High on my list of precautions would be to avoid stupid places, hanging out with stupid people, and doing stupid things. This alone can spare you a world of grief.

 see this link to self defense.

 There is a great lesson to learn from Henry II. He did not repent because of religious leanings. Rather he realized that things were going terribly wrong in his life. Everything. [His kingdom was being invaded by the king of Scotland.  His own family was offering England to the king of France.]  At some point it occurred to him that the cause was not this rational explanation or the other. It was just one thing--the murder of Thomas Becket. And so he made his way barefoot and blooded to the cathedral and the grave of Becket, and had the monks beat the living daylights out of him. Five lashes given by each of the hundred monks. 

The very next day word came to him that the king of Scotland had been captured.

  In the Gemara Yeruhalmi in the first chapter of Gitin [on the mishna that if a  kuti is one of the witnesses on the divorce doc. it is okay] is brought the reason why the Kutim [Samarians]were not Jewish--because they intermarried with the priests of the high places--[even though those priests themselves were born Jewish.

This comes from the law that any object that is brought as a gift to an idol, can not be nullified. 

Today that religious leaders are themselves worshiped a objects of adoration and praise, thus the people serving  and worshiping them lose their soul.

I see the Litvak seminaries for girls in Bnei Brak do not want give graduation diplomas to girls that are after that off to get a secular education. This makes sense to me since the girls would be going into ''education'' which means ''critical race theory''. The humanities and social studies departments of universities ought to be closed. [Allan bloom pointed in 1990 the crisis but now there  is no crisis. these two parts of the modern university are poison.]

Friesian school of Leonard Nelson - the best route to take for modern philosophy

 The New Friesian school of Leonard Nelson [https://www.friesian.com] needs some clarity in the writings of the  frieian.com of Kelley Ross. One major point of clarity that Dr. Ross brings to the subject is that non intuitive immediate knowledge is not infallible. [It can need modification in view of new evidence. --evidence that has stronger prima facia likelihood].

This clarity would have avoided the seeming problem of Special Relativity. [And that is what caused the defection from the group of nelson to the Berlin group of Reichenbach.]

[Another important aspect of Kelley Ross is that he joins Fries with Schopenhauer.]]

You might think that this ought to be obvious but even in Germany where there is renewed interest in Kant, they go off on a tangent with Hermann Cohen and the neo-Kantian which is another dead end.

Problems in modern philosophy

 The line of thought of Plato and Aristotle  got to be a part of Torah thought in the Rishonim [authorities from the middle ages.] But there are problems in this as pointed out by Berkley and Thomas Reid. Nevertheless, when I saw the problems in modern philosophy, I more or less retreated to the Rishonim. Still the problem remained, though I tended to ignore them. But to get some sort of answer for the mind body problem which remained in the enlightenment until Kant  is important. And the developments since Kant seem futile. So to get to some kind of answer for problems that remained in Kant, I think the New Friesian School of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross seems to be the best. [See this link]

To get an idea of what bothered me about British American ''analytic philosophy" see Robert Hanna. See this link [I had not read Hanna when in high school, but still the problems in analytic philosophy and continental philosophy seemed apparent to me.]

Why did Hegel not seem like the right track? Mainly because the dialectic approach of Socrates is just  one sub category of ways that reason  gets to the truth of things. [There are lot of ways. We see this in Physics and math where every new discovery come about by some different approach.] And not every idea contain its opposite unless any kind of logic is impossible. "Hot" does not mean "cold". Furthermore the off shoots from Hegel are more like alchemy than any kind of building up anything. the idea of melting down lead to find the core of gold is wrong. So to destroy western civilization in order  that the gold underneath becomes apparent  does not work.  

Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88

 I have not had time to consider how to express my notion here. But just to do the best that I can right now let me say that there is something hard to understand in the Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of maaser depends on one's intention at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in tithes from the Torah. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. 

this is based on the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88 which says that a buyer is not obligated from the Torah but only by decree.

Rabbainu Tam says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the Rambam but Rabainu Tam does not mention intention.

Rav Shach brings some clarity on here. He brings the mishna [maaser I:5] that selling grain makes it obligated but if he is bringing it home then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not "tevel". But that does not explain from where the Rambam derives the idea of intention. 

(I am not sure if the Rambam is posek (deciding) like the simple explanation of that mishna. It might be that he explains that mishna as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in laws of maaser chapter 3 law 1 that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean until he reaches home, but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

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 There is something hard to understand in the Rambam in הלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א . The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of מעשר depends on one's כוונה at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in מעשר from the תורה. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. This is based on the גמרא in בבא מציעא page פ''ח which says that a buyer is not obligated from the תורה but only by decree. רבינו תם says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the רמב''ם, but רבינו תם does not mention intention. רב שך brings some clarity on here. He brings the משנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה  that מוליכן לשוק makes it obligated, but if he is bringing it home, then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not טבל. But that does not explain from where the רמב''ם derives the idea of intention בגמר מלאכה. 

(I am not sure if the רמב''ם is פוסק  like the simple explanation of that משנה. It might be that he explains that משנה as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all, he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in הלכות מעשר פרק ג הלכה א that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean ""until he reaches home", but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

יש משהו קשה להבין ברמב"ם בהלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א'. הדבר שקשה להבין הוא מנין הוא שואב את הרעיון שחיוב מעשר תלוי בכוונה של האדם ברגע החלקת ערימת התבואה. כוונתי בשאלה זו: הוא כותב כשמסיימים את המלאכה על התבואה, אם הייתה כוונתו לאכול אותה, הרי הוא חייב במעשר מהתורה. אבל אם כוונתו הייתה למכור אותו. ואז הוא חייב רק בגזרה. וכן, הקונה חייב מהתורה אם סיים את המלאכה בעצמו. אבל אם קנה את התבואה לאחר שסיים המלאכה בו על ידי המוכר, הרי שחייב רק בגזירה. זאת על סמך הגמרא בבא מציעא דף פ''ח שאומר שקונה אינו חייב מהתורה אלא רק בגזרה. רבינו תם אומר אם הסתיימה המלאכה ע"י המוכר הרי שהקונה אינו חייב. זה דומה לרמב''ם, אבל רבינו תם לא מזכיר כוונה. רב שך מביא כאן קצת בהירות. הוא מביא את המשנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה ''שמוליכן לשוק'' מחייב אותו, אבל אם הוא מביא אותו הביתה, אז הוא יכול לאכול ממנו בצורה סתמית עד שזה יגיע לביתו. אז כדי להיות חייב צריך להיות סיום העבודה וגם להגיע לביתו. אחרת זה לא טבל. אבל זה לא מסביר מהיכן שואב הרמב''ם את רעיון הכוונה בגמר מלאכה. אגב אני לא בטוח אם הרמב''ם פוסק כמו ההסבר הפשוט של אותה משנה. יכול להיות שהוא מסביר את המשנה הזאת כמתייחס למה שהכוונה שלו בזמן סיום העבודה, כלומר החלקה של הערימה של דגן. הרי אינו מזכיר שאפשר לאכול מהתבואה עד שיגיע הביתה. שהרי כותב בהלכות מעשר פרק ג' הלכה א' שאם כוונתו להביא את התבואה לביתו, יוכל לאכול ממנו בדרך אגבית. זה נשמע כאילו הוא בטח מתכוון ל""עד שהוא מגיע הביתה", אבל לא ברור לי למה הוא לא אומר את זה בגלוי