Bava Kama page 6a. Rav Shach asks why the Rambam does not bring the law of his stone knife or burden that he left on top of a roof and they fell in a common wind and they did damage after they were already abandoned that he is liable. The answer is that the gemara originally thought one must to to do and act in order that he be liable for causing damage. But after we learn about the wall and tree that fell and did damage that he is liable without his doing any deed, all the more so in our case of the stone on the roof when he did a deed by putting them on the roof. A similar answer Rav Shach provided about why the Rambam did not mention the law of a pit that is being kicked around by the feet on people in a public domain. The reason this is not brought is the same. The question I have on this is the question who is liable in the case of a rolling pit? Even if you say the one who put it there is liable, but still there is the second person. Tosphot in fact says it is the one kicking the pit thar is liable.So you cannot learn that he is liable by negligence since he is not negligent. A second problem is that even in way that we learn before we learn about the wall and tree that feel that the obligation for the stone on the roof is from pit and fire.so that might be a gap too wide to cross to learn that the stone of the roof from the wall and tree. however, I think Rav Shach does answer this last question himself. It is the first question that I think might be a good question unless we assume it simple that only the one who put the rolling pit in the public domain is liable.Although it is clear that the second person who is pushing the pit is doing it in an even more serious way than a negligence, and that he is clearly doing it intentionally, I still have a problem because it is the first person who committed the crime and the second person who caused the problem who should share the responsibility and each pay half. Not just the first person------------------------------------בבא קמא דך ו ע''א רב שך asks why the רמב''ם does not bring the law of his stone knife or burden that he left on top of a roof and they fell in a common wind and they did damage after they were already abandoned that he is חייב. The answer is that the גמרא originally thought one to has to do an act in order that he be חייב for causing damage. But after we learn about the כותל and אילן that fell and did damage that he is חייב without his doing any deed, all the more so in our case of the stone on the roof when he did a deed by putting them on the roof. A similar answer רב שך provided about why the רמב''ם did not mention the law of a pit that is being kicked around by the feet on people in a רשות הרבים. The reason this is not brought is the same. It is a case of negligence and so it is liable with needed the common denominator from pit and ox. The question I have on this is the question who is חייב in the case of a rolling pit? Even if you say the one who put it there is חייב ,but still there is the second person. תוספות in fact says it is the one kicking the pit that is חייב. So you cannot learn that he is חייב by negligence since he is not negligent. A second problem is that (even in the way that we learn before we learn about the wall and tree that fell) that the obligation for the stone on the roof is from pit and fire. So that might be a gap too wide to cross to learn that the stone of the roof from the כותל ואילן. However, I think רב שך does answer this last question himself. It is the first question that I think might be a good question unless we assume it simple that only the one who put the בור המתגלגל in the רשות הרבים is חייב. Although it is clear that the second person who caused the problem is doing it in a way that is even more serious than a case of negligence, since that he is clearly doing it intentionally, I still have a problem because the first person who was negligent and the second person who caused the problem should share the responsibility and each person should pay half, not just the first.

