Rambam in Laws of Theft, Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in Tosfot

 The Rambam in Laws of Theft  chapter 1 halacha 15 holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke but  pays the whole amount. The Raavad holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in tosfot holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11 that the thief can pay in movable objects' and the Raavad does not disagree there. Therefore it seems that the Rambam intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. And it seems that the Raavad holds that one evaluates the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court.

However this can not be thus because in ch. 1 halacha 14, the Rambam writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore' I think when the Rambam writes in Laws of Theft 3:11 that the thief can pay in movable objects, he must mean like the Tosphot, Rashi and Rosh that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

I noticed that Rav Isar Meltzer  has some very deep insights on this subject. I have not had a chance yet to dig into his approach. I see Rav Shach also has some important insights here, and apparently I need to understand the Gra here who has a different approach than the Rambam. Plus there is an argument between the Ketzot haChoshen and the Netivot which is relevant here along with the Gemara in Ketuboth page 34. 

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The רמב''ם in הלכות גניבה  פרק א' הלכה ט''ו holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke, but  pays the whole amount. אין שמין לגנב. The ראב''ד holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא צ''ו בתוספות   holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11. The ראב''ד does not disagree there. Therefore, the רמב''ם intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. The ראב''ד holds that one evaluate the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court 

However this can not be thus because in פרק א' הלכה י''ד  the רמב''ם writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore I think when the רמב''ם writes in בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א that the thief can pay in movable objects מיטלטלים, he must mean like the תוספות רש''י ורא''ש that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

הרמב''ם בהלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה ט''ו מחזיק לא מעריכים את שוויו של חפץ שגנב גנב ושבר, אלא משלם את כל הסכום. אין שמין לגנב. הראב''ד קובע שזה חל רק על ערך החפץ, לא הכפל שהגנב מחויב לשלם. הרשב''ם בבא מציעא מחזיק גנב יכול לשלם בכל מה ששווה כסף, ולכאורה הרמב"ם מסכים עם זה כפי שהוא כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם במטלטלים, והראב''ד לא חולק שם. לפיכך לכאורה כוונת הרמב''ם שאין להעריך את שווי החפץ בשעת הגניבה, אלא מאוחר יותר בשעת עמידה בבית הדין. ואז מעריכים את השווי של חפץ כזה שאפשר לקנות בשוק. ולכאורה הראב''ד סבור כי מעריכים את הכפיל בזמן הגניבה. כל זה חל כאשר ערכו של חפץ כזה השתנה מרגע הגניבה ועד למועד היות הגנב בבית המשפט 

 

אולם זה לא יכול להיות כך כי בפרק א' הלכה י''ד הרמב''ם כותב אם גנב גנב חפץ ושבור אותו, והוא יורד בערכו, אז הגנב משלם לפי הסכום שהיה שווה באותו זמן של הגניבה, והכפל לפי הזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית הדין

 לכן אני חושב שכאשר הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם בחפצים מיטלטלין, הוא חייב להתכוון כמו התוספות רש''י ורא''ש שזה אומר כלים שלמים, לא סתם כל דבר ששווה כסף

 

 

the situation in Israel

My feeling about the situation in Israel is that people ought to learn Torah. This is based on an event recounted in the Gemara. There was an excessive tax decree that was being collected by the Roman rulers. so all the Jewish citizens that were ignorant of Torah of the city came to R. Yehuda to see if he would contribute. He said 'Run away.' ,They said "If we do so, you will be left alone." He said that is ok. Some did so. Then more came and he repeated 'Run away.' Finally  all the ignorant people ran away, and the Romans nullified the decree. R Yehuda said ''All problem that come into the world, all come only because of people ignorant of Torah.'' 

