religious fanatics are not moral people

I have wondered a long time why religious fanatics are not moral people. I mean this in terms of what you might say is common human decency. The answer I think is that every area of value has an opposite area of value. The way to understand this is I think by means of the system of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross. You start with the insight of Kant that there are much of what we see as objective reality (but not all) has subjective aspects. And objective morality also has subjective aspects—but not all. There still is a core bedrock of right and wrong that does not depend on what people think, but on what is truly right and wrong. People often get mixed up by thinking that their personal goals and feeling equal objective morality. And this happens most often among religious and political fanatics. I do not agree with fanatics, unless they are fanatic about "midot tovot"--good clean character

Even though understanding is the point of learning, but people do not pay enough attention to the fact that learning is always a collection of small impressions on the mind. You never learn anything until the small impressions accumulate. Thus, we find in tractate Avoda Zara page 19a that one should always be ‘’ saying the words and going, even though he does not remember,and even though he does not understand what he is saying. This approach found helped me in physics and math and certainly all the more so in learning gemara with tosphot

הוכחה חזקה לגישתו של רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח ע''ב של בבא בתרא

ברצוני להביא הוכחה חזקה לגישתו של רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח ע''ב של בבא בתרא. זאת היא. רבינא עונה "החכמים גורסים שיש להסיר את הדבר הגורם לנזק". ובכן זה כַּמוּבָן. אחרת למה היו אומרים להרחיק את הגיגית של הפשתן מהירקות ובור מבור אחר? ברור שרבינא בא לענות על שאלה מסוימת. והשאלה הזו היא בבירור השאלה שנשאלה זה עתה על החכמים: אם אנחנו מדברים על לוקח, למה אומרים החכמים להרחיק את גיגית הפשתן מהירקות? תשובה: כי גם במקרה של מכירה, הם מחזיקים שחייבים להרחיק את הגורם לנזק מזה שיכול להינזק. אבל אם אתה מחזיק כמו רבינו תם, התשובה הזו כנראה לא עונה על השאלה. השאלה שרבינא אמור לענות עליה בגישתו של רבינו תם היא זו. ר' יוסי אמר להרחיק את הדבורים מהחרדל. אם רבא צודק שחייבים להרחיק מהגבול כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק, איך אפשר למצוא מצב שכזה בו מגיע המקרה של ר' יוסי? התשובה לשאלה זו אמורה להיות ""החכמים מחזיקים חייבים להסיר כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק". עם זאת, אני עדיין יכול לראות את גישה של רבינו תם. הוא אמנם קורא בתשובת רבינא קצת יותר ממה שכתוב בה, אבל רק טיפה יותר שאתה צריך לקרוא בה בכל מקרה. לרבינו יצחק צריך לקרוא לתוכו שרבא מסכים עם הרבנן לבדם ולא עם ר' יוסי. לר''ת אתה צריך לקרוא את זה לתוך האמירה ההיא, אבל להוסיף גם שרבא אמר את החוק שלו רק במקרה אחד. העובדה שהרי''ף ור''י מיגש גורסים שהדין כמו ר' יוסי ור' יוסי אמר את דינו רק במקרה של "חיציו" ושהם יכולים על ידי זה לבצע משימה חשובה. זה לא תקלה, אבל דבר טוב. שהרי הכלל שהדין כרבא בכל המקרים חוץ מיע''ל כג''ם והלן הגמרא אומר הדין כר' יוסי. בגירסה של ר''ת הרי''ף יכול לקבוע שזהו עִקבִי; החוק הוא גם כר' יוסי וגם כרבא

