I think the approach of the Litvak world is the right thing: to learn in depth in the morning and to learn fast in the afternoon. The learning in depth I think should be with ten times review of every section. Even though learning with depth and understanding should be the main emphasis still there is a place for fast learning--jut saying the words and going on.
Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
7.5.23
Counterfeit Torah
Most of what is sold as Torah nowadays is not Torah at all. It is a fake and not authentic. This is the very reason for the signature of the Gra on the famous letter of excommunication--to warn people to stay away from Torah of the Dark Side. The is idolatry which dresses up in Jewish rituals in order to seem kosher
3.5.23
Politics is not a part of Torah thought
Politics is not a part of Torah thought. I do not know from where the Reform get the idea that "social justice" is somehow a part of Torah While on one hand, I can see some slight indications of some kind of government in Torah, but these are only slight. Even for a king that is made by a prophet, there is an argument in Tractate Sanhedrin what powers he has. To one opinion all the threats of Samuel were legal. To another opinion they were just threats, but not actual legal powers.
Note: Samuel got angry at Israel for asking for king, and even made a miracle to show the people of Israel that God was angry at them for asking for king . Then he told them all the terrible things that a king would do to them, To one opinion, these threats were just Samuel telling them what in fact a king would do, not that they be legal. To another opinion these things that a king will do would be legal.
In TORAH the mitzvah of making a king is only when people ask for a king. But the prophet Samuel showed that asking for a king is a terrible sin. It is like brining a sin offering. There is a mitzvah to bring a in offering if one has sinned, but it is better not to sin in the first place.
2.5.23
i was reading Robert Hanna' works and his blog and noted that he thinks all American so called "Analytic Philosophy" is destined for the trash bin and instead advocates a Forward to Kant Approach. This makes a lot of sense except for one particular problem--that Kant's solution to the synthetic a-priori never really worked that well. There were lots of different approaches after him trying to answer the same problem and later there was the Neo Kant approach- all of which fell into oblivion.
[One problem in Kant was noticed right away by a close friend of his Scholz and his critique was printed and Kant claimed after that that he would answer. The question was about the Transcendental Deduction--not at all a trivial side issue, but rather the fulcrum upon which the entire Critique of Pure Reason revolves.
And my mind there is another flaw. It is that philosophy is supposed to help us understand the world and ourselves-not create a system that is not credible without a lot of evidence. I mean, in natural sciences or mathematics, you do not start with assumptions that sound good but are not very obvious, You start with simple things. The shortest line between two points is straight line, Not a set of questions based on Berkley and Hume.
By this I do not mean to trivialize Kant, but rather suggest the modification of Fries and Leonard Nelson to Kant in which the realm that reason can penetrate is limited but that by immediate non intuitive knowledge there is knowledge of the 12 categories and possibly even faith a per Otto
[hume made a mistake for some reason Kant did not pick up and which was a stumbling block for him i.e that reason can tell us only when a definition entails a contradiction--a per Euclid. ]
29.4.23
Bava Metzia end of Hamafkid page 43 side a
If one hands over to another coins that are not tied up, then he can use them. If they are robbed then to Rav Huna he has to pay them back. To Rav Nahman he does not have to since he is in the category of a paid guard who is not obligated to pay back in case of robbery, [But in case they were lost or stolen then he would have to pay.] Rav Nahman asks on Rav Huna from a teaching" If a gizbar [a person in charge of the money of the Temple] hands loose coins to a money changer and the money changer uses that money then the Gizbar is guilty of meila] [using money that was dedicated to the Temple for private use]. To Rav Huna he should be guilty even if the money changer did not use the money. My question here is that acquiring of a paid guard or a borrower is by picking up. Not by usage. But to be guilty of meila does require use. so the same question applies to Rav Nahman. changing domain and acquiring of the money as a loan or as a paid guard happens before usage. But if you want to say that anyway, there is no meila until usage, then to both Rav Nahman and Rav Huna cases there should not be meila until it is used and in any case it not clear why the gizbar is guilty of meila when the money changer uses the money. He should be guilty right away.
I was at the sea again and on the way back it occurred to me how one might answer the question I asked yesterday night. I think Rav Nahman must be understanding Rav Huna to mean that the money is considered a loan, not as a borrowing of an object where the object is considered as belonging to the original owner. That it unlike a loan where the money belong to the borrower but he has to pay back that same amount. so both Rav Nahman and Rav Huna are understanding that for there to be meila there has to be change of ownership or usage. This is like Rav Huna in Bava Metzia page 99 Rav Huna said one who borrows an ax, if he chopped with it he transgress and if not then not. so now the question of Rav Nahman makes sense. If the money that was handed to the money changer was a loan then if the money changer doe not use it, still since it is a loan the gizbar should transgress the prohibition of meila right away
I would like to mention that this is also how Rav Shach understands the question of Rav Nahman on Rav Huna in Laws of Robbery and Loss chapter 13 halacha 17
I
__________________________________________________________________________________
If one hands over to another coins that are not tied up, then he can use them. If they are robbed then to רב הונא he has to pay them back. To רב נחמן he does not have to since he is in the category of a paid guard who is not obligated to pay back in case of גזילה, [But in case they were lost or גנבה then he would have to pay.] רב נחמן asks on רב הונא from a teaching" If a גזבר [a person in charge of the money of the Temple] hands loose coins to a money changer (שולחני), and the money changer uses that money then the גזבר is guilty of מעילה. To רב הונא he should be guilty even if the money changer did not use the money. My question here is that acquiring of a paid guard or a borrower is by picking up. Not by usage. But to be guilty of מעילה does require use. so the same question applies to רב נחמן. changing domain and acquiring of the money as a loan or as a paid guard happens before usage. But if you want to say that anyway, there is no מעילה until usage, then to both רב נחמן and רב הונא cases there should not be מעילה until it is used and in any case it not clear why the גזבר is guilty of מעילה when the money changer uses the money. He should be guilty right away.