''Torah''in this sense means the Old Testament and all of the books of the Oral Law written from about 160 AD until 500 AD. Those books written by the sages of the Mishna and Gemara all bring the authentic oral law. but no books written later can be called Torah. At most, the better of them can be counted as learning Torah in so far that they attempt to explain the Oral and Written Law.  ''Just like you can not add to the law of Moses and the prophets, so you cant add to the oral law.''  [Letter to Yemen of Maimonides ]

However there is learning of the Seven Wisdoms [Quadrivium,  Trivium] that are important to understand Torah, the Gra said ''One who lacks knowledge of any of the seven wisdoms, will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold.''] [SO the natural sciences are important. The rest of secular subjects are Bitul Torah. ]

  The Mishna Bava Kama 49b. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. Rashi writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a braita [law not contained in the Mishna] that says R. Ishmael said one who opens a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. R. Akiva said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. Raba said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only R. Akiva says he is liable, but R. Ishmael says he is not liable. So Rashi is going like Raba. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to Rashi (since he abandoned his domain)therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then Rav Josef said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, R. Akiva  said he is  not liable and R. Ishmael said he is  liable.  So this Rashi is only going like R Ishmael not, R Akiva, for the pit is totally in a public domain

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The משנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. רש''י writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a ברייתא  that says ר' ישמעאל said one who חופר a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. ר' עקיבא said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. רבה said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only ר' עקיבא says he is liable, but ר' ישמעאל says he is not liable. So רש''י is going like רבה. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to רש''י since he abandoned his domain, therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then רב יוסף said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, ר' עקיבא  said he is  not liable and ר' ישמעאל said he is  liable.  So this רש''י is only going like ר' ישמעאל not, ר' עקיבא, for the pit is totally in a public domain

המשנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. חופר בור ברשות הרבים ופותח אותו ברשות פרטית הוא אחראי. רש''י כותב שם שהוא נטש את רשותו. יש ברייתא שאומר ר' ישמעאל אמר מי שחופר בור ברשות פרטית ופותח אותו ברשות הרבים או להיפך חייב. אמר ר' עקיבא החופר בור בשטח פרטי שלו ואחר כך נוטש רשותו, אבל לא הבור חייב. רבה אמר שכולם מסכימים שפתיחת בור ברשות הרבים היא באחריות. אבל על חפירת בור בשטח פרטי, רק ר' עקיבא אומר שהוא חייב, אבל ר' ישמעאל אומר שאינו חייב. אז רש''י הולך כמו רבה. כיון שעיקר הבור הוא ברשות הרבים וגם הפתח הוא ברשות הרבים לפי רש''י כיון שנטש את רשותו, לפיכך מסכימים כולם שהוא חייב. אבל אז רב יוסף אמר שכולם מסכימים אם הוא חפר בור בשטח פרטי, הוא אחראי. אבל ברשות הרבים אמר ר' עקיבא אינו חייב ור' ישמעאל אמר שהוא חייב. אז הרש''י הזה הולך רק כמו ר' ישמעאל לא, ר' עקיבא, כי הבור הוא לגמרי ברשות הרבים

learning Torah equals all the other commandments.

 One of the unfamiliar ideas of the Gra is that every word of learning Torah equals all the other commandments. The Mishna in tractate Peah brings this in short without going into it but the Gemara Yerushalmi explains in great detail that every word of Torah equals all the other commandments. That means that even if one would keep all the commandments of the Torah with the greatest love and fear of God, with the greatest degree of burning love and attachment with God, still if you would place all that one one side of a scale and just one word of Torah on the other, they would be equal in weight. All the more so if you would place two words of Torah on the opposite side that scale would immediately tip over to the side of the two words of Torah. however if there is a commandment   that can not be done by someone else, then one ought to interrupt learning to fulfill it and then return to learning as brought also in the Yerushalmi where one person sent his son to learn Torah in Tiberias and heard that he was involved in helping burying the dead. He asked his son' "Did I send you there to bury the dead or to learn Torah? [The Yerushalmi says when the commandment can not be done by another, one should interrupt one' learning. however there is also a principle one involved in a mitzvah doe not have to interrupt to do another. This is the case with the penny of Rav Josef. That is since one is guarding a lost object, he doe not have to give a penny to a pauper.  ]

What counts as Torah? See the letter to Yemen of the Rambam: "Just as there is no adding nor subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law."

That means that just as one can not add to the books of the prophets from Moses until the last prophets of the First Temple period, so one can not add the the Oral Law as redacted by the Tenaim of the Mishna and Amoraim of the two Talmuds. The Gemara also mentions this: "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of rendering a halachic decision."  רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה

        I would like to add here that there are two ways of learning Torah. One is that of Reb Chaim of Brisk which is global or you might say a hawk eyes approach that learns the whole Shas [Talmud] by learning one page. The other is that of Rav Naftali Yeager of Shar Yashuv and David Bronson which is an electron microscope approach. You can least see the Reb Chaim approach in his writings and the other great sages of the Litvak world. The other I think is not so available. I myself could get to this approximately by learning one Tosphot for about a month and then I could start to see the infinite depth of Tosphot. .  

