the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored.

I am very sad because I feel that the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored. but i also feel that I am not one who can help recover from this loss. [Tosphot is the commentary on the Talmud on the opposite ide from Rashi.] the only two people i ever knew that could see this depth were naftali yeager [the rosh yeshiva in Shar Yashuv and David Bronson my learning partner in Uman [by the ziun of Rav Nahman]. ] My feeling is that to see this requires a combination of high IQ and talent.

Now I do not mean to belittle the great efforts of that whole school of thought that revolved on Reb Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shach that digs into the Rambam. But I miss the people that could see what is really going on in Tosphot. Believe me,-- I looked . All my years in the Mir Yeshiva in New York I learned every achron [later commentary] I could get my hands on, but never saw this. They certainly have important points -especially the Maharsha. Still my impression is that they are all revolving on the outside of Tosphot--never the inside. 

[i tried to capture a little of this in my little booklet on bava metzia to which i provide a link here.]

but you will see what i mean here only in the parts that i bring the questions and issues brought up by david bronson and my tentative answers. that is from bava mezia pgs 97b to 104b. the rest i wa doing without his insights    

Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks

  When the Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks  --that took a certain amount of courage. Even though this was an ancient approach that began with Saadia Gaon and the Obligations of the Hearts still it does not sound like how the sages of the Talmud think of the ancient Greeks. [Most of the time in the Talmud you get the idea that they did not like the ancient Greeks very much..And the few places where the Work of Creation and the Divine Chariot are mentioned, the Talmud does not describe them as being what in Attic Greece were the subjects of Physics and Metaphysics. Still I eventually had to depend on this opinion of the Rambam. [but no before i saw this same approach brought in the obligations of the hearts. ] [For some reason I have not been able to understand, I never ''made it'' in the Litvak yeshiva world which I really loved--but they did not love me. So from lack of choices, I went to university to major in Physics]

When the Rambam mentions Physics, he includes Chemistry as you can see in the first four chapters of the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah.] When he mentions metaphysics, he is mainly referring to the set of books of Aristotle by that name;- but not that alo ne. He clearly includes Plotinus--as has been noted before that he is not solely going with Aristotle, but rather the synthesis the Plotinus created between Aristotle and Plato. [Nowadays I would include Kant and Leonard Nelson's approach to Kant. see the web site of Kelley Ross]. That is  not the only approach to Kant but it makes a lot more sense to me than the other one's of sensibility first or reason first. See Robert Hanna and Sperber. [I mean that there were critiques on Kant by Schulze, and Maimon and some others. Because of that set of questions, there arose three approaches to Kant --1. reason first, 2. sensibility first, and 3. neither of the above but rather a kind of knowledge that precedes both reason and sensibility--nonintuitive immediate knowledge  ]

בבא בתרא י''ג ורמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכה ב'

 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the Rambam and the approach of Rav Shach. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the Gemara in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So Rava would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the Rambam who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard.

However you might ask if that is so that Rava agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the first born son and the second born? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So Rava would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''  

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 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the רמב''ם and the approach of רב שך. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the גמרא in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' (גוד או אגוד) is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So רבא would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the רמב''ם who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard. 

However you might ask if that is so that רבא agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the בכור and the פשוט? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So רבא would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''

הייתי בחוף הים ועלה בדעתי לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול על הרמב''ם וגישתו של רב שך. כלומר כך. אנחנו לא עושים חוק כדי להכריח מישהו לקנות משהו שהוא לא רוצה, וגם לא למכור משהו שהוא צריך. אז כל העניין של הגמרא באומרו אם החצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה, אז אפשר לומר לשותף השני ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' (גוד או אגוד) הוא רק הצעה, לא דרישה. אז המקרה של החצר וחצי העבד זהה לגבי הרעיון של ''אתה קונה חצי או אני אקנה חצי'' זה לא יכול להיות חוק. אז רבא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן תהיה גישה תקפה מכיוון שאיננו יכולים להכריח אף אחד מהצדדים לקנות או למכור את חלקו. אז עכשיו אנחנו מבינים שהרמב''ם שאכן מחזיק שהחלוקה בזמן היא גישה תקפה עם חצר קטנה

עם זאת אתה יכול לשאול אם זה כך שרבא מסכים לחלוקה בזמן כאשר ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' אינו אפשרי, אז למה הוא לא אמר זאת במקרה הראשון של בכור והפשוט? אני חושב שהסיבה היא שירושה זה לא אותו סוג של קנייה ומכירה או שותפות רגילה. בירושה, הרעיון הוא לחלק. אז רבא למעשה יסכים לחלק בזמן רק אם הם יסרבו ל''אני אקנה את שני השלישים שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את השליש שלי

בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א Bava Batra page 13 a

Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 1 halacha  2. The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide the other must divide if it is 8 yards by 4 yards. If the courtyard is less, then one can not force the other, but rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' The Rambam says if both refuse that arrangement then they divide in time. That is one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this.

The Raavad disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the Raavad is clear in the Gemara itself and it is hard to see how the Rambam would have understood that Gemara. 

