x90 D minor mp3 

x90 midi

[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar, ]

Even though I had  a lot of benefit by learning the particular path of Musar (Ethics) of Navardok (which is trust in God), I have to mention that there were  few different schools of thought that came from Rav Israel Salanter like Slobodka (which is about the greatness of Man). Each of his disciples had a different approach. And from what I learned, each has something important to add. [The main ones were Rav Isaac Blazer (fear of God), and Rav Simcha Zisel of Kelm.] There was a different emphasis in each school.  With Isaac Blazer there was the emphasis on Fear of God. Simcha Zisel's emphasis was on order.  But the core and essence of Musar was always good character traits. And the idea there is that good character is the essence and goal of Torah.  And how to define good character is the clarity of the medieval books of Musar. 

What I found most beneficial (for me ) was to go through all the basic books of Musar of the Middle Ages along with the books of the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar. And when I say "side tracked", I mean that as an understatement. For some reason God, blessed me with great parents and teachers, But I realize that not everyone has that, so all the more so is Musar important. [אורחות צדיקים, שערי תשובה, מסילת ישרים ,מעלות המידות, חובות הלבבות]  [Obligations of the Heart. Gates of Repentance, Ways of the Righteous, ...]

x89 mp3 G major

x89 nwc

 x89 midi 

עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א

 חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת את זה רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומרת מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל, ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם, ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. An das for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of תוספות is that these two גמרות do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be ר' אלעזר that an  עכו''ם does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of תרומה and מעשר. That is the only way I can see that the גמרא in  ראש השנה can make sense. But if so then what is the question in  עבודה זרה? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. Just like תוספות answers for the גמרא in  ראש השנה. So you must say instead that תוספות is going like רבה that the עכו''ם has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the גמרא in עבודה זרה. And as for the גמרא in ראש השנה the answer is the  עכו''ם has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of תרומה. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the עכו''ם could own land.

עם זאת אני עדיין תוהה את השאלה הזו. התשובה של תוספות היא ששתי הגמרות הללו אינן חולקות. בסדר. אבל אז לפי איזו דעה התשובה הזו הולכת? זה חייב להיות ר' אלעזר כי לעובד אלילים יש יכולת להחזיק אדמות בישראל  כדי לסלק את חובת תרומה ומעשר. זו הדרך אחת שיכולים לראות שהגמרא בראש השנה יכולה להיות הגיונית. אבל אם כן אז מה השאלה בעבודה זרה? איך הגויים יכולים לגרום לאיסור על העצים בארץ ישראל? התשובה צריכה להיות פשוטה. יש להם רכוש חלקי. בדיוק כמו שתוספות עונה לגמרא בראש השנה. אז אתה חייב לומר במקום זאת שתוספות מתנהלות כמו רבה שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק קרקעות בישראל עד כדי נטילת חובת המעשר. זה עונה לגמרא בעבודה זרה. ובאשר לגמרא בראש השנה התשובה היא שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק אדמות בכדי להסיר את חובת תרומה. אבל האדמה בזמן כניסתה של ישראל לארץ כנען, הארץ הייתה בבעלות קולקטיבית בלבד, ולא בבעלותו של אדם אחד. ובמקרה זה יכול האכו''ם להחזיק אדמה באופן שמסולק חיוב תרומה ומעשר.

Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a.

I was thinking about those two Gemaras in Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a. While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other Gemara holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly Tosphot [in Rosh Hashana 13a] does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. Raba who holds אין קניין לעבו''ם בארץ ישראל (there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel) holds that only with regard to Truma and Maasar [tithes], not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact Raba holds that  monetary ownership even stronger than Rav Elazar. So the the Gemara in Avoda Zara can not simply be said to be of Raba.

The actual Gemara in Avoda Zara 23 says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to Avraham, and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the Gemara answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden.

Now the way Rav Shach understands the Rambam in laws of idolatry 8:3, that Gemara in fact is like Raba that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to Avraham. But that answer is hard to see since even Raba holds a gentile can have monetary ownership, and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So Tosphot explains that that Gemara is referring to trees that existed already in the time of Avraham, and its question refers to them.

[But I can see the answer to Rav Shach also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as truma and maasar would go.]

[The other Gemara in Rosh Hashana asks how could Israel bring the omer from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the omer from grain that was owned by gentiles.

The contradiction between these two Gemaras is answered by Tosphot thus: The gemara in Rosh Hashana is ok because even though Israel owned the land still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in Avoda Zara is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees]--that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees even those that were around from the time of Avraham

[There is still a lot to think about here --in terms of in fact how these two gemaras relate to the issue between Raba and Rav Elazar. I recall that I wrote something about this in my little booklet on [page 101]

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It seems that it must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. And so why does the Gemara there not simply answer the question in that way? So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. And as for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana, the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land._____________________________I was thinking about those two גמרות in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב and ראש השנה י''ג ע''א . While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other גמרא holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly תוספות does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. רבה who holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel holds that only with regard to תרומה and מעשר, not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact רבה holds that in terms of monetary ownership even stronger than רב אלעזר. So the the גמרא in עבודה זרה  can not simply be said to be of רבה. The actual גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to אברהם and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the גמרא answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden. Now the way רב שך understands the רמב''ם in laws of idolatry 8:3 that גמרא in fact is like רבה that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to אברהם. But that answer is hard to see since even רבה holds a gentile can have monetary ownership and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So תוספות explains that that גמרא is referring to trees that existed already in the time of אברהם and its question refers to them.  But I can see the answer  של רב שך  also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as תרומה and מעשר would go. The other גמרא in ראש השנה asks how could Israel bring the עומר from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the עומר from grain that was owned by gentiles. The contradiction between these two גמרות is answered by תוספות thus: The גמרא in ראש השנה י''ג ע''א  is ok because even though Israel owned the land, still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in עבודה זרה is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees?] that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees, even those that were around from the time of אברהם.

[I am thinking that that is what Tosphot means over there in Rosh Hashana.]

_________________________________________________________________________________

חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת כי רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. גמרא בפועל בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומר מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

 x87 D minor mp3

x87 midi file

 In Breslov today, I was speaking with a fellow that is in the paratroopers units of IDF and the subject the religious world sucking money out of the state ( a well known sore spot) came up. [I suggested that the parliamentary system is at fault.]  At any rate, I think it ought to be clear that people ought to learn Torah; but to use Torah to make money is  different subject. The ideal way of learning Torah is to sit and learn and trust in God for parnasah [making a living]. But the trouble begins when people begin to see Torah as a means of making money. 