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[The difference between Fries and Hegel

 Hegel is considered to be defending  law and order,  and that everyone has their place in society and  their obligation is to fulfill the duties and obligations that are naturally part of that place. Kant was quite opposite to this. Individual autonomy was the rule. So you might sum-up the argument thus: Hegel saw the disaster of the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution and sought a principle by which freedom can be preserved without disintegrating into chaos. Kant had developed his system before the French revolution, and had a portrait of Rousseau [the ideal of the French  revolutionaries] in his room.

In my view, both are a necessary advancement in philosophy, and reflect the ancient tension between individual and the group, and I do not think that anyone has come up with an answer to this tension. I am mainly on the side of the modified approach to Kant of the Kant-Friesian school  that Kelley Ross so ably defends in his web site, but I can not share the distain that most Kantians feel towards Hegel.[I admit I might be wrong. After all, see the book by Hobhouse, The Metaphysical State. And I do see that communism took a certain degree of Hegel, and yet I do not agree with communism. I hold with John Locke and the Two Treaties.  ]

[BUT I admit my regard for Hegel is probably because I read his Logic ( part of his Encyclopedia) rather than the Phenomenology that everyone else reads--or is assigned to read for their homework. Plus I think the best book on Hegel is McTaggart's.  I also like Cunningham ]   

At any rate, I would like here to recommend the founders of the second Friesian school, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross who provide a necessary amendment to Kant, since I do not think that the B deduction of Kant stands very well on its own, and anyway there is absolutely not the slightest bit of agreement about what Kant actually says there in the first place. [Modern scholars do not agree on the argument of Kant and some of the ambiguity revolves around the question why should things be amenable to be unified into the mind of one subject even before we get to the categories? ] I can see how wonderful it is that Kant is being reintroduced in some universities, still  I  can't see why people do not adopt the modification of Leonard Nelson. [Even though Nelson was just a continuation of Fries in his own mind, I see a lot more rigorous logic in Nelson. But you do not have to take my word for it. Take a look yourself, and I think you will  see what I mean.  ]

[The difference between Fries and Hegel is that the connection between sensory perception and the intellectual categories or why, where, when and what are through non intuitive immediate knowledge in the Friesian approach because Kant did not explain any better way that concepts and senses can exist. To Hegel, even sense objects are manifestations of the Logos of Plato-so there is no place where the intellect can't penetrate. ]

Maybe there is disagreement between them, but I see both as modifications of Plotinus and his Neoplatonist approach

i would like here to suggest looking at the phd thesis of kelley ross where he explains the problems of the b deduction and where he whole issue of ''who is the user?''' is explained. i mean that dr ross shows that kant doe not explain well how synthesis of perceptions or consciousness itself comes about and hegel never asks this question and it is only in the leonard nelson approach that this question gets a good answer.

Bava Mezia 93b. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep and one fell into the river. Raba said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. Abayee asked on this from a braita a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. Abayee suggested that the break was a normal kind and yet he is still liable and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident]and so the shepherd is liable. Raba answered, no. rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. abaye asked if the case is he took an unusual break then it it is a case of the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident is liable. Tosphot learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident.

The Ramban brings the gemara in Bava Kama 45a to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for Abayee. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the unpaid guard pay kofer a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the unpaid guard is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression (for all guards). My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding? [I noticed later that the Ramban, in fact, only meant his argument to apply to the unpaid guard.]

I might mention that Rav Shach and Rav Meltzer had an argument about this Ramban. Rav Meltzer claimed the argument of the Ramban only worked if the obligation of the guard is towards the owner of the animal, while Rav Shach showed that the Ramban's argument works even if the guard is obligated toone whom gets injured by an animal he was guarding.

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בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep, and one fell into the river. רבה said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. אביי asked on this from a ברייתא a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. אביי suggested that the break was a normal kind, and yet he is still liable; and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident] and so the shepherd is liable. רבה answered, no. Rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident, but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. אביי asked if the case is he took an unusual break, then it it is a case of "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in אונס is liable." תוספות learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in accident."

