Rav Shach asks this question on the Rambam.[laws of temura, chapter 4 law 7] If one sanctifies a female sheep to be a Passover sacrifice (and we know a female cannot be a pesah) and it gives birth to a male sheep, both go to pasture. This like the first tana in Temura page 19a. But the Gemara says that this law of the tana is applicable even if the female was pregnant at the time she was sanctified, and the gemara says the reason is because the baby in the womb is part of the mother. (The offspring does not become sanctified separately from the mother.) However, the Rambam decided the law like this tana, and yet also holds that the baby in the womb is not part the mother, so the Rambam should have decided the law is the male lamb can be sacrificed as a Passover like R. Elazar. To answer this question I would like to suggest that in Tmura page 10 there is an argument between R. Yochanan and Bar Pada. There, Bar Pada said holiness does not descend on a baby in the womb. I think the Rambam decided the law to be like Bar Pada. [Therefore, even though the baby is not part of the mother still it cannot be sacrificed as a Passover offering]. {But one can still ask on this because the Rambam says the baby sheep must not be sacrificed as a Passover, while Bar Pada might mean that holiness does not automatically descend on the baby lamb, but that after it is born, it can be sacrificed for whatever one intends it to be.} However, he interprets Bar Padaa to mean that a lamb in the womb can only receive holiness of money not holiness of body. We can see many examples of this in the Rambam for example if one sanctifies a lamb in the womb to be a sin offering. There also the holiness that descends on the lamb in that of moeny.ie it goes to pasture until it receives blemish and is sold and the money is used to buy a sin offering. The question on this would come from the law that the Rambam writes that a lamb in the womb of an animal with a blemish is considered whole and perfect, and can be sacrificed, I think the way people understand the Rambam is that if one sanctifies a female animal to be a peace offering, and then it receives a blemish, then its offspring can still be sacrificed to be a peace offering. But I think the Rambam meant that the offspring can be sacrificed as a peace offering, but not that it is sacrificed as such. Rather one needs to sanctify the offspring after it is born, and then it can be sacrificed as a peace offering. Rav Shach brings the answer of Rav Isaac Zev, but asks on it. And he does not find a better answer. So here I suggest a possible approach to answer this question. So, my approach is this. I am saying the Rambam decided the law like bar pada and that bar pada meant that the holiness of the altar does not come on the lamb but holiness of money does, and not just holiness on money comes on the lamb, but it comes in such a way that it cannot be excused from the altar until it goes to pasture, and gets a blemish, and then is sold, and that money that it is sold for becomes a Passover if it was sold before Passover and a peace offering of after Passover. A proof is that the Gemara itself says exactly this that Bar Pada meant only holiness of the altar does not come on the lamb, for the Gemara asked on Bar Pada from a Mishna that implies holiness can come on the lamb and answers that refers to holiness on money. But even there the Tosphot asks from the end of that Mishna and answers that since holiness of money descends on it, therefore automatically the holiness of body also come on it and that means it is sold and with that money one buys the sacrifice it was meant for. This is exactly how the Rambam decided the law in our case of the female that was sanctified to be a Passover. Then she gives birth to a male lamb. Even though the Rambam decided that the baby in the womb is not part of the mother, still holiness of the altar does not come on it, and it is sold and with that money one buys a Passover sacrifice. This is exactly how Bar Pada is explained in the Gemara and Tosphot and the Shita Mekubetzet, number 16, page 10 of TemuraI saw after writing the above paragraph that Rav Aaron Kotler has an approach that also can answer this question. The question is that the male lamb of a female that was sanctified to be a Passover sacrifice is not sacrificed as a Passover. This is odd because we hold the offspring while in the womb is not part of teh mother and we hold since the holiness of money comes on something then also come the holiness of the body. Rav Aaron hold that last principle works only if it is immediate. but if there is a delay between the holiness of money and holiness of body then holiness if body does not come. ---------------------------------------------------------רב