want to. So I think just to put the name back to show my earnest hope to merit to walk in his holy ways of learning and keeping Torah and trust in God.

I mean, after all I am not exactly walking in the ways of my parents either- I never went to Cal Tech, nor the USAF, nor invented the infrared telescope, nor was I much of a father, brother, husband. In all these things my dad excelled, but not me. But still I mention my parents as the title of this blog because I want to walk in the ways of my parents.

Mathematics and Physics are not ""Secular Learning"

 To learn Mathematics and Physics one has to have an awareness that there is in this a sort of service towards God. It is not ""Secular Learning" [man-made abstractions ], but rather the wisdom of God as revealed in His Creation. This is  an opinion that you can see in the Obligations of the Hearts in Shar HaBechina cha. 3 where he distinguishes between the wisdom of God that is revealed in the physical objects of Creation, and the Spiritual aspect of them. The Spiritual aspects are what the Ari {Rav Isaac Luria} brings in the Eitz Chaim about the Divine names of the physical universe. [listed in order in vol 4 of the large sidur of the Reshash ] But that is not the same thing as the Divine wisdom that is revealed in them.

 And "to speak out and proclaim the Wisdom of God" is brought in Psalms 77, and 105 [and other places] as being a great mitzvah. שיחו בכל נפלאותיו "Speak of his wonderous works." Psalm 105

This is well accepted by many of the medieval authorities, but not all. The one that would be for learning Mathematics and Physics and Chemistry would be mainly Saadia Gaon, Ibn Pakuda of the Chovot Levavot and Rav Moshe ben Maimon and the many authors that go with their approach. Even though Nahmanides did not agree with Aristotle, that does not seem to indicate that he disagreed with the Rambam. He might have thought that Physics and Metaphysics are important to learn, but that they are not contained in Aristotle. Maybe Physics and Math  are a bit different from what you might find in Aristotle. And that seems to be the case,- as we can see there are more elements than the four elements. The four elements seem to be able to broken down into more basic components. So they can not be .unreducible. For example, water can be broken down into hydrogen and oxygen. So water is not an element.

Of course it is always possible to see the true ideas in Aristotle in somewhat different form as I have noticed. One example that I saw recently is the idea that the Earth stays in the center of the universe of the ancients. Aristotle disagreed and came up with the idea of spontaneous symmetry breaking--showing that a hungry person sitting in the center of bread will at some point decide to break the symmetry to go and pick one piece of bread.

But I can see that the Wisdom of God is deep and hard to understand. So people can be discouraged and go off into other pseudo sciences that are false. To reach the real thing can be hard. But I ask: Why give up? If it is hard, is that a reason to give up? and turn to pseudo sciences? They might pay well, but does that make them legitimate.  Rather, it is better to grit one's teeth and go through the Mathematics and Physics textbooks word by word, from start to end. Say the words in order. Do not worry if you understand because you will eventually understand if you persevere.

Gemara in Zevachim pg 6.

  The book called "Torat Kohanim" [behukatai 12 perek 5] [which is from the sages of the Mishna but not included in the Mishna. Written around 160 A.D.] asks how do you know one the receives the second tithe as an inheritance can redeem it? Answer: הכתוב אומר גאול יגאל he will surely redeem it. [The extra word comes to include not just the owner but also one that inherits from him. ]

This has a  difficulty in getting it to correspond to the Gemara in Zevachim  pg 6.

The Raavad there explains that Braita in two ways. One way is that it is going according to "the second tithe is the money of the owner". The other is "the second tithe is the money of heaven"

The second way seems  fine. But the first way --which works in its place does not seem to fit that Gemara. Rav Shach has an answer for this difficulty in Laws of Temura,

The Gemara in Zevachim says How do we know that one who inherits an animal that has been dedicated as a sacrifice can do Temura [An illegal exchange which nonetheless puts holiness on the second animal]? Because the verse says "he shall surely exchange". המיר ימיר. [And that should work for the second tithe also.] But in terms of temura, only one inheritor can make an exchange, not two. That is they are not partners in ownership. Rather they own as far as "forgiveness of sin" is concerned. That is: they bring the animal that their father or mother left to them as an inheritance But not as joint owners but as far as accomplishing the sacrifice. 

This Gemara does not seem like the opinion of light sacrifices and or the second tithe are property of their owners, not of heaven.

