Deterministic Quantum Mechanics: the Mathematical Equations Gerard t Hooft

 Deterministic Quantum Mechanics: the Mathematical Equations Gerard t Hooft

He finds classical QM by means of fast variables instead of hidden variables.

 On one hand it seems like a great philosophical idea. The fulfillment of Einstein's idea that QM is a mathematical device, but not a theory of what is going on inside of stuff.

On the other hand, physics is about black holes and tons of other stuff in such away that at least in physics, it is not thought to be earth shaking or to matter much to what is going on today. 

There are tests of this theory as d' Hooft has noticed.

I think d Hooft's Deterministic Quantum Mechanics really is from String Theory where these fast vibrations can be seen.

Gemara in Avoda Zara 23 side b. Tosphot Rosh Hahanah 13 side a.

Tosphot Rosh Hahanah 13 side a. Gemara in Avoda Zara 23 side b. The Gemara in Avoda Zara asks why were Israel commanded to burn the Asherot? After all the land belonged to Avraham and אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו no one can make forbidden that which does not belong to him. Answer: Israel served the Golden Calf so doing idolatry was OK to them. For if it had been the trees from the previous generations that would have been enough to nullify them, not burn them. Tosphot brings up the point that even though the land belonged to Avraham, the Canaanites were not thieves. They had permission to plant trees. And the trees they planted were owned by them. But when the Gemara in Avoda Zara asks its question, it is referring to the asherot from the previous generations.  So let me try to figure out this Gemara in AZ [Avoda Zara]. I guess it must be talking about trees that were in the land of Canaan before it was given to Avraham. And then the land with the trees were given to Avraham. If so the question of the Gemara makes sense. The trees belonged to Avraham and so even if the Canaanites worshipped them, they could not make them forbidden. Then look at the answer: since Israel worshipped the Calf, therefore idolatry was OK to them. That does not answer the question since an ashera has to be planted as an ashera. It can not be a regular tree that was planted for fruit and then worshipped. [That is from the Gemara itself and brought in the Rambam. Avoda Zara perek 8.] So those trees would not have been forbidden even if idolatry was ok to Israel. So let's say the question refers to asherot that were in the land at the time of Avraham, and then given to Avraham. So now they are asherot of a Israel which are required to be burned. That would be great if that was the answer of the Gemara, but the question nor the answer refer to them. So lets say the question of the gemara refers to trees [or even asherot] that were planted after the land was given to Avraham. Well, then they belong to the Canaanites outright and so the question of the Gemara makes not sense. They can cause to be forbidden that which belongs to them. Possible answer: the Gemara might be thinking since the land belongs to Avraham so the trees do also [that were planted after it was given to him]. Maybe the Gemara is thinking that regular trees also can be made forbidden by being worshipped? 

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תוספות ראש השנה י''ג ע''א. גמרא עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. The גמרא in עבודה זרה  asks why were Israel commanded to burn the אשרות? After all the land belonged to Avraham and אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו no one can make forbidden that which does not belong to him. Answer: Israel served the Golden Calf so doing idolatry was OK to them. For if it had been the trees from the previous generations that would have been enough to nullify them, not burn them. תוספות brings up the point that even though the land belonged to Avraham, the Canaanites were not thieves. They had permission to plant trees. And the trees they planted were owned by them. But when the גמרא in עבודה זרה asks its question, it is referring to the אשרות from the previous generations.  So let me try to figure out this גמרא in עבודה זרה . I guess it must be talking about trees that were in the land of Canaan before it was given to Avraham. And then the land with the trees were given to Avraham. If so the question of the גמרא makes sense. The trees belonged to Avraham and so even if the Canaanites worshipped them, they could not make them forbidden. Then look at the answer: since Israel worshipped the Calf, therefore idolatry was OK to them. That does not answer the question since an אשרה has to be planted as an אשרה. It can not be a regular tree that was planted for fruit and then worshipped. That is from the גמרא itself and brought in the רמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח. So those trees would not have been forbidden even if idolatry was ok to Israel. So let's say the question refers to אשרות that were in the land at the time of Avraham, and then given to Avraham. So now they are אשרות of a Israel which are required to be burned. That would be great if that was the answer of the גמרא, but the answer does not refer to them. [Rather the answer is about trees that were forbidden because Israel served idols. Not to tree that were already asherot and then owned by avraham which already required burning] So lets say the question of the גמרא refers to trees or even אשרות that were planted after the land was given to Avraham. Well, then they belong to the Canaanites outright and so the question of the גמרא makes not sense. They can cause to be forbidden that which belongs to them. Possible answer: the גמרא might be thinking since the land belongs to Avraham so the trees do also [that were planted after it was given to him]. Maybe the גמרא is thinking that regular trees also can be made forbidden by being worshipped? 