שך asks this question on the רמב’’ם. If one sanctifies a female sheep to be a קרבן פסח (and we know a female cannot be a פסח) and it gives birth to a male sheep, both go to pasture. This like the first תנא in תמורה page י''ט ע''א. But the גמרא says that this law of the תנא is applicable even if the female was pregnant at the time she was sanctified, and the גמרא says the reason is because the וולד in the womb is part of the mother. (The וולד does not become sanctified separately from the mother.) However, the רמב’’ם decided the law like this תנא, and yet also holds that the וולד in the womb is not part the mother, so the רמב’’ם should have decided the law is the male וולד can be sacrificed as a פסח like ר' אלעזר. To answer this question, I would like to suggest that in תמורה page י' there is an argument between ר' יוחנן and בר פדא. There, בר פדא said holiness does not descend on a וולד in the womb. I think the רמב’’ם decided the law to be like בר פדא. [Therefore, even though the וולד is not part of the mother still it cannot be sacrificed as a קרבן פסח. {But one can still ask on this because the רמב’’ם says the וולד must not be sacrificed as a פסח, while בר פדא might mean that holiness does not automatically descend on the וולד ,but that after it is born ,it can be sacrificed for whatever one intends it to be .} However, he interprets בר פדאa to mean that a וולד in the womb can only receive holiness of דמים not holiness of גוף. and we can see many examples of this in the רמב’’ם ,for example if one sanctifies a וולד in the womb to be a sin offering. There also the holiness that descends on the וולד in that of money. i.e. it goes to pasture until it receives blemish, and is sold, and the money is used to buy a sin offering. The question on this would come from the law that the רמב’’ם writes that a וולד in the womb of an animal with a blemish is considered whole and perfect, and can be sacrificed. I think the way people understand the רמב’’ם is that if one sanctifies a female animal to be a peace offering, and then it receives a blemish, then its וולד can still be sacrificed to be a peace offering. But I think the רמב’’ם meant that the וולד can be sacrificed as a peace offering, but not that it is sacrificed as such. Rather one needs to sanctify the וולד after it is born, and then it can be sacrificed as peace offering.So, my approach is this. I am saying the רמב’’ם decided the law like בר פדא and that בר פדא meant that the holiness of the altar does not come on the lamb וולד ,but holiness of דמים does. And not just holiness of דמים come on the lamb, but it comes in such a way that it cannot be excused from the altar (אינו יוצא מידי המזבח לעולם)until it goes to pasture and gets a blemish and then is sold and that money that it is sold for becomes a קרבן פסח if it was sold before קרבן פסח and a peace offering If after Passover. A proof is that the גמרא itself says exactly this that בר פדא meant only holiness of the altar does not come on the lamb, for the גמרא asked on בר פדא from a משנה that implies holiness can come on the lamb and answers that refers to holiness on money. But even there the תוספות asks from the end of that משנה and answers that since holiness of money descends on it, therefore automatically the holiness of body also come on it and that means it is sold and with that money one buys the sacrifice it was meant for. This is exactly how the רמב’’ם decided the law in our case of the female that was sanctified to be a קרבן פסח. Then she gives birth to a male lamb. Even though the רמב’’ם decided that the וולד in the womb is not part of the mother(עובר לאו ירך אמו) , still holiness of the מזבח does not come on it, and it is sold and with that money one buys a קרבן פסח sacrifice. This is exactly how בר פדא is explained in the גמרא and תוספות and the שיטה מקובצת, number ט''ז, דף י' of תמורה ------------------------------------------------------------------ I saw after writing the above paragraph that רב אהרן קטלר has an approach that also can answer this question. The question is that the male lamb of a female that was sanctified to be a Passover sacrifice is not sacrificed as a Passover. This is odd because we hold the וולד while in the womb is not part of the mother and we hold since the holiness of money comes on something,(מיגו דנחתא קדושת דמים נחתא קדושת הגוף) then also come the holiness of the body. רב אהרון hold that last principle works only if it is immediate. But if there is a delay between the holiness of money and holiness of body then holiness if body does not come.

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The implication of the difference between concepts and things is that Kant was right as opposed to H.A. Prichard.

