ישנה מה שנראה כמו סתירה בחוק בסוכה דף ד' ובעירובין דף פ''ט. בסוכה, רב נחמן אמר שאנו רואים את הקירות כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה במקרה של ארבעה מוטות המונחים על צידי הגג. (גוד אסיק מחיצתא.) והרמב"ם פסק זאת כדין כפי שהוא כותב שתקע ארבעה מוטות בפינות הגג, ושם עליהם כיסוי של עלים, הסוכה תקפה, ואנו רואים את הקירות התחתונים כאילו הם משתרעים כלפי מעלה עד לפינות כיסוי העלים (סיכוך). אולם בעירובין, אמרו חכמים שכאשר יש גגות מחוברים, כולם נחשבים כרשות אחת. הגמרא אומרת שזהו הדין. אך שם איננו אומרים שקירות הבניינים שמתחת לגגות המחוברים נחשבים כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה. אני חושב שההבדל ברור ורמוז גם בתוספות. במקרה של גגות, הקירות התחתונים של הבניינים מוסתרים לחלוטין על ידי גגות והם בהחלט לא נראים. אבל בסוכה, לפחות קיר הבית נראה מבחוץ

Suka page 4 and Eruvin page 89b. there is what looks like a contradiction in law. In Suka Rav Nachman said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the Rambam decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put sa covering of leaves over them, the suka is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves. However in Eruvin, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The Gemara says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in Tosphot. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the suka the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside._______________________________________________There is what looks like a contradiction in law סוכה page 4 and עירובין page 89b. In סוכה,רב נחמן said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the רמב''ם decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put a covering of leaves over them, the סוכה is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves (סיכוך) . However in עירובין, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The גמרא says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in תוספות. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the סוכה the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside.

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גיטין ס''ז ע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'תנו גט לאשתי' או לשלושה אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם כותבים אותו ונותנים אותו. אבל הם לא יכולים להגיד לאף אחד אחר לעשות זאת. אבל אם אמר לשלושה אנשים פשוט "תנו גט לאשתי", אז לפי ר' מאיר הם יכולים להגיד לסופר לכתוב אותו ולעדים לחתום עליו והם נותנים אותו לאשתו. ר' יוסי חולק על כך ואומר שגם במצב האחרון הם חייבים לכתוב ולתת אותו בעצמם. שמואל אמר, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם צריכים לעשות זאת בעצמם. אם יאמרו לסופר לכתוב והם חתמו, הגט אינו תקף, אולם נושא זה עדיין דורש לימוד." הגמרא שואלת על משפט זה של שמואל. היא שואלת מדוע זה דורש לימוד? אולי משום שהוא יכול לחשוב שיש אפשרות שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. השאלה שיש לי על גמרא זו היא זו. הדעה שניתן למסור מילים לשליח היא ר' מאיר והוא מסכים במשנה שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים לתת גט לאשתו, עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. (ואף על פי שמקרה של שמואל שונה מהמשנה, כי במקרה של שמואל הוא אמר "כתובו ותנו" בעוד שבמשנה הוא אמר רק "תנו", עדיין זה מחמיר את השאלה שלי, כי הוספת המילה "כתובו" אנו רואים במשנה שזה אפילו מחמיר יותר מאשר אם הוא רק אמר לתת. אם הוא גם אמר כתובו לשלשה, אז ר' מאיר מסכים שהם חייבים לכתוב את הגט בעצמם.) אז אפילו אם שמואל יכול להסכים עם ר' מאיר, עדיין לא אמור להיות ספק לגבי ההלכה. תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו היא שאולי בנקודה זו הגמרא חושבת שר' מאיר עצמו יכול לחלוק אפילו על תחילת המשנה, לא רק בבא שנייה

Gitin 67b The Mishna says if one says to two people give a get to my wife or to three people write and give a get to my wife they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a get to his wife then according to r Meir they can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. R Jose disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. Shmuel said if one says to two people write and give get to my wife they have to do it themselves. if they tell a scribe to write and they signed, it is not valid however this subject still requires study. The Gemara ask on this statement of Shmuel. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this gemara is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is R Meir and he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give get to his wife that they must do it themselves.(And even though the case of Shmuel is different from the Mishna because in the case of Shmuel he said “write and give” while in the Mishna he said only “give” still this makes my question even stronger because adding the words "write" we see in the Mishna that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also saidto three "write" , then R Meir agrees they must write it themselves.) So even if Shmuel might hold with R Meir there still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to thsi question is that perhaps at this point the gemara is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.---------------------------------------------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''ב The משנה says, "If one says to two people 'give a גט to my wife' or to three people, 'write and give a גט to my wife' they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a גט to his wife then according to ר’ מאירthey can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. ר' יוסי disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. שמואל said, "If one says to two people write and give גט to my wife they have to do it themselves. If they tell a scribe tp write and they signed, it is not valid, however this subject still requires study." The גמרא ask on this statement of שמואל. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this גמרא is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is ר’ מאירand he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give גט to his wife that they must do it themselves. [(And even though the case ofשמואל is different from the משנה because in the case of שמואל he said “write and give” while in the משנה he said to three only “give” tstill this makes my question even stronger because adding the word "write" we see in the משנה that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also said to three "write" then ר' מאיר agrees they must write it themselves.)] So even if שמואל might hold with ר’ מאירthere still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to this question is that perhaps at this point the גמרא is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.

