Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a

I was at the local Lithuanian Beit Midrash at night and had a chance to look at the Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a. As I was looking at the Ramban, it occurred to me that perhaps Tosphot and the Ramban are saying the same basic approach to the statement of Abaye that "R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things." If so, then this approach to Tosphot is not like the Maharsha, nor like the Maharhal. To the Maharsha, the Tosphot is saying that to R. Judah there are two ways of being not liable (when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage). One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To R Meir there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the Maharshal, the meaning of Tosphot is that at the time of the fall, the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (R. Judah) or by negligence (R. Meir). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the Ramban has a different approach, and I think this is what Tosphot means. To the Ramban, the approach of R. Judah is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both Tosphot and the Ramban bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole nor want it. Therefore R. Judah and R. Meir disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. To R. Meir he is liable and R. Judah disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about Tosphot at the present time[A proof that Tosphot holds the same as the Ramban is that the Rosh brings a statement from Rabainu Izhak that if the fall was by accident and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and Tosphot in general is Rabainu Izhakk ] However, I want to add here that the Rif has the opposite approach to R. Judah. He says that R. Judah agrees with R. Meir when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both R. Judah and R. Meir agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object. I would like to add here that later in the Gemara page 29 b R Yochanan said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and R Oshiya said he is not liable. If we learn like the Maharshal, the statement of Abaye is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between R Yochanan and R Oshiya, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the Maharsha, the statement of Abaye is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable. At this point I would like to ask a question on the Rif and the Ramban. It is this. If we learn like the Maharshal, then when Abaye says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like Rabainu Izhak that cannot be so. For he says even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the Rif if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. At this point I would like to ask a question on the Rif and the Ramban. It is this. If we learn like the Maharshal, then when Abaye says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like Rabainu Izhak that cannot be so. For he says even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the Rif if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. ------------------------------------------------the רמב’’ן on בבא קמא כ''ט ע''א page. As I was looking at the רמב’’ן, it occurred to me that perhaps תוספות and the רמב’’ן are saying the same basic approach to the statement of אביי that ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. If so, then this approach to תוספות is not like the מהרש’’א, nor like the מהרש’’ל. To the מהרש’’א, the תוספות is saying that to ר' יהודה there are two ways of being not liable when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage. One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To ר’ מאיר there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the מהרש’ל, the meaning of תוספות is that at the time of the fall the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (ר’ יהודה) or by negligence (ר’ מאיר). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the רמב’’ן has a different approach and I think this is what תוספות means. To the רמב’’ן, the approach of ר’ יהודה is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both תוספות and the רמב’’ן bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole, nor want it. Therefore ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence and yet he abandoned the object. To ר’ מאיר he is liable and ר’ יהודה disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about תוספות at the present time.([A proof that תוספות holds the same as the רמב''ן is that the רא''ש brings a statement from רבינו יצחק (הר''י) that if the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and תוספות in general is רבינו יצחק) However, I want to add here that the רי''ף has the opposite approach. He says that ר’ יהודה agrees with ר’ מאיר when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object.------- I would like to add here that later in the גמרא page כ''ט ע''ב ר' יוחנן said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and ר' אושעיה said he is not liable. If we learn like the מהרש''ל, the statement of אביי is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between ר' יוחנן and ר' אושעיה, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the מהרש''א, the statement of אביי is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable. At this point I would like to ask a question on the רי''ף and the רמב''ן. It is this. If we learn like the מהרש''ל, then when אביי says, “they disagree about two,” that means they disagree about two separate times. One is when the object is falling and the other is when it is on the ground. But if we do not learn like that, then the other approach is that they disagree about two different kinds of reasoning. one is whether tripping is by accident or not. The other is if abandoning his object releases him from obligation. But if we learn like הרמב''ן ורבינו יצחק that cannot be so. For THEY say even if the fall was by accident, if did not abandon the object he is liable. So, to that logic, the only factor that matters is if he abandons the object. To the רי''ף if he abandoned the object after a fall by negligence, then he is liable. So, the only thing that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not.