Rav Shach says that is only in the very end of that Gemara does that conclusion arise, not in the middle discussion. But I can not see how even the end of that Gemara can be in accordance with "light sacrifices are the property of their owners." 

Later I saw what Rav Shach says. It is this: the end part of that Gemara means that light sacrifices are the property of their owners means property as far as forgiveness for sin goes. Not monetary ownership. This answers my question completely.

So from the side of 'light sacrifices are the property of heaven" it all makes sense: one inheritor can do exchange because to do exchange one does not need to own the animal but rather to be the one that is receiving forgiveness for sin.[Just two inheritors are excluded by means of the verse.] And two inheritors can bring the flour offering because they do not own it at all. And maasar sheni they can do"hilul" make a valid exchange because of the verse that includes inheritors and it can not include them as owners because maasar sheni is the property of heaven, so it must include them as being able to make exchange.

But from the side of "light sacrifices are the property of the owners" the way I think Rav Shach is explain this is that the owners only own the animal in so far as forgiveness of sin is concerned. But maasar sheni comes out well. But what about the flour offering that can be brought only by one individua;? So I am still pondering what Rav Shach means here.

But in the meantime I just want to add a bit of info. the first tithe everyone knows about. You have a field of grain. You take 1/10 and give it to a Levi. The next tithe is in years 1,2,4,5 of the Sabatical cycle. That means to take the next 1/10  of what is left and take it to Jerusalem and eat it within the walls of the city.

But if that is too much to take there you can redeem it. You take a coin and say the holiness of these fruits and or grains of maasar sheni the second tithe is by this declaration now upon this coin. Then you take the coin to Jerusalem and there you buy fruit or grain and eat there. [That is called redeeming the second tithe maasar sheni][You can find this procedure in the Bible in the Book of Deuteronomy.]

Religious fanaticism takes up too much bandwidth. The Evil Inclination is dressed in mitzvot.

religious fantasticism takes up too much bandwidth. [note 1] Even if one manages to get to authentic Torah, still religious obsession tends to sidetrack.[note 2]

That is the reason for Torah with the way of the Earth. Torah with Derech Eretz.

{All the more so that religious fanaticism is not coupled to truth. It is an epiphenomenon of a schizoid personality as Robert Sapolsky mentions in one of his lectures.) 

[note 1] What I mean is it leaves no room for other positive areas of value. You might be concentrating on Tosphot, which is great and important, but then you might find you have no mental energy to concentrate on anything else.

[note 2] See  the LeM vol I, perek1 of Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman,"The Evil Inclination  is dressed in mitzvot." The evil inclination does not come and says to do evil for its own sake. 

For I do not trust any totalitarian system.

 A lot of people in Ukraine were pro USSR. I was very surprised by this since I thought that everyone would have been happy to be free of the yoke of Communism. But most people were unhappy with the chaos that came after that. [Areas in each city became subject to some mafioso]. Still if the orientation is towards the West, that ought to be embraced.

For I do not trust any totalitarian system. So when England handed Hong Kong over to China, I never thought for one minute that would end up in anything but disaster and tragedy. I never had any illusions when Venezuela became socialist that that would end up in anything but mass famine. 

I just do not trust any totalitarian system, no matter if it comes from the Left or the Right. I can see on one hand, when there is chaos, that you need some sort of rule of law to impose order. So instead of chaos, I can see why in the Ukraine people would always say the USSR was better. But that does not mean they would not rather have the rule of law and a Western sort of Democracy --as long as there is order and peace. So I do not trust China at all, and do not for  second believe in any of her intentions in the South China Sea nor in Taiwan.

[Even in High School when I read the Communist Manifesto I was totally unimpressed. Not everything that someone owns was gained by theft. Is the computer you are reading this on was gained by theft? Did you exploit someone to get it? Probably not.] So why think all private property is theft?

[I believe that there should be order just enough for people to be safe and proper, but not more. After there is peace and rule of law, people must be free.

the Divine Chariot and the Work of Creation are the subjects that the Greeks called Physics and Metaphysics

 In the book (Nefesh Hachaim by Rav Haim of Voloshin) of the disciple of the Gra  we find [volume 4] the importance of learning Torah. He brings this from many statements of the Chazal [Sages]. So the idea you find in the Litvak yeshiva world about the prime importance of learning Torah is not made up or pulled out of a hat. It is a basic axiom of the Sages. 