The Gemara is Bava Batra 13 side a. Rava asked Rav Nahman,'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a braita, where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. Rava answered in that case there is not choice. In our case it is clear that Rava does not hold with dividing in time. Rav Shach says the case of a court yard that has less than  4 yards for each one is different and Rava would agree that dividing in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full slave. So Rava would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half, or I will buy your half.'' So the Raavad is right that Rava does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

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 The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide, the other must divide if it is ח אמות על ד אמות. But if the courtyard has less area than that, then one can not force the other.  Rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' [ גד או אגוד ] The רמב''ם in  הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב says if both refuse that arrangement, then they divide in time. That is, one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this. The ראב''ד disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the ראב''ד is clear in the גמרא itself and it is hard to see how the רמב''ם would have understood that. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א)'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a ברייתא. where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. רבא answered in that case there is not choice. In our case, it is clear that רבא does not hold with dividing in time. רב שך says the case of a court yard that has less than ארבע אמות for each one is different, and רבא would agree that diving in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full Slave. So רבא would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' So the ראב''ד  is right that רבא does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

הדין לחצר שבבעלות שני אנשים הוא שאם אחד רוצה לחלק, השני חייב לחלק אם זה ח' אמות על ד' אמות. אבל אם בחצר יש פחות שטח מזה, אז אי אפשר להכריח את השני. במקום זאת אחד יכול לומר לשני ''קנה את החצי שלי או שאני אקנה את החצי שלך'' [גד או אגוד] הרמב''ם בהלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב', אומר אם שניהם מסרבים להסדר הזה, אז הם מחלקים בזמן. כלומר, אחד גר בו שנה ואחר כך השני, והם ממשיכים ככה. הראב''ד חולק על חלוקה בזמן. דעת הראב"ד ברורה בגמרא עצמו וקשה לראות כיצד היה מבין זאת הרמב"ם. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א) ''אתה לא מסכים עם ההלכה שאחד אומר לשני 'אתה קונה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך'. אז מה יעשה בכור ובן שני עם עבד?'' הוא ענה, ''הוא עובד יומיים בשביל הבכור על כל יום שהוא עובד לבן השני'' מביאים הוכחה מברייתא שבו עבד הופך חופשי בחצי. (היו לו שני בעלים, ואחד שחרר אותו.) הוא עובד יום אחד עבור אדונו, ויום אחד עבור עצמו. רבא ענה במקרה כזה אין ברירה. בענייננו ברור שרבא אינו מחזיק בחלוקה בזמן. רב שך אומר שהמקרה של חצר שיש בה פחות מארבע אמות לכל אחת שונה ורבא יסכים שגם חלוקה בזמן הגיונית כי אין ברירה. אבל סירוב להקשיב להצעה לקנות את החצי השני או למכור את החצי שלך, אינו אותו מקרה של חצי עבד שאינו יכול להפוך לעבד מלא. אז רבא לא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן היא תחליף תקף להצעה של ''קנה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך''. אז צודק הראב''ד שרבא לא מסכים לחלק בזמן אלא אם כן יש אין אלטרנטיבה אחרת

 

 i  find it instructive that the only people that have opened their hearts and homes to the many several hundred thousands of Jews that had to escape from the areas in the south of Israel have been the kibbutzim. i was at first unaware of this until i saw an article about a nearby kibbutz givat chaviva that opened all its facilities to thousands of Jews that had to escape--and till cant go back to their homes. now i have become aware that the only places that have been helping the Jews that have had to escape have been the kibbutzim  

 The Russian revolution is for me a case where it is hard to take sides. given what Nicholas II saw what had happened to all the previous tsars when they tried to be soft [they were murdered], it is hard to imagine what else he could have done. On the other hand, the misery of the Russian people was already growing in intensity because of the cities and industry growing and with WWI it is hard to see any recourse to any kind of action than to throw out a czar that seemed insensitive to their trouble. It is also hard to see any party taking power except the Bolshevik who controlled the army with Trotsky at it head. It is all very confusing. Then to try to reason through it all seems to make it worse. Marx was the author of a brilliant hypothesis that like all scientific hypotheses needed to make predictions, and then can be tested based on those predictions. All of Marx's prediction turned out to be false. Maybe it all comes down to what Rasputin told the czar, ''If my death will be caused by you or any of your close relatives, then you and your family will not last one year after that.''

 

 I think I ought to make Kant clear. There is knowledge that is known by way of reason, for example things known by definition. And there are things known by the five senses. But can we know things like universals [things that particulars have in common]?-Yes. Things are in the realm of possibility of experience. We can know them by structures in the mind like computer chips. [E.G. the ideas of time space and causality. But outside of the conditions of possible experience we can not know.

There are some attempts to get past this blockage, and one approach is that of Jacob Fries--and that is to say there is knowledge that is known, but not by reason and not by the senses.

[This is different from reason first Kant [the first interpretation] and from sensibility first Kant [Robert Hanna, Sperber].] This Kant-Friesian approach says neither reason nor sense perception is first. See Kelley Ross's web site To get an idea about this Kant-Friesian approach I think the best idea is to learn the books of Leonard Nelson who is a lot more clear than Fries himself, even though I think most are still in  German.