zb4 F Minor midi file zb4 nwc file

בבא בתרא כ''ו. אני חושב שכדאי להזכיר את גישתו של רב שמואל רוזובסקי בנוגע לאמירת עולא. עכשיו עולא אמר שמי שיש לו עץ שש עשרה אמות משכנו אינו יכול להביא ביכורים משום שהוא גזלן. הדרך שבה רב שמואל רוזובסקי מסביר זאת בזכרון שמואל פרק י"ד היא שהחלק העיקרי של עץ הוא השורש. מכיוון שהשורשים הולכים לשדה השכן, לכן העץ העיקרי נמצא בשדה השכן, ולכן לפרי שהעץ נושא יש לפחות חלק כלשהו בו השייך לשכן. (רב שך אומר שהעניין העיקרי הוא שהשורשים שואבים הזנה משדה השכן) השאלה שיש לי בנושא זה היא מהמשנה בדף פ''א ע''א (נפסק להלכה ברמב''ם, טור, ושלחן ערוך). המשנה אומרת שאם אדם קונה שני עצים בשדה, הוא אינו הבעלים של האדמה שהם עליה. מה שיוצא מהעץ הראשי שייך לו. מה שיוצא מהשורשים שייך לבעל האדמה. אבל אם אדם קונה שלושה עצים באותו שדה, אז הוא הבעלים של האדמה שהם עליה ביניהם וסביבם. לכן, מה שיוצא מהעץ או מהשורשים שייך לבעל העץ. לכן, יש שאלה. ברור שמה שיוצא מהעץ שייך לבעל העץ. גם אם יש רק עץ אחד במקרה של עולא, עדיין הדבר היחיד ששיייך לבעל הקרקע הוא מה שיוצא ישירות מהשורשים. אבל גם במקרה כזה, הפרי שהעץ נושא שייך לבעל העץ. אני יכול לחשוב שרב שמואל רוזובסקי יענה על כך באופן הבא. המשנה מדברת על כך שהעץ נמצא על אדמתו של האדם שמכר לו את העץ. המקרה של עולא שונה. המקרה של עולא הוא כאשר השורשים משתרעים לשדה של מישהו אחר. אבל איך זה יענה על השאלה אין לי מושג.

Bava Batra 26. I think it is worthwhile to mention the approach of Rav Shmuel Rozovski concerning the statement of Ula. Ula said one who has a tree with sixteen cubits of his neighbour cannot bring first fruits because he is a robber. The way Rav Shmuel Rozovsjki explains this in Zichron Shmuel chapter 14 is that the main part of a tree is the root. Since the roots are going into the neighbours’ field, therefore the main tree is in the neighbours’ field and so the fruit that it the tree bears has at least some portion in it that belongs to the neighbour. (Rav Shach says the main issue is that the roots draw substance from the neighbours’ field) The question I have on this is from the Mishna on page 81a (and that mishna is the law as decided in the Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Aruch).The mishna says if one buys two tree in a field he does not own the land they are on. what comes out of the main tree belongs to him. what comes out of the roots belongs to the owner of the land. But if one buys three trees in that field, then he owns the land they are on between them and around them. Therefore, what comes out of the tree or the roots belongs to the owner of the tree. So, we have a question. It is clear that what comes out of the tree belongs to the owner of the tree. and even if there is only one tree in the case of ula, still the only thing that would belong to the owner of the ground is what comes out of the roots directly. But even in that case the fruit that the tree bears belong to the owner f the tree. I can imagine however that Rav Shmuel rozovski might answer this in the following way. That mishna is talking about when the tree is on the land of the person that sold the tree to him. The case of Ula is different. The case of Ula is when the roots are extending into someone else’s field-------------------------------------- בבא בתרא 26. I think it is worthwhile to mention the approach of רב שמואל רוזובסקי concerning the statement of עולא. NOW עולא said one who has a tree with sixteen cubits of his neighbour cannot bring first fruits because he is a robber. The way רב שמואל רוזובסקי explains this in זכרון שמואל chapter 14 is that the main part of a tree is the root. Since the roots are going into the neighbours’ field, therefore the main tree is in the neighbours’ field and so the fruit that it the tree bears has at least some portion in it that belongs to the neighbour. (רב שך says the main issue is that the roots draw substance from the neighbours’ field) The question I have on this is from the משנה on page פ''א ע''א (and that משנה is the law as decided in the רמב''ם טור and שלחן ערוך). The משנה says if one buys two trees in a field, he does not own the land they are on. What comes out of the main tree belongs to him. What comes out of the roots belongs to the owner of the land. היוצא מן הגזע שלו היוצא מן השרשים של בעל הקרקעBut if one buys three trees in that field, then he owns the land they are on between them and around them. Therefore, what comes out of the tree or the roots belongs to the owner of the tree. היוצא מן הגזע מו השורשים שלוSo, we have a question. It is clear that what comes out of the tree belongs to the owner of the tree. Even if there is only one tree in the case of עולא, still the only thing that would belong to the owner of the ground is what comes out of the roots directly. But even in that case the fruit that the tree bears belong to the owner f the tree. I can imagine however that רב שמואל רוזובסקי might answer this in the following way. That משנה is talking about when the tree is on the land of the person that sold the tree to him. The case of עולא is different. The case of עולא is when the roots are extending into someone else’s field

