Divine realm

I should say right out that the way I defend Torah is by separating to levels of reality. I hold anything in Torah hard to understand in this world must be referring to some Divine realm. I mentioned this once to my learning partner. Clearly knowing a drop of Isaac Luria is helpful in this respect. [The Rambam held in a similar vein.]
Plato himself has two levels of reality though he links them by some mysterious process called participation. Kant and Hegel also. But to Kant there was no bridge. To Hegel there is a bridge- dialectics which it seems he thought was a kind of group endeavor. 

[Plato was forced into his opinion because of Parmenides. Kant was forced into his because of the problem that all character traits of things depend on the subject. That is Decartes, and also the problem between the rationalist and empiricists and the problem in his on home town between the Pietists and the school of the rationalists of Germany (Johann Salomo Semler,)]
The way Kant navigated between these two extremes was to find a ground of validity of each one, and thus one could know the limits of each one.

The problem is Leftism. I mean to say while the right is splintered, it still seems to be a much better approach, even in its original formulation of being on the side of Monarchy. But my feeling is the original constitution of the Virginia Colony  made the most sense with the obligation of belonging to some church [I do not think they were thinking about Jewish people at that point or what they would have said] while the government would stay out of religious affairs.  

My impression was that original constitution was inspired in some way by John Locke but I might be mistaken.

[This balanced approach was not taken by later colonies that left out all religious obligation. That does not seem right to me. Perhaps they thought the trouble was in the churches themselves with lots of problematic doctrines. And that problem has not seem to have been abated. I guess they could have chosen the best ones, and forbade the less desirable ones;--but instead they choose to say that Federal government ought to stay out of religion altogether. Anyway, I think some of the Founding Fathers were Deists anyhow, so it would not have made any sense to have clause that one has to belong to some church. Instead they focused on the mechanisms of government and tried to get that part right. That seems to work well. In that way they left the power to the states to support whatever religious orders they saw fit- and that seems to have worked well until recently. Even the Mir yeshiva in NY I think was getting state funds for being a  institution of higher learning. So this approach of the founding fathers seems to be a pretty decent model of government.

Hegel and Dr Kelley Ross.

''The second sphere of those manifestations of spirit which are more closely related to philosophy is the area of religious representations in general. Here belongs primarily religion as such, then mythology and the mysteries, and even to a certain extent poetry. Just as the first area of which we spoke had in common with philosophy its formal element, the I and the form of universality, so what is common here is the other side, i.e., the substantial element, the content.''

"...how man is conscious of God, i.e., how in consciousness he represents God, this being the objective form or determination of thought whereby man sets the essence of divinity over against himself, represents it as something other than himself, as an alien being in the beyond. The second characteristic is to be found in devotion and cult, which constitute the overcoming of this opposition, whereby. man raises himself to God and becomes conscious of his unity with God’s being.''

Introduction to the History of Philosophy.

Source: Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy, by Quentin Lauer, S.J. with a new translation of Hegel’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy;

Translated: from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Hamburg, 1940.

It is hard to see here much difference between Hegel and Dr. Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School of Thought. Hegel is not coining a new term for holiness an attachment with God like Otto does with "Numinous" value, but still the message is obviously the same.

tying oneself to a "tzadik"

One of the problems of tying oneself to a "tzadik" is not just the problem that Reb Chaim from Voloshin noticed that it is the exact same prohibition in the Torah of not to type or bind one's soul to any idol. But furthermore when one allows someone to shadow his life as his 'spiritual leader' and dominate his thinking, he takes on the quirks, oddities and idiosyncrasies of his 'spiritual leader'. He becomes a disciple alright, but not of God. I have seen leaders who had produced hundreds of disciples--but every one of them had his obvious mishegasim [bad character and nutty habits] Their God-given distinctiveness has been absorbed by their hovering 'spiritual leader.'
Mainly the way I see it the problem all began with the movement of the Shatz and Natan from Gaza, his false prophet. An examination of the microfilm copies of Natan's book will show I think from where most doctrines of the religious world come from. [Not from the Ari Isaac Luria or Musar.] 
But I am not claiming any special insight into this outside of just plain horrific experiences. I was duped just like everyone else and fell for the polished image of respectability. I in fact fell harder than most and because of that I realize the sinister nature of the religious world. If I could go back today I would imply have stayed in the Mir Yeshiva in NY and not budged an inch. Or if I had to go to Israel--as I felt I needed to based on the Ramban-then I should have made it my business to be in an authentic Litvak yeshiva or Religious Zionist one. The trouble is this: outside of the authentic Litvak and Zionist places, the religious world is a large quilt of cults.