There is an argument if it is permitted it accept charity in order to learn Torah, but to use Torah to suck the state is not the same thing. But that is not just in Israel. There is a general problem in the religious world of using Torah for money and power.

See the Guide for the Perplexed: the parable about the king in his country

 In the approach of the Rambam you place Physics and Metaphysics on a higher plane than learning Gemara. You can see this in the Guide where his parable about the king in his country says this openly. [In that parable there are different levels of closeness to the king. Those outside the palace but inside the capitol city are closer than almost everyone else--except for those that are inside the palace. Those outside the palace are the Torah scholars. Those inside the palace are the Physicists. 

[The Rambam is depending on the Gemara about ר' יוחנן בן זכאי שלמד דבר גדול ודבר קטן מאי דבר גדול? מעשה מרכבה. ומאי דבר קטן ? מעשה בראשית]

But even closer to the king are the "philosophers and prophets." OK about the prophets. But philosophers? I have trouble seeing that. Philosophy today is in deep trouble. There seems to be something about philosophy that has a sort of Achilles heel. Physics I think the best way of learning this mainly saying the words and going on. But also some time one should do review.

God is not the same as the world.The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him," means there are no other gods besides Him.

In Torah, God is not thought to be the same as the world. I do not know from where people get the opposite idea from. The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him,"  means there are no other gods besides Him. But on a deeper level it means that  everything besides God can not exist without Him. This is clear in all Rishonim when they discuss the basic core beliefs of Torah. You can see this in all Musar books of the Rishonim. In the first seven laws of Mishna Torah you can see this also. There the Rambam explains "there is none besides Him" to mean the existence of everything besides God is dependent on God. 

None of that implies that God is the same as the world.

 In the Musar movement of Rav Israel Salanter, Fear of God was a major goal. I noticed today in the local Breslov shul a Torah lesson of Rav Nahman that echoes that point. He say that by bringing up Fear of God to its roots one merits to the secrets of Torah.  And he explains to bring "fear of God up" to mean not to be afraid of lower things but of God alone. In fact when I was in Uman I noticed a lot of Torah lessons of Rav Nahman revolved on the theme of fear of God  and from that I decided to dig more deeply into Musar. 

I have in my own life seen that fear of God is can be gained and lost and once lost does not come back easily. Even learning Musar does not seems to help a lot. It is as if the hand of the  fates is over one in such a way that regaining lost levels is against the grain.

On one hand learning Musar seems to be the only way to gain any idea of authentic Torah and to gain at first fear of God. But there is a sort of way of falling from that that does not return.

Some Rishonim [medieval authorities] like the Ramban [Nahmanides] would hold that to learn practical professions for the sake of making a living is OK.

Some Rishonim [medieval authorities] like the Ramban [Nahmanides] would hold that to learn practical professions for the sake of making a living is OK.  He himself was a doctor. It was just that this group of rishonim would not hold that learning Physics and Metaphysics are a part of learning Torah.

You only see the opinion that Physics and Metaphysics are are part of Torah in Saadia Gaon, Ibn Pakuda [author of the Hovot Levavot], Binyamin the Doctor, the Rambam.

Words of the Rishonim are thought to be valid even when they argue.אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. But I tend to go with the opinions based on Saadia Gaon. 

But even if you go with Saadia Gaon, still how can one do physics which is hard? My suggestion is the idea of the Gemara לעלם לגרס איניש ואחר כך ליסבר אף על גב דמשכח ואף על גב דלא ידע מאי קאמר

Always one should just say the words in order and go on ["girsa"] and after that to go back and explain, even though he forgets and even though he does not know what he is saying.

x88 D minor    x88 midi  x88 nwc

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 x86 E flat major mp3 x86 midi E flat major   x86 E flat major nwc

לרב שך על הרמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג'

 ראש השנה דף י''ג ע''א ועבודה זרה דף כ''ג ע''ב. הגמרא בעבודה זרה שואלת מדוע נאסרו אשירות [העצים הנסגדים]? אחרי הכל איש אינו יכול לאסור את השייך למישהו אחר, והארץ הייתה בבעלות ישראל מימי אברהם. תשובה: מכיוון שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב, זה נחשב כאילו הכנענים היו כאילו שליחיהם. הגמרא בראש השנה שואלת, "איך ישראל יכולה הייתה להביא את העומר כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? התבואה הייתה בבעלות גויים והפסוק אומר קצירכם ולא קציר עכו'’ם. לפי תוספות בראש השנה שלמרות שהאדמה שייכת לישראל, עדיין גויים שקונים אדמות בישראל הם הבעלים של תבואת אדמתם. אבל עדיין הגמרא בעבודה זרה היא בסדר לשאול איך גויים יכולים לאסור את מה שלא שייך להם? תירוץ: בגלל העצים שהיו שם מלפני תקופת אברהם. אני חושב שהדרך שבה תוספות מבינה את הסוגיא הזו קשה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה אומרת שהסיבה שהאשירות אסורות בגלל שהכנענים כאילו הם פועלים על דעת ישראל לעשות עבודת אלילים לאחר שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב. הגמרא אינה חוזרת מעמדתה המקורית שלפיה הארץ שייכת לישראל, ולכן כל מה שצומח עליה שייך לישראל. לדעת  של הרמב''ם  שני הגמרות האלה לא מסכימות זו עם זו. זה נקרא שזה נושאים חלוקות בש''ס.  לרב שך (הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג'),. הגמרא בעבודה זרה היא פשוטה. העצים אסורים מכיוון שישראל הייתה בסדר עם עבודת אלילים. לא כי לכנענים היה חלק כלשהו בהם. רב שך נותן סיבה קצרה לאמירת הרמב''ם, שהוא לא מזכיר “את קצירכם ולא קציר עכו''ם". אבל אני חושב שרב שך בוודאי חשב גם בקווים האלה. אחרת למה לא לומר כמו תוספות? והגמרא בראש השנה מחזיקה כמו רב אלעזר שיש קניין לעכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות, שלמרות שהארץ ניתנה לאברהם, עדיין גוי יכול להחזיק שם אדמה וכשהוא עושה זאת, התבואה אינה חייבת בתרומה ומעשר, או העומר. והגמרא האחרת בעבודה זרה מחזיקה כמו זה שאין לעכו''ם קניין להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות גם כאשר גוי מחזיק בקרקע בישראל, התבואה עדיין חייבת בתרומות ומעשרות

I wanted to mention here the point of the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam [according to the way that Rav Shach is explaining the Rambam]. There are three points on the stalk that are the issue here. Who  owns the ground. Who owns the stalk. Who finishes the work on the stalk which is smoothing the stake of what. Tosphot sees a difference between the first two. Israel can own the ground  and the gentile the wheat, [as a renter.] To the Rambam (at least in terms of truma) there is no difference. If the gentile owns the ground in terms of truma then he owns the wheat and that is the point of Rav Elazar. He  can possess land such that the wheat is not obligated in trumah. To Raba he can not own the land in such a sense. Even if he owns land in Israel, that is like renting and the wheat is still obligated in truma.  