There is a difference between concepts and things. Concepts are universals, but are only perceptible by the mind. The reason I mention this is that Thomas Reid pointed out the fallacy of the theory of ideas of Hume and Berkley that when we are aware of something we are only aware of something in our mind. (Reid pointed out that this is false. Our minds relay information about what is outside the mind. It does not relay information about what is in the mind.) But there is a difference of being aware of universals (characteristic that can be shared by individual things) and being aware of tables. The problem with the theory of ideas of Hume is that it formed the basis of German Idealism -i.e., Kant and Hegel. And it is not so far fetched since even for color to be perceived by us we have to be affected by it. It needs to be caused. But causality is never perceived. We only see one event follow another and from that we extrapolate causality. In short--what we area aware of are things in the mind. But then what is the difference between things and concepts? individuals and universals? Concepts are universals, but are only perceptible by the mind. But the mind is also aware of individual things. But not because of reason. Rather just because they are there. They do not need justification. [The implication of the difference between concepts and things is that Kant was right as opposed to H.A. Prichard. So, we are right back to where we started with Kant Hegel and Leonard Nelson of the New Friesian School.}

רמב"ם, מעשה הקרבנות פרק ט''ו הלכה ד'

ברצוני לציין שישנה החלטה ברמב"ם קשה להבנה. הרמב"ם פסק כי ניתן להקריב את בהמת השותפים [מעשה הקרבנות פרק ט''ו הלכה ד'], אך כאשר מדובר במקרה של כבשה המקודשת להיות קורבן פסח ומולדת זכר, הכבש ואמו הולכים למרעה ואינם יכולים להיקרב. [הלכות תמורה פרק ד' הלכה ז'] מה שאני מתכוון הוא שיש מקרה של שני שותפים שבבעלותם בהמה, ואחד מהם קידש אותה, ומאוחר יותר קנה את החצי השני והקדיש אותו החצי השני. ר' יוחנן אמר שאי אפשר להקריב אותה מכיוון שניתן לדחות בעלי חיים מקדושת המזבח. עכשיו, רב אמר ביומא ס''ד ע''א שבעלי חיים נדחים, וכדומה לזה רב אמר על שני השעירים של יום הכיפורים שאחד מת שניתן להקריב את השני עם עוד שעיר בלי הגרלה. הרמב"ם פסק את הדין כמו רב. לכן, עולה השאלה כיצד הוא יכול גם לפסוק את הדין כמו המשנה שיש דיחוי בבעלי חיים (בעניין מקדיש נקבה לפסחו והולידה זכר)? רב שך עונה שהרמב''ם פסק כרב ולא כר' יוחנן. רב סובר יש דיחוי בבעלי חיים רק כשיש דיחוי בעצם הקדושה כמו מקדיש נקבה לפסחו (שם עצם הקדושה דחויה), אבל אין דיחוי בבעלי חיים כשיש רק עיכוב זמני או שה דיחוי בא מצד סיבות שאינן קשורות לעצם חלות הקדושה כמו נקבה לפסחו או שאפשר לתקן כגון בהמת השותפים. ( ר' יוחנן סובר שיש דיחוי בבעלי חיים גם כיש רק עיכוב זמני או שזה סתם דיחוי שאינו בהקשר לעצם הקדושה כמו בהמת השותפים, לא רק כשיש דיחוי בעצם הקדושה.) זאת תירוצו של רב שך לישב את הרמב''ם.[תוספות (פסחים צ''ח ע''א) שואלים מדוע ר' יוחנן טרח לספר לנו שבעלי חיים נדחים? אנו יודעים זאת כבר מהמשנה שכאשר יש מקרה של כבשה נקבה שמקודשת לפסח והולידה זכר, אסור להקריב אותה ווולדה.]עכשיו עם ההבנה של רב שך, ברור למה אין להקשות שאלה הזו בגישתו של הרמב''ם. בגלל שהרמב''ם היה אומר שהמשנה על נקבה לפסחו הוא מצב של קדושה דחויה. ולכן ר' יוחנן היה צריך לומר שבעלי חיים נדחים גם כשיש דיחוי בעלמא שאינו בהקשר עם עצם חלות הקדושה. אבל כאמור הר''מ אינו פוסק כר' יוחנן בזה אלא כרב שאין בעלי חיים נדחים כשהדיחוי בא מצד סיבות שונות מעצם חלות הקדושה

Light does not experience time, and therefore cannot experience distance You can only get from place to place if there is a time difference from when you started to when you arrived. So space and time are not fundamental. This is shown in the Bell Inequality. The most common explanation is that there is action at a distance, but that can not be true because we know that General Relativity is true because of GPS. [GPS would be off by very significant amounts daily if not for corrections that were hardwired into the satellites based on slowing time down because of special relativity, and speeding it up because the satellites are further away from the earth.] Therefore, the reason for the Bell inequality is that things do not have classical values of space and time until they are measured (or interact with their environment.) (You can see this in Kant who holds that space is not comprehensible by reason. Dinge an sich. Things in themselves are beyond reason. The idea of Kant is that ,when reason goes beyond the realm of possibility of experience reason itself breaks down, and results in contradictions.)