[No disrespect intended towards Reb Nachman who was a true tzadik, but even a true tzadik can make an occasional  mistake --even in doctrine. I think a close examination of the Cherem of the Gra will show it did not apply to Reb Nachman,

What is the connection between Avraham's going down to Egypt and Sara's being taken to the house of Pharaoh and the later escape from Egypt?  It seems to me that that was to prepare the way for Israel later to make the same trip. This is an  about  paving a path that later people can walk on with more ease than he had.

I mentioned before the idea of the Ten Commandments being hidden in the Ten Statements of Creation. [Nine times "And God said" and the first verse "In the beginning God create heaven and earth" which was the first statement but since it doesn't say "God said" it is the hidden statement ] These Ten Statements are hidden inside all things that have been created. But the light of the Torah in them need to be revealed. Avraham paved the way so that later the ten plagues would bring forth the light of the Ten Commandments.  This is the hidden reason for the Rambam seeing in Physics the highest\ light--the light of the hidden statement of Creation.

Clearly this has a relation to ten types song that are mentioned in the Tikunai HaZohar and also in the Tikunim of the Ramchal. That is the fact that the light of God does not extend to unclean places as it "My glory I will not give to another." So from where does an unclean place get it's life force? From the Hidden Statement of Creation. But for that to be revealed, one needs the ten kinds of song.

My original point was however more along the lines of why God wrote the Torah in this way? What  lesson is the story of Avraham's going down and Sara being held prisoner and then being redeemed?
[The connections here are based to some extent on Reb Nachman]

ראב''ד and הרמב''ם
 There is a question when the reason for a law דרבנן no longer applies can the law itself  be nullified.

 But if I recall correctly the ראב''ד puts his comment about רבי יוחנן בן זכאי and the first fruits on הלכה ג and his comment about when the law is accepted throughout all Israel in הלכה ב. That is in laws of ממרים

From what I recall  הלכה ב says when the reason no longer applies for a  גזירה or תקנה or a מנהג that was instituted by the בית דין in Jerusalem and has been accepted by all Israel, then another בית דין can nullify it if it is greater in wisdom and numbers. But how is it possible to be greater in number when the number is already set to be שבעים ואחד. The הרמב''ם answers this refers to teh number of the sage of Israel that agree with the בית דין. The הרמב''ם in all three הלכות deals only with the great בית דין did does not enter into the question of what about a lesser בית דין or a בית דין today with no סמיכה.
On this הלכה I think the ראב''ד say: No, but once it has been accepted by all Israel, even a בית דין with great numbers and wisdom can not nullify it.

Then in  הלכה ג the הרמב''ם writes a law that was made as a סייג לתורה then even  בית דין with greater wisdom and numbers can not nullify it. On that the ראב''ד brings that רבי יוחנן בן זכאי nullified the law to adorn the streets of Jerusalem with the first fruits even though he was not as great as the בית דין that made the law.

What seems to come out from this to the  ראב''ד is that if the law has been accepted by all Israel then even though the reason no longer applies, no בית דין can nullify it, and if it was not accepted by all Israel then even a smaller בית דין can nullify it. To the ראב''ד everything depends on if it has been accepted by all Israel.


