Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
20.10.26
I was at the Litvack beit midrash in my local vicinity and was able to find where the Raavad might deal with some of the above questions. That would be in laws of pleas 3:14 and the Tur-Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat chapter 88, law 19. That adds some clarity to the issues, however in terms of my specific question about "Here it is" that absolves one from an oath of partial admission for a pledge, I still have no answer.[I had little time and/or energy.]--I was at the Litvack beit midrash in my local vicinity and was able to find where the ראב''ד might deal with some of the above questions. That would be in laws of pleas 3:14 and the טור שלחן ערוך חושן משפט chapter 88 law 19. That adds some clarity to the issues however in terms of my specific question about "הילך" that absolves one from an oath of מודה במקצת I still have no answer. [I would expect Rav Nachum of the Mir to deal with some of my questions, but so far I have only seen him deal with different issues. At this point, it seems to me that I need to see what the Shach [Shabatai haCohen] deals with in the Tur- Shulchan Aruch choshen mishpat chapter 88: law19.
לדעת הראב"ד, כדי ששומר יוכל לטעון "הרי הוא לפניך" – ובכך להיפטר מחיוב שבועת "מודה במקצת" – נדרש שהפיקדון יהיה נוכח באותו רגע בבית הדין. לעומת זאת, במקרה של משכון, ניתן לטעון "הרי הוא לפניך" גם אם החפץ נמצא בביתו של השומר או אפילו ליד אגם. נראה כי ההבדל נעוץ בכך שבמקרה של פיקדון מדובר ב"שומר שכר". וייתכן אף שהראב"ד סבור כי מלווה המחזיק במשכון נחשב ל"שומר חינם". אולם, קשה על כך, שהרי ייתכן מקרה של פיקדון שבו השומר הוא "שומר חינם". קושי נוסף הוא שאינני זוכר מהי עמדת הראב"ד לגבי סיווגו של מלווה המחזיק במשכון; אם הוא סבור – כדעות מסוימות – שמדובר ב"שומר שכר", הרי שההסבר הנ"ל אינו תקף
the opinion of the raavad in laws of pleas chapter 4, law 6.
The Raavad holds that a deposit needs to be there and then in the court in order for the guard to be able to say ""here it is" and thus not have to take an oath of admission in part. but for a pledge, ''here it is'' can be applied even if the object is in his home or by a lake. The difference I think is that the case of a deposit is that of a paid guard. But it might b that the Raavad holds that a lender with pledge is an unpaid guard. however, the question on this is that there can be a case o a deposit that is also of an unpaid guard. another possible question is that I do not remember what the Raaavad says about the category of a lender with a pledge. If he holds like the opinions that he is a paid guard, then the answer here falls away.-----------------The ראב''ד holds that a deposit needs to be there and then in the court in order for the guard to be able to say ""here it is" and thus not have to take an oath of admission in part. but for a pledge or a loan, here it is can be applied even if the object is in his home or by a lake. The difference I think is that the case of a deposit is that of a paid guard. But it might b that the ראב''ד holds that a lender with pledge is an unpaid guard. however, the question on this is that there can be a case o a deposit that is also of an unpaid guard. another possible question is that I do not remember what the ראב''ד says about the category of a lender with a pledge. If he holds like the opinions that he is a paid guard, then the answer here falls away.
