Musar approach of the Rishonim

I might have just gone with the Musar approach of the Rishonim except that their framework is faith {sinai} with reason {Aristotle}. That works for me to some degree except for the problem pointed out by Berkley that there is nothing of the heat of the fire or the sharpness of the sword that enters the mind to give an idea of heat or fire. To see that point clearly it helps to read Thomas Reid, the common sense philosopher. [There are also problems  in Aristotle's Metaphysics.] So the purely Aristotelian approach is not possible except with some sort of modification. Thus, the three critiques of Kant are a necessary development. That leaves me however with some problems in Kant which were noticed almost before the ink was dry. From that emanated a few schools. To me the one that makes the most sense is Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson. ["Why not Hegel?" you might ask. For me, the reason is the dialectic method is a tool of reason, but not the only way reason progress. Empirical evidence is needed. There is the problem of pure reason alone that Kant pointed out.

Roughly the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson https://www.friesian.com/nelson.htm"> makes the most sense to me, but not exactly because of an issue in Kant. I,e, Kant accepts Hume's critique of reason to some degree and does escape from it. I however have an issue thus: I think Hume was wrong from the start. Reason is not limited to figuring out contradictions based in definitions like: bachelors are not married. Why did Hume make this mistake? Because in his day, Euclid had authority almost equal to the Bible. And in Euclid, reason is to see when a result of a hypothesis contradicts one of the five starting axioms. Hume says over and over that that is the only function of reason, but with no proof. He assumes it. But that is an arbitrary limitation. Kant did break out of that prison, but limited reason to the realm of possible experience. That is true to some degree, but still assumes that there is no knowledge outside of reason or empirical experience. But that too is too limiting. For even if we start with Euclid, from where do the axioms come from? Why are they reasonable? That is the starting point of Fries and Leonard Nelson: non intuitive immediate knowledge I owe a debt of gratitude in understanding this to Kelley Ross for his web site on the approach of Leonard Nelson and in particular his PhD thesis there. Also To Michael Huemer in his books and essays and Brain Caplan and Steven Dutch whose web it is back after being down for year.

Bava Metzia page 41 in Rashi and the Baal HaMeor.Rambam laws of stealing and losing chapter 3. law 11.

 שולח יד בפיקדון  In Exodus there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard{shomer hinam{ is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen.

To the Baal Hameor if he steals that object by force then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the Rambam and Ravad.[In the Rambam this is open. For the Raavad you have to see where the Shita Mekubetzet bring him there.]

But if so then arises a difficulty. In the Rambam it say about one that steals [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather ''one uses a pledge'' then why is stealing not by force not also considered the same way? Or visa versa why not consider stealing by force just stealing by force.

See the Avi Ezri in Laws of stealing chapter 3. halacha 11 for more details.

[The main reason why the Rishonim hold stealing by force if a pledge is  שולח יד בפיקדון is from that Gemara in Bava Metzia 41.] 

Answer: Using  a pledge is obligated only when the pledge is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the pledge. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of stealing by force. The case of stealing not by force where he pay double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of swearing "it was  stolen not by force" is a special case learned from verses in Bava Kama 105

 

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 שולח יד בפיקדון  In שמות there is a verse that if one uses a pledge or any object that he is guarding for another, and then that object is lost, he is obligated even though normally a unpaid guard is not obligated when an object in his possession has been lost or stolen. To the בעל המאור if he steals that object by force [גוזל] then also he  is obligated for the same prohibition of "one uses a pledge". It look like this is also the opinion of the רמב''ם andהראב''ד. But if so then arises a difficulty. In the רמב''ם it say about one that גונב [not by force] a pledge he is obligated in double. The problem is that there is an asymmetry between the two cases. If stealing by force is not considered stealing for a pledge [since it is anyway in his possession by the permission of the owner of the pledge] but rather שולח יד בפיקדון, then why is גונב not also considered the same way? Or visa versa, why not consider גוזל just גוזל. see the אבי עזרי in הלכות גזלה ואביה ג' הלכה י''א  

Answer: Using  a פיקדון is obligated only when the פיקדון is no longer available. Otherwise he simply give back the פיקדון. Or if it has been lost or stolen, he pays the amount it was worth. The case of  שולח יד בפיקדון is when he takes an a oath that it was lost or "there never was any such thing" and as an unpaid guard he would not pay back anything. That is the case of גזלה. The case of גנבה where he pays double is when he claims the item was stolen not by force. 