I recall that this very issue was a point of confusion for me in Bava Metzia chapter 8 where this same argument between R. Elazar and Raba comes up.

Rosh Hashanah pg 13a and Avoda Zara 23b.

 Rosh Hashanah pg 13a and Avoda Zara 23b. 

The Gemara in Avoda Zara asks why were the worshipped trees forbidden? After all, no one can forbid that which belongs to someone else, and the land was owned by Israel from the time of Abraham. Answer: since Israel served the Golden Calf, it is considered as the Canaanites were acting on their behalf. The Gemara in Rosh Hashana asks "How could Israel bring the Omer when they entered into the Land of Canaanan? The grain was owned by gentiles and the verse says your grain, not the grain of gentiles."

Tosphot the Rosh Hashana gemara is saying that even though the land belongs to Israel still gentiles that buy land in Israel own the grain of their land. But still the gemara in Avoda Zara is Ok to ask how can gentiles forbid that which does not belong to them   because of the trees that were there from before the time of Abraham.

So to Rav Shach, the Rambam comes out this way. The gemara in Avoda Zara is straight and simple. The trees are forbidden because Israel was OK with idolatry. Not because the Canaanites had any portion in them. [There were trees the Canaanites had a portion in --that is trees that they planted. But the trees that were growing at the time the land was given to Abraham those trees belong to Israel and the gentiles could not cause them to be forbidden. So then why was Israel commanded to destroy all the Asherot  those the gentiles had no portion in. To that question the Gemara gives an answer.] Rav Shach gives a  reason for saying the Rambam disagrees with Tosphot. The Rambam does not mention קצירכם ולא קציר עכו''ם. 

And the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah holds like R, Elazar that יש קניין לעכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות that even though the land was given to Abraham, still a gentile can own land there and when he does, the produce is not obligated in Truma and Maasar --or as in our case the Omer. [And the other Gemara in Avoda Zara holds like Rabah that אין לעכו''ם קניין להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות Even when a gentile owns land in Israel, the produce is still obligated in Trumah and maasar

 The Ari [Rav Isaac Luria Ashkenazi] says that Emanation is pure Godliness, Briah (Creation) is mostly good, Yezira (Formation) half and half, and the Physical universe is mostly evil.

This explains a lot to me. We find people that start out sincere seekers of God and his will but fall. The reason I think is this. That every area of value has an opposite area of value. But the opposite can be no so much damaging as areas of value with more content. What I mean is that Logic is one area of value that is pure form and no content. The sentences: "A implies B. B implies C. If A is true, then C is true" are an example of the form is true but the content of each A B and C can be anything. zero content. Math has more content and is not just formal as Kurt Godel proved. Then up the scale you get to art and music with more content and less form. And the progression continues until you get to God--all content and no form. לא ראיתם כל תמונה ביום עמדכם בהר סיני "You did not see any form on the day you stood at Mount Sinai."

See this diagram which shows this [By Kelley Ross based on Leonard Nelson]

But every area of value has an opposite area. The Sitra Achra of that area. And since this world is mostly evil is easy to fall from holiness into the opposite area of value.

 x86 D minor 

 The attack on me by the Arabs last Sunday night was in fact serious. After stealing money they were dragging me away to a hidden to do something else while they were saying they are going to kill as many Jews as they can. So I figured that I was in a serious situation. I really do not know what distracted them for a second that gave me a chance to run away. At any rate, in a nearby parking lot there was a woman who I told what had happened and she suggested that she would call the police. So I was taken to the station to give as many details as I could remember and then to Binyamin near Jerusalem. The police wanted to talk to me about other issues. But God granted me grace in their eyes and let me go. But I had no money to return so they gave me money from a sort of fund box they have there for random purposes, and shared their sort of grilled pizza sandwiches with me. [I can not explain it. It seems to be an Israeli invention. Combination of sandwich and pizza.]  I got back Monday afternoon.

Rav Shach suggest that the Rambam has a different approach to the two gemaras in rosh hashanah 13 and and Avoda Zara 23 .

Rav Shach suggest that the Rambam has a different approach to the two gemaras in Rosh Hashanah 13 and and Avoda Zara 23 . The one in Avoda Zara we know he holds with since that is the source of the idea that if someone sets up a brick to worship and then someone else comes along and worships it then it is forbidden even though a person can not forbid that which belongs to someone else. Still in this case the first person has already revealed his acquiescence.

But the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah, the Rambam simply does not hold with. The reason is this. It says How could Israel bring the Omer after they arrived in the land of Canaan? Did not the grain grow in the possession of gentiles? And the Omer has to be brought from a harvest that belonged to a Israeli.

In fact the Rambam does not bring that law that the Omer has to be brought from a harvest that belonged to a Israeli. Rather he holds like the Gemara in Avoda Zara that the land belonged to Israel from the time of Abraham.

[But Rav Shach is not simply saying that the two gemaras disagree with each other סוגיות חלוקות. Rather that the Gemara is Rosh Hashana 13:a hold with the opinion יש קנין לנכרי בארץ ישראל להפקיע מתרומות ומעשרות and so even though everyone holds that the land of Canaan belongs to Israel from the time of Avraham still they should not have been able to bring the Omer since the grain that grew in the possession of a gentile would anyway not be obligated in tithes. But the law is אין קניין לנכרי להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות and the law does not follow  the Gemara in Rosh Hashana.

The leaders of the religious world tend to come under the category of Torah scholars that are demons that Rav Nahman brings in the LeM in ch 12. [ch.s 28, 61, vol II ch.s 1, 8 and many other places that do not occur to me this minute ] There are exceptions but no fixed rule how to tell. Someone suggested to me that this is the reason so many do not show much interest in keeping the Torah since the Torah scholars that are demons give the Torah a disreputable reputation. 

In the LeM of Rav Nahman you do not really see any clear way of how to avoid the demonic Torah scholars except in the LeM ch 12 where the major difference is the "Shelo Lishma" aspect. [i,e, those that use Torah to gain power and money.]   

In any case you see Rav Nahman was very aware of the problem that the Sitra Achra has taken over much of the religious world. No wonder most people left it when they had the chance. 

So in a practical sense how does one come to learn authentic Torah? To me it seem the answer is clear--to go to any yeshiva based on the Gra. However in that very conversation it came up that many people in Israel have had problems  even in Litvak yeshivas. So while I base my recommendation of Litvak yeshivas based on my experiences in Litvak yeshiva in NY, it could be that in Israel things might be different. So maybe the best thing is to learn at home? 