realize that there is a problem with worship people. if you look at the general gist of the Old Testament you will see that there is a specific emphasis on worship of God alone and depending on God alone. There are on occasion hint of some kind of mediator when you have moses prying for the people but that is more of a factor that does not come into the main scheme of things where the emphasis is on the importance of approaching God alone. You ee this pretty clearly with Elijah the prophet on mount Carmel where he told the people if the Lord is God, then worship him. If the Baal is god, then worship him. Make up your minds. After the fire came down from heaven, the people exclaimed the Lord is God the Lord is God

ברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי בתוספות לפני מספר ימים בבבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''ב. הסיבה שתוספות מניחה שתחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה שבו הנפילה לא הייתה באשמתו היא שזו ההנחה בנקודה זו של הטיעון. [(שברייתה אומר שאם הכד שלו נשבר והוא לא הרים אותה, ר' מאיר אמר שהוא אחראי ור' יהודה אמר שלא)] ר' יוחנן אמר שהם חלוקים בדעותיהם לאחר זמן הנפילה. בנקודה זו הגמרא מציעה שבמהלך זמן הנפילה שניהם מסכימים שהוא אינו אחראי. זו הסיבה שתוספות גורסת בנקודה זו של הטיעון שהגמרא מניחה שהוא לא היה באשמתו. לאחר מכן שואלת התוספות שאם אכן תחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה של תאונה טהורה [אונס], אז תהיה סתירה בר' מאיר. כי כאן הוא אומר שאחרי נפילה בתאונה [אונס] הוא אחראי, בעוד שבסוף אותה בריאתה הוא אומר שאחרי נפילה בתאונה (וכלי שלו גרם נזק) הוא לא יהיה אחראי. לכן, בחלק הבא של הגמרא, שבו הגמרא מציעה שבמהלך הנפילה שניהם מסכימים שהוא אחראי, בנקודה זו נניח שתחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה של נפילה עקב רשלנות ושר' יהודה יסכים שהוא אחראי

I would like to answer the question I asked on Tophot a few days ago in Bava Kama page 29b. The reason Tosphot assumes the beginning of the braita is talking about a case in which the fall was not his fault is that that is the assumption at this point in the argument. [(That braita says if his jar broken and he did not pick it up, R Meir said he is liable and R Judah said no)] R Yochanan said they disagree after the time of the fall. At this point the Gemara suggests that during the time of the fall both agree that he is not liable. That is why Tosphot holds at this point in the argument that the Gemara assumes he fall was not because of his fault. Then the Tosphot asks that if in fact that beginning of the braita would be talking about a case of pure accident, then there would be a contradiction in R Meir. For here he would be saying after a fall by accident he is liable, while in the end of this same braita he says that after a fall by accident (and his vessels caused damage) that he would not be liable. So, in the next part of the Gemara where the Gemara suggests that during the fall both agree he is liable, at that point we would assume the beginning of the braita is talking about a case of a fall because of negligence and that there R Judah would agree he is liable

Gaza in the time of Abraham the patriarch

Gaza in the time of Abraham the patriarch was the land of the Philistines [not Canaan]. But there is a promise to give to Abraham, “these lands”—not just the land of Canaan. And there is another promise to give him the land of Canaan. And there is another promise to give to him all the land from the Nile until the Euphrates. But, in any case, the actual land that is defined in the Book of Numbers chapter 34 includes Gaza. And in fact, Gaza was a part of Israel after the tribe of Judah conquered it after the time of Joshua [as brought in the first chapter of the Book of Judges.] [But that might mean only Gaza and Ashkelon. There were a few other cities that perhaps they did not conquer.] Also, incidentally, Jerusalem was also settled by the tribe of Simon who lived there with the Jebusi [one of the Canaanite nations] who were already there. This raises the question: in dividing the land of Israel. Gaza was not conquered yet [in the time of Joshua]. So, to which tribe should it belong? And furthermore, if an area needs to be conquered before it can be