I would like to bring a strong proof for the approach of Rabbainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra. It is this. Raviva answers "The sages hold that the thing that causes damage must be removed." Well Yes. Of course. Why else would they have said to keep the tub soaking the linen away from the vegetables and a pit from another pit? Clearly, Ravina is coming to answer a certain question. And that question is clearly the one just asked on the sages: "If we are talking about a sale, they why do the sages say to keep the tub of linen away from the vegetables?" Answer: because even in the case of a sale, they hold one must keep that which causes damage away from that which can be damaged. But if you hold like Rabbainu Tam this answer does not answer the question. The question that this is supposed to answer in the approach of Rabainu Tam is this. R Jose said to keep the bees away from the mustard. If Rava would be right [that one must keep anything that can cause damage away from the border], how can you find such a situation in which the case of R. Jose comes up? The answer to this question is according to R. Tam to be ""The sages hold one must remove anything that can cause damage." Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel have to read into this answer that Rava changed his mind and agrees with Abyee about everything except the pit next to a border. All this is a very strong proof to the approach of Rabbainu Izhak._ However, I can still see the point of R. Tam. He does read into the answer of Ravina a little more than what it says, but only a drop more that you have to read into it anyway. To R. Izhak you have to read into it that Rava agrees with the sages alone, and not with R. Jose. To R. Tam you have to read that into that statement, but add also that Rava said his law only in one case. The fact that the Rif and Ri Migash hold that the law is like R. Yose and that R. Jose only said his law in a case of "his arrows", and that they can by this accomplish an important task is not a fault but a good thing. For the rule in the law is like Rava in all cases (except yal kegam) and later the gemara says the law is like R. Jose, In the girsa (approach) of R. Tam, the Rif can hold that this is consistent; the law is both like R. Jose and Rava,

למרות שאני יכול לראות את חשיבות גישתו של רבינו יצחק דף י''ח ע''ב בבא בתרא, אני לא יכול להבין למה להניח שר' יוסי מסכים שהחרדל גורם נזק כלשהו. אני מתכוון לומר, שאם אתה מניח את זה כעובדה, אז רבינו יצחק צריך לצאת ממה שנראה כקשיים מיותרים. למה לשנות את ההנחה המקורית מהיות הדבורים ליד הגבול לחרדל שנמצא שם? ועוד, אם אתה מחליף שהחרדל יהיה ליד הגבול, אז למה אתה צריך בכלל לטעון שמדובר במכירה? רק תגיד שהחרדל היה שם קודם, ולכן יש להסיר את הדבורים. אם היית אומר שר' יוסי מחזיק שהדבורים עושות את כל הנזק והחרדל לא עושה כלום, אז הכל יהיה בסדר. ר' יוסי אומר שאפשר לשים את החרדל ליד הגבול גם כשהדבורים היו שם קודם כי החרדל לא גורם נזק. אם בעל החרדל לא מוטרד, אז הוא יכול לשים שם את החרדל אם ירצה. מדוע יטען ר' יוסי שלא ירשה לשים שם את החרדל שמה. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרב שך מסתכל על השאלה מדוע השלחן ערוך אומר שיש חשש לפתוח חלון לבניין נטוש כי בעל הבניין יכול לטעון שהוא רוצה לבנות, ומתי שהוא עושה זאת ,הוא לא רוצה לפנות לבית המשפט כדי שבעל החלון יסגור את החלון כדי לא לגרום ל"נזק בראייה". הוא הולך עם הפוסקים הגדולים בנושא, אבל אני תוהה מדוע הדאגה מפנייה לבית המשפט חלה על החלון לבניין הנטוש, ולא במקרים אחרים של גורמים לנזק? אבל לדעתי החוק הוא תמיד כמו רבא ותמיד יש דאגה כזו

Even though I can see the importance of the approach of Rabainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra, I cannot understand why assume that R Yose agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever? I mean to saט that if you assume that as a fact, then Rabbainu Izhak has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that R. Yose holds the bees do all the damage, and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. R. Yose says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would R. Yose claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there? I might mention here that Rav shach mainly is looking at the question of why the shulchan Aruch says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so as not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major poskim [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like Ravaת and there is always such a worry. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Even though I can see the importance of the approach of רבינו יצחק page י''ח ע''ב of בבא בתרא, I cannot understand why assume that ר' יוסי agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever. I mean to say, that if you assume that as A fact, then רבינו יצחק has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that ר' יוסי holds the bees do all the damage and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. ר' יוסי says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would ר' יוסי claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there. I might mention here that רב שך is looking at the question of why the שלחן ערוך says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so a not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major פוסקים [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like רבא and there is always such a worry.