The only thing in which I differ is Mathematics and Physics which you find are thought to be  part of the commandment of learning Torah in some rishonim. Mainly Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam but hints to this opinion exist in other rishonim as well.

The in Guide for the Perplexed you find the Rambam saying that the work of the Divine Chariot and the Work of Creation are the subjects that the Greeks called Physics and Metaphysics. [He repeats this same idea in the Mishna Torah--so it is not just something he decided towards the end of his life.]

[Not that I can do any learning myself anymore. So I figure even if I can not do what is best and good, why should I not want my friend to know and do what is right? And who knows if perhaps someday God may grant to me to get back to learning?] 

The American Civil War.

I figure that the Supreme Court could have been appealed to if the South had not seceded from the Union. But even if they did, the North did not recognize that as being valid. So the South always had a right to appeal to the Supreme Court. And what could the North have said? That it was legal for some states to wage war on other states because they did not like some of their practices?

I guess the role of the Supreme Court as being the arbitrator of Constitutional issues had not been firmly established by that point. 

[Besides I can not figure out what the North was thinking. If the Southern States were still part of the Union, then how could one state make war on another? Is not that a  violation of the Constitution? (And so what if the president orders it? So what? That does not make it legal.) So the North must have thought the South had legally seceded. Okay. Then they had seceded. Fine. End of Story. [I am not ignoring Fort Sumter. True that it had been attacked, but the North was not fighting the South to take back Fort Sumter!!]

(As General R.E. Lee put it ironically in one of his letters (I forget which one), the issue of secession had been "decided by arms."---i.e., it had not been decided at all.] 

music file z54

z54 A minor   z54 nwc

Zevachim page 6 side A.

I apologize for not writing on Torah for awhile. At any rate, I wish now to share an issue that I have still not worked out but just as a beginning I still want to mention.

There are basically two issues which I have not worked out. One is that light sacrifices are the money of the owner. (קדשים קלים ממון בעלים לפי ר' יוסי הגלילי)Plus if one is not able to inherit a sacrifice then it should be the same with maasar sheni (I imagine). And we know that two inheritors can redeem maasar sheni.

What I mean to say is Zevachim page 6 side A. A inheritor can make exchange but not two inheritors. (יורש ממיר. אחד ממיר ולא שנים ממירים ) Not because of owning  jointly, but because they do not own the animal at all. Proof: R. Yochanan said a two inheritors of a flour offering can bring it. Why is this so? Is it not the case that only an individual can ring a flour offering? Answer: they do not own it at all. But if so then why can one inheritor make exchange? Because while in terms of monetary value, the inheritors do not own the sacrifice, but in terms of forgiveness of sin, they do.

So my first question is obvious. The second one maybe not so much Still I am mulling these issues over. I imagine Rav Shach must have an answer for these difficulties, if I can get around to seeing what he says.

[I might mention here that exchange of an animal dedicated to be a sacrifice is not allowed. But if one does it anyway, the second animal becomes holy--in so far that it is not sacrificed but is not allowed to be used for work or shearing.

The second maasar can be redeemed by two inheritors even though the same  kind of verse applies אם גאול יגאל

אם המיר ימיר

Robert Hanna wants to get back to Kant and to me that makes some sense.

 Robert Hanna wants to get back to Kant and to me that makes some sense. Except that it leaves the problem that I think Kant Kant's argument about against Berkley does not seem to work. The reason is the step of the difference between dreams which are not rule based and the categories which are the rules by which the mind processes data. But this step seems weak. The rules are themselves synthetic a priori. --the very things Kant is setting out to prove. 

Now you could ignore Kant and go like Michael Huemer, but that seems to be a sort of quietism [things are the way they are because that is how they are.] Huemer is based on the Intuitionists [Prichard, Ross, G.E. Moore] but also on the insight of Bryan Caplan who noticed that Hume never proved a very basic point that all philosophers after him assumed to be true. [The pure reason can only tell us what is implied in definitions.] {A idea based on Euclid's Geometry. You start with the axioms and go from there.

I have long thought that Hegel is away to get around the problem in Kant that in similar to Huemer in this: why place arbitrary constraints on Reason?  

There is also Kelley Ross's idea that the categories of Kant [Why When where how--space time causality etc.] are known not by reason nor by sense perception, rather immediate non intuitive knowledge.

