I was at the sea shore and on the way back it occurred to me that the law in the Rambam laws of gifts 8 law 6 (if one says if my wife gives birth to a  son he will take 100 zuz and if he gives birth to a daughter she will get 200 zuz.) might refer to a kinyan sudar [handkerchief]. But that is not how the Magid Mishna explains it there [and he says it refers to a person dying] because of the gemara in Gitin page 40 side b that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the Rambam brings that law in laws of gifts chapter 4. The Rashba however brings the Magid Mishna that there might be a difference between a kinyan sudar and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is derabanan [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the Torah explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a kinyan sudar is from the Torah as a valid exchange [halifin]. Thus it makes sense to say that the Rambam is referring to a kinyan sudar which is clearly more powerful than a document.

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 The Rambam  writes הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: If one says, "If my wife gives birth to a  son, he will take מנה.  If she gives birth to a daughter, she will get מאתיים. This might refer to a קניין סודר [handkerchief]. But that is not how the מגיד משנה explains it there. [He says it refers to a person dying שכיב מרע]. The reason the מגיד משנה explains this differently is because of the גמרא in גיטין מ' ע''ב that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the רמב''ם brings that law in laws of giftsהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. The רשב''א however brings the מגיד משנה that there might be a difference between a קניין סודר and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is מן הרבנן [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the תורה explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a קניין סודר is from the תורה as a valid exchange [חליפין]. Thus it makes sense to say that the רמב''ם is referring to a קניין סודר which is clearly more powerful than a document.

הרמב"ם כותב הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: אם יאמר "אם אשתי תלד בן, ייקח מנה. אם היא תלד בת, היא תקבל מאתיים. זה יכול להתייחס לקניין סודר [מטפחת]. אבל לא כך מסביר זאת המגיד משנה שם. [הוא אומר שזה מתייחס לשכיב מרע]. הסיבה שהמגיד משנה מסביר זאת אחרת היא בגלל הגמרא בגיטין מ' ע''ב שאם יכתוב אדם במסמך ''אתן כזה וכזה'' שאינו תקף, ואין התחייבות שנגרמה על ידי אותו מסמך. והרמב''ם מביא את הדין הזה בהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. הרשב"א לעומת זאת מביא את המגיד משנה שאולי יש הבדל בין קניין סודר למסמך. עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם בעצמו כותב שתוקף המסמכים הוא מן הרבנן [מהחכמים, לא מהתורה אלא במקום שבו התורה אומרת במפורש שצריך מסמך כמו בגירושין.] ואילו קניין סודר הוא מהתורה כחילופין. לפיכך הגיוני לומר שהרמב''ם מתייחס לקניין סודר שהוא בבירור חזק יותר ממסמך

 In the ketubah there is a clause ''I will work.'' But in any document, if one writes ''I will do such and such a thing'' it is קניין דברים acquisition of words which has no validity.  So why is it in the ketubah-- because of the obligation that exists anyway. Even though the obligation to provide for a wife is an argument if it is from the Torah or the words of the scribes, still there is no doubt that there is such an obligation which amounts to about two kilograms of flour every week. 

there is a lot to go into about all this which i might get to someday. 

 When Christians talk about Bible Studies for Wednesday night [or some other time they get together during the week], they do not ever learn the Old Testament in depth, and most of the time not even the New Testament except for the letters of Paul.  But that just goes to show that Christianity is really based on Paul. But that requires a belief that Paul understood the approach of Jesus better that any of the actual people that heard and saw him, and wrote down his teachings directly from first hand knowledge.  But if they want to learn Paul as an authority on Jesus, well so be it. But then, why is it that the ''Bible Studies''never include the Old Testament.

[One place where you can see the problem of not learning the Old Testament is when Christians try to take a verse from the Old Testament to show something is morally wrong, but ignore other verses. When they take the words of the Old Testament to be authoritative, they are depending on Jesus. When they ignore the Law of Moses, they depend on Paul. But this weakens their position . You can not have it both ways. Either the Law of Moses means what it  says, or it does not. I ask them to make up their minds.]

