''It is better to sit in one's room and twiddle one's thumbs, rather that to go around looking for mitzvot to do.''

  In the Gemara Megilah  is brought this verse and explanation in Deuteronomy 12, '' These  are the commandments that God has set before you this day..'' ''From here we learn that no prophet can add anything new.'' אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה Later I saw  brought from the Gra  the verse ''You have seen that every man who was joined to Baal Peor [an idol], God destroyed,'' that the worship of Baal Peor was to throw feces at it, and some people had done so thinking that it was a mitzvah. From here the Gra also shows that one not ought to go around looking for mitzvot to do. And in the Sidur haGra is brought a statement from Reb Chaim of Veloshin,  ''It is better to sit in one's room and twiddle one's thumbs, rather that to go around looking for mitzvot to do.''

In Deuteronomy 4 it says "Thou shalt not add nor subtract from these commandments" which pretty much sums up this subject.

Gemara Bava Kama 65a Rav said a stolen object is evaluated as it was at the time it was stolen, and the double, four and five time amount  at time standing before the court. The Gemara asks does this disagree with Raba who said if one steals by force a barrel that was worth a zuz and then it goes up in value to four, and then breaks it or drinks it, pays four. But if it broke by itself he pays one zuz. The Gemara answers no. Rather Rav was talking about a case when the object went down in value. The Rambam brings the law of Rav as the Gemara states it. Then he writes one who steals an object not by force and it goes up in value from one to four and breaks it, he pays the double four or five times at the rate of the higher value. But if it broke by itself [like in an earthquake] he pays the double as per the value it was worth at the time it was stolen. The Gra [Choshen Mishpat chapter 354 halacha 3 paragraph 8] asks on this later part when it broke by itself and says this can't be learned from Raba, but rather he pays one zuz as per the time it was stolen, and four zuz to pay for the double. I think the Gra holds that the breaking of the vessel is a long act of stealing, like the Netivot in Choshen Mishpat 34. The reason is thus: he is thinking that since Rav learns his law from a verse, it must apply to all cases. So when the Gemara says Rav said his law only in a case the object went down in value, it means that in a case when it went up in value, and then broken, the time of stealing and time of standing before the court are the same. If it would not have been broken but witnesses came and testified that he stole it, then he would give back the object, and then also it would be evaluated at time of giving it back. But if he gave it back before witnesses testified against him he would give it back without the double according to Rashi on page 68]   I might mention here that the main reason the Gra is saying there is no proof from Raba to the law of the Rambam about when it was broken by itself is that Raba is talking about a case of stealing by force where there is no double.

I saw this Gra brought in Rav  Isar Metlzer's Even haAzel, , and I have been looking at Rav Shach' approach to this halacha and also a book called Afikei Yam from a sage in Europe who discussed thi halacha with Reb Chaim of Brisk.. So far I have not seen anyone suggest the reason for the Gra might be becaue he holds by the same opinion as the Netivot. [This is opposed to the Ketzot who holds breaking the vessel after stealing it is obligated because of causing damage. Rav Shach asks on that opinion from very powerful arguments. at any rate, everyone of the achronim are trying to answer the question of the Gra.  ]

In the meantime I am wondering why the Gemara does not answer that Rav is talking about paying back a sheep and Raba is talking about paying back in money. This is how the Gemara later on page 66 answers a question on Rav and it seems to me before I get to look into it that the same answer should apply to the question from Raba on Rav. [answer to rabbainu izhak the gemara means like it says on pg 65. the difference is between hen the thief fattened up the sheep and when it went up in value in th marketplace.]

I might mention here the reason the Gra disagrees with the Rambam is that the Gemara did not ask any question from when vessel broke by itself, only from when he broke the vessel, and it answered that question .  It was never bothered by double, four or five times the value of the animal because that doe not apply in a case of theft by force.  

You might look at R. Isar Meltzer who brings a Rosh that there can be theft after theft which is clearly  the opinion of the Gra and Rav Shach on this halacha. But R. Isar Melzer holds like the Ketzot and uses that to explain the Rambam. He   explains the Rambam based on  Rabbainu Tam. I can see a point here. That is, if he breaks the vessel on purpose when it was worth four, then he has to pay four.  But if it broke by itself, then he just pays for the theft, and breaking according to its value at the time he stole it. Later on Rav Shach seem to agree that there can be an obligation of damage even for a stolen object in the first chapter of theft and lost objects. 