It occurred to me how one might answer the question. I think רב נחמן must be understanding Rav Huna to mean that the money is considered a loan, not as a borrowing of an object where the object is considered as belonging to the original owner. That it unlike a loan where the money belong to the borrower but he has to pay back that same amount. so both רב נחמן and רב הונא are understanding that for there to be מעילה there has to be change of ownership or usage. This is like רב הונא in בבא מציעא צ''ט רב הונא said one who borrow an ax, if he chopped with it, he transgress מעילה and if not then not. so now the question of רב נחמן makes sense. If the money that was handed to the money changer שלחני was a loan then if the money changer אינו משתמש , still since it is a loan the גזבר should transgress the prohibition of מעילה right away
אם אחד מוסר לאחר מטבעות שאינם קשורים, אז הוא יכול להשתמש בהם. אם הם נשדדו אז לרב הונא הוא צריך לשלם. לרב נחמן אינו חייב כיון שהוא בקטגוריה של שומר בתשלום שאינו חייב להחזיר במקרה של גזלה, [אבל במקרה שאבדו או גנבו אז יצטרך לשלם.] רב נחמן שואל על רב הונא מהוראה: אם גזבר [אחראי על כספי המקדש] מוסר מטבעות לחלפן (שולחני), והחלפן משתמש בכסף זה אז הגזבר אשם במעילה. לרב הונא הוא צריך להיות אשם גם אם חלפן הכספים לא השתמש בכסף. השאלה שלי כאן היא שקניין שומר שכר או לווה היא על ידי הגבה, לא על ידי שימוש. אבל כדי להיות אשם במעילה כן דורש שימוש. אז אותה שאלה חלה על רב נחמן. שינוי רשות ורכישת הכסף כהלוואה או כשומר שכר קורה לפני השימוש. אבל אם אתה רוצה להגיד בכל מקרה אין מעילה עד השימוש, אז גם לרב נחמן וגם לרב הונא אין מעילה עד שנעשה שימוש. ובכל מקרה לא ברור למה הגזבר אשם במעילה רק כשהחלפן משתמש בכסף. הגזבר צריך להיות אשם מיד
עלה
בדעתי איך אפשר לענות על השאלה. אני חושב שרב נחמן חייב להבין את רב הונא בכך
שהכסף נחשב כהלוואה, לא כהשאלה של חפץ שבו החפץ נחשב כשייך לבעלים המקורי. שזה לא
כמו הלוואה שבה הכסף שייך ללווה אבל הוא צריך להחזיר את אותו הסכום. אז גם רב נחמן
וגם רב הונא מבינים שכדי שתהיה מעילה צריך להיות שינוי בעלות או שימוש. זה כמו רב
הונא בבא מציעא צ''ט רב הונא אמר השואל גרזן, אם בקע בו, עובר על מעילה, ואם לאו
אז לא. אז עכשיו השאלה של רב נחמן הגיונית. אם הכסף שנמסר לחלפן (שלחני) היה
הלוואה, אז אם החלפן אינו משתמש אתו , עדיין מכיוון שמדובר בהלוואה, הגזבר צריך
לעבור על איסור מעילה מיד
28.4.23
It is useful to clarify thinkers in terms of enlightenment thinkers as opposed to anti enlightenment. This is more useful than empirical as opposed to rational. And then, even enlightenment thinkers can also be classified in how much or little does faith have its place, and also in terms of the place of the state.
That goes for thinkers in philosophy. But since the advent of the Frankfurt school and post modernism, it even more useful to classify thinkers in term of America or anti America, [Freedom, Individual rights private property, the Rule of Reason, capitalism].
There is a lot to unpack here and I doubt if I can do justice to these gigantic subjects. I might mention here that John Locke and Hobhouse (The Metaphysical State) are two significant figures.
In the meantime, I might mention that the Middle Ages did provide a sort of synthesis between faith and reason to make an opening for a John Locke kind of Democracy.
There is a bridge from Aristotle to John Locke. Too much of the religious world is directed against freedom, individual rights and pure reason. Too much of the academic world is against faith. There is a middle way.[In particular, the academic world nowadays is in direct antagonism towards Christianity.]
26.4.23
a problem in Enlightenment philosophy is that "education" per se is good for everyone. And along with that came the assumption that education can lift up all mankind.
The problem is education in what?
If the idea was education in Torah Physics and Mathematics, then I would have to agree. But that i not how that idea was applied. Now it can mean in the most ridiculous things. Or it might mean education in law--so you get not noble people, but vicious people with a law degree. Or it might mean queer studies
but then you might ask why should people that are not talented in Math be educated in math? To that I answer that in the hard sciences there is a commandment to learn. It i included in the commandment to learn Torah as we see in Rambam chapter 3 of laws of learning Torah that learning the subject called "pardes" as he defined them in the first four chapters are in the category of learning Gemara