I would like to bring a strong proof for the approach of Rabbainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra. It is this. Raviva answers "The sages hold that the thing that causes damage must be removed." Well Yes. Of course. Why else would they have said to keep the tub soaking the linen away from the vegetables and a pit from another pit? Clearly, Ravina is coming to answer a certain question. And that question is clearly the one just asked on the sages: "If we are talking about a sale, they why do the sages say to keep the tub of linen away from the vegetables?" Answer: because even in the case of a sale, they hold one must keep that which causes damage away from that which can be damaged. But if you hold like Rabbainu Tam this answer does not answer the question. The question that this is supposed to answer in the approach of Rabainu Tam is this. R Jose said to keep the bees away from the mustard. If Rava would be right [that one must keep anything that can cause damage away from the border], how can you find such a situation in which the case of R. Jose comes up? The answer to this question is according to R. Tam to be ""The sages hold one must remove anything that can cause damage." Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel have to read into this answer that Rava changed his mind and agrees with Abyee about everything except the pit next to a border. All this is a very strong proof to the approach of Rabbainu Izhak._ However, I can still see the point of R. Tam. He does read into the answer of Ravina a little more than what it says, but only a drop more that you have to read into it anyway. To R. Izhak you have to read into it that Rava agrees with the sages alone, and not with R. Jose. To R. Tam you have to read that into that statement, but add also that Rava said his law only in one case. The fact that the Rif and Ri Migash hold that the law is like R. Yose and that R. Jose only said his law in a case of "his arrows", and that they can by this accomplish an important task is not a fault but a good thing. For the rule in the law is like Rava in all cases (except yal kegam) and later the gemara says the law is like R. Jose, In the girsa (approach) of R. Tam, the Rif can hold that this is consistent; the law is both like R. Jose and Rava,

למרות שאני יכול לראות את חשיבות גישתו של רבינו יצחק דף י''ח ע''ב בבא בתרא, אני לא יכול להבין למה להניח שר' יוסי מסכים שהחרדל גורם נזק כלשהו. אני מתכוון לומר, שאם אתה מניח את זה כעובדה, אז רבינו יצחק צריך לצאת ממה שנראה כקשיים מיותרים. למה לשנות את ההנחה המקורית מהיות הדבורים ליד הגבול לחרדל שנמצא שם? ועוד, אם אתה מחליף שהחרדל יהיה ליד הגבול, אז למה אתה צריך בכלל לטעון שמדובר במכירה? רק תגיד שהחרדל היה שם קודם, ולכן יש להסיר את הדבורים. אם היית אומר שר' יוסי מחזיק שהדבורים עושות את כל הנזק והחרדל לא עושה כלום, אז הכל יהיה בסדר. ר' יוסי אומר שאפשר לשים את החרדל ליד הגבול גם כשהדבורים היו שם קודם כי החרדל לא גורם נזק. אם בעל החרדל לא מוטרד, אז הוא יכול לשים שם את החרדל אם ירצה. מדוע יטען ר' יוסי שלא ירשה לשים שם את החרדל שמה. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרב שך מסתכל על השאלה מדוע השלחן ערוך אומר שיש חשש לפתוח חלון לבניין נטוש כי בעל הבניין יכול לטעון שהוא רוצה לבנות, ומתי שהוא עושה זאת ,הוא לא רוצה לפנות לבית המשפט כדי שבעל החלון יסגור את החלון כדי לא לגרום ל"נזק בראייה". הוא הולך עם הפוסקים הגדולים בנושא, אבל אני תוהה מדוע הדאגה מפנייה לבית המשפט חלה על החלון לבניין הנטוש, ולא במקרים אחרים של גורמים לנזק? אבל לדעתי החוק הוא תמיד כמו רבא ותמיד יש דאגה כזו

Even though I can see the importance of the approach of Rabainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra, I cannot understand why assume that R Yose agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever? I mean to saט that if you assume that as a fact, then Rabbainu Izhak has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that R. Yose holds the bees do all the damage, and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. R. Yose says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would R. Yose claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there? I might mention here that Rav shach mainly is looking at the question of why the shulchan Aruch says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so as not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major poskim [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like Ravaת and there is always such a worry. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Even though I can see the importance of the approach of רבינו יצחק page י''ח ע''ב of בבא בתרא, I cannot understand why assume that ר' יוסי agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever. I mean to say, that if you assume that as A fact, then רבינו יצחק has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that ר' יוסי holds the bees do all the damage and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. ר' יוסי says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would ר' יוסי claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there. I might mention here that רב שך is looking at the question of why the שלחן ערוך says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so a not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major פוסקים [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like רבא and there is always such a worry.

Abraham the patriarch lived in Gerar (an ancient city of the Pleshtim) for some period. Also, Isaac for a few years. [The land at that time was mostly Canaan, but those southern areas were settled by the Pleshtim. [[It coincides almost exactly with Gaza.] If you look on a map at where the archeologists discovered the site of that ancient city, it comes out at modern day Netivot. This explains the statement of Bava sali that Netivot is the "city of the Patriarchs." [Isaac was there for a few years, but had trouble with the shepherds of the Pleshtim, and eventually had to move (or wanted to move) to Beersheva. (He was okay with the king of the pleshtim, but decided at some point that that staying there was more trouble than what it was worth.)