19.10.26
בדרכי חזרה מהים, הרהרתי בהבחנה שעורך הראב"ד בין "משכון" לבין "פיקדון", בהקשר לדין "הא לך". עלתה בדעתי אפשרות אחת: לא ניתן להבחין ביניהם על בסיס השאלה למי שייך החפץ. {הסיבה לכך היא שבכל המקרים האפשריים, השאלה היכן צריך להימצא החפץ כדי להיחשב כ"הוחזר", אינה תלויה בשאלה אם מדובר במשכון או בפיקדון.} לדעתי, ההבדל טמון בשאלה האם המלווה נחשב ל"שומר שכר" (שומר המקבל תשלום) או שאינו כזה; ושאלה זו רלוונטית באותה מידה גם לגבי פיקדון. אם הוא "שומר שכר", הרי שאינו רשאי להניח את החפץ באגם או בביצה ולומר "הא לך", שכן הוא מקבל תשלום עבור השמירה עליו – ובוודאי שאין להניחו במקום שבו הוא עלול להינזק בקלות. אפשרות נוספת היא שהראב"ד אינו מקבל את דינו של ר' יצחק. ייתכן שהמשכון אינו בבעלות המלווה; אולי הוא רק מוחזק אצלו עד לפירעון החוב, ולאחר מכן עליו להשיבו. במקרה כזה, אם הוא גם "שומר שכר", הרי שבוודאי אינו רשאי להניחו בביצה. יש הסבורים כי המלווה נחשב ל"שומר חינם" (שומר שאינו מקבל תשלום), ולכן התנאים לגבי המקום שבו יש להשיב את החפץ עשויים להיות מקלים יותר – לא בתוך ביצה, אך אולי במקום כלשהו המוגן באופן חלקי בקרבת מקום
Bava Metzia pg 4 and page 34
On my way back from the sea I was thinking about the difference the Raavad [(in laws of pleas chapter 4 law 6)] makes between a pledge and a deposit. in terms of the law of, “Here it is.” One possible answer occurred to me is that we can not make a distinction between them by who owes the object. {The reason is that in all possible cases, the question of where the object must be to be considered to have been returned is not dependent of if it is a pledge or a deposit.} The difference I think must lay in the question is the lender a paid guard or an unpaid guard and similarly that same question applies to the deposit. If he is a paid guard, he cannot out the object in a lake or swamp and say here it is because he is paid to guard it, not put it in a place where it can be easily damaged. A different answer is that it is possible that the Raavad does not hold with the law of r Isaac. Perhaps the pledge is not owned by the lender? Maybe it is just his to keep until the debt is paid and then he has to give it back. And in such a case if he is a paid guard also, he cannot put it in a swamp. Some people hold a lender is an unpaid guard, thus there are less stringent conditions of where to return the object. Not a swamp but maybe some semi guarded place near one?=-----------------------------------------On my way back from the sea I was thinking about the difference the ראב’’ד makes between a משכון and a deposit. in terms of the law of, “Here it is.” One possible answer occurred to me is that we can not make a distinction between them by who owes the object. {The reason is that in all possible cases, the question of where the object must be to be considered to have been returned is not dependent of if it is a משכון or a deposit.} The difference I think must lay in the question is the lender a שומר שכר or an unשומר שכר and similarly that same question applies to the deposit. If he is a שומר שכר, he cannot out the object in a lake or swamp and say here it is because he is paid to guard it, not put it in a place where it can be easily damaged. A different answer is that it is possible that the ראב’’ד does not hold with the law of ר' יצחק. Perhaps the משכון is not owned by the lender? Maybe it is just his to keep until the debt is paid and then he has to give it back. And in such a case if he is a שומר שכר also, he cannot put it in a swamp. Some people hold a lender is an שומר חימם, thus there are less stringent conditions of where to return the object. Not a swamp but maybe some semi guarded place near one?
רמב"ם הלוואות יג:ד. טענות א:ג. מלווה מלווה סלע [4 דינרים] וקיבל משכון. הוא מאבד את המשכון ברשלנות. הוא אומר שהמשכון היה שווה חצי סלע. הלווה אומר שהוא היה שווה שלושה דינרים. המלווה נשבע שזה לא בתחום שלי. המלווה נשבע כי הוא מודה בחלקו ומשלם את מה שהוא מודה. הרמב"ן שואל שהלווה יאמר למלווה שיחזיר לי את המשכון ואני אחזיר את ההלוואה. בהלכות טענות א:ג, הרב שך מביא שהראב"ד קבע שדיני משכון שונים מפיקדון מבחינת "הילך". כמו כן, שמואל אמר: אם מישהו נותן ידית של לשעבר עבור משכון להלוואה והמלווה מאבד את הידית, הוא מאבד את כל ההלוואה.
הר"ן אומר שהוא חייב את התוספת בכל מקרה. בדרך כלל אני לא נמצא ליד הים מאוחר בלילה, אבל הלילה עשיתי יוצא מן הכלל ובדרך חזרה הוצפתי במחשבות ובשאלות בנושא.
(1) שאלת הרמב"ן מתקיימת גם אם החוק הוא כמו שמואל שהמשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה.
(2) המקרה הרגיל של "הילך" הוא שהלווה מחזיר חלק מהחוב ונשבע על היתרה, אולם לראב"ד, המשכון נחשב להילך כתשלום חלקי. אם נלך עם שמואל, אז המשכון נחשב לתשלום מלא.
(3) לרש"י, שבועת המלווה "לא ברשותי" היא מהתורה. לרמב"ם זה דרבנן. זה מרב הונא במוד 34. אבל לשמואל זה בכלל חל? הרי אם הוא שולם במלואו, אז למה להישבע. אבל מצד שני, השבועה אינה עבור ההלוואה. היא רק נוגעת למיקום המשכון.
(4) לחלק מהדעות, דינו של שמואל הוא החוק. ר' יצחק נכדו של רש''י, ויש הסוברים ששמואל הוא הבסיס לפסיקתו של ר' יוחנן שאם אדם מאבד משכון, זה נחשב לכל ההלוואה.
[5] לראב''ד המשכון נחשב ל"הילך" ולכן הלווה לא יישב שבועה בגלל הודאה חלקית. ולשמואל המשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה וזה יותר תואם את הרמב''ן שהמלווה צריך לקבל בחזרה את הכסף עבור ההלוואה רק לאחר שהלווה מקבל בחזרה את המשכון.
היו לי מיליוני מחשבות אחרות אבל זה כל מה שאני זוכר כרגע.
Rambam loans 13:4. Pleas 1:3. A lender lends a sela [4 dinars] and gets a pledge. He losses the pledge by negligence. He says the pledge was worth 1 half sela. The borrower says it was worth three dinars. The lender takes an oath ''It is not in my domain.'' The lender takes an oath because he admits in part and pays what he admits. The Ramban asks let the borrower tell the lender give m back the pledge and I will repay the loan. In laws of pleas 1:3 Rav Shach brings down that the Raavad held the law of a pledge is different than a deposit in terms of "Here it is".Shmuel said: If one gives a handle of an ex for a pledge for a loan and the lender losses the handle, he loses the whole loan.
the Ran says he owes the extra anyway. I usually am not by the sea late at night, but to night i made an exception and on the way back I was flooded with thoughts and questions about this.
(1) the question of the Ramban holds even if the law is like Shmuel that the pledge counts for the whole loan.
(2) the normal case of "here it is" is the borrower repays part of the debt and swears on the remainder however to the Raavad, the pledge counts for here it isas partial payment. If we go with Shmuel then the pledge counts for full payment.
(3) To Rashi the oath of the lender "it is not in my domain "is from the Torah. To the Rambam it is derabanan. This is from Rav Huna on page 34b. But to Shmuel does it apply at all? after all if he has been paid back in full, then why take an oath. But on the other hand, the oath isn’t for the loan. It is only concerning the whereabout of the pledge.
(4) To some opinions the law of Shmuel is the law. R. Isaac the grandson of Rashi, and some hold Shmuel is the basis of the ruling of R Yochanan that if one loses a pledge, it counts for the whole loan.
[5] to the Raavad the pledge counts for "here it is" and thus the borrower would not take an oath because of admission in part. and to Shmuel the pledge counts for the whole loan and this i s more in line with the Ramban that the lender should get back the money for the loan only after the borrower gets back the pledge.
i had millions of other thoughts but then this is all I can recall right now.
------------------------------------------------------------------רמב''ם loans 13:4. Pleas 1:3. A lender lends a sela [4 dinars] and gets a pledge. He losses the pledge by negligence. He says the pledge was worth 1 half sela. The borrower says it was worth three dinars. te lender taks an oath it is not in my domain. the lender takes an oath because he admits in part and pays what he admits. The Ramban asks let the borrower tell the lender give m back the pledge and I will repay the loan. In laws of pleas 1:3 Rav Shach brings down that the ראב’’ד held the law of a pledge is different than a deposit in terms of "הילך".ALSO—שמואל said: If one gives a handle of an ex for a pledge for a loan and the lender losses the handle, he loses the whole loan.
the ר''ן says he owes the extra anyway. I usually am not by the sea late at night, but to night i made an exception and on the way back I was flooded with thoughts and questions about this.
(1) the question of the ארמב''ן holds even if the law is likeשמואל that the pledge counts for the whole loan.
(2) the normal case of "הילך" is the borrower repays part of the debt and swears on the remainder however to the ראב’’ד, the pledge counts for הילךas partial payment. If we go withשמואל then the pledge counts for full payment.
(3) To רש’’י, the oath of the lender "it is not in my domain "is from the Torah. To the רמב''ם it is derabanan. This is from Rav Huna on page 34. But toשמואל does it apply at all? after all if he has been paid back in full, then why take an oath. But on the other hand, the oath isn’t for the loan. It is only concerning the whereabout of the pledge.
(4) To some opinions the law of שמואל is the law. ר' יצחק the grandson of רש’’י, and some hold שמואל is the basis of the ruling of ר’ יוחנן that if one loses a pledge, it counts for the whole loan.
[5] to the ראב’’ד the pledge counts for "הילך" and thus the borrower would not take an oath because of admission in part. and to שמואל the pledge counts for the whole loan and this i s more in line with the רמב''ו that the lender should get back the money for the loan only after the borrower gets back the pledge.
i had millions of other thoughts but then this is all I can recall right now.
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