Let me mention here what R Isar  Meltzer is saying. That is,  that later on on page 61a the Gemara brings a Braita that says  double four and five go by the time of theft. Then asks if that disagrees with Rav? It answers no. Because one case is live animals and the other is money. Rabainu Tam says that means the braita is talking about when the object went up in value. Thus when it goes up from one to four, the double four and five still go by  the time of theft. That is exactly what the Rambam writes about the case when the object went up in value, and then it broke by itself. But if he broke it on purpose, he pays four  because of causing damage.      

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בבא קמא ס''ה ע''א רב said a stolen object is evaluated as it was at the time it was stolen, and the double, four and five time amount  at time standing before the court. The גמרא asks does this disagree with רבה  who said if one steals by force a barrel that was worth a זוז and then it goes up in value to four זוז, and then breaks it or drinks it, pays four? But if it broke by itself he pays one זוז. The  גמרא answers no. Rather רב was talking about a case when the object went down in value. The רמב''ם הלכות גניבה א' הלכה י''ד brings the law of רב as the  גמרא states it. Then he writes one who גונב an object not by force and it goes up in value from one to four and breaks it, he pays the double four or five times at the rate of the higher value. But if it broke by itself [like in an earthquake] he pays the double as per the value it was worth at the time it was stolen. The גר''א asks on this later part when it broke by itself and says this can't be learned from רבה, but rather he pays one זוז as per the time it was stolen, and four זוז to pay for the double. I think the גר''א holds that the breaking of the vessel is a long act of stealing, like the נתיבות in חושן משפט ל''ד . The reason is thus: he is thinking that since רב learns his law from a verse, it must apply to all cases. So when the גמרא says רב said his law only in a case the object went down in value, it means that in a case when it went up in value, and then broken, the time of stealing and time of standing before the court are the same. If it would not have been broken but witnesses came and testified that he stole it, then he would give back the object, and then also it would be evaluated at time of giving it back. But if he gave it back before witnesses testified against him he would give it back without the double according to רש''י on page 68] 

I might mention here that the main reason the גר'א is saying there is no proof from רבה to the law of the רמב''ם about when it was broken by itself is that רבה is talking about a case of גזילה by force where there is no double.

In the meantime I am wondering why the גמרא doe not answer that רב is talking about paying back a sheep and רבה is talking about paying back in money. This is how the גמרא later on page ס''ו ע''א answers a question on רב and it seems to me (before I get to look into it) that the same answer should apply to the question from רבה on רב.

I might mention here the reason the גר''א disagrees with the רמב''ם is that the גמרא did not ask any question from when vessel broke by itself, only from when he broke the vessel, and it answered that question .  It was never bothered by double, four or five times the value of the animal because that doe not apply in a case of theft by force.  

 ר' איסר מלצר  brings a רא''ש that there can be theft after theft which is clearly  the opinion of the גר''א and רב שך on this הלכה. but רב איסר מלצר  holds the כמו הקצוות החושן and uses that to explain the רמב''ם. and though I can not see how he   explains the רמב''ם based on a variation on ר''ת and the ר''י I can see a point here. That is--if he breaks the vessel on purpose when it was worth four then he has to pay four.  But if it broke by itself, then he just pays for the theft and breaking according to its value at the time he stole it. 

Later on רב שך seem to agree that there can be an obligation of damage even for a stolen object in the first chapter of גזילה ואבדה. 

Let me mention here what רב איסר מלצר is saying. That is,  that later on on page ס''א ע''א the גמרא brings a ברייתא that says  double, four and five, go by the time of theft. Then asks if that disagrees with רב? It answers no. Because one case is live animals and the other is money. רבינו תם says that means the ברייתא is talking about when the object went up in value. Thus when it goes up from one to four, the double four and five still go by  the time of theft. That is exactly what the רמב''ם writes about the case when the object went up in value, and then it broke by itself. But if he broke it on purpose, he pays four  because of causing damage.      