designated to belong to any one tribe, who could Jerusalem belong to? Benjamin and Judah? But no one had it during the time of Joshua; and later only, Simon settled it. Oddly enough, Sidon was the city of the first born of Canaan, and yet is not included in the seven Canaanite nations that Israel was commanded to destroy. [Deuteronomy chapter 7] It eventually became the major center of the Phoenicians. After that, the major center of the Phoenician became Carthage. They were the pirates of the Mediterranean Sea until Rome wiped them of the map. Abraham the Patriarch first entered Israel in the middle around Schem. And after he was forced to go to Egypt (because of a famine), he returned to that same area as it says, “he dwelt between Ai and Beit El. Beit El was on the West [by the sea] and Ai was on the East. We know where Ai was because that was the second city conquered by Joshua. so it was right in the middle of Israel. and it say that Abraham was right between these two cities one on the West and the other on the East. That sounds like it means they are in a horizontal line. -----Abraham eventually got to Hevron as it says, “He was sitting in the area of the oak trees of Mamre,” and later in Genisis it identifies the area of Mamre with Hevron. --- But Abraham made his way down south and eventually was in the land of the Philistines. Then the king of the Philistines (Avimeleh) kidnapped Sarah, and after a dream he gave her back to Abraham. You can see right after that Abraham left that area [around Gerar which is a drop north of Netivot ] and went directly to Beer Sheba. You know this because right after the event with the taking and giving back of Sara, Sarah gave birth to Isaac and immediately after that sara saw Hagar with her on and told Abraham to get rid of her, and she was sent out and wandered in the desert of Beer Sheva. So, Abraham in Beer Sheva at that time. ---When Abraham was in Beer Sheva, Lot went to the Jordan Valley because it was lush and fruitful and that was where Sodom was. So, when God destroyed Sodom, it says that Abraham got up in the morning and looked toward that area and the smoke was rising from it like an oven. That means he was looking north from Hevron. The only way he could have seen the smoke rising from Sodom was if the cloud cover was rising about 15 km high or more (I think). I was also thinking that perhaps Beer Sheva was an oasis in a desert when Abraham first got there, because the first time Abraham and Avimelech (king of the Philistines) made a covenant with each other it never says that they went to Abraham [like it says later with Isaac]. Rather it just says they spoke with him to make a covenant and they called that place Beer Sheva. So, Beer Sheva was not a city yet. It was just a place where there was spring and trees. it was not yet Canaan nor Philistines. And right there it says Abraham wandered in the land of the Philistines many days. probably, later the Canaanites took over Beer Sheva and settled it and made it a city. So, by the time of Isaac, when Isaac decided he had had enough trouble in the land of the Philistines, he left and went to Beer Sheva. So, by that time, it was Canaan, and then Avimelech went to him out of the land of the Philistines into the land of Canaan to come to an agreement with Isaac. --- At any rate, now that we know that Beit El is right up in the middle of Israel [not down South] around Jericho therefore when Isaac told Jacob to Laban in Padan Aram he first went up to Beit El, not directly East. I think the kings that fought with Abraham were not Canaanites because Lot went there and Abraham stayed in Canaan. ____________________________________________________ ______________________________________ __________________ עזה בתקופת אברהם הייתה ארץ פלישתים [לא כנען]. אבל יש הבטחה לתת לאברהם, "הארצות האלה" - לא רק ארץ כנען. ויש הבטחה נוספת לתת לו את ארץ כנען. ויש הבטחה נוספת לתת לו את כל הארץ מהנילוס ועד הפרת. אבל, בכל מקרה, הארץ עצמה שמוגדרת בפרק ל"ד במדבר כוללת את עזה. ולמעשה, עזה הייתה חלק מישראל לאחר ששבט יהודה כבש אותה לאחר ימי יהושע [כפי שמובא בפרק הראשון של ספר שופטים] [אבל זה יכול להיות רק עזה ואשקלון]. היו עוד כמה ערים