יש ויכוח בין עולא לרבין, אם יש לאדם עץ במרחק של 16 אמות משכנו אם הוא יכול להביא ביכורים, עולא אמר שלא. רבין אמר כן משום שיהושע בן נון קבע שאדם יכול להביא ביכורים במקרה כזה. מלבד זאת, יש ויכוח נוסף בין תוספות לרבינו חננאל לגבי הסיבה של עולא לאסור ( בבא בתרא כ''ו ע''ב תוספות ד''ה גזלן). לר' חננאל, הסיבה היא בגלל גרימת נזק. לתוספות, הסיבה היא בעלות. אם הסיבה היא בעלות, אז עולא סבור שכאשר ר' יוחנן אמר את הכמות הדרושה לאספן של פירות שנשרו, הוא כיוון לט''ז אמות. בגמרא בבבא בתרא דף פ''א יש ויכוח מה פירוש של ר' יוחנן. ישנן שלוש דעות, ארבע עד שמונה אמות. שמונה עד שש עשרה, או ארבע עד שש עשרה אמות. עולא יטען ש"ט''ז אמות" היא התשובה התקפה היחידה. לגבי רבין, איננו יודעים מה הוא סבור. הוא יכול להסכים לחלוטין עם עולא, ולחלוק רק על סיבה אחת, שהיא תניית יהושע. או שיכולות להיות סיבות רבות אחרות. הרמב"ם סבור שהחוק הוא כמו רבין, וגם שאין דין של מרחק עץ משכן אלא כאשר לשכן יש גם עצים, ואז המרחק הוא ארבע אמות, זה כנראה מה שהרמב"ם חושב שמסכים עם רבין. עכשיו יש גם גישה שונה לכל הנושא הזה. לרבינו חננאל הסיבה לעולא היא נזקים. אבל אז קשה לדעת מאיפה מגיעות ט''ז האמות. המשנה בעמוד כ''ה קובעת כ''ה אמות אם יש בור בשדה של שכנו לפי החכמים, ואפס אמות לר' יוסי. אם יש עצים בשדה של השכן, אז המרחק הוא ארבע אמות לפי משנה מאוחרת יותר. ורבין יכול לקבוע כמו ר' יוסי שעל הניזק להרחיק את עצמו ועץ אינו גורם נזק מיידי לשדה של שכן, הוא אינו החיצים שלו

Gemara in Bava Batra page 26

There is an argument between עולא and רבין if one has a tree within 16 cubits of his neighbour, if he can bring first fruits, עולא said no. רבין said yes because יהושוה בו נון made a stipulation that one can bring first fruits in such a case. Besides that, there is another argument between תוספות and רבינו חננאל about the reason of עולא to forbid (Bava Batra page 26 side b tosphot first word robber.). To ר' חננאל, the reason is because of causing damage. To תוספות, the reason is ownership. If the reason is ownership, then עולא holds that when ר' יוחנן said the amount needed for a collector of the fallen fruit, that means 16 cubits. In the גמרא in בבא בתרא דף פ''א there is an argument what ר' יוחנן means. There are three opinions, 4 to eight cubits. Eight to sixteen or four to sixteen. עולא would hold the 16 is the only valid answer. As for רבין, we do not know what he holds. He might agree totally with עולא and disagree only on one account, that is the stipulation of יהושוה בו נון. Or there might be many other issues. The רמב’’ם holds the law is like רבין, and also that there is no law of distance of a tree from a neighbour except when the neighbour has trees also, and then the distance is four cubits. This is probably what the רמב’’ם thinks Rabin is in agreement with. Now there is also a different approach to this whole subject. It is רבינו חננאל that the reason for עולא is damages. But then it is hard to know from where the 16 cubits comes from. The משנה on page 25 holds 25 cubits if there is a pit in the field of his neighbour according to the חכמים, and zero cubits to ר' יוסי. If there are trees on the neighbour’s field, then the distance is four cubits according to a later mishna/ Rabin might hold like the ר' יוסי that a tree on one property causes no immediate damage to a neighbour’s field and so it does not have to be moved away