בבא קמא ס''ה ע''א רב אמר חפץ גנוב מוערך כפי שהיה בעת גניבתו, והסכום הכפול, ארבע וחמשה בזמן שעומד לפני בית הדין. שואלת הגמרא האם זה חולק על רבה שאמר שאם גונבים בכוח חבית ששווה זוז ואז היא עולה בערכה לארבע זוז, ואחר כך שובר אותה או שותה, משלם ארבעה.

.אבל אם נשבר מעצמו הוא משלם זוז אחד

הגמרא עונה שלא. אלא רב דיבר על מקרה שבו החפץ ירד בערכו. הרמב''ם הלכות גניבה א' הלכה י''ד מביא את דין רב כפי שקובע הגמרא. אחר כך כותב מי שגונב חפץ שלא בכוח והוא עולה בערכו מאחד לארבע ושובר אותו, משלם את הכפול ארבע או חמש פעמים בשיעור הערך הגבוה יותר. אבל אם נשבר מעצמו [כמו ברעידת אדמה] הוא משלם את הכפל לפי השווי שהיה שווה בזמן גניבתו. שואל הגר''א [שו''ע חושן משפט שנ''ד הלכה ג'ס''ק ח' ] על החלק המאוחר הזה מתי שנשבר מעצמו, ואומר לא ניתן ללמוד זאת מרבה, אלא משלם זוז אחד לפי שעת גניבה, וארבע זוז משלם בגלל הכפל. אני חושב שהגר''א גורס ששבירת הכלי היא מעשה ארוך של גניבה, כמו הנתיבות בחושן משפט ל''ד. הטעם הוא כך: הוא חושב שמאחר שרב לומד את דינו מפסוק, הוא חייב לחול על כל המקרים. אז כשהגמרא אומר רב אמר דינו רק במקרה שהחפץ ירד בערכו, משמע שבמקרה שעלה בערכו, ואחר כך נשבר, זמן הגניבה וזמן העמידה בפני בית הדין הם אותו זמן. אם זה לא היה נשבר אבל באו עדים והעידו שהוא גנב אותו, אז היה מחזיר את החפץ, ואז גם זה היה מוערך בזמן החזרתו. אבל אם החזירו קודם שהעידו עליו עדים יחזירו בלא הכפל ע"פ רש"י בעמוד 68. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהסיבה העיקרית שהגר"א אומר אין הוכחה מרבה לדין הרמב"ם היא שרבה מדבר על מקרה גזילה בכוח שבו אין כפל.

בינתיים אני תוהה למה הגמרא לא עונה שרב מדבר על החזר כבש ורבה מדבר על החזר בכסף. כך עונה הגמרא בהמשך עמוד ס''ו ע''א על שאלה על רב, ונראה לי (לפני שאספיק לעיין בזה) שאותה תשובה יכולה לחול על השאלה מרב על רב

אני יכול להזכיר כאן את הסיבה שהגר"א חולק על הרמב"ם היא שהגמרא לא שאל שום שאלה משעה שנשבר הכלי מעצמו, רק משעה ששבר את הכלי, והוא ענה על השאלה הזאת. מעולם לא הפריע לו ערך כפול, פי ארבעה או חמישה, כי זה לא חל במקרה של גזילה בכוח.

ר' איסר מלצר מביא את הרא''ש שאוחז שיכולה להיות גניבה אחר גניבה וזה ברור לדעת הגר''א ורב שך על ההלכה הזו. אבל רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כמו הקצוות החושן ומשתמש בזה כדי להסביר את הרמב''ם. ולמרות שאיני יכול לראות כיצד הוא מסביר את הרמב"ם על סמך וריאציה של ר"ת והר"י, אני יכול לראות כאן נקודה. כלומר--אם שבר את הכלי במזיד כשהיה שווה ארבע, אז צריך לשלם ארבעה. אבל אם הוא נשבר מעצמו, אז הוא רק משלם על הגניבה והשבירה לפי ערכו בזמן שגנב אותו

בהמשך נראה שהרב שך מסכים שיכול להיות חיוב מזיק גם על חפץ גזול בפרק הראשון של גזילה ואבודה.

