Copernicus did not predict new effects. Even his calculations were less accurate than that of astronomers working on the Ptolemy model.  But he explained things better. Rather than keeping on adding new rings he was able to make simple sense of the solar system by postulating that the earth goes around the sun.No new rings were needed.

Newton did not predict new effects. He simply explained the same force of gravity we see here on Earth is also in the heavens. It made more sense to explain the Kepler laws rather that leaving them unexplained. But there were no new predictions.

String theory explains things that do not and can not work in quantum gravity. That it has not be developed enough to know what new predictions at present day scales that can be tested  is not a lack. And it is testable.  See this: https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-gravity-could-soon-be-tested-using-ultracold-atoms/ So string theory or other approaches to gravity can be tested. 

Philosophy has been in a rut for some time. Robert Hanna's approach is to place pretty much everything since Kant into the waste basket.  ["Forward to Kant" is his motto.] And judging by the astounding emptiness of academic philosophy, who can blame him? But I still can see a lot of value in the Kant-Fries School of thought that takes an approach based on Kant, but diverges from him in some ways. And this school is so much ignored that even in lists of philosophers you will not even find Fries or Leonard Nelson mentioned.

But my own interest is in understanding my own experience in the world and making sense of it, [not to understand philosophy]. And for that I found the basis of the Kant-Friesian approach to be helpful.

I should add that the Fries approach and also the Nelson approach also have kinks that need to be worked out. I found that the web site of Kelley Ross does this job the best.  [and this seems to be thanks to the efforts of Greta Hermann.]  [Dr Ross is the best of all philosophers in over view and scope. but there is still plenty to learn from Huemer and Hegel. And I can see how some might say there are deep contradictions between them, but I can not see that. Humer bases himself  on the Intuitionists that reason is a faulty,--which is true. But that does not  contradict the subtleties of Kant. And Hegel does not deal with the Mind Body problem at all-. He sees the Notion as being the synthesis of both. But he  does not explain how and that is the very problem for those that deal with it. Hegel is not interested in that at all. He simply sees empirical and a priori knowledge as two outer sides of some inner coin.]  I still must say that Hegel has some good points that seem to be missed by this school of thought, plus the Intuitionists like Michael Huemer also have some points. They all seem to me to be some aspect of a deeper world view that I can not put my finger on exactly. 

{I truly feel guilty that I can not see the great chasm between Hegel and Fries. To me the whole issue is this: the Friesian school is a post Kant  Platonism. (That is the doctrines of Plato, but taking into account the three critiques). Hegel is a post Kant Plotinus. {That is Neo Platonism taking Kant into account.}  

 One problem I have noticed in religious leaders is that of self deception. That is to say you can not accuse them of being hypocrites  since they sincerely believe that they are super geniuses super wise and in contact with the ultimate wisdom, when in fact they are mostly pretty stupid and obsessed with sex and power. And they very much desire the money of secular Jews-- as you can see by the fact that they are asking for it all the time.

They are people that have never accomplished anything and act and pretend as of the whole world depends on them. And resort to degrading anyone besides them who has accomplished great deeds.

You can see that I am not the first person to notice this. In fact, this theme is mentioned in the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov when he refers to the Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chapters 8, 12, 28. It is  a theme that occurs often in the LeM, but also is brought in the Gemara itself in the end of tractate Shabat. There the Gemara says says that most of the problems in the world come from Torah scholars that are evil.  [The whole quotation is this: "If you see a generation that troubles come upon it, go and check the judges of Israel; for all troubles that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel.'']

 z2 D major

religious fanaticism and the worship of dead people. Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

 There is a point to what many people say about religious fanaticism. I.e. that it is insane. And that is a true point. And also well justified by observation. But the opposite extreme seems  also somewhat off. The way I think is best to deal with this issue is to find the good and throw out what is wrong. [One good way to see this issue is like Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School where religious belief comes under the category of immediate non intuitive knowledge. So where as id one find the path towards holiness that has the most energy and light, the problem is if one misses the target even by the slightest amount he or she falls into the Dark Side where the energy and power of evil is infinite. And even worse is the fact that these two opposite poles are often contained in the same person. (as people often have that characteristic of containing opposite in one body.)

[Another problem in the religious world is the worship of dead people. In Torah we find that there is a prohibition of worship of any other gods besides the One and only First Cause. The religious worship other gods but they get away with this because they pretend that what they are doing is not idolatry. They clothe their worship of dead people in Jewish religious clothing and that is supposed to make it OK.]

Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

בכורות דף נ''ו ואבי עזרי של רב שך הלכות שקלים

 I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the אבי עזרי of רב שך in הלכות of שקלים. It is this in the רמב''ם there is this approach to מעשר בהמה. Sheep or cows come into the domain of יורשים it is is not obligated. That is where is disagrees with the ראב''ד. But in the domain, what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated.  The question רב שך has on this רמב''ם is based on the משנה that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. רב שך asks would it not be more of a חידוש to say that the inheritors that   divide are מחויבים if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה. The lack of understanding on my part is this. The משנה certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly רב שך here is understanding the רמב''ם that that משנה is coming to tell us יש ברירה. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. On one hand I can see the point of רב שך. In the way of the רמב''ם, that משנה has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear. What I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the מעשר for animals is that there is a change in domain, from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain..

It occurred to me later today to mention that my basic point is that there is not much difference with the brothers going into a new partnership of coming out of one when it comes to the issue of "breira". If אין ברירה [no choosing] then going into one is the same as coming out, and same is there is choosing. While Rav Shach's question revolves on the idea that there is a difference. Going into a new partnership he holds is clearly like they are buyers. But not coming out of one. But if we hold "there is choosing", it ought not to make a difference. Rav Shach is saying since there is choosing the mishna could have simply told us coming out of the partnership does not change anything and they are still obligated in maasar behama. [As the Mishna obviously hold that way anyway.] So why come onto the next case of rejoining? [It is doubtful to me why this should be different] Rav Shach holds that this is where the mishna tells us there is choosing and this new partnership is what makes them obligated.

בכורות נ''ו רמב''ם הלכות שקלים

תמהתי על נושא מסוים באבי עזרי של רב שך בהלכות של שקלים. זה ברמב''ם יש גישה זו למעשר בהמה. כבשים או פרות נכנסים לרשות של יורשים הם לא מחויבים. שם הוא לא מסכים עם הראב''ד. אך מה שנולד ברשות היורשים חייב. השאלה שיש לרב שך על רמב''ם זה מבוססת על הנושא שאם היורשים מתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב, הם אינם חייבים במעשר. רב שך שואל האם זה לא יהיה יותר חידוש לומר שיורשים שמתחלקים הם מחויבים אם המשנה באה לומר לנו יש ברירה. חוסר ההבנה מצדי הוא זה. המשנה בהחלט מחזיקה יש ברירה. האחים עדיין חייבים במה שנולד בזמן הצטרפותם. ההצטרפות  השנייה היא זו שגורמת להם לא להיות חייבים. ברור שרב שך כאן מבין את הרמב''ם שאותו משנה בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. אבל נראה שכך או אחרת זה לא אומר כלום אם האחים מתחלקים. מצד אחד אני יכול לראות את הטעם של רב שך. בדרך של הרמב''ם, אותו משנה צריכה ללכת על פי הדעה שיש ברירה. כי אם לא [כלומר אם החוק יהיה אין ברירה], אז כאשר האחים מתחלקים הם ייחשבו כקונים שלא יהיו חייבים במעשר בהמה. ובכל זאת קשה לומר שגם לפי אין ברירה שההתחייבות שכבר הייתה עליהם לתת כל חיה עשירית תיעלם. מה שאני מתכוון. הדרך הרגילה בה אנו מבינים שאנשים שקונים אינם חייבים במעשר בהמה היא שיש שינוי בתחום, מאדם אחד לאחר. אבל כאן בעלי חיים שנולדו כשהאחים היו ביחד הם עכשיו בבעלות זה או אחר בלבד. זה לא ממש שינוי בעלות.

I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach [in the only law in Laws of Shekalim that there is a chapter in the Avi Ezri]. It is this in the Rambam there is this approach to tithe of animals [every tenth animal must be given away]. It comes into the domain of inheritors it is is not obligated. [That is where is disagrees with the Raavad.] But in the domain --i.e. what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated [That is both to the Raavad and Rambam.] The question Rav Shach has on this Rambam is a different. The question is based on the fact that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. Rav Shach asks would it not be more of a "chidush" [new idea] to say that the inheritors that   divide are obligated if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה [what is divided reveals what was already divided in potential in the past.].

The lack of understanding on my part is this. The mishna certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly Rav Shach here is understanding the Rambam that that mishna is coming to tell us something about there is "braira"  יש ברירה or there is not braira [choosing]. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. 

On one hand I can see the point of Rav Shach. In the way of the Rambam, that mishna has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה [there is choosing]. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear.

I think you can see what I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the maasar for animals is that there is a change in domain--from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain.