The Hegelian State is not so absurd in my eyes. I think Communism is in its very core based on serious mistake like the Labor Theory of Value--even thought that was accepted as fact in the time of Marx--still it is not true that they value of any thing depends on how much labor went into making it. Rather it depends on how much people want to buy it.

And Hegel's model was in any case meant to help avoid the insane chaos that was the French Revolution.
And what then is up with China?
Dr Michael Huemer and Kelley Ross are against Communism in any and all forms for very good reasons and yet how else can one take control of chaos before it gets out of hand? Anyone who has been to Ukraine knows there is some kind of elements in the population that are simply crimnal and there is  alarge percent. They are not WASPS [White Anglo Saxon Protestants]. And then good elemenst are either in fact Russian DNA or Russia leaning.

In the Talmud in Nazir you have a case around page 32 or so where two people see someone coming. One thinks it is George and the other says it is Simon. The one that said it is George says "if it is Simon I will be a nazirite." The one that says it is Simon says "if it is George I will be  a Nazirite" If it is Simon the first one who thought it is George is a nazirite.

Why is this any different from nidrei zeruzim of other kinds of vow where one really does not intend the vow to actually become obligated?

I always had a kind of conflict between learning fast as I wanted to do{as I saw in a few books] in Shar Yashuv and the fact that Rav Friefeld and his son Moti were always recommending review.

So what I did was this kind of compromise that I would do the actual paragraph of the gemara twice with Rashi and also one time the English translation in the Soncino.

The idea of a sort of minimal review seemed to help me then and later on also when I was in university learning Physics I also had this kind of minimal review approach. That is one time to review the page or paragraph and go on.

This is not exactly the way of Rav Nahman that was to read the words i.e. say them in a whisper or out loud, and go on without review until you reach the end of the book and then review. But neither was it was Rav Freifeld was.


In Shar Yashuv [a Litvak yeshiva that went more or less along the path of the Gra.] They were doing Gemara in a deep way that was different from the Mir where I went later on. In Shar Yashuv the way was kind of what is called in Israel" To calculate the sugia" that is intense analysis ofg the actual words of the Gemara and Tosphot. Later in the Mir and especially with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum I saw a different approach that was based on Rav Haim Soloveichik which was global--and not concentrated on that one page in front of you. I benefited from both approaches but again as I mentioned up above when it came to personal; learning I found this kind of method of review of the paragraph twice and going on to be the thing that worked for me best. 

The basic background in Bava Mezia 101a as far as I can recall is this:
The Mishna brings the law that a renter of a field in Israel from an non Jew, takes maasar (tithe) and then pays the non Jew (probably Arab). The reason is that you can not pay your debts with tevel (produce that has not had tithes taken from it). R. Yehuda adds "also a sharecropper must take tithes and then pay." The Gemara says at first it looks like a gentile has no possesion in such a way that the crops are not obligated in tithe and a sharecropper is like a renter.

Then the Gemara brings a braita that says that R Yehuda said his law only in the case of a gentile that took the ground without paying for it. That is he stole it.  So the Gemara concludes that there is possesion and a sharecropper is not like a renter.


Sharecropping is when the worker shares some percent of the crops like Frank Hamer used to do before he became a Texas Ranger and brought down Bonnie and Clyde. 

Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

__________________________________________________________________________________




The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.