I might add here that the way I see morality of the Old Testament is that it is based on a synthesis of faith and reason. This is as we see in the Talmud where there is a great deal of discussion about how to understand the verses of the Law of Moses based on reason. Very few times is any discussion based on the idea that someone's opinion is halacha le'Moshe miSinai [a law to Moses from Sinai]. [There are a few places where it is considered that a law is halacha to Moses from Sinai. More often it is just clear that some things are in fact ''from the Torah''; e.g., things like the 39 types of work on the sabbath, or the many laws about the temple or marriage]. Rather all discussions are based on the idea of how can we reconcile seemingly contrary verses or later teachings that themselves were based on verses.

I hope that Christians start to learn the Old Testament in depth, not superficially. In fact, I recall that there was once a long time ago a father who read to his family a few chapters of the Bible at the dinner table every night until the family had finished the Bible several times over.

The issue about the need for knowledge in the writing of  the get [divorce] or kidushin is unclear to me like I wrote a few days ago. The main point of confusion is the Ramban brought by the Ran that for a get one needs both for her sake and the husband should write it. That is how the Ramban gets out of the problem about why he could not say to a messenger [or two] to go and tell so and so to write a get and give it. The answer מילי לא מימסרי לשליח ''words are not given to a messenger'' clearly does not work as the Ramban himself noted. After all you can tell a messenger to take trumah or to write a document of ownership and give it to someone--and lots of things that require intension. But if you need the man to write the get, then that should be that. I noticed that Rav Shach deals with this issue, and I imagine many of the other Achronim also try, but to me the whole issue is unclear. [I might just give up. Or i might wait until i can gain clarity by learning further on.]

 I get the impression that most people do not have an idea about  learning Torah. They see it is only applicable to people that want to use it to make money.

And I think that the fact that people in kollel use Torah to make money adds to this misimpression.

 But it should be obvious that learning Torah is incumbent on every person, and that no one should use it to make money. 

But while I am on the subject, I would like to suggest and offer here my approach. That is- I think people should learn in depth in the morning right when they wake up and learn fast in the afternoon when it is harder to concentrate.  So the morning should be like in the great Litvak yeshivot-- with staying on one page of Gemara for a few weeks. That is either in depth with Reb Chaim of Brisk or Rav Shach or the other great sages of the Litvak world [i.e., Birchat Shmuel, Shaari Yosher of R. Shimon Shkopf etc.] The afternoon for getting through Shas with Tosphot and Maharsha. Also there should be a few sessions in Mathematics and Physics-- to get through fast the basic material. [I mean to get through it,-- and then review.]

 Kant's synthesis between empirical knowledge and rational knowledge has been a problem as soon as the ink was dry on the first Critique as was immediately noted by Schulze  and Maimon. The answer to their objections I have thought was best answered by Jacob Fries until I noticed what I think is the similar answer given by Reinhold. [I saw this answer in a paper by   Peter Sperber]. Schulze had objected to a sort of circularity in Kant  [that  sense perception works by way of cause and effect. The object outside of oneself causes the perception. But if causality is the only thing that makes perception possible, then it can't be part of perception.][The problem is that without causality, perception is pure delusion] and Salomon Maimon had objected to any possible contact between a priori concepts and empirical senses. The answer is there are concepts that are known immediately without have to go through  reasoning process--they are the categories of where, when, how, why, etc.

Kidushin page 9

 I have been puzzled about a Rambam that says if one writes a document of marriage and it is given to a messenger of the woman, then it must be written with the agreement of the messenger. The Magid Mishna brings there [Laws of Marriage chapter 3-law 18] that the Ramban disagrees with this and says it has to be written with the knowledge and agreement of the woman. This is just like the fact that  a husband  can not say, ''Tell so and so to write a divorce doc and give it to my wife.'' The Ramban is bringing this from a Gemara in Kidushin page 9 that says a doc of marriage has to be written with the knowledge of the woman. [ That is an argument there, but this is the agreed upon conclusion.] What is the puzzle about this to me is the general law, ''Words are not given over to a messenger.''  That means one can appoint a messenger to do things, but not to say things. And for a divorce doc  to be for a particular woman requires the husband to say so. But this in itself is the source of my confusion. Why is it that a scribe could not write a doc of divorce for a particular man and wife?  If we say a scribe  is ok to write the doc, then why should he have to hear it from the husband. If we say the verse says that the husband himself has to write it, then why should a scribe be ok-- even if the husband tells him to write it?