The רמב''ן brings the גמרא in בבא קמא מ''ה ע''א to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for אביי. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the שומר חינם pay כופר a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the שומר חינם is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression. My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding?

בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. היה רועה צאן ואחד נפל לנהר. רבה אמר שהרועה אינו אחראי. מה הוא היה יכול לעשות? כלומר הוא ראה בזה מקרה של תאונה בלתי נמנעת (גדולה) ששומר בתשלום לא משלם עליה. אביי שאל על כך מברייתא רועה צאן שומר כבשיו ונכנס לעיר להפסקה קצרה, ובא אריה ולקח את אחת הכבשים. אם הוא היה יכול להציל את הכבשה לו היה שם הוא אחראי. אביי הציע שההפסקה היא רגילה, ובכל זאת הוא עדיין אחראי; ולכן אנו רואים שזה נחשב למקרה של תאונה נמנעת [תאונה קטנה] ולכן הרועה אחראי. רבה ענה לא. אלא מדובר בהפסקה חריגה, ולכן היא נחשבת לתאונה שאפשר להיות נמנעת, אך בגין תאונה בלתי נמנעת הוא לא יהיה אחראי. אביי שאל אם במקרה הוא לקח הפסקה חריגה, אז זה מקרה של "ההתחלה בפשיעה והסוף באונס שהוא אחראי". תוספות לומדת מכאן שכמות מינימלית של שמירה אינה נחשבת "התחלה בפשיעה וסוף בתאונה.

הרמב''ן מביא את הגמרא בבבא קמא מ''ה ע''א להראות שאותו עיקרון מקובל בכל העולם, לא רק על אביי. שם ההוראה היא שארבעה סוגי שומרים תופסים את מקומו של הבעלים. אם הם שומרים על שור מסוכן (שראו אותו הורג בשלוש הזדמנויות אחרות) שהשתחרר והרג מישהו. השור נהרג, והשומרים חוץ מהשומר חינם משלמים כופר (קנס) ומשלמים על אובדן השור לבעלים. אז אנו רואים בעובדה שהשומר חינם אינו אחראי שכמות השמירה המינימלית אינה נחשבת לעבירה. שאלתי כאן היא שאולי כמות שמירה מינימלית אינה נחשבת עבירה לשומר ללא שכר, אבל אולי היא נחשבת עבירה לשומר בתשלום שכן הוא חייב ברמת שמירה גבוהה יותר?

Bava Kama page 6a

In the Rambam laws of damages 13:19 there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In Bava Kama page 6a  Abyee says we learn from the Mishna in the beginning of Bava Kama "the common denominator" comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The Rif and  Rambam leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. Rav Shach writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  a question is that Abyee derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while Ravina derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The Rif and Rambam do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  another question is if the Rif and Rambam do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between Abyee,  Rava, Rav Ada bar Ahava and Ravina,  and we do not go with Abyee against Rava except in 6 specified cases. [Yal Kegam]. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 

Also I would like to mention that the Rosh learns from Tosphot that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the Rif and Rambam hold the same way.   

I would like to add here for clarification the  Gemara on page 6a of Bava Kama. The Gemara asks what is the "common denominator" of the Mishna coming to add? Abyee says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. Rava said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. Rav Ada Bar Ahava said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. Ravina said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To Tosphot any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to Rav Isar Melzter damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell. However the answer to this is one learns from an ox that one is obligated in damage even if the thing that causes damage was not dangerous from its inception. But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact Rav Isar Melzar suggested that this is the reason Tosphot holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire     

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In the רמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון  פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In בבא קמא ו' ע''א says we learn from the משנה in the beginning of בבא קמא "the common denominator" צד השווה comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The רי''ף and  רמב''ם leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. רב שך writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  A question is that אביי derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while רבינא derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The רי''ף and רמב''ם do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  Another question is if the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה and רבינא,  and we do not go with אביי against רבא except in 6 specified cases. יע''ל כג''ם.. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 

Also I would like to mention that the רא''ש learns from תוספות that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the רי''ף and רמב''ם hold the same way.   

I would like to add here for clarification the  גמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א  . The גמרא asks what is the "common denominator" of the משנה coming to add? אביי says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. רבא said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. רב אדא בר אהבה said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. רבינא said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To תוספות any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to רב איסר מלצר damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell.