תוספות ראש השנה י''ג ע''א. גמרא עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. הגמרא בעבודה זרה שואלת מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את האשרות? אחרי הכל, האדמות היו של אברהם ואין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו [אף אחד לא יכול לעשות אסור את מה שלא שייך לו]. תשובה: ישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב ולכן עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם. כי אם היו העצים מהדורות הקודמים היו מספיקים לבטלם, ולא לשרוף אותם. תוספות מעלה את הנקודה שלמרות שהאדמה הייתה של אברהם, הכנענים לא היו גנבים. היה להם אישור לשתול עצים. והעצים ששתלו היו בבעלותם. אך כאשר הגמרא בעבודה זרה שואלת את שאלתה, היא מתייחסת לאשרות מהדורות הקודמים. אז תן לי לנסות להבין את הגמרא הזו בעבודה זרה. אני מניח שזה בוודאי מדבר על עצים שהיו בארץ כנען לפני שניתן לאברהם. ואז האדמה עם העצים ניתנה לאברהם. אם כן שאלת הגמרא הגיונית. העצים היו של אברהם ולכן גם אם הכנענים סגדו להם, הם לא יכלו להפוך אותם לאסורים. ואז התבונן בתשובה: מכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל, לכן עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם. זה לא עונה על השאלה מכיוון שיש לנטוע אשרה כאשרה. זה לא יכול להיות עץ רגיל שנשתל לפירות ואז סגדו אותו. זה מהגמרא עצמה והביא את הרמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח. כך שהעצים האלה לא היו אסורים גם אם עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר לישראל. אז בואו נגיד השאלה מתייחסת לאשרות שהיו בארץ בזמן אברהם, ואז ניתנה לאברהם. אז עכשיו הם אשרות של ישראל ונדרשים להישרף. זה יהיה נהדר אם זו הייתה התשובה של הגמרא, אך התשובה אינה מתייחסת אליהם. [אדרבה התשובה היא על עצים שהיו אסורים מכיוון שישראל שימשה אלילים. לא לעץ שהיה כבר אשרה ואז היה בבעלותו של אברהם שכבר נדרש לשרוף]. אז נניח ששאלת הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים או אפילו אשרות שנטעו לאחר שהאדמה ניתנה לאברהם. ובכן, אז הם שייכים לכנענים על הסף ולכן שאלת הגמרא אינה הגיונית. הם יכולים לגרום לאסור את מה ששייך להם. תשובה אפשרית: הגמרא חושבת מכיוון שהאדמה שייכת לאברהם כך שגם העצים [שנטעו לאחר שניתנה לו]. אולי הגמרא חושבת שאפשר לאסור עצים רגילים על ידי סגידה?

The signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication

The signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication is generally ignored and because of that the Dark Side has taken over most of the religious world. [There are exceptions like the great Litvak yeshivas that are devoted to straight Torah, -- but outside of them I fear the religious world is dark and ugly-- and highly immoral.] 

[The problem is that  if you look at Kelley Ross's Kant Fries school you will see there is a hierarchy of areas of value. 

From that I think it is possible to see that the major test of a person  is to separate the good from the evil in whatever area of value his or her abilities lie in.] So the test of the religions area of value is if one is willing to accept the insight of the Gra. The signature of the Gra is what separates good from evil. But it is not  an area that is impossible to discern. Rather--reason can discern where is the truth. All one needs is a bit of common sense. I.e. reason has the ability to discern between good and evil. [As Huemer goes into in his paper on Ayn Rand.]

The great aspect of the Litvaks is the basic faithfulness to authentic Torah.

The great aspect of the Litvaks is the basic faithfulness to authentic Torah. Yet what is the idea of "kollel". To support people for learning Torah "lishma"--for its own sake and not for money. And in fact if people would be learning Torah for the sake of money or power that takes away any value in what they are doing. So it comes out we are supporting people that learn Torah not for the sake of money by giving them money.

[My impression of the religious world is that in fact it is all about money. But I might give to individuals that I sense that they are true Torah scholars and are learning Torah for its own sake.]    

 

between Hegel and Leonard Nelson.

 To me it seems the most important issue to straighten out is between Hegel and Leonard Nelson. That last is known as the Friesian school. It is completely ignored in the West, but was well known in the USSR.

The issues between these schools of thought are many about Kant's dinge an sich. Things in themselves isolated from all characteristics, [known by dialect, or by immediate non intuitive knowledge, or by straight reason according to the intuitionists like Huemer, G.E. Moore and Prichard.

It looks like the same sort of argument that existed between Plato and Aristotle until Plotinus made Neoplatonism philosophy based on Plato, but incorporated elements of Aristotle. 

[The issues between these two schools seem great to them, but the areas of agreement are much more that the strange areas where philosophy drifted into afterwards.  It seems that there is great value and insight in the Kant Friesian school but that should not be a reason to cancel Hegel or Prichard. What it looks like to me is  is the "soul" The deeper level where  intuitive [sense perception] and a priori knowledge originate. That is implied by Kelley Ross. I once wrote to him asking about this kind of question -that immediate non intuitive knowledge refers to a level of existence that is in the physical world and yet also refers to some level of reason--an end of the regress of reason. And his answer was that these two levels in their origin are one. That seems to refer to the soul. The "soul" seems  to be one area that philosophy has skipped in some sense except the Friesian school. 

