There are a few questions that occurred to me on the way back from the sea concerning the subject in Menachot page 3 and Zevachim page 9 about the argument between Rava and Rav Acha bar Rava. To Rava a sin offering for fat that is brought for blood is valid. That means it is close enough to be not shelo lishma. To Rav Acha bar Rava it is invalid (pasul). The thing that if a sin offering is brought for the sake of any other sacrifice, it is invalid, and does not count at all. So, what i think is that in our case, it is close enough to be to be not invalid completely, but still off enough to be not counted for the owner's obligation to be fulfilled (in the opinion of Rav Acha). The difficult thing to understand here is that it ought to be the case that the closer it is to the actual obligation, the more invalid it ought to be. (This is based on the principle, “If it is its same kind, it can destroy it. If it is not its same type, it cannot destroy it.” (It is like a third category. In general, if one sacrifices most things not for the sake of that which it was sanctified for, they are valid, but do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. But a sin offering is different. If it is brought not for its own sake, it is invalid completely. But here we have a third category of a sin offering that is not invalid, but does not count for the owner's obligation. This is a category that unusual for a sin offering,) The other question is a case where one brings a burnt offering for the sake of someone else who is not obligated in a burnt offering. The law it is valid, but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of the owner because everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or another. The problem I see in this is that in any case it is a case of change of owner, and so it is a regular case of, “All sacrifices that are brought shelo lishma (or not for the sake of their owners) are valid, but do not count for the obligation of the owner.------------------------There are a few questions that occurred to me on the way back from the sea concerning the subject in מנחות page 3 and זבחים page 9 about the argument between רבא and רב אחא בר רבא. To רבא ,a חטאת for חלב that is brought for blood is כשר. That means it is close enough to be notשלא לשמה . [] To רב אחא it is פסול. The thing that if a חטאת is brought for the sake of any other sacrifice, it is פסול and does not count at all. So, what I think is that in our case, it is close enough to be to be not פסול completely, but still off enough to be not counted for the owners obligation in the opinion of רב אחא. The difficult thing to understand here is that it ought to be the case that the closer it is to the actual obligation, the more pasul it ought to be. (This is based on the principle “If it is its same kind, it can destroy it. If it is not its same type, it cannot destroy it.”מינה מחריב בה שלא מינה אינו מחריב בה (It is like a third category. In general, if one sacrifices most things שלא לשמה, they are valid but do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. But a חטאת is different. If it is brought not for its שלא לשמה, it is פסול completely. But here we have a third category of a חטאת that is not פסול but does לא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה, that is a category that usually אינו resourced for a חטאת,) The other question is a case where one brings a קרבן עולה for the sake of someone else who is not obligated in a קרבן עולה. It is valid, but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of the owner because everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or another. The problem I see in this is that in any case it is a case of שינוי בעלים, and so it is a regular case of, “All sacrifices that are brought שלא לשמם(or not for the sake of their owners) are valid, but do not count for the obligation of the owner.