[The Rambam brings the problem of using Torah to make money in his commentary of Pirkei Avot ch 4 on the Mishna "He that uses the crown passes away". [To find that commentary you have to go to chapter 4, because the same mishna of Hillel occurs in chapter 1 and there the Rambam does not write anything.] ]

 I was thinking about the dialectical approach of Hegel. The idea starts with pure Being which by itself implies Non-Being since Being is without "being things".  And Non-Being implies Being for the reason nothing implies nothing of being things, so there is an implicit recognition that there are being things. The resolution to Hegel is Becoming. But it occurs to me that Becoming requires a third category--time. [Without time there can be no Becoming]. And this model I think provides Hegel with a long series in which every concept implies its opposite, and the solution is by adding a third category. [After all hot and cold are two contradictory things until you add time and/or place.] So Hegel wants to continue this series --adding concept after concept until you get to the Absolute Idea [God] where all contradictions are resolved.[I want to add that Dr Kelley Ross [https://www.friesian.com/origin/chap-4.htm#sect-1][or here https://www.friesian.com/origin/] brings in his PhD thesis that this original idea of Hegel is valid. Just that he disagrees with the long series expansion.

Dr Kelley Ross writes:"The similarity and the connection that Hegel described between Being and Not Being is also very germane, although the motivation and explanation here will be different from his."

 The question that occurred to me at the police station was implicitly asked by Tosphot and answered. Just to give a background let me explain. The Gemara in Avoda Zara [page 23 side b] says when Israel came into the land of Canaan why did they have to burn all the asherot [worshipped trees] of the Canaanites? After all, no one can make forbidden that which belongs to his neighbor, and the land was given to Israel from the time Abraham. So it must be that since Israel worshipped the Golden Calf that makes the worship of the trees [asherot] OK to them, so  the Canaanites were acting as messengers for them.

Now the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah asks. how can it be that Israel brought the Omer [a offering of grain] right away when they came into the land? After all the only produce was grown by the Canaanites, and the verse says to bring the Omer from your produce, not the produce of a gentile.

On this Gemara in Rosh Hashana [page 13], Tosphot asks:  we know from the Gemara in Avoda Zara that the land belongs to Avraham from before Israel came into the land.(So the produce does in fact belong to them) Still the question is valid since the gentiles have ownership in the grain that they grow even if the land belongs to Israel. But if that is so then what is the question in Avoda Zara if after all the land is of Israel then the asherot are forbidden and need to be burnt. But the Gemara's question is from the asherot that were planted before the time of Avraham Avinu [Abraham the Patriarch]] that would be permitted in use by just nullification. [An idol of a gentile becomes permitted by simple nullification, without burning. Only an idol of a Israeli needs to be burnt]

So you see that it is implicit in the answer of Tosphot that trees that were outright owned by the Canaanites would come under the same category that tosphot brings about the trees that were planted before the time of Avraham

 I was in the Breslov place today and they were learning Lesson 52 in the book of Rav Nahman. There is brought the idea that "hitbodadut" [talking with God as one talks with a close friend] helps to correct one's midot [character traits]. But I think that Rav Nahman is depending on a certain amount of knowledge of context. I mean to say that just hitbodadut by itself without knowledge of what is a good character trait and what is not probably can not help much.

How could hitbodadut help one to correct the trait of speaking lashon hara [slander] unless one even knows that lashon hara is wrong, and also knows the specific laws of lashon hara.

Rather my impression is that Rav Nahman's teachings are meant to bring one to a higher level of service of God. But there has to be something to start with. Some basic knowledge of authentic Torah. But authentic Torah nowadays is only found in the Litvak yeshiva world. And the closer to the path of the Gra, the better.

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 x85  E flat major mp3

 I was attacked by Arabs and taken to the local police station to make a statement, and then to the police station in Binyamin for other reasons. Then after the interrogation was over, I was thinking about the Gemara in Avoda Zara page 23 that serves as the source for the previous blog entry [about the Israeli setting up a brick to worship, and then comes a gentile and worships it--in which case the brick is forbidden to be used.]

The Gemara says this: It says in the verse: "their worshipped trees you should burn". [That refers to when the children if Israel entered into the Land of Canaan.] The Gemara asks, 'but a person can not make forbidden that which belongs to another'. The Gemara answers, since Israel served the Golden Calf that shows idolatry is OK to them, so when the Canaanites were worshipping their trees, that is just doing what Israel sent them to do.

My question is this: What about trees they planted in order to be worshiped trees (i.e. tree planted by the Canaanites in order to worship them )? That is the regular case of "ashera" and so when the Torah says to burn those trees, why can it not be talking about the most regular simple case of worshipped trees that in fact belong to the Canaanites? [Not trees that were planted for other reasons or which grow by themselves.]

הגמרא אומרת: הפסוק אומר: "אשירהם תשרפו אש". [הכוונה היא, מתי ישראל נכנס לארץ כנען.] הגמרא שואלת אך אדם אינו יכול לאסור את מה ששייך לאחר. הגמרא עונה מאז שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב זה מראה שעבודת אלילים זה בסדר מבחינתם, אז כשהכנענים עבדו לעצים שלהם זה מה שישראל שלח להם לעשות

השאלה שלי היא זו: מה עם עצים שהכנענים נטעו על מנת שיעבדו עצים? זהו המקרה הרגיל של "אשרה" ולכן כאשר התורה אומרת לשרוף את העצים האלה מדוע היא לא יכולה לדבר על המקרה הפשוט ביותר של עצים סגודים השייכים למעשה לכנענים? [לא עצים שנשתלו מסיבות אחרות או שגדלים מעצמם

[The police offered to me one of their sandwiches which costs them 26 shekels [around 8 dollars] which was kind of like a combination of pizza doubled over with vegetables and coffee.  I had no money to return home, so the police gave me money from a sort of general purpose collection box they keep there in the station. I still could not get home, until some soldier bought me a ticket to the central bus station in Jerusalem. There is a lot more interesting stuff but that is enough of my personal affairs for now. 

I was attacked by Arabs and then the police were informed that the police at Binyamin wanted me under arrest. I was very afraid this was going to be a many year prison sentence, and prayed hard the whole way, But God turned the heart of the police officer towards me and let me go. 

 In terms of my previous blog entry I just wanted to add that if the gentile would bow down to the brick without the Israeli having set it up to be served, the brick would not be forbidden to derive benefit from (since the gentile does not own the brick). So it is just the setting it up by the Israeli which makes it prepared to receive idolatrous worship which makes it forbidden after the worship was done. So when the Rambam says "the setting it up is an act" he means it causes a "halut" [state of being]. There is no question about what the law is, but rather what does the  Rambam mean by words "setting up the brick is an act''.