But after one would come to this level, the questions still remain how to distinguish between area of good and evil- for every area of value seems to have  an opposite area of value that mimics the authentic area of value.

z13 music file

 z13 C Minor

a difficult Rambam [Laws of Idolatry 8:3]

 I have been thinking about a difficult Rambam. He writes: One who stands up a brick and an idolater comes along and bows down to it, it is forbidden because the act of making it stand up is considered an act." [Laws of Idolatry 8:3]. The very difficult thing to understand here is that the brick is man made. So there needs to be no act besides that fact in order that it should be forbidden. Rav Shach askes this question and answers it in a certain way. He says those last words about it being an act is a mistake and should have been places after the later law about the same scenario except it is referring to an egg. And there you can see that the setting the egg would have to be considered an act for it is not man made. However I am still wondering if there is some way to leave the law as it stands.  For the Gemara itself compares the case of the egg with the case of the brick. That is it asks if one sets up an egg and an idolater comes along and bows down to it is it forbidden like the brick of perhaps it is not an act that is able to be seen, so the fact that the person setting it up might have been in agreement that it should be worshipped but that intension is not clear since the egg looks the same whether it is set up or not. But what I noticed here is this question. What is the connection between the egg and the brick? If the brick is forbidden it is because it is man made and the owner acquiesces that it should be worshipped. The egg would be forbidden because the setting it is an act. So you see even so there is some reason the Gemara equates these two cases. [The Gemara is Avoda Zara 46 side A. Hezkia asked if one stands up an egg and bows down to it--is it forbidden? The Gemara says the meaning is the Israeli sets its it up and a idolater bows. The Gemara asked maybe it is just a brick where it is seen and visible that the Israeli intends it to be worshipped but perhaps an egg--not. The Rambam  [as opposed to Rashi] says that even for the brick we see is it enough not that it is manmade, but also you need  an act that shows his wanting the object to be worshipped. So this might be the reason the Rambam writes this reason on the brick not on the egg since in both cases you need an act. The only question of the Gemara is if you also need a visible act which the conclusion is that you do not. Otherwise the egg would be permitted.

In any case this would disagree with the sugia in avoda zara page 23 about why the asherot [trees that were worshipped by the Canaanites would have to have been burned]. They had been planted regularly [before the land was given to Avraham] and then worshiped [after it was given to Avraham] and then worshiped, but no act was done like here to set them up to be worshiped.

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 ֱחשבתי על רמב''ם קשה. הוא כותב: מי שמעמיד לבנה, ועובד אלילים בא ומשתחווה אליו, זו אסורה מכיוון שפעולת העמדה נחשבת כמעשה. [הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג']. הדבר הקשה להבין כאן הוא שהלבנה היא מעשה ידי אדם. לכן בהשקפה ראשונה לא צריך להיות שום פעולה מלבד עבודה זו כדי שזו תהיה אסורה. רב שך שואל את השאלה הזו ועונה עליה שאת המילים האחרונות האלה על " זה מעשה" זו טעות והיו צריכים להיות מקומן אחרי המשפט המאוחר יותר לגבי אותו תרחיש, אלא שהוא מתייחס לביצה. ושם אתה יכול לראות שההגדרה שהביצה תצטרך להיחשב כמעשה כי היא לא על ידי אדם עשוי. עם זאת אני עדיין תוהה אם יש איזושהי דרך להשאיר את החוק כפי שהוא. הגמרא עצמה משווה את המקרה של הביצה למקרה של הלבנה. כלומר היא שואלת אם מקימים ביצה ועובד אלילים בא ומתכופף אליו זו אסורה כמו הלבנה או אולי זה לא מעשה שמסוגל לראות, ולכן העובדה שהאדם שהקים אותה אולי היה מסכים שיש לסגוד לה, אך הכוונה הזו אינה ברורה מכיוון שהביצה נראית זהה בין אם היא עומדת בצד הזה או השני. אבל מה ששמתי לב כאן זו השאלה הזו. מה הקשר בין הביצה ללבנה? אם הלבנה אסורה, זה בגלל שנעשה על ידי האדם והבעלים מסכימים לסגוד לה. הביצה תהיה אסורה משום שההגדרה היא מעשה. אז אתה רואה למרות זאת יש סיבה כלשהי שהגמרא משווה את שני המקרים האלה. [גמרא עבודה זרה 46 צד א' "חזקיה שאל אם אחד העמיד ביצה ומשתחווה אליה, האם זו אסורה. הגמרא אומרת שהכוונה היא שהישראלי מכין את זו לשם עבודת אלילים. הגמרא שאלה אולי זו רק לבנה שבה נראה ונראה שהישראלי מתכוון לסגוד לה, אבל אולי ביצה - לא. הרמב''ם בניגוד לרש''י אומר שגם עבור הלבנים שאנו רואים זה לא מספיק שזה מעשה ידי אדם, אלא גם אתה זקוק למעשה שממנו נראה של רצונו לעבודה זרה. זו עשויה להיות הסיבה שהרמב"ם כותב את הסיבה הזו על הלבנה ולא על ביצה שכן בשני המקרים אתה זקוק למעשה. השאלה היחידה של הגמרא היא אם אתה צריך גם מעשה גלוי. המסקנה היא שאתה לא צריך. אחרת הביצה תהיה מותרת.