הרשו לי להזכיר כאן את מה שאומר ר' איסר מלצר. כלומר, שבהמשך בעמוד ס''א ע"א מביאה הגמרא ברייתא שאומרת כפול ארבע וחמש הולכים  לפי זמן הגניבה. ואז שואל אם זה לא מסכים עם הרב? זה עונה לא. כי מקרה אחד הוא חיות והשני זה כסף. רבינו תם אומר משמע שהברייתא מדברת כשהחפץ עלה בערכו. לפיכך כשהוא עולה מאחד לארבע,  כפל ארבע וחמש עדיין הולכים לפי שעת הגניבה. זה בדיוק מה שכותב הרמב"ם על המקרה כשהחפץ עלה בערכו, ואז הוא נשבר מעצמו. אבל אם שבר במזיד, משלם ארבעה מחמת בגלל גרימת נזק

Rambam in Laws of Theft, Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in Tosfot

 The Rambam in Laws of Theft  chapter 1 halacha 15 holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke but  pays the whole amount. The Raavad holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in tosfot holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11 that the thief can pay in movable objects' and the Raavad does not disagree there. Therefore it seems that the Rambam intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. And it seems that the Raavad holds that one evaluates the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court.

However this can not be thus because in ch. 1 halacha 14, the Rambam writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore' I think when the Rambam writes in Laws of Theft 3:11 that the thief can pay in movable objects, he must mean like the Tosphot, Rashi and Rosh that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

I noticed that Rav Isar Meltzer  has some very deep insights on this subject. I have not had a chance yet to dig into his approach. I see Rav Shach also has some important insights here, and apparently I need to understand the Gra here who has a different approach than the Rambam. Plus there is an argument between the Ketzot haChoshen and the Netivot which is relevant here along with the Gemara in Ketuboth page 34. 

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The רמב''ם in הלכות גניבה  פרק א' הלכה ט''ו holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke, but  pays the whole amount. אין שמין לגנב. The ראב''ד holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא צ''ו בתוספות   holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11. The ראב''ד does not disagree there. Therefore, the רמב''ם intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. The ראב''ד holds that one evaluate the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court 

However this can not be thus because in פרק א' הלכה י''ד  the רמב''ם writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore I think when the רמב''ם writes in בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א that the thief can pay in movable objects מיטלטלים, he must mean like the תוספות רש''י ורא''ש that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

הרמב''ם בהלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה ט''ו מחזיק לא מעריכים את שוויו של חפץ שגנב גנב ושבר, אלא משלם את כל הסכום. אין שמין לגנב. הראב''ד קובע שזה חל רק על ערך החפץ, לא הכפל שהגנב מחויב לשלם. הרשב''ם בבא מציעא מחזיק גנב יכול לשלם בכל מה ששווה כסף, ולכאורה הרמב"ם מסכים עם זה כפי שהוא כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם במטלטלים, והראב''ד לא חולק שם. לפיכך לכאורה כוונת הרמב''ם שאין להעריך את שווי החפץ בשעת הגניבה, אלא מאוחר יותר בשעת עמידה בבית הדין. ואז מעריכים את השווי של חפץ כזה שאפשר לקנות בשוק. ולכאורה הראב''ד סבור כי מעריכים את הכפיל בזמן הגניבה. כל זה חל כאשר ערכו של חפץ כזה השתנה מרגע הגניבה ועד למועד היות הגנב בבית המשפט 

 

אולם זה לא יכול להיות כך כי בפרק א' הלכה י''ד הרמב''ם כותב אם גנב גנב חפץ ושבור אותו, והוא יורד בערכו, אז הגנב משלם לפי הסכום שהיה שווה באותו זמן של הגניבה, והכפל לפי הזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית הדין

 לכן אני חושב שכאשר הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם בחפצים מיטלטלין, הוא חייב להתכוון כמו התוספות רש''י ורא''ש שזה אומר כלים שלמים, לא סתם כל דבר ששווה כסף

 

 

the situation in Israel

My feeling about the situation in Israel is that people ought to learn Torah. This is based on an event recounted in the Gemara. There was an excessive tax decree that was being collected by the Roman rulers. so all the Jewish citizens that were ignorant of Torah of the city came to R. Yehuda to see if he would contribute. He said 'Run away.' ,They said "If we do so, you will be left alone." He said that is ok. Some did so. Then more came and he repeated 'Run away.' Finally  all the ignorant people ran away, and the Romans nullified the decree. R Yehuda said ''All problem that come into the world, all come only because of people ignorant of Torah.'' 