[The brick is just an example. Worship of any physical object would be the same thing. And worship means bowing, burning incense, bringing close to an altar, slaughter of an animal before it, or doing a kind of service that is specified for that idol. And example would be throwing a stone at Markulit which is its service. And the physical object does not have to be a statue. It would be anything except for the One First Cause. This I hope might bring clarity to why I say that the religious world is really doing idolatry, and why the Gra signed the letter of excommunication.] [The reason for the Gra might not have been clear at the time, but nowadays it is crystal clear]

I want to mention that Rav Shach answers the obvious question n the Rambam by putting setting up the object is an act by the egg.

רמב''ם בהלכות עבודת כוכבים פרק 8. חוק 1 Rambam Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1

רב שך שואל על חוק מסוים ברמב''ם. אחד שם לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה ואז מגיע עכו''ם שסוגד לו, אסור להפיק ממנו תועלת מכיוון שההקמה שלו היא מעשה. יש לו תשובה מסוימת לכך, אבל עלתה לי תשובה אחרת. הרמב''ם קובע על פי חוק רב הונא כי לא ניתן להפוך לאובייקט של מישהו אחר אסור. אתה רואה זאת בחוק, אם אחד שוחט חיה של מישהו אחר לאלילים, מותר להרוויח שימוש ממנה. עכשיו יש את העובדה שפעולה על האובייקט עושה שהדבר אסור. אבל זה לא המקרה כאן. הגוי השתחווה לחפץ של מישהו אחר. והקמת האובייקט כשלעצמה אינה הופכת אותו לאסור. זה פשוט גורם להיות מוכן להיות סוגדים. כך שזה שיחד אותה עם מעשה הגוי הופך את זה לאסור וזה מה שהרמב"ם מתכוון להקמתו הוא מעשה. זו הקמתו יחד עם פולחן העכו''ם שהופך אותו לאסור. כלומר, שזה מעשה שלם. הרעיון כאן הוא שאופן השימוש במילה "מעשה" שונה מהרעיון הפשוט של פולחן. לדוגמא בהלכות עבודת כוכבים פרק 8. חוק 1 אנו רואים שאפילו פולחן על בעל חי אינו גורם לכך שאסור להשתמש בו. רק "מעשה" כמו שחיטת הבעל חי לאליל או החלפתו לאליל הופך אותו לאסור. זה לא אותו דבר כמו מה שגורם לאסור להביא חיה כקרבן במקדש, ובמקרה זה די בפולחן פשוט כדי לאסור את החיה. בכל מקרה אנו רואים את אופן השימוש במילת "מעשה" בהקשר זה הוא מאוד ספציפי. וככה הרמב"ם משתמש במילה בפרק ח' הלכה ג' שם הוא כותב, "אחד שם לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה ואז בא עכו''ם שסוגד לו, אסור להפיק ממנו תועלת כי הקמתו הוא 'מעשה'". אז הוא לא יכול להתכוון למעשה כאן אומר שהחפץ אסור. במקום זאת הפעולה של הקמתה בקשר עם מישהו אחר שמגיע ומתפלל ללבנה היא זו שהופכת אותה לאסורה. אז מה קורה אם מקימים לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה אך עדיין לא סגדו לה? זה מה שהרמב''ם מתכוון אליו כאן. אנו יודעים שאם אחד סוגד לבעל חי, אפילו אם הוא סוגד לחיה שלו, לא נעשה איסור להשתמש בבעל החי מכיוון שזה לא מעשה ידי אדם. אבל מה עם לבנה? נראה שזה המקרה שהרמב''ם מתכוון אליו. העובדה שאם ההקמה לא הייתה הופכת אותה לאסורה. אבל אם מישהו אחר בא סוגד אליה, בקשר להקמתו זה יהפוך את זו לאסורה. כל זה בא מגמרא בה נשאלת השאלה אם מקימים ביצה לסגוד לה ואז סוגדים לה אם אסור להשתמש בלבנה זו [ע''ז דף מ''ו ע''א] [חזקיה שאל אם זקיפתה היא מעשה]. ואז הגמרא מציינת שהתשובה ברורה מאליה, אלא שהשאלה הייתה אם הוא פשוט הקים את הלבנה ומישהו אחר סגד לה. האופן שבו הרמב''ם מסתכל על השאלה נראה קשור לוויכוח אחר אם שוחטים חיה של מישהו אחר לאליל אם אסור להשתמש בחיה זו. שם הרמב''ם סבור כדעה שאינה אסורה להפיק תועלת. אלא הנה העובדה שהלבנה היא מעשה האדם עשתה השינוי.

 רב שך asks about a certain law in the רמב''ם. One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an act. He has a certain answer for this, but it occurred to me a different answer. The רמב''ם holds by the law of רב הונא that one can not make an object of someone else forbidden. You see this in the law, if one slaughters an animal  of someone else to idols, the animal is not forbidden to gain use from. Now there is the fact that an act on one's an object that is man made makes it forbidden. But that is not the case here. The gentile bowed to an object of someone else. And the setting up of the object in itself does not make it forbidden. It just makes to prepared to be worshiped. So that together with the act of the gentile makes it forbidden and that is what the Rambam means the setting it up is an מעשה. That is the setting it up along with the worship of the gentile makes it forbidden. That is, that that is a whole act. The idea here is that the way the word "act" is used is different from the simple idea of worship. For example in Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1, we see that even worship of an animal does not make it forbidden to be used. Only an "act" like slaughtering it for an idol or exchanging it for an idol makes it forbidden. This is not the same thing as what makes an animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the temple in which case simple worship --bowing down--is enough to make the animal forbidden. At any rate we see the way act is used in this context is very specific. And that is the way the Rambam uses the word in chapter 8 law 3 where he writes, "One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an 'act'". So he can not mean the act here means the object is forbidden. Rather the act of setting it up in connection with someone else coming and worshipping the brick is what makes it forbidden.]

So what happens if one sets up a brick to worship it but has not yet worshipped it? That is what i think is what the Rambam is addressing here. We know that even one does that with an animal or even if he worships his own animal that animal does not become forbidden to be used since it is not man made. But what about a brick? This seems to be the case the רמב''ם is addressing. The fact if setting it up would not make it forbidden. But if someone else comes and bows down to it, that in connection with his setting it up would make it forbidden. This all come from a גמרא where the question is asked if one sets up a brick to worship and then worships it if that brick is forbidden to be used. Then the גמרא points out that the answer is obvious, but rather the question was if he just set up the brick and someone else worshipped it. The way the רמב''ם looks at the question seems related to a different argument if one slaughters an animal of someone else to an idol if that animal is forbidden to be used. There the רמב''ם holds like the opinion it is not forbidden to derive benefit from. So here the fact that the brick is man made changes that.