But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact, רב איסר מלצר suggested that this is the reason תוספות holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire. This is in spite of the fact that תוספות holds that having another power mixed with it would be more of  a reason to acquit from responsibility.

ברמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט יש דין שאם עץ או חומה נופלים וגורמים נזק אין אחריות אלא אם לא היו יציבים והזהירו הבית הדין להוריד אותם. ואז הוא מחויב. בבבא קמא ו' ע''א אומר למדים מהמשנה בתחילת בבא קמא "המכנה המשותף" צד השווה בא לכלול את אבן, סכינו או חבילה שהשאיר על גג ונפלו בגלל רוח מצויה שגם לאחר שנפלו הוא אחראי. הרי''ף ורמב''ם משאירים בחוץ את הדין על סכין אבן או משא. רב שך כותב שאפשר ללמוד את זה ממקרה הקיר. שאלה היא שאבי שואב את האבן מבור ברשות הרבים ואש, ואילו רבינא לומד את העץ והקיר מבור ושור. לכן לא נוכל ללמוד את האבן והסכין מהקיר כי ייתכן שהסכין לא חייבת כיון שכוח אחר מעורב בנפילתם. חשבתי על התשובה לשאלה האחרונה הזו. הרי''ף והרמב''ם אכן מביאים מקרים אחרים שאנו נובעים מבור ואש, וכך נוכל להפיק את האבן והסכין מאותם מקרים. שאלה נוספת היא אם הרי''ף והרמב''ם אינם מביאים דין האבן והסכין על הגג, אולי אינם מחזיקים ממנו כלל. הרי הדין הזה הוא מאבי, וייתכן שיגידו שכל הנושא הזה הוא ויכוח בין אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה ורבינא, ואין אנו הולכים עם אביי נגד רבא אלא בשש מקרים מוגדרים, יע''ל כג''ם.. אבל השאלה האחרונה הזו לא נראית סבירה מאוד שכן המקרה של האבן והסכין נראים חמורים יותר מהעץ מאז שהניח אותם על הגג שם היה מודע לכך שרוח רגילה עלולה לדפוק הם למטה

כמו כן אני רוצה להזכיר שהרא''ש לומד מתוספות שלכל המקרים האלה יש דין של בור ברשות הרבים, וצריך ללמוד אותם מהמכנה המשותף רק כדי להראות שהם חייבים, אבל החוק העיקרי הוא של בור. סביר להניח שהרי''ף והרמב''ם מחזיקים באותו אופן.

אני רוצה להוסיף כאן לבירור את הגמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א . הגמרא שואלת מהו "המכנה המשותף" של המשנה שבא להוסיף? אביי אומר כי סכין האבן או החבילה שלו שהשאיר על גג והם נפלו ברוח מצויה וגרמו נזק לאחר שכבר היו על הקרקע. זה נגזר מבור ואש. אמר רבא בור שדוחפים אותו ברשות הרבים מבור ואש. רב אדא בר אהבה אמר פתיחת צינורות הניקוז וכי הניקוז גורם נזק מבור ואש. רבינא אמר חומה ועץ שנפלו מבור ושור

 

   לתוספות כל נזק שיגרמו הכותל או עץ בשעת נפילה אינו אחראי כי הבעלים נחשבים חף מפשע. אבל לרב איסר מלצר נזק שעושים בשעת נפילה חייב משום שהם כאש הפוגעת תוך כדי תנועה. אבל הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא אש וסכין שנפלו מגג אחראים כי הייתה עבירה מלכתחילה כשהניח אותם שם, אבל לא הייתה עבירה בנטיעת העץ ובבניית החומה שנפלו

אולם התשובה לכך היא לומדים משור שחייב בנזק, גם אם הדבר הגורם נזק לא היה מסוכן מראשיתו

אבל יתרה מכך, עם אש יש גם את העובדה שכוח אחר כלומר רוח מתערבב בו והופכת אותו למסוכן יותר. למעשה, רב איסר מלצר הציע שזו הסיבה שתוספות מחזיקים את שהקיר והעץ אינם חייבים בגלל שריפה. זאת, וזה למרות שתוספות גורסת כי כשמעורבת בה כוח אחר תהיה סיבה יותר לזכות מאחריות