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There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. Essay by Michael Huemer

3. Inclinations to Believe 3.1. Types of Inclination There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. You might be inclined to believe X because X just seems to be true. Or you might be inclined to believe X because X is emotionally comforting. Or because you think good people believe X. Or because your social group believes X. Notice how the last three are quite different from believing something because it seems correct. So here’s a theory: Unjustified beliefs result when non-appearance-based inclinations influence our credences or outright beliefs. Only appearances are (epistemically) justification-conferring. 3.2. Can We Control our Beliefs? Some philosophers would question whether we can control our beliefs and whether we can believe something on the basis of ordinary (non-epistemic) desires, such as the desire for emotional comfort, or to fit in, or to be a good person. Examples: If I offered you a million dollars to sincerely believe that you are a giraffe, I bet you still couldn’t do it. But maybe this only shows that you can’t believe for practical reasons when you have conclusive evidence that the proposition is false. So consider … If I offered you a million dollars to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is even, I bet you couldn’t do it. In #2, the evidence is evenly balanced; thus, if non-epistemic desires can ever influence belief, they should be able to do so in that example, right? It looks like they can’t, so desires can’t influence beliefs. 3.3. Doxastic Semi-voluntarism Consider two extreme positions: Doxastic Involuntarism: Desires can never have any influence on any beliefs. (Strong) Doxastic Voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs just as easily as they influence ordinary actions. Neither of these is the case. What is correct is Doxastic Semi-voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs sometimes, but their influence is limited. One cannot believe a thing that is too obviously false, or too obviously unjustified. There is a limit to how epistemically irrational a person can be, even if they want to (this limit varies across people). Thus, you can’t believe you are a giraffe, no matter the reward, because that’s obviously false. Nor can you believe the number of atoms is even, because that is obviously unjustified. But suppose that your child is accused of a heinous crime (say, deadnaming Caitlin Jenner). If the evidence is complex and hard to evaluate, so that it is not too obvious what the right judgment is, then it becomes much easier for your love for your child and desire to believe that she is good to influence your judgment, causing you to believe the child innocent even when the evidence does not justify this. There will be some degree of evidence that would induce you to admit that your child had committed the heinous act, but the evidentiary threshold will just be much higher than it would be for an impartial observer. Everyone knows that things like this can happen; that is why defendants’ family members are not allowed to sit on juries. If you try talking to a political ideologue some time and giving them evidence against their beliefs, you’ll probably become convinced that the same thing is happening to them. So the first thing that enables people to adopt unjustified beliefs is evidential ambiguity. There should be mixed evidence, evidence pointing in different directions, and it should be unclear how to weigh the evidence, perhaps because the evidence for and against X is of different kinds. 3.4. Confusing Feelings with Appearances In some cases, people may confuse their emotions with appearances. When you hear a claim that you don’t like, you may have an aversive reaction, which includes a sense of the clash between that claim and others of your current attitudes. E.g., you hear a negative claim about someone you like, or a positive one about someone you dislike. You might confuse that feeling with an appearance that the claim is factually wrong. Likewise, it is possible to confuse a positive feeling, a feeling of fit with your other current attitudes, with an appearance that a claim is correct. This, in turn, partially disguises the fact that your desired belief is unjustified; it makes this sufficiently unobvious that it becomes possible to adopt the belief. 4. Corruption of Belief-Forming Practices You’re obligated, before forming a belief on a controversial issue, to conduct a responsible inquiry. This typically requires things like: listening to both sides (or multiple sides), looking for counter-evidence, and trying to find objections to arguments that you are initially attracted to. Most people are terrible at this. They only listen to news sources who they already know agree with their political orientation; they accept evidence supporting their favored view at face value, while carefully scrutinizing only the evidence that undermines their favored view (if they happen to accidentally run into some); they don’t think about objections to their views but focus their attention on reasons for their views. This violation of epistemic norms stops many beliefs from being justified (the 3rd kind of irrationality mentioned in sec. 2). Why do people do these things? Again, doxastic semi-voluntarism is important. If involuntarism were true (so that only epistemic reasons could influence beliefs and not desires), then these measures would be impotent. E.g., you could still deliberately select news sources that already agree with you, but then your credences would automatically update on the fact that you did that, and that there were many other news sources that would very likely have given you evidence against your favored view, and that would prevent you from adopting a high credence in your favored view. On the other hand, if strong voluntarism were true (so that we could form beliefs based on our desires just as easily as we take actions based on our desires), then there would be no need for these measures. You would just directly believe X based on your desire to believe it, with no need to select evidence sources, direct your attention away from objections, etc. We do these things because our desires have some power to affect our beliefs, but only when it’s not too clear what epistemic rationality demands. 5. Conclusion Actually, it’s not hard to be irrational. Everybody has non-epistemic belief preferences—desires to believe something for reasons unrelated to truth or evidential justification. These have a limited, direct influence on our beliefs, which is most important when the evidence is ambiguous and when our feelings about a proposition can be confused with appearances. Desires can also directly influence how we conduct inquiry, enabling us to take advantage of our predictable cognitive shortcomings, such as the tendency to under-adjust for biases in our evidence sources. The beliefs that we form after such an inquiry are unjustified due to failure to satisfy obligations of responsible inquiry. This is bad because unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false, and false beliefs can wreak havoc. E.g., false political beliefs prevent us from solving social problems, and often make the problems worse. The mechanisms for generating unjustified beliefs will operate more or less automatically unless you make specific, positive efforts to stop them—which you should do to be a good person. That is why the points developed above are important to know. [After the above essay I might mention here that Michael Huemer is with the school of thought of the intuitionists which is different from the Kant Fries school and also different from Hegel. As for me I see value in all three schools and see each as relating to a different stratum of level of reality phenomenal world, the rational world and the world beyond reason the dinge an sich. All this along the lines of Plotinus the philosopher who was mainly with Plato but used modifications from Aristotle]