Abraham the patriarch lived in Gerar (an ancient city of the Pleshtim) for some period. Also, Isaac for a few years. [The land at that time was mostly Canaan, but those southern areas were settled by the Pleshtim. [[It coincides almost exactly with Gaza.] If you look on a map at where the archeologists discovered the site of that ancient city, it comes out at modern day Netivot. This explains the statement of Bava sali that Netivot is the "city of the Patriarchs." [Isaac was there for a few years, but had trouble with the shepherds of the Pleshtim, and eventually had to move (or wanted to move) to Beersheva. (He was okay with the king of the pleshtim, but decided at some point that that staying there was more trouble than what it was worth.)

I have been hoping to understand the approach of Rav shach in removal of objects that can cause damage, but (outside of some basic ideas) I have not gotten far. I have a local beit midrash within walking distance, so I have been able to look at the gemara Bava batra page 18 and one of Rav shmuel Rozovski's books on bava Batra. [[I think one volume of his is missing] I think I need to continue in this subject, but I have to say that the small pamphlet on this subject in Rav shach's avi ezri is still a mystery to me.

someone using Torah to make money to me seems completely wrong

There is a pretty straight forward law that one is not allowed to make money by learning or teaching Torah. But as for shechita I can see the point of having a rav to check the knife and signs of possible traif. I can also see the point of a Kollel where people accept charity in order to continue learning Torah. That is to say, that I can see in positive light the yeshivot and kollels where people really want to learn Torah, and accept a stipend in order to be able to continue to learn. But the position of someone using Torah to make money to me seems completely wrong. Rav Naftali Troup was one of a few great Torah sage in Lithuania before WWII, and there were problems in Europe with the Litvak Torah World. Somone wrote a letter to Naftali Troup why asking, "Why he did not come to America?" And he answering a letter all rabanim in the USA use Torah to make money. In his words, “In America, Torah is a business.” And he added, “They are all trying to sell their brand.” The problem in the USA in the religious world is that religious people think that they are righteous.

אם אתה מסתכל על רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח של בבא בתרא אז הנושא נראה ברור. רבא הולך כמו החכמים שמחייבים את הגורם לנזק להוציא את חפצו מהמקום. ואף על פי שכל הפוסקים מחזיקים בדין כר' יוסי שגורס שמי שיכול להינזק צריך להוציא את חפצו מהמקום, וכמעט אוניברסליים המחזיקים בדעת שרבא חזר בו, וחל רק במקרה של חפירת בור ליד גבול, עדיין אני חושב שהפוסקים נמשכו לשני כיוונים מנוגדים. מצד אחד הגמרא אומרת אחר כך שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי. מאידך, הדין תמיד כרבא חוץ ביע''ל כג''ם. הדרך היחידה להחזיק בשני הניגודים הללו היא ללכת עם רבינו תם ולקבוע שר' יוסי מסכים כאשר מדובר ב"החצים שלו גורמים נזק ישיר" ולומר שלזה רבא מתכוון. ולי נראה שהכי טוב ללכת עם רבינו יצחק שמסביר את הנושא בצורה פשוטה יותר. לפיכך, הנושא יהיה כזה. "אם רבא צודק, אז איך נמצא מקרה של הדבורים ליד הגבול כפי ר' יוסי? עונה רב פפא "מדובר במכירה", [והדבורים אינן גורמות נזק לדעת החכמים, אבל לר' יוסי כן והדבורים באו אחר החרדל. ובנקודה זו, כיון שר' יוסי סובר שהדבורים גורמות נזק, היה אומר גם אם היו שם קודם, יש להרחיקן]. אז למה שהחכמים יקבעו שיש להרחיק את פשתן(משרה) מהירקות? תשובה: על כל מה שגורם לנזק שיילקח מהמקום. ורבא הוא כמו החכמים. אם היית הולך עם רבינו תם, קשה לראות מדוע, ובאיזה נקודה בגמרא שהוא אמור לחזור בו מגישתו, זה מלבד שאר השאלות שהרמב''ן מביא נגד הדרך של רוב ראשונים מבינים ר' תם ור' חננאל. איך לענות על הסתירה בהלכה? הייתי אומר סוגיות חלוקות

If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra

If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the poskim hold the law is like R. Yose who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of Rava was retracted and only applies in the case of the of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the poskim were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand, the Gemara says later that the law is like R. Yose. On the other hand, the law is always like Rava except in yal kegam. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with Rabbanu Tam, and to hold that R Yose agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what Rava means. And to me it seems best to go with Rabainu Izhak who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this:(the gemara would be read thus): "If Rava is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like R Yose implies? Answers Rav Papa, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the sages, but to R. Yose they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point since R Yose thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away].Then why would the sages hold that the tub of linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene." And Rava is like the sages. If you would go with Rabbainu Tam, it is hard to see why and at what point in the gemara that rava is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the Ramban brings against the way most rishonim understand rabainu Tam and rabbainu chananel. How to answer the contradiction in halacha? I would say the two sugiot are not the same. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ If you look at רבינו יצחק in page י''ח of בבא בתרא then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the חכמים that hold it the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the פוסקים hold the law is like ר' יוסי who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of רבא was retracted, and only applies in the case of of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the פוסקים were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand the גמרא says later that the law is like ר' יוסי. On the other hand, the law is always like רבא except in יע''ל כג''ם. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with רבינו תם and to hold that ר' יוסי agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what רבא means. And to me it seems best to go with רבינו יצחק who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this. If רבא is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like ר' יוסי implies? Answers רב פפא, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the חכמים, but to ר' יוסי they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point, since ר' יוסי thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away]. Then why would the חכמים hold that the משרה linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene. And רבא is like the חכמים. If you would go with רבינו תם, it is hard to see why, and at what point in the גמרא that he is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the רמב''ן brings against the way most ראשונים understand ר' תם and ר' חננאל. How to answer the contradiction in הלכה? I would say סוגיות חלוקות