שאולי הם לא כבשו.] כמו כן, אגב, ירושלים גם הייתא מיושב על ידי שבט שמעון שחי שם עם היבוסים [אחד מעמי הכנען] שכבר היו שם. זה מעלה את השאלה: בחלוקת ארץ ישראל, עזה עדיין לא נכבשה [בימי יהושע]. אז, לאיזה שבט היא צריכה להשתייך? ויתרה מכך, אם יש צורך לכבוש אזור לפני שניתן יהיה להגדירו כשייך לשבט אחד, למי ירושלים יכולה להשתייך? לבנימין וליהודה? אבל לאף אחד לא היה את זה בימי יהושע; ורק מאוחר יותר ששמעון יישב אותה. --- למרבה הפלא, צידון הייתה עיר בכור כנען, אך היא אינה כלולה בין שבע עמי הכנען שישראל נצטווה להשמיד. [דברים פרק ז'] בסופו של דבר היא הפכה למרכז העיקרי של פלישתים. --- אברהם נכנס לראשונה לישראל באמצע, בסביבות שכם. ואחרי שנאלץ ללכת למצרים (בגלל רעב), הוא חזר לאותו אזור כפי שכתוב, "וישב בין עי ובין בית אל. ובית אל הייתה במערב [על יד הים] ועי במזרח." אנו יודעים היכן הייתה עי כי זו הייתה העיר השנייה שנכבשה על ידי יהושע. כך שהיא הייתה באמצע ישראל. ונאמר שאברהם ישב בין שתי הערים הללו, אחת במערב והשנייה במזרח. זה נשמע כאילו זה אומר שהן בקו אופקי. -----אברהם הגיע בסופו של דבר לחברון כפי שכתוב, "והיה יושב באלוני ממרא", ומאוחר יותר בבראשית מזהה את אזור ממרא עם חברון. --- אבל אברהם עשה את דרכו דרומה ובסופו של דבר היה בארץ הפלשתים. אז מלך הפלשתים (אבימלך) חטף את שרה ואלוהים ענה אותו, ולכן החזיר אותה לאברהם. אתם יכולים לראות שמיד לאחר מכן אברהם עזב את האזור הזה [סביב גרר, שנמצאת טיפה צפונית לנתיבות] והלך ישירות לבאר שבע. אתם יודעים זאת כי מיד לאחר האירוע עם לקיחתה והחזרתה של שרה, שרה ילדה את יצחק ומיד לאחר מכן שרה ראתה את הגר ואמרה לאברהם להיפטר ממנה, והיא נשלחה ונדדה במדבר באר שבע. אז, אברהם היה בבאר שבע באותה תקופה. ---כאשר אברהם היה בבאר שבע, לוט הלך לבקעת הירדן כי היא הייתה שופעת ופורייה ושם הייתה סדום. אז, כאשר אלוהים השמיד את סדום, כתוב שאברהם קם בבוקר והביט לעבר האזור הזה והעשן עלה ממנו כמו תנור. משמעות הדבר היא שהוא הביט צפונה מבאר שבע או אולי מחברון (אני לא זוכר). הדרך היחידה שהוא היה יכול לראות את העשן עולה מסדום הייתה אם ענני העננים היו מתנשאים לגובה של כ-80 קילומטרים. או יותר (אני חושב). חשבתי גם שאולי באר שבע הייתה בארץ הפלשתים כשאברהם הגיע לשם לראשונה, כי בפעם הראשונה שאברהם ואבימלך (מלך הפלשתים) כרתו ברית זה עם זה, לא נאמר שהם הלכו אל אברהם [כמו שכתוב מאוחר יותר עם יצחק]. אלא נאמר שהם דיברו איתו כדי לכרות ברית וקראו למקום הזה באר שבע. אז באר שבע עדיין לא הייתה עיר. זה היה רק מקום שבו היה באר. ושם נאמר שאברהם ישב בארץ הפלשתים ימים רבים. אז, כנראה, מאוחר יותר הכנענים השתלטו על באר שבע והתיישבו בה והפכו אותה לעיר. אז, בימי יצחק, כשיצחק החליט שהיו לו מספיק צרות בארץ הפלשתים, הוא עזב והלך לבאר שבע. אז, באותה תקופה, זה היה בארץ כנען, ואז אבימלך הלך אליו מארץ הפלישתים לארץ כנען כדי להגיע להסכם עם יצחק. --- בכל מקרה, עכשיו כשאנחנו יודעים שבית אל נמצאת באמצע ישראל [לא בדרום] סביב יריחו, לכן כאשר יצחק אמר ליעקב ללכת ללבן בפדן ארם הוא עלה תחילה לבית אל, לא ישירות מזרחה

אני רוצה לשאול כמה שאלות בתוספות בדף כ"ט ע"ב בבבא קמא. הברייתא אמרה שאם אדם הולך בדרך ונשברה כדתו או שנפל גמלו ולא הרים אותם לפני שגרמו נזק, ר' מאיר אמר שהוא חייב, ור' יהודה אמר שהוא לא חייב. אבל אם הניח את סכינו על גג, ונפלה בגלל רוח רגילה, הוא חייב כדברי כולם. אבל אם הניח כדונים קטנים על גג, ונפלו ברוח חריגה, הוא לא חייב. ר' יוחנן אמר שהם חלוקים רק על הזמן שאחרי הנפילה. הגמרא שואלת, "אז מה היו אומרים בזמן הנפילה? אולי שהוא לא יהיה אחראי? אבל זה יסתור את מה שאמר ר' יוחנן על משנה מאוחרת יותר על אנשים שנושאים כדים והראשון החליק וגרם לשני להחליק, והוא בתורו גרם לשלישי להחליק. הראשון אחראי. ר' יוחנן אמר שהמשנה היא גם לפי ר' מאיר וגם לפי ר' יהודה. עכשיו התוספות שואלת מדוע הגמרא לא שאלה מהברייתא עצמה. הרי הברייתא אמרה שהכדים שנפלו מגג ברוח חריגה אינם אחראים. זה סותר את מה שאמר ר' יוחנן כאן שאם אדם נופל ושובר את כדו, הוא אחראי. זו בבירור נפילה במקרה (באונס), ובכל זאת ר' מאיר אמר שהוא אחראי. הקושי שאני רואה בתוספת זו הוא שהיא מביאה סתירה בר יוחנן, אך אינה עונה על שאלתנו מה היו אומרים ר' מאיר ור' יהודה על זמן הנפילה. מקרה הכד שנפל מהגג מספר לנו רק על הזמן שאחרי הנפילה. אבל אם הוא היה מספר לנו גם על זמן הנפילה, זו אינה קושי, אלא תומך בטענתנו שבזמן הנפילה כולם מסכימים שהוא אינו אחראי. והשאלה הקשה ביותר שיש לי על תוספות היא שאולי הגמרא לא רצתה להביא שאלה שיש לה תשובה ברורה. הכדים שנפלו מהגג נשברו, ולכן הוא נטש אותם ואינו אחראי. אבל אם הוא הולך בדרך, וכד שלו נשבר או גמלו נפל, אין סיבה לחשוב שהוא נטש אותם

