Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a

I was at the local Lithuanian Beit Midrash at night and had a chance to look at the Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a. As I was looking at the Ramban, it occurred to me that perhaps Tosphot and the Ramban are saying the same basic approach to the statement of Abaye that "R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things." If so, then this approach to Tosphot is not like the Maharsha, nor like the Maharhal. To the Maharsha, the Tosphot is saying that to R. Judah there are two ways of being not liable (when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage). One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To R Meir there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the Maharshal, the meaning of Tosphot is that at the time of the fall, the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (R. Judah) or by negligence (R. Meir). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the Ramban has a different approach, and I think this is what Tosphot means. To the Ramban, the approach of R. Judah is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both Tosphot and the Ramban bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole nor want it. Therefore R. Judah and R. Meir disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. To R. Meir he is liable and R. Judah disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about Tosphot at the present time[A proof that Tosphot holds the same as the Ramban is that the Rosh brings a statement from Rabainu Izhak that if the fall was by accident and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and Tosphot in general is Rabainu Izhakk ] However, I want to add here that the Rif has the opposite approach to R. Judah. He says that R. Judah agrees with R. Meir when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both R. Judah and R. Meir agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object. I would like to add here that later in the Gemara page 29 b R Yochanan said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and R Oshiya said he is not liable. If we learn like the Maharshal, the statement of Abaye is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between R Yochanan and R Oshiya, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the Maharsha, the statement of Abaye is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable. At this point I would like to ask a question on the Rif and the Ramban. It is this. If we learn like the Maharshal, then when Abaye says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like Rabainu Izhak that cannot be so. For he says even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the Rif if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. At this point I would like to ask a question on the Rif and the Ramban. It is this. If we learn like the Maharshal, then when Abaye says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like Rabainu Izhak that cannot be so. For he says even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the Rif if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. ------------------------------------------------the רמב’’ן on בבא קמא כ''ט ע''א page. As I was looking at the רמב’’ן, it occurred to me that perhaps תוספות and the רמב’’ן are saying the same basic approach to the statement of אביי that ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. If so, then this approach to תוספות is not like the מהרש’’א, nor like the מהרש’’ל. To the מהרש’’א, the תוספות is saying that to ר' יהודה there are two ways of being not liable when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage. One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To ר’ מאיר there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the מהרש’ל, the meaning of תוספות is that at the time of the fall the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (ר’ יהודה) or by negligence (ר’ מאיר). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the רמב’’ן has a different approach and I think this is what תוספות means. To the רמב’’ן, the approach of ר’ יהודה is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both תוספות and the רמב’’ן bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole, nor want it. Therefore ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence and yet he abandoned the object. To ר’ מאיר he is liable and ר’ יהודה disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about תוספות at the present time.([A proof that תוספות holds the same as the רמב''ן is that the רא''ש brings a statement from רבינו יצחק (הר''י) that if the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and תוספות in general is רבינו יצחק) However, I want to add here that the רי''ף has the opposite approach. He says that ר’ יהודה agrees with ר’ מאיר when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object.------- I would like to add here that later in the גמרא page כ''ט ע''ב ר' יוחנן said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and ר' אושעיה said he is not liable. If we learn like the מהרש''ל, the statement of אביי is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between ר' יוחנן and ר' אושעיה, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the מהרש''א, the statement of אביי is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable. At this point I would like to ask a question on the רי''ף and the רמב''ן. It is this. If we learn like the מהרש''ל, then when אביי says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like הרמב''ן ורבינו יצחק that cannot be so. For THEY say even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the רי''ף if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not.