Dr. Michael Huemer is certainly a brilliant philosopher. But the problem with his idea of anarcho-capitalism that occurs to me is the Federalist Papers, paper number 6.  [Danny Frederick discusses one other possible critique. That is; he brings the idea of Berkeley that the legitimacy of government is because of the consequences of not having one. But I can already predict that Dr. Huemer would not be convinced by that argument. He just thinks governments are just awful.] However the arguments of the Federalist papers I think do answer his points. Not that any government is OK. The Federalist Papers are arguing for a certain kind of government. [The authors of the Federalist Papers might very well agree with Dr. Huemer about most governments except for the one they were advocating. That is a Republic based on the English model.

So Anarchy or Communism would certainly fall under the critique of Huemer on government, but a lot depends on the type of people and situation. He says financial interests would cause different groups to not make war on each other but that is only refuted in Federalist Papers 6 and 7.

learning as fast as possible

I wanted to mention that even though learning as fast as possible was certainly one aspect of Rav Nahman (of Breslov) thought as you can see in the Conversations of Rav Nahman section 76. And in fact we know that he told  Rav Natan his disciple to learn that way. Still if you look in the Sefer HaMidot about learning, he brings up the issue of review as being very important.
So on one hand you could say, "Well, anyway he holds from review in the Conversations of Rav Nahman. But there the idea of review is to finish the whole book you are doing, and then go back and review it many times." That you can say just so as not to have him being contradictory. Still in a practical sense, I find it hard to review after I have finished  a book. It lacks the freshness of the first time, and also I have forgotten everything by the time I start a second time. So the best idea is like what they do in the Mir in NY. The morning for intense depth learning--which means lots of review then and there. Not some distant time in the future. And the afternoon for fast learning. [In the Mir fast learning meant Gemara with Tosphot,]

"Identity" based ideology is the modern idolatry. That is the idea that truth is determined by what group one belongs to. Rather one ought to strive to be moral based on what the Torah says. That often differs from group identity. In fact the only two groups that I see that really strive to live according to what the Law of Moses says are Shar Yashuv and the Mir [both in NY]. Though I think most Litvak based Musar yeshivas do the same.

It is not the amount of Musar [Ethics] that they learn but rather the mental orientation. For in fact most Musar yeshiva learn very little Musar. But that little bit still forms the mental attitude.

w86 G Major w86 midi w86 nwc

An argument between Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach about things that are worth money.

שווה כסף something worth money is considered as money to Rav Haim of Brisk but to Rav Shach it is in the category of barter.

The issue is how to marry a woman. That works by means of actual money. [I mean some kind of coin. Not paper money.] But also it works by means of something worth money. Tosphot asks how do we know this? After all the fact that money works we learn from the field of Efron the Hitite. Tospfot says right on the first page of Kidushin that something worth money works to marry we learn from a Hebrew slave. That means that in the verse of how a Hebrew slave is redeemed it says  כסף ישיב לבעליו and from the extra words we learn this includes something worth money שווה כסף.
The question on this is that learning from place to place by a "gezera shava" גזירה שווה only works if you learn everything, But here you do not since a Hebrew slave that is owned by a gentile can not be redeemed by something worth money שווה כסף,-- only by actual physical money. Rav Shach answers this question in this way. This is the important principle: that there are different kinds of acquisition. For example an when a person is hired to work for someone else. Lets says he is hired to work for the manager of the bank for a five year contract. So even though he is not owned by the manager, still here is a "kinyan".

That is the same kind of thing as a Hebrew slave or marrying a woman. There is not an acquisition of the person but there is a different kind of acquisition. So you can learn something worth money can acquire for this kind of acquisition.

[I had forgotten this very point until my learning partner in Uman David Bronson showed me that there are many different kinds of kinyanim קניניים acquisitions. They something mean ownership of an object. But other times it might mean a acquisition of certain obligations or rights as when an employee is hired for a job. He has an obligation to fulfill the contract but his body is not owned by the employer.]

It is pretty clear that the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities] were not into "identity politics" when it came to issues about what the Torah means. To them what matters is the search for truth and justice. Not to believe in things because one is born into some belief system.
You can see this in the Rambam for one example when he emphasizes the study of Physics and Metaphysics as defined by the ancient Greeks.Yet this has been for me a bit confusing because I do not assume that Physics reached its peak with Aristotle. And not Metaphysics either.

The progress of Physics is easily defined because of experiment. But what progress in Metaphysics is possible?  Kant thought his anti-monies [showing the limits of reason] stood in the place of experiment. He was  trying to walk a similar kind of path in Philosophy that Newton had walked in Physics. [This point is brought by Palatnik at Harvard].

It is a good thing that nowadays there is a lot more clarity in philosophy than in the 20th century. The top people have realized that getting back to Kant is important. E.g, Kelley Ross. And most serious thinkers have realized most of twentieth century philosophy was pure nonsense.

[It is has been my hope for a long time to introduce the idea of Rav Nahman of just saying the words and going on as a way to learn Physics even for people like me that are simply not that very talented in it and yet see it as an important part of the commandment to learn Torah --at least according to those Rishonim that hold this way. [It is not at all unanimous but still a significant group of Rishonim hold this way.]]

In Deuteronomy: "Thou shalt not add nor subtract from the commandments I command you this day."

In Torah there is brought twice a prohibition of adding or subtracting from the commandments.
I have had a problem in understanding this for  along time. One explanation I heard from my learning partner in Uman is that rabbinical laws do not add to the Torah since they are not saying that they are adding. Rather they claim those laws are rabbinical so that is not adding.
This might seem to you a bit disingenuous. [They can add as long as they do not say they are adding. It would be like if a thief steals but that is OK as long as he does not say that that is what he is doing.]
The way I see this is this. The Pilgrims on the Mayflower made the "Mayflower Compact". That is there is such a thing as a community of people getting together and deciding that they are going to live under certain rules. So there would be no such thing as decrees of anything that is binding for all generations except the actual laws of the Torah. Other than that there just basic norms that are applicable to a particular time and place.

 But this is a debate. Like in the city of R. Yose ha'Galili they went by his rulings even when that was against the general rulings on things even things from the Torah. [I recall this came up a few times. Like the meat of fowl with milk. But I recall it comes up more than that.] So the idea that there is a general right to add seems to be specific to place and time. Besides this there is the old argument even in the Gemara itself if once the reason for a decree disappears then the decree itself is null and void. Most Rishonim hold the decree is null, i.e, the Raavad and Tosphot.



But just to show the basic idea see Avot of R. Natan [a commentary on Avot by an amora. a sage of the gemara] on the mishna "to make a fence".
Also the idea that decrees are for the local communities that they were made for comes up in the Gemara often enough. Like with R. Yehuda Hanasi and R Yose in terms of milk with poultry