 

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Rav Shach asks about a certain law in the Rambam. [Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 3] "One puts up a brick to worship it, and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an "act".

He has a certain answer for this but it occurred to me a different answer. The Rambam holds by the law of Rav Huna that one can not make an object of someone else forbidden. [You see this in the law, if one slaughters an animal  of someone else to idols, the animal is not forbidden to gain use from.]

Now there is the fact that an act on one's an object that is man made makes it forbidden. But that is not the case here. The gentile bowed to an object of someone else. And the setting up of the object in itself does not make it forbidden. It just makes to prepared to be worshiped. So that together with the act of the gentile makes it forbidden and that is what the Rambam means the setting it up is an "act". That is the setting it up along with the worship of the gentile makes it forbidden. That is, that that is a whole act.

[The idea here is that the way the word "act" is used is different from the simple idea of worship. For example in Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1, we see that even worship of an animal does not make it forbidden to be used. Only an "act" like slaughtering it for an idol or exchanging it for an idol makes it forbidden. This is not the same thing as what makes an animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the temple in which case simple worship is enough to make the animal forbidden. At any rate we see the way act is used in this context is very specific. And that is the way the Rambam uses the word in chapter 8 law 3 where he writes, "One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an 'act'". So he can not mean the act here means the object is forbidden. Rather the act of setting it up in connection with someone else coming and worshipping the brick is what makes it forbidden.]

So what happens if one sets up a brick to worship it but has not yet worshipped it? That is what i think is what the Rambam is addressing here. We know that even one does that with an animal or even if he worships his own animal that animal does not become forbidden to be used since it is not man made. But what about a brick? This seems to be the case the Rambam is addressing. The fact if setting it up would not make it forbidden. But if someone else comes and bows down to it, that in connection with his setting it up would make it forbidden.

[This all come from a Gemara where the question is asked if one sets up a brick to worship and then worships it if that brick is forbidden to be used. Then the Gemara points out that the answer is obvious, but rather the question was if he just set up teh brink and someone else worshipped it. The way the Rambam looks at the question seems related to a different argument if one slaughters an animal of someone else to an idol if that animal is forbidden to be used. There the Rambam holds like the opinion it is not forbidden to derive benefit from. So here the fact that the brick is man made changes that.]

The great thing about Litvak yeshivas is that they learn and teach authentic Torah.

 I have thought about an idea of making a Litvak yeshiva in every city. A yeshiva in the path of the Gra and Rav Shach would give people  a great idea of the essence of Torah. However the difficulty is that not every Litvak yeshiva is Ponovitch or the Mir. Some are good and some not so good.

A different idea occurred to me about the ancient custom to learn Mishna between the afternoon prayer an the evening prayer. This in fact seems like a great idea.

The great thing about Litvak yeshivas is that they learn and teach authentic Torah. 

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 I wanted to mention that even though you have the space foam [little black holes] which are sort of like the Dirac sea of negative particles that fill space, still space is not quantized. There can not be any sudden jumps because of Max Born's four postulates. It has to be that way because otherwise there would be infinite momentum at the jump-off point. [However I am wondering if perhaps a Lipschitz function might fill the needs of the Max Born postulates. It would have a limited derivative even though space would not be continuous. And that might be helpful for the space foam which  seem to mean that space would not be continuous, [even if they are connected by worm holes as mentioned by Alsaleh]] [The original idea of worm holes connecting the quantum foam came from a paper  by Robert Penna]

I also wanted to mention something that was noted by Kelley Ross. That the uncertainty principle does not just mean a limit on what one can know. It requires that things do not have both classical values of position and momentum at the same time because otherwise the electrons would fall into the nucleus. And there are lots of hydrogen atoms in the universe that are not observed.[So it is not just Bell's inequality which shows that things do not have classical values until they interact with something big. Even the very existence of hydrogen atoms shows that.]

Things sacrificed to idolatry

Things sacrificed to idolatry are forbidden to be used. Rav Huna in the Gemara holds of one does an act on an animal that even someone else owns, the animal is still forbidden to derive benefit from. And that is the way the Raavad decided the law. But Rav Nahman, R.Amram, and Rav Isaac decided the law is that when one does an act on an animal that he does not own, then the animal is permitted. And that is how the Rambam decided the law. But when they say an "act" they mean slaughter, not just bowing down.

So that is what makes it a bit confusing when it comes to a different kind of prohibition that when an animal is worshipped even one that belongs to someone else, that animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the Temple. And there the Rambam holds that is even any kind of worship. But the Raavad holds there too there needs to be a physical act on the animal to make it forbidden.

Rav Shach has an explanation for the Rambam in this case. He brings that the prohibition of bringing a worshiped animal to the Temple is learned in two different ways. One way is from the beginning of Leviticus. "Bring from the sheep". That verse is extra since we already know you can only bring sheep or goats or cows as a sacrifice. So the Gemara learns that the verse is coming to exclude something. That is a worshipped animal. But there is a different teaching that that same prohibition comes from "their destruction is in the their defect is in them". Rav Shach shows that the Rambam holds from the second teaching and then that implies that any kind of act in which the animal is worshipped makes it forbidden to bring to the altar. 

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 There is a paper by Alsaleh [ER=EPR] that suggests space time in connected by little worm holes. [https://inspirehep.net/literature/1496409] This might lead to a way of combining these little worm holes to create a large one by which space time travel might be possible. 

The paper is coauthored, but I think Alsaleh is the main author because he often has a characteristic way of spelling things which makes it clear to me that he was the one doing the writing.] 

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 What is idolatry? Bowing, burning, bringing close, slaughter and service according to its way.[note 1] And it helps to have a clear idea of what idolatry is so that one is not tempted to use it as a general catch all phrase for whatever one disapproves of.

[So when I say that the religious world is doing idolatry, I am not saying going to Uman to pray in the merit of Rav Nahman is any kind of problem. Rather the issue is attitude. And even if one can not be legally guilty, it is helpful to have an idea of what the actual essence of the issue is. As the Gra said to judge any action one needs both to know the law and also the situation.

[note 1] These are the four services done in the Temple. If done for an idol, the one doing them is guilty of idolatry. Bowing is understood. burning is like in the Temple when one brings  a burnt offering. If that same act is done for an idol, it is idolatry. The rest are understood. The last one means this: sometimes an idol has a certain kind of service that is unique for that idol. So that is also idolatry if one does it. Now what is an idol? Anything. It does not need to be an object. But any object will do. So in the religious world when worship is done towards dead people, that constitutes idolatry.] 