''Torah''in this sense means the Old Testament and all of the books of the Oral Law written from about 160 AD until 500 AD. Those books written by the sages of the Mishna and Gemara all bring the authentic oral law. but no books written later can be called Torah. At most, the better of them can be counted as learning Torah in so far that they attempt to explain the Oral and Written Law.  ''Just like you can not add to the law of Moses and the prophets, so you cant add to the oral law.''  [Letter to Yemen of Maimonides ]

However there is learning of the Seven Wisdoms [Quadrivium,  Trivium] that are important to understand Torah, the Gra said ''One who lacks knowledge of any of the seven wisdoms, will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold.''] [SO the natural sciences are important. The rest of secular subjects are Bitul Torah. ]

  The Mishna Bava Kama 49b. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. Rashi writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a braita [law not contained in the Mishna] that says R. Ishmael said one who opens a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. R. Akiva said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. Raba said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only R. Akiva says he is liable, but R. Ishmael says he is not liable. So Rashi is going like Raba. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to Rashi (since he abandoned his domain)therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then Rav Josef said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, R. Akiva  said he is  not liable and R. Ishmael said he is  liable.  So this Rashi is only going like R Ishmael not, R Akiva, for the pit is totally in a public domain

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The משנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. רש''י writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a ברייתא  that says ר' ישמעאל said one who חופר a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. ר' עקיבא said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. רבה said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only ר' עקיבא says he is liable, but ר' ישמעאל says he is not liable. So רש''י is going like רבה. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to רש''י since he abandoned his domain, therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then רב יוסף said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, ר' עקיבא  said he is  not liable and ר' ישמעאל said he is  liable.  So this רש''י is only going like ר' ישמעאל not, ר' עקיבא, for the pit is totally in a public domain

המשנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. חופר בור ברשות הרבים ופותח אותו ברשות פרטית הוא אחראי. רש''י כותב שם שהוא נטש את רשותו. יש ברייתא שאומר ר' ישמעאל אמר מי שחופר בור ברשות פרטית ופותח אותו ברשות הרבים או להיפך חייב. אמר ר' עקיבא החופר בור בשטח פרטי שלו ואחר כך נוטש רשותו, אבל לא הבור חייב. רבה אמר שכולם מסכימים שפתיחת בור ברשות הרבים היא באחריות. אבל על חפירת בור בשטח פרטי, רק ר' עקיבא אומר שהוא חייב, אבל ר' ישמעאל אומר שאינו חייב. אז רש''י הולך כמו רבה. כיון שעיקר הבור הוא ברשות הרבים וגם הפתח הוא ברשות הרבים לפי רש''י כיון שנטש את רשותו, לפיכך מסכימים כולם שהוא חייב. אבל אז רב יוסף אמר שכולם מסכימים אם הוא חפר בור בשטח פרטי, הוא אחראי. אבל ברשות הרבים אמר ר' עקיבא אינו חייב ור' ישמעאל אמר שהוא חייב. אז הרש''י הזה הולך רק כמו ר' ישמעאל לא, ר' עקיבא, כי הבור הוא לגמרי ברשות הרבים

learning Torah equals all the other commandments.

 One of the unfamiliar ideas of the Gra is that every word of learning Torah equals all the other commandments. The Mishna in tractate Peah brings this in short without going into it but the Gemara Yerushalmi explains in great detail that every word of Torah equals all the other commandments. That means that even if one would keep all the commandments of the Torah with the greatest love and fear of God, with the greatest degree of burning love and attachment with God, still if you would place all that one one side of a scale and just one word of Torah on the other, they would be equal in weight. All the more so if you would place two words of Torah on the opposite side that scale would immediately tip over to the side of the two words of Torah. however if there is a commandment   that can not be done by someone else, then one ought to interrupt learning to fulfill it and then return to learning as brought also in the Yerushalmi where one person sent his son to learn Torah in Tiberias and heard that he was involved in helping burying the dead. He asked his son' "Did I send you there to bury the dead or to learn Torah? [The Yerushalmi says when the commandment can not be done by another, one should interrupt one' learning. however there is also a principle one involved in a mitzvah doe not have to interrupt to do another. This is the case with the penny of Rav Josef. That is since one is guarding a lost object, he doe not have to give a penny to a pauper.  ]

What counts as Torah? See the letter to Yemen of the Rambam: "Just as there is no adding nor subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law."