I would like to ask a question on Tosphot page 29 side b in Bava Kama. The Braita said if one is walking by the road and his jar is broken or his camel fell and he did not pick them up before they did damage, R. Meir said he is liable, and R. Judah said he is not liable. But if he put his knife on a roof top, and it fell because of a normal wind, he is liable according to everyone. But if he put small jars on a rooftop, and they fell in an unusual wind, he is not liable. R Jochanan said they disagree only about the time after the fall. The Gemara asks, “Then what would they say at the time of the fall? Perhaps that he would not be liable? But that would go against what R. Jochanan said about a later Mishna about people carrying jars and the first one slipped and caused the second one to slip, and he in turn caused the third one to slip. The first one is liable. R. Jochanan said that Mishna is according to both R. Meir and R. Judah. Now Tosphot asks why did the Gemara not ask from the Braita itself. For, after all, the Braita said the jars that fell from a rooftop in an unusual wind are not liable. That goes against what R. Jochanan said here that if one falls and breaks his jar, that he is liable. That clearly is a fall by accident, and yet R. Meir said he is liable. The difficulty I see in this Tosphot is that it brings a contradiction in R. Jochanan, but does not answer our question what would R Meir and R. Judah say about the time of the fall. The case of the jar falling from the roof tells us only about the time after the fall. But if it would tell us also about the time of the fall, it is not a difficulty, but rather it supports our contention that at the time of the fall everyone agrees he is not liable. And the most difficult of all questions that I have on Tosphot is that perhaps the Gemara did not want to bring a question that has an obvious answer. The jar falling from the roof broke and so he abandons them and is not liable. But if he is walking on the road and his jar broke or his camel fell, there is no reason to think he abandoned them.---------------------------------------------I would like to ask some questions on תוספות page כ''ט ע''ב in בבא קמא. The ברייתא said if one is walking by the road and his jar is broken or his camel fell and he did not pick them up before they did damage, ר’ מאיר said he is liable, and ר’ יהודה said he is not liable. But if he put his knife on a roof top, and it fell because of a normal wind, he is liable according to everyone. But if he put small jars on a rooftop, and they fell in an unusual wind, he is not liable. R Jochanan said they disagree only about the time after the fall. The גמרא asks, “Then what would they say at the time of the fall? Perhaps that he would not be liable? But that would go against what ר’ יוחנן said about a later משנה about people carrying jars and the first one slipped and caused the second one to slip, and he in turn caused the third one to slip. The first one is liable. ר’ יוחנן said that משנה is according to both ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה. Now תוספות asks why did the גמרא not ask from the ברייתא itself. For, after all, the ברייתא said the jars that fell from a rooftop in an unusual wind are not liable. That goes against what ר’ יוחנן said here that if one falls and breaks his jar, that he is liable. That clearly is a fall by accident, and yet ר’ מאיר said he is liable. The difficulty I see in this תוספות is that it brings a contradiction in ר’ יוחנן, but does not answer our question what would ר’ מאיר and ר' יהודהsay about the time of the fall. The case of the jar falling from the roof tells us only about the time after the fall. But if it would tell us also about the time of the fall, it is not a difficulty, but rather it supports our contention that at the time of the fall everyone agrees he is not liable. And the most difficult of all questions that I have on תוספות is that perhaps the גמרא did not want to bring a question that has an obvious answer. The jar falling from the roof broke and so he abandons them and is not liable. But if he is walking on the road and his jar broke or his camel fell, there is no reason to think he abandoned them.