 The idea of the "infinite light" does not get into philosophy much or even religion. The reason is that it is not grasped, but given. And even when it is given, it is only one area of value. This you can see in the diagram of Kelley Ross about the modes of necessity on the z axis and the mode of the transcendent in  the x direction. [https://www.friesian.com/system.htm]

So even if one merits to have some flow of the infinite light, that does not mean he or she has any connection with the other  areas of value. They might not have any particular insight in anything or even in spiritual values.

And the problem with each area of value is there is an equal and opposite area of negative value that mimics the authentic area of value. [The Dark Side. The Sitra Achra.] (That is the reason the religious world is so messed up.)

[This is based on Kant's dinge an sich--the areas where reason does not enter. And Leonard Nelson's particular approach which was adopted from Fries with some modifications.]

[Though the Kelley Ross, Leonard Nelson  approach makes the most sense to me I tend to see a lot of good points in Hegel also.]

[This approach makes sense to me because Hegel sees everything as leading to God as the absolute idea through reason. That would be so if the only emanation of God was logos. But with the Kelley Ross, there is a whole area of transcendental which  can not be grasped by reason. ]

The pervasive idolatry that one finds in the religious world is upsetting.

 I tend to see Reform and Conservative as more in accord with Torah because these groups lack the idolatry aspect that one usually gets in the religious world . But I can not account for why this is. It would seem that the more people would be interested in keeping Torah, the farther away from idolatry they would get. But in practice, the effect seems to be just the opposite.

And to stay away idolatry is not just a minor issue in Torah. It is the major point.

You can see this in for example the case of a עיר הנידחת a city that has been seduced to serve idolatry that is burnt. That is the whole city. And even its ashes are forbidden to be be used for any purpose. And in fact because of this, I tend to stay away from the religious. The pervasive idolatry that one finds in the religious world is upsetting. 

[You would think that since idolatry is the one and most issue in Torah that it would have the most weight.  Yet the religious seem to ignore the issue. So the best idea is to avoid the religious world unless this issue gets fixed.]

[I should add that this problem seems to be a lot less in the Litvak world which goes by the Gra. Still no one in the religious world seems innocent in this regard. Clearly the Gra himself saw this problem and for that reason signed the letter of excommunication. But the Gra in this very important issue is ignored,]

[There is also an odd fact that everyone sees this but no one mentions it--like the king's clothes. And I think that one ought to object. After all even if one's objection is not heeded, still there is an obligation to show that the religious does not represent the Torah at all, since the idolatry makes the whole thing forbidden.]  

[It is no accident that the vast majority of Jews do not want any connection with the religious because the fact that the religious put on this show and dance about how they supposedly keep Torah, but in fact worship dead people.]

Just to give an idea of how serious the issue of idolatry is let me mention that not just עיר הנידחת the city that has most of its peopled doing idolatry needs to be burnt to a crisp but even the ashes are forbidden to be used. Or at least that seems clear from the Tosephta and Gemara.   

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There is a major point that I gained from the advice of Rav Nahman that I wanted to share. One is the path of learning. Even though the idea of learning fast is common place in the great Litvak yeshivas based on the Gra, still Rav Nahman puts it in a way that makes it possible for even small mediocre people like me to get to  levels of learning. Say the words and go on even without understanding. The deeper reasons he said this might be many. However I found this to be a great benefit, whether in Torah, or also later in Physics.  For if I had gotten stuck on  every single point in learning before I could go on, I never would have gotten anywhere. However, the only way to get to authentic Torah learning is through the Gra and the great Litvak yeshivas. But if one is in a authentic Litvak yeshiva then the advice of Rav Nahman is an amazing help.

[And in Litvak yeshivas there is an emphasis on review and learning in depth. What seems the best to have some kind of combination. For example, half learning in depth and the other half just saying the words and going on.]

You can see that the Torah takes a dim view of worship of any being besides God alone.]

Laws of Idolatry. When the Torah says "this and that" there is an argument between R Yoshiyahu and R Yonathan whether it means this or that or both, or if it means it has to be both. This comes up in Bava Metzia chapter 11.

This might explain the the fact that the Rambam says a city that has been seduced to serve idolatry "ir hanadachat" is from 100 to the majority of a tribe but also that the number of people that have been seduced can not be less than 100. However anywhere from 200 and up, it is enough to have the majority of the city. So it looks like the Rambam is understanding you need two conditions in order to be a ir hanidachat. It has to be a city of no less than hundred and that you need no less that 100.

This way of looking at that Gemara does require some explanation. The way Tosphot understands it along with most other rishonim is the city has to be no less than 100 but the actual number of seduced people is just the majority; i.e. 51 in a city of 100. Why in a city of 100 you need the whole city is hard to understand unless the Rambam is understanding that you need the city itself and the number of those seduced to be two condition that you need both like the opinion when the Torah says this and that it means both together.

[You can see why I stay away from the religious world as far as possible since I think they all are deeply into idolatry except for the people that follow the Gra. You can see that the Torah takes a dim view of worship of any being besides God alone.] 

the religious teachers are the enemies of Torah.

 Even though Rav Nahman emphasizes the importance of not speaking lashon hara [slander], he still peppers the Le.M with his idea that the religious teachers are the enemies of Torah. The subject of  "Torah Scholars who are demons" comes up in the LeM vol. I chapter 12 and 28.  Rav Israel Odesser the founder of the Na Nach group even makes the same point מפורסמים של שקר ("the famous people that are frauds"). That is the language Rav Nahman uses in LeM volume II chapter 1. And Rav Israel Odesser says אם מפורסם הוא שקר ("If one is famous, then you know he is a fraud"). 

So to where can one go to learn Torah. It is not automatic that even the name of "Breslov" involves actually following the advice and ideas of Rav Nahman. In fact, usually it does not. So to my mind it seems clear that Litvak yeshivas [based on the path of the Gra] are the only places where one can go to learn authentic Torah. And within that context, it is good to learn Rav Nahman's advice and follow it.

 I can see that Hegel wants to use the idea that opposites turn into each other to get to his idea of sublimation. The opposites subsumed in some higher idea of being until everything reaches the Absolute Idea. But to me it seems he is lacked the idea of "birur" sifting. That is separating what is good from what is evil.  [Maybe you might say that birur is implicit in what he means, but to me it does not seem that way. And the lack I think of this idea  means that lots of dumb ideas could be hung on Hegel and there does not seem to be any kind of "birur process".

On the other hand, he is a post Kant person that seems to me to take account of Kant, but avoids much of the mind is needed for matter that seems a bit too much embedded in "Idealism". He might be going with mind but his mind is "Logos", not the human minds of Kant. Or even animal minds. There was plenty of matter before there were minds.