That means that just as one can not add to the books of the prophets from Moses until the last prophets of the First Temple period, so one can not add the the Oral Law as redacted by the Tenaim of the Mishna and Amoraim of the two Talmuds. The Gemara also mentions this: "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of rendering a halachic decision."  רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה

        I would like to add here that there are two ways of learning Torah. One is that of Reb Chaim of Brisk which is global or you might say a hawk eyes approach that learns the whole Shas [Talmud] by learning one page. The other is that of Rav Naftali Yeager of Shar Yashuv and David Bronson which is an electron microscope approach. You can least see the Reb Chaim approach in his writings and the other great sages of the Litvak world. The other I think is not so available. I myself could get to this approximately by learning one Tosphot for about a month and then I could start to see the infinite depth of Tosphot. .  

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[The difference between Fries and Hegel

 Hegel is considered to be defending  law and order,  and that everyone has their place in society and  their obligation is to fulfill the duties and obligations that are naturally part of that place. Kant was quite opposite to this. Individual autonomy was the rule. So you might sum-up the argument thus: Hegel saw the disaster of the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution and sought a principle by which freedom can be preserved without disintegrating into chaos. Kant had developed his system before the French revolution, and had a portrait of Rousseau [the ideal of the French  revolutionaries] in his room.

In my view, both are a necessary advancement in philosophy, and reflect the ancient tension between individual and the group, and I do not think that anyone has come up with an answer to this tension. I am mainly on the side of the modified approach to Kant of the Kant-Friesian school  that Kelley Ross so ably defends in his web site, but I can not share the distain that most Kantians feel towards Hegel.[I admit I might be wrong. After all, see the book by Hobhouse, The Metaphysical State. And I do see that communism took a certain degree of Hegel, and yet I do not agree with communism. I hold with John Locke and the Two Treaties.  ]

[BUT I admit my regard for Hegel is probably because I read his Logic ( part of his Encyclopedia) rather than the Phenomenology that everyone else reads--or is assigned to read for their homework. Plus I think the best book on Hegel is McTaggart's.  I also like Cunningham ]   

At any rate, I would like here to recommend the founders of the second Friesian school, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross who provide a necessary amendment to Kant, since I do not think that the B deduction of Kant stands very well on its own, and anyway there is absolutely not the slightest bit of agreement about what Kant actually says there in the first place. [Modern scholars do not agree on the argument of Kant and some of the ambiguity revolves around the question why should things be amenable to be unified into the mind of one subject even before we get to the categories? ] I can see how wonderful it is that Kant is being reintroduced in some universities, still  I  can't see why people do not adopt the modification of Leonard Nelson. [Even though Nelson was just a continuation of Fries in his own mind, I see a lot more rigorous logic in Nelson. But you do not have to take my word for it. Take a look yourself, and I think you will  see what I mean.  ]

[The difference between Fries and Hegel is that the connection between sensory perception and the intellectual categories or why, where, when and what are through non intuitive immediate knowledge in the Friesian approach because Kant did not explain any better way that concepts and senses can exist. To Hegel, even sense objects are manifestations of the Logos of Plato-so there is no place where the intellect can't penetrate. ]

Maybe there is disagreement between them, but I see both as modifications of Plotinus and his Neoplatonist approach

i would like here to suggest looking at the phd thesis of kelley ross where he explains the problems of the b deduction and where he whole issue of ''who is the user?''' is explained. i mean that dr ross shows that kant doe not explain well how synthesis of perceptions or consciousness itself comes about and hegel never asks this question and it is only in the leonard nelson approach that this question gets a good answer.