I.e., the case of נשבע הפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל is a special case learned from verses in בבא קמא ק''ה 

שולח יד בפיקדון. בשמות יש פסוק שאם אחד  משתמש במשכון או בכל חפץ שהוא שומר עבור אחר, ואז החפץ הזה אבד, הוא חייב למרות שבדרך כלל שומר ללא תשלום[שומר חינם] אינו חייב כאשר חפץ נמצא אצלו אבד או נגנב. לבעל המאור אם הוא גונב את החפץ בכוח [גוזל] אז גם הוא חייב באותו איסור של "משתמש במשכון". נראה שזאת גם דעת הרמב''ם והראב''ד. אבל אם כן אז מתעורר קושי. הרמב''ם אומר על אחד שגונב [שלא בכוח] משכון הוא חייב בכפל. הבעיה היא שיש אסימטריה בין שני המקרים. אם גזלה בכוח אינה נחשבת לגזלה [שהרי היא ממילא ברשותו ברשות בעל המשכון] אלא שולח יד בפיקדון, אז מדוע לא נחשב גם גונב באותה דרך? או להיפך, למה לא לשקול גוזל רק גוזל. ראה אבי עזרי בהלכות גזלה ואבדה ג' הלכה י''א

תשובה: חיוב על השתמשות בפיקדון הוא רק כאשר הפיקדון אינו זמין יותר. אחרת הוא פשוט מחזיר את הפיקדון. או אם הוא אבד או נגנב, הוא משלם את הסכום שהיה שווה. המקרה של שולח יד בפיקדון הוא כשהוא נשבע שהיא אבדה או ש"לא היה דבר כזה מעולם" וכשומר ללא שכר לא היה מחזיר כלום. זה המקרה של גזלה. מקרה הגניבה שבו הוא משלם כפול הוא כאשר הוא טוען שהפריט נגנב שלא בכוח

דהיינו נשבע שהפיקדון נגנב חייב כפל הוא מקרה מיוחד הנלמד מפסוקים בבא קמא ק''ה.

i know this is way too short, but I hope anyone reading this will look at the Baal Hameor over there in Bava Metzia and I think you see what I mean here. I  think he is right. Rather, my question is about גניבה stealing not by force.

the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent wholesome society.

 The ancient Greeks thought the best way to make sure your children turn out alright is by making sure the grow up in a decent, wholesome society. They knew that the influence of parents and family is limited while that of society is unlimited, Thus I can see that even though I have a great deal of respect for Rav Nahman of Breslov, still it would have been better to stick with the wholesome Litvak Yeshiva environment. 

One lesson I learned in Shar Yahuv  was the idea of review ten times everything you learn. Another thing I noticed in the Litvak world is a great respect for Rav Nahman, but no interest to  "become Breslov".

"Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

 There is a point in not doing a favor for someone who will use it against you. In the Midrash i brought a story about some one who came from Israel to Persia and saw a dead bird. Then came another bird with a leaf from a plant, and put it on the dead bird, and that bird came back to life. Then he went to that same plant and picked a leaf from it, and said to himself,
"This will come in handy." On the way, he saw the carcass of a dead lion. He put it on the lion, and it came back to life and ate  him. From this the Midrash learns: "Do not do good to an evil person, and evil will not reach you."

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל

 A lot of religious motivation is from schizoid personality defects, not from strong faith in God. [video lecture by Sapolsky (start at minutes 8:00 and onward. And in particular minute 1:15:16 [i.e. one hour and fifteen min.]) and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEnklxGAmak] [See : Alfred Kroeber] Thus it is easy to see why the religious world seems so unhealthy. Clearly, this was noticed by Rav Israel Salanter who saw that the essence of Torah is Monotheism with good Midot [good character traits], not religions fanaticism. But that did not help after the first few generations of Musar. Eventually, it became  another sort of religious fanaticism. [See: Geschwind Syndrome]

And this is the reason the religious people commonly refer to secular Jews as "crazy." כל הפוסל במומו פוסל." ''All who calls names calls with his own name." [ Gemara and brought in many Musar books.]

learning in depth. that is with lot's of review

 The major lesson that I learned from my son Izhak is that of learning in depth, that is with lot's of review until I understand, and even then to keep on reviewing. I had of course been introduced to this at Shar Yashuv and the Mir yeshivot, but the lesson did not really sink in until Izhak explained this to me. But it still seem to me to be unclear how much review to do. I have been thinking of the idea of focusing on one subject and kind of expanding out from there. 

Even though Rav Nahman is known for advocating the fast kind of learning, see his book Le.M vol I chap. 74 where learning with iyun [review and depth] is considered to be a higher level.

to rav nahman there are two kinds of judgment: (1) from the realm of holiness, (2) from the realm of uncleaniness. The last is understood: sickness, tragedy, etc. The first i when one tries to come into the realm of holiness and just then troubles begin. These come as tests of faith, or because one was not fit in the first place. And learning without understanding is the same essence as judgment of the realm  of holiness. But when one learns with understanding that mitigates and weakens that all the judgments.