) בענין גזירה דרבנן שהתבטל טעמה של הגזירה. הוא מחלוקת בגמרא (ביצה ה.) אם הגזירה בעצמה מתבטלת אם טעמה התבטלה.
רבה אמר שלא נמשכת הגזירה, ורבא אמר שכן היא נמשכת. הרמב''ם פסק כמו רבא שהיא נמשכת (ממרים פרק ב' הלכה א-ג). הראב''ד פוסק כמו רבה אם החוק לא התקבל בכל ישראל. הגם שהראב''ד בא מסוגיית ביכורים. אני חושב שיש סמך לראב''ד מן הגמרא בגיטין (פרק ראשון). הגמרא אומרת לדעת רבא שאם טעם התקנה לומר "בפני נכתב ובפני ונחתם" אינו שייך (כגון במקום ששיירות מצוייות), אז אין לומר "בפני נכתב ובפני ונחתם". (ואפילו אין להחמיר כמו שרואים אחר כך בסוגיית רבי יהושע בן לוי.)  הרמב''ם אינו יכול לתרץ שיש חילוק בין תקנה שהיא עשה דרבנן  ובין גזירה שהיא לא תעשה דרבנן, בגלל שכתב שגם תקנה דרבנן אינה מתבטלת אם טעמה התבטל.
גזירות או תקנות שאומצו על ידי בית דין מאוחר יותר כאשר סיבת החוק היא בטלה, הוא נושא לדיון בין רמב''ם ותוספות והראב''ד. זה נובע מגמרא בביצה דף ה' ע''א. הדבר המעניין הוא שהרמב''ם במבוא למשנה התורה, שם הוא עוסק בנושא אחר על בית הדין מקומי. שם הוא אומר כי לאף אחד אין  הסמכות לבטל חוק של הגמרא. ועל שבגמרא יש מערכת הכללים כיצד להחליט הלכה. בכל מקרה לרמב''ם לא היה ספק בכך. אבל בין הראשונים יש דעות שונות על כללים אלה. הדבר המוזר בהלכות ממרים ב' הלכה ב' לא נראה שהוא מתייחס לבית דין ללא  סמיכה אותנטי מסיני אשר אינו קיים עוד. בהקדמה למשנה תורה הוא מתייחס לסוג של  בית  דין של שלושה בלי סמיכה שיכולים לשפוט קבוצה מאוד מוגבלת של דברים.  ברור כי כפי שאנו רואים שהיתה להם סמכות לעשות גזירות רק  בזמן הגמרא.
רמב''ם בתחילת משנה תורה והן בממרים פ''ב הלכות א-ג אומר בערך אותו הדבר. זה במונחים של הלכה. פסק בית הדין המאוחר אינו מחויב ללכת לפי בית דין הגדול לשעבר בדבר שדנו על פי הי''ג מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן. כלומר זו הלכה א'. אבל כשמדובר בתקנות גזירות ומנהגים בית הדין המאוחר מחוייב להסכים עם בית דין הקודם אלא אם כן הוא גדול בחכמה וכמות. עם זאת חוק שנעשה בתור סייג לתורה, בית הדין המאוחר לא יכול לבטל. זהו החוק הבסיסי של הרמב''ם, וזה גם איך רב שך מבין אותו. הדרך שאתה רואה שכך רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם היא העובדה כי בעדויות הוא אומר שהרמב''ם מדבר על גזירות ותקנות. באותה משנה עדוית א:ה' המשנה מבקשת "למה לכתוב דעת המיעוט?" וזו נותנת תשובה. הרמב''ם אומר  שהמשמעות היא שבית הדין המאוחר יכול להכריע את החוק ככה אם יש לו רוב חכמה ורוב מניין. למה לא מבינים את הרמב''ם פשוט כי הוא מתכוון לפסק הלכה? בגלל שהרמב''ם קישר אותה משנה עם הרעיון כי בית דין אחר עשוי לתלות בדעת המיעוט אם יש לו רוב חכמה ורוב המניין. אנחנו כבר יודעים מתוך משנה תורה שהרמב''ם אינו מחייב בית דין המאוחר להיות יותר במספר ויותר בחוכמה כשמדובר בפסק הלכה.
) ראב''ד  והרמב''ם הלכות ממרים פ''ב הלכות א-ג'. יש שאלה כאשר סיבת חוק דרבנן כבר לא חלה אם החוק עצמו יבוטל? אבל אם אני זוכר נכון, ראב''ד מעמיד את ההערה שלו על רבי יוחנן בן זכאי ואת הביכורים על הלכה ג וההערה שלו על מצב כשהחוק מקובל בכל ישראל בהלכה ב.  הלכה ב' אומרת כאשר הסיבה כבר לא חלה על גזירה או תקנה או מנהג זה שהונהג בידי בית הדין בירושלים שהתקבל על ידי כל ישראל, אז עוד בית דין יכול לבטל את החוק אם הוא גדול בחכמה ומספר. אבל איך אפשר להיות יותר במספר כשמספר כבר מוגדר להיות שבעים ואחד. הרמב"ם עונה זו מתייחסת למספר החכמים של ישראל שמסכימים עם בית הדין. הרמב''ם בכל שלושת ההלכות עוסק רק עם  בית הדין הגדול,  ולא נכנס לשאלה מה לגבי בית הדין רגיל או בית הדין של היום ללא סמיכה.  בהלכה זו  הראב''ד אומר: לא, אבל ברגע שזה התקבל על ידי כל ישראל, אפילו בית דין עם יותר מספר וחוכמה לא יכול לבטל אותו. ואז הלכה ג' הרמב''ם כותב שחוק אשר נעשה בתור סייג לתורה אז אפילו בית הדין עם חוכמה גדולה ויותר ומספרים לא יכול לבטל אותו.  והראב''ד מביא כי רבי יוחנן בן זכאי ביטל את החוק לעטר את רחובות ירושלים עם הביכורים למרות שהוא לא היה גדול כמו בית דין שתקנו את החוק. מה שיוצא מזה אל ראב"ד היא שאם החוק התקבל על ידי כל ישראל, אז למרות שהסיבה כבר לא חלה, אין בית דין יכול לבטל את החוק, ואם זה לא התקבל על ידי כל ישראל אז אפילו  בית הדין קטן יכול לבטל אותו. לראב''ד הכל תלוי אם זה התקבל על ידי כל ישראל.