There is an idea you see a few times in Tehilim [psalms] of searching out the works of God. [E.g psalm105.] This corresponds to what some rishonim wrote about the importance of learning Physics and Metaphysics.  This was an issue at the Mir. It was not thought to be proper to be at the Mir and also to go to university. In one way the Mir was right. Most of what is taught in universities is pseudo science. But not everything. If they would stick with the natural sciences that would be great. Allan Bloom wrote in the Closing of the American Mind the problems with the departments outside of STEM.

[Even though when Ibn Pakuda and other rishonim emphasized Metaphysics their intension was concerning Aristotle still I think you have to count Kant, Hegel, and Leonard Nelson [i.e. that particular post Kant approach.] Physics I think means String Theory, but that would include some of the background behind it like Algebra and Topology.]

The religious world has a problem with cults. That is that sometimes straight fraud, and other times the Dark Side has powers that can fool people. This is the reason the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication,--to warn people not to be fooled. But after him, Rav Shach also stated the same warning. And also Rav Israel Oddeser of the Na  Nach group. But for some reason their warning went largely unheeded. [Rav Nahman I should mention not only was not included in the excommunication but also stated the same warning. עיין השמטות של חיי מוהר''ן של רב שמואל הורביץ See left out portions of the  Life of Rav Nahman of Shmuel Horvitz.  Not the left out parts that were eventually published but rather the left out parts that were collected separately. and never included. 

 I have thought that it would be a great idea if people would have the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and learn it every day. The reason I say this is that there is a depth in Torah that is hard to reach on one's own efforts. Now this kind of depth certainly is there just in the Oral Law [Gemara]. However it can be hard to reach without Rav Shach. [Certainly this kind of depth in the Gemara and Rishonim also can be seen in Rav Haim [Soloveitchik] of Brisk and his other disciples. But Rav Shach brings that kind of learning to it peak.]  

I might add here that if you go into any Litvak yeshiva, they always talk about the importance of the Rishonim and they are right about that on one hand. But on the other hand they are not mentioning that then after the morning learning session they go and hear a class from one of the teachers. And that class always contains  the achronim, e.g. the Ketzot HaHoshen, R. Akiva Eigger, the Pnei Yehoshua, Rav Haim of Brisk, and his disciples. They are not actually thinking that you on your own can just open up the rishonim and understand their depth.

So I see the learning of the achronim just as important as the rishonim. But that already depends on one's level. At first probably the best is to go to the Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua. Then after doing a few tractates like that, then to go to to Rav Shach's Avi Ezri.

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Gemara Bava Batra page 56

 There is an argument between the Ri of Gash and the Rambam. [Laws of Testimony 21:6] [ sys The Ri Mi'Gash (Rav Joseph of Gash) was the teacher of the father of the Rambam.] Three brothers testify for three years of "hazaka". The Mishna itself says that is valid if each brother testified for one year and another person testified with him. But if there are other witnesses that come and say how can you say that when you were with us the whole time. To the Ri Migash there is no payment to the owner since brothers can not testify together. The Rambam says there is payment. The question is how to explain the Ri Migash that even the Ramban [Nahmandes asks on]. Rav Shach explains this in Laws of Testimony. But I have to write his answer at a different time because of a certain amount of chaos that is in my life this minute.

OK. [My life is always in chaos, but Thanks to Heaven that I have a few minutes now to write the answer of Rav Shach and my slight question after that.] The answer of Rav Shach is that the Jerusalem Talmud says ומנין שלא יהיו עדים קרובים זה לזה? הגע עצמך אם הוזמו לא מפיהם הם נהרגים ("From where do you know that witnesses can not be relatives? Just think about it. Is it not so that if they would become false witnesses they would not be  killed?") The Yerushalmi is thinking that no testimony can be valid unless there would be a punishment if it turned out to be false.   עדות שאי אתה יכול להזימה. And the Rif brings that Yerushalmi.

I have no question that Rav Shach is correct that this Yerushalmi is the source of the Ri Migash. But the question remains how is it possible that any testimony can be accepted if not for the fact that if it would turn out to be false that there would be the same punishment that the false witnesses wanted to give to an innocent person? You still have the very same question that started the whole process.

The problem with Torah from the Sitra Achra is not just that it is wrong. but that it brings wickedness into the heart of those that study it. ]

Someone asked me about the more mystic teachings of Torah and I thought to share my thoughts with the wider public. I have to say that my impression has been for a long time that the best book of mysticism that I have ever seen is the Tree of Life [Eitz Haim] of Rav Isaac Luria. (The other writings of the Ari I think are better to learn after that.) After that, I think the best is the Nahar Shalom of Shalom Sharabi. [The reason I say this is that even though the Eitz Haim itself is pretty much self explicit, still there are two problems in putting it all together. One is the "Drush HaDaat" which was not included, but implies a modification of that whole system. Plus there is the whole second half of the Eitz Haim which automatically implies a sort of modification on the whole system. The only book I have ever seen that addresses these two problems is the Nahar Shalom of Rav Sharabi. [The two sidurim of the Rashash take the system of the Nahar Shalom into account.]

However I should add that I gained a lot from learning the ideas of Avraham Abulafia, Rav Moshe Haim Luzato (Ramchal), Rav Yakov Abuchatzeira,  the Gra, and Rav Nahman of Breslov.

Outside of these few,  the problem with mysticism is that most of it is from the Dark Side [Sitra Achra]. --The way to avoid that problem would be by taking heed of the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication that already drew a line between what is OK and what is not. Rav Nahman of Breslov was not under that excommunication in spite of what most people think, and hinted plenty of times to the same thing the Gra was talking about, but also ignored. The Na Nach group however based on Rav Israel Odeser seem to be a bit more aware of this issue. [Rav Oddeser was also plain and open about this issue.] 

[The problem with Torah from the Sitra Achra is not just that it is wrong. but that it brings wickedness into the heart of those that study it. ]

x78 E flat major   x78 midi  x78 nwc

 There are lots of interpretations of Hegel. [See the Cambridge Companion to Hegel.] I am not claiming any great understanding of any of them. Rather I simply see the world in the of Neo Platonic form that has God at the top and creation being "flowed" forth [emanation]. And this fits in with the original way people understood Hegel. [But also has elements of Kant Fries and Leonard Nelson]. But the basic structure is neo platonic.

There is a good reason to notice the great points in each of these different philosophers. The reason is that the best of the philosopher today--the deepest and most thorough also have this same set of differences. Kelly Ross  and Robert Hanna goes with Kant. Huemer with GE Moore. And though he is back in time, McTaggart was with Hegel.