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אני רוצה להציע שלפי אביי אין צורך בגט שיהיה לו קטגוריה של תקפות של מסמך הגם שהגט צריך להיכתב למענה. היכן בתורה יש לנו דבר כזה קטגוריות תקפות של מסמכים? אבל זה נכון שאנו מוצאים שהחכמים קבעו הוראות מסוימות לגבי מסמכים, אך אלו אינן מהתורה. {למעשה, הרמב"ם כתב שמסמכי הלוואות תקפים רק מדברי החכמים, לא מהתורה.} מה שאני מתכוון הוא זה. אנו יודעים שהגט צריך להיכתב למענה. כמו כן, ר' אלעזר אמר עדי מסירה כרתי (עדים שרואים את מסירת הגט גורמים לגירושין להיות תקפים). אבל ר' אלעזר לא אומר דבר על כך שהעדים הללו צריכים לראות המסירה למענה. אפילו ר' מאיר (שאמר שעדי חתימה כרתי) לא אמר דבר על כך שהעדים צריכים להיות למענה. אולם, בגיטין פ''ו ע''א, המשנה אומרת שאם שני מסמכי גירושין נשלחו על ידי שני אנשים שונים והתערבבו, השליחים נותנים את שניהם לכל אישה. ר' ירמיה אמר שמשנה זו אינה כר' אלעזר, ורש''י אומר שהסיבה היא שהעדים אינם יודעים עבור איזו אישה נכתבו המסמכים. כי ר' ירמיה אכן מחייבת לשמה במתן המסמכים. אבל אביי אמר שאין צורך שהעדים ידעו עבור איזו אישה נכתב כל מסמך. הם צריכים רק לראות את מתן המסמכים. אני צריך לציין שאפילו ר' מאיר לא אומר דבר על כך שהעדים צריכים להיות לשמה. בכל אופן ראיתי שרב שך ור' אהרון קטלר מעלים את הרעיון הזה לגבי המסמכים שצריכים לקבל את קטגוריה התקינה של מסמך, אבל אני לא יודע למה זה נחוץ כדי להסביר את אביי או ר' ירמיה. כל מה שר' ירמיה אמר זה שהעדים צריכים להיות לשמה.רב אהרון קוטלר כותב שגט צריך להתקבע כבעל תוקף של מסמך, והוא גוזר זאת מגיטין דף י' צד ב'. שם אמר ר' שמעון במשנה שגיטין שנכתבו בבתי דין של גויים תקפים, אבל לא גיטין שנכתב על ידי הדיוט. הגמרא שואלת על זה, "אבל הם לא בקטגוריה של גיטין וקידושין." עכשיו רב אהרון מבין מזה שלגיטין צריך קטגוריה של מסמך תקף. זו גזירה תקפה מהשאלה בגישת ר' מאיר (עדי חתימה כרתי). אולם, הגמרא עונה שר' שמעון מחזיק כמו ר' אלעזר שעדי מסירה כרתי. ובדף פ''ו, ר' ירמיה ואביי דנים בדעת ר' אלעזר