(At least that is what I think Dr. Ross is saying. Lack of time and energy has caused the sad fact that I have not read the actual writings of Leonard Nelson. But from what I understand, he uses the idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge to justify the categories.[That is to say they are not based on reason nor the senses.]

[If it is not clear my own view let me just say I see there are three different schools of thought, Kant Hegel and the Intuitionists that each has some aspect of truth and I think they are all pointing in the same direction and I think some kind of synthesis ought to be possible to combine them.

Dr. Huemer is modifying the Intuitionists [GE Moore, Prichard. Ross] in a way that takes account of some odd fact that Hume never proved his point about that reason can only tell us about contradictions. In that way the point of Berkley seems not even to start. So one question that Kant was addressing in the CPR does not even start. However this does not seem to answer the questions exactly.  For I still think that Kant and Hegel were addressing real concerns. Even Thomas Reid saw that Berkley had a point. 

attachment with God

There is an aspect of attachment with God-- that is not emotion, nor reason nor sensory perception. This is why there is a interest in immediate non intuitive knowledge.

That being said, I admit that the religious world tends to lunacy, since every area of value can deteriorate and even become its opposite.

So obviously most of the religious world is insane and in fact highly immoral. But that in itself ought not to reflect on Torah. The way I see things is that Torah is to bring to objective morality. But when Torah becomes a business as is the case nowadays it becomes its opposite --as the sages said סם חיים למימיניים בה וסם מוות למשמאילים בה It [Torah] is the elixir of life to those that walk on its right side for its own sake and a poison of death to those that walk on its left side(learn and keep it for personal benefits)

Being religious and keeping Torah are two opposites.

 Being religious and keeping Torah are two opposites. Being religious is group identification. That is directly opposed to keeping Torah which means to follow the law of the Torah no matter what any one says or believes. 

And in fact we find most practices of the religious are directly opposed to Torah. E.g., honor your father and mother. This is given hypocritical lip service.

But the legalistic aspects of thing is not what is the most pressing issue. Rather there is some deep kelipa of Amalek which infests the religious world. Some real viciousness that is hard to talk about since they use the show of keeping Torah which makes it difficult to see into the hypocrisy. 

the very emphasis on appearance of religiosity ought to give a red light to warning since thenTorah says the opposite--to walk privately with God.

music file z57

 z57 D Minor

even though marrying the daughter of a Torah scholar in an important value, I can see that it is more important to marry someone that appreciates learning Torah [for its own sake].

 Human relations are hard to figure out. My wife was absolutely intense on marrying me. This relation had started to some degree in high school. She was a  violinist in the high school orchestra when I first saw her. We got along very well but there was no serious relationship. Then when I went off to Shar Yashuv in NY [a great Litvak yeshiva in NY], she had written a note to God telling him that she thought that I had discovered something important, but I had disappeared. She was hoping I would call her and let her know what I had discovered. Then after a year, I called her. [For the last year in high school and my first year at Shar Yashuv, I had no contact with any of my former friends. Intentionally]. But while I was back home in California, after one year I decided to call her. This is a long story, but she became extremely intent with trying to get me to marry her--which I did.--And I am very happy that I did so. But she was not the daughter of a Torah scholar, so she did not really understand what I was doing in learning Torah. Maybe I myself did not understand this. Learning Torah is after all an area of value that is beyond human reason. 

And the odd thing is that very often daughters of Torah scholars also do not seem to appreciate learning Torah. I began to see that Torah to most people is a means to make money. So even those that learn Torah for its own sake would be at a loss to understand why the religious world cannot see learning Torah for its own sake as a positive value.

So even though marrying the daughter of a Torah scholar in an important value, I can see that it is more important to marry someone that appreciates learning Torah [for its own sake].

The answer of Dr Ross to my letter about the difference between Copenhagen and Everett.

[I was advocating Everett as being a better approach since there is no magical collapse of the wave function. But then Dr. Kelley Ross points out that in in Bohr there must be an observer (somewhere) for Quantum mechanics to work. And this two level of reality is essential to Kant and Plato also.    

[I also want to mention that Everett's many worlds theory does not mean many universes, but can simply be different areas in our universe where the different possibilities of QM come to be.]