Kant, Leonard Nelson, Hegel, Prichard and Michael Huemer, the Intuitionists

I have been thinking a little about philosophy. To Prichard and Michael Huemer (the Intuitionists) direct perception of physical reality and of concepts is a fact. What I think they are ignoring is the problem that Kant has with this idea. You see, after reading Hume, Kant accepted that causality is not known by any empirical data. We might see that we hit a ball and it goes flying off many times, but we do not know that one thing causes the other. We just see one event happens after the other. To Kant causality is a priori. This is the quandary that led Kant into a bifurcated version of reality (Things in themselves, and empirical phenomena), because even what we see is not perceived directly. The object we are seeing causes light to be reflected from it and that light causes us to see the object. That even little bit of causality between the object and our senses is what makes even our seeing anything as having a half empirical and half a priori part. (The object causes us to see it). The way Kant bridged this gap between knowledge and objective reality is by combining the senses and structures of the mind based on Aristotelian categories with sense data.-------------- But this solution was rejected by Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson. To them, there is deeper source of knowledge, intuitive non-immediate knowledge that we know without reasoning and without empirical data. To some degree, this is obvious. Reasoning has to start from somewhere, otherwise you get an infinite regression. But to Fries, this knowledge is imbedded in the human mind. Leonard Nelson, however, understood this knowledge to be axioms that we have to start with in order to be able to reason at all. However, this approach seems to really be Kant’s original assumption because in order to made axioms that make sense, we already have to have some sense of what the outside world is like. ------------------------To Hegel the problem of Kant to get to true knowledge is however solvable, but means of an infinite regression, (if you can get to the end of that regression), i.e., the triads that start in our world and lead up to God, the Infinite Subject. So Hegel agrees with the problem of Kant, and does not try to bypass it by direct knowledge. Rather he goes with this idea of triads, that work from below to get up higher and higher until one reaches God. This process was in fact introduced by Kant and Fichte --that of thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis.---------[This approach of Hegel is really the same structure of reality as the Neoplatonic philosopher, Plotinus. The difference is that Plotinus starts from above (The ONE, the Good) and goes down to this world]. --------------------A later note. I would like to argue for H.A. Pricharad and to show why and how he does not ignore Kant's idea that empirical perception is based on causality and even if there is the slightest step of causality, then all our perception has an a priori [non empirical] element. The way to see how Prichard would bypass this difficulty in order to come to the idea that we have direct awareness of objects is this. All our perception is a light and chemical process, not a mind process. the light that is reflected from the body to out eyes to the brain is all direct natural processes. Only once the image is in the brain then does the mind begin to work on it to decipher what it is that we are seeing. So, perception is direct. We do not add causality until we have already perceived the object.----------------------------------The problem in philosophy is that to become a philosopher of note and reputation one needs to disagree with all other philosophers. This is exactly how not to get anything done. to see how things work differently in physics you might notice that the photo electric effect was discovered by someone and then instead of trying to explain it away as contrary to the established way of understanding light to be waves, Einstein went with it an won the noble prize explaining how light comes in discreate particles. Thus, I think that philosophy would do a lot better if one person could learn from the other--and take and good points and discard the invalid ones. For example, I think that Kant was right about most things in philosophy but about little or nothing in moral philosophy of political philosophy. But even his three Critiques needed modification by Jacob fries and Leonard Nelson, mainly because the beginning of reason needs a beginning in axioms, not in Aristotlelean logic. Also, Prichard had some very important points about the very nature o reason itself i.e., that it has only one function. That function has nothing to do with Hume’s idea o perceiving contradictions. Rather, the function of reason is to perceive universals, and that is exactly what Kant talking about when he called this synthetic a-priori. None of this contradicts Hegel’s idea about how reason progress towards the absolute Subject. The problem is that philosophers are so smart that they see contradictions where there are none. Rather they ought to see how to build on each others work.