Jose Faur brings that a lot of Tosphot hold if the reason for the law is gone the law is gone but I do not have any Gemara to be able to look this up. Maybe someday God will grant me to start learning Gemara.


It is upsetting tome that I have no more any sefer of Rav Shach or the Rambam to look this up. Still I want to point out what I recall that the Rambam puts in the idea that teh reason for the law has gone away and on that halacha, halacha 2, that is where the Raavad puts his comment about the law being spread through all Israel and later in halacha 3 where I think the Rambam does  not mention the reason for the law disappearing that is where the Raavad puts his comment about R. Yochanan Ben Zachai.  So does the Raavad make a distinction between a law made for  fence  and other laws that are d'rabanan?And what is the Rambam thinking? Other laws are not made for a fence?! Then why are they made? This is one of those times I wish I had a learning partner to thrash this issue out with. 



Yose Faur brings a lot of places where Tosphot goes with the opinion of Raba that once the reason for the law is gone, the law itself is gone--which is even more radical than the Raavad. Still not having any Gemaras with me to be able to look it up, I do not bring it down.

I had a kind of history with the Bava Sali family.

I had a kind of history with the Bava Sali family. His daughter saw in me a great responsibility for Klal Israel, but I could not figure out what that is supposed to mean. When I look back on it and try to decipher  what kind of responsibility that implies I find I can not figure it out.  What my best guess is that she thought I could help to influence the world towards these simple things, Tur, Beit Joseph Shulchan Aruch and Musar. That is the basic Lithuanian yeshiva path but with an extra emphasis on Halacha and Musar [classical Musar means medieval books of ethics like the חובות לבבות, שערי תשובה, ספר היראה המיוחס לרבינו תם,  אורחות צדיקים מסילת ישרים וספר מוסר של הרמ''ק].

I should mention that Bava Sali did not want to see any mystics when he came to Jerusalem and was accepting visitors that wanted blessings and advice from him. He gave explicit instructions not to let anyone with a name as a mystic in. 
This to me seems to indicate exactly what is brought in the Ari, that the secrets of the Torah--that is the Eitz Chaim is not for anyone, but only those that live a life of great sanctity. 

[Whatever responsibility she saw in me I do not think I fulfilled. Nowhere  near. I seem to have dropped the ball. The hard thing to understand about this is thus: I feel that I had dropped the ball a long time ago, long before I met her. But apparently she thought there was still something I could and should do.]