I think it is important to mention here that even in Everett, there is an observer. So the two levels of reality are preserved. I.e., in Bohr if u have two and one observes the other then there is a collapse of the wave function. But someone outside of that system can see them both as one system and thus still connected by one wave function. [You can see that even a piece of matter like an electron can have a wave function--because of E=mc^2. So the outer observer sees just these two inner people as a connected wave.]  

When you say "QM just gets larger and larger as far as one wants to go," I take that to mean that there is no "magical collapse" of the wave function, ever.  This "Everett" must be one of the people who doesn't like the dualism implied in quantum mechanics.

He's not alone, although usually it goes the other way, that the reality of the wave is dismissed and particles affirmed.  But it is hard to leave out the particle part, since particles do at times behave like particles:  They have definite location (within Uncertainty) and Dirac's mathematics for them postulates a geometrical point, which a wave is not.

So this doesn't seem right or helpful to me.  The whole idea of a Kantian quantum mechanics is that the dualism is preserved, as in Kant's metaphysics.  You don't like that?

KR

the importance of the Gra

There is on one hand the very great importance of learning Torah. On the other the religious world which makes it money by means of a pretense of keeping Torah is quite corrupt. Even though there are here and there great yeshivot which keep and learn Torah sincerely, the religious word itself is mainly fill with delusions. Thus it is clear that for anyone to keep and learn Torah sincerely he or she must stay away from the corrupting influence of the religious . I have no claim to understand the hearts of men, but I can see clearly that the practices of the religious have nothing to do with Torah at all. It is all a show or the sake of money and power.

However, the general world of the Litvaks is basically OK.--except that they have not and do not realize the importance of the Gra. If they would the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication would be listened to.

My question that I asked Dr Kelley Ross and his answer. [He is going with the Friesian sort of modification of Kant.--and frankly I can not see any other way to go with Kant.

(Here Dr Ross quotes my question): There was one letter that I sent where I was asking if immediate non intuitive knowledge can help for how intuitions can fit into the basket of the categories and thus become united. 

(Dr Ross's answer:) In Kant, there is confusion about "intuition," since he originally says that it is given to us without any functions of thought, but then he ends up with the argument that to enter consciousness, intuition must be synthesized using the categories of the understanding.

Non-intuitive immediate knowledge is outside that debate.  That is how the categories are available in the first place, but we are not aware of them until we reflect on the products of synthesis, i.e. consciousness and perception.

(Here again is part pf my question): I forget this minute how he puts it but basically I think it is that there is some aspect of the intuitions -their form- that has the possibility of fitting into the categories and then the categories unite them.

(Dr Ross:) This overlooks the existence and activity of synthesis, which leaves out Kant's mature theory.  So I'm not sure what the reference in Kant would be for your citation. [my later note: I will have to look that up.]

(Me again:) Similarly there is some answer on how the categories can process the intuitions.

(Dr Ross:) Synthesis uses the categories to "process" the manifold of sensation so as to produce consciousness and experience.  If "intuition" implies awareness, then the application of the term must be moved from the given manifold to the product of synthesis.  This is a challenge in Kant scholarship.

(Me): It seemed to me that immediate non intuitive knowledge can be the source of this unity [of the intuitions]. That is the deeper source of knowledge that unites both the senses and the categories. 

Dr Ross: Again, there are different issues.  How the categories are available in the first place is different from what they are used for.  Kant's argument "from the possibility of experience" means that the categories must be available in order to be used.   And one thing that must also be available is the "unity of apperception," according to which synthesis constructs consciousness.  That will be "the source of this unity," and it will be, like the categories themselves, non-intuitive.

Note that Kant believed the "availability" of the categories was covered by his "metaphysical deduction," i.e. that the categories are artifacts of the forms of logic.  This was grossly insufficient for what was needed.  To get from the form of conditional propositions in logic to the concept of causality you need, well, the concept of causality.  Kant can't get that rabbit out of that hat.  Modern logic, for all its faults, clarified that -- although the Stoics had done it already.  Kant has similar problems in morality, thinking that moral imperatives will follow from the forms of logic also.  In all of that, even Platonism works better.

Yours truly,

KR

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I think one of the very important aspects of Kelley Ross is that he shows how the Friesian school i not psychologism but rather depends on axioms that are known, but not known infallibly but can be defeated as per the idea of Popper of falsifiability.