General Grant in his book on the Civil War

General Grant in his book on the Civil War wrote that the Constitution does not forbid succession, nor allows it. From that fact, I would say that the Federal Government can not go against it because the Federal Government has only enumerated powers. But Grant himself did not draw that conclusion, but rather wrote that since the idea of succession was not stated in the Constitution, therefore the country founded on the Constitution has the right of self-defense. What I think this brings forth is the question of how different politics is different from civil law between individuals. In mean in individuals, what I written in a contract is exactly what I there, nothing more or less—unless things are unclear. And if that would be applied to the Constitution then this issue is not ambiguous, it clearly stated that the government has only enumerated powers. How however politics in terms of nation states is different from civil law between individuals. How much so and why is unclear to me. In the tradition of England [upon which the American concept of government is based] a written document of the government is absolutely binding. But if you look at countries like the ussr, contracts are approximate indication of intention, but what matters is the individuals in power.

Rav shach does not usually state a halacha, but in his pamphlet of keeping damages away, he does actually bring the idea that most first authorities hold with the law of Tophot on page 22 of Bava Batra that the kind of damages that are brought in chapter 2 of Bava Batra are only considered to cause damage if on the other side of the border, there is already placed there something that could cause damage. And also, that if that is the case (that one has placed there something that can cause damage), then it can stay there even after the other person has placed his object there. And example would be like a tub used to soak linen that can cause vegetables on the other side of the border to absorb the noxious fumes. so, if that tub was already there, then even if the neighbor plants vegetables on the other side of the border, the tub can stay there [within three handbreaths of the border].

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I have been thinking about politics and it occurred to me that it is a significant subject that deserves study. One thing I learned when very young is the approach taken by the hard sciences that even if one has the most logical consistent system, and most developed with rigor and painstaking logic, if that theory predictes a result that turns but to be false, then that theory is wrong. And this fact is what always seemed to me to be wrong with communism. It is a powerful logical system based on great thinkers like Adam smith in economics [who came up with the Labor Theory of Value which is an essential building block of communism, and on Hegel. And like any respectable scientific theory, it makes specific predictions. The problem is all its predictions turned out to be false. And this was obvious even to Lenin himself when he established the first communist state, and therefore tried to patch up the system by claiming certain outside forces were propping up Capitalism. But even since then, there has never been a communist state with prosperity as claimed in the communist manifesto. But if you try to find logical rigor in capitalism, you will have a hard time trying. The kind of system that results in prosperity and human flourishing wherever it is tried is based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights. And these were not created by any kind of abstract theory, but came about as a result of a cruel King, John I who was so overbearing that the lords of the land decided to force him to sign a document—the Magna Carta. And later, a religious crusader (Simon DE Monfort) forced a king to sign an even more extensive document, the Provisions of Oxford. And the English system as developed was taken over almost in its entirety by the American Colonies who kept the system. The idea of the America Revolution was in order to keep on living under the same kind of system that they had been already. The objection to England was that the Parliament was treating the colonies not as Englishmen with the same rights as all other Englishmen. The reason that "Reason" fails that the important task of figuring out a decent system of government is that there is a limit to pure reason, and that when it attempts to go beyond its limits, it begins to come up with aburdities.

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I want to mention that my learning partner, David Bronson would not have left that 2nd Tosphot on page 18B of Bava Batra unless he understood it fully. And yet I tend to go along with the approach of Rav Nachman of Breslov in learning “to say the words in order and then to go on” in learning Torah and Math and Physics. (And then later to review and Izhak Rosten once told me. I.e. even with this approach of “just saying the words”, it Is very important to later to do review until you get the idea thoroughly) .. That was definitely not the approach of David Bronson. However, it could be that if I can try understand the great Rav Shach and Reb Aaron Kotler on this subject, perhaps I can answer that later question I was asking on that Tosphot, (i.e., “why he changes the original assumption) .Obviously Tosphot himself was worried about this difficulty and tried to answer it, but I still cannot see how their answer helps. It possible that because of this problem that Tosphot himself in the third Tosphot on that page decided to start looking at the approach of Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chanaanel. {I think at least for me, I will not be able to understand rabbainu Tamuntil I get that second Tosphot approach of Rabbainu Izhak}

za64 F minor midi ditto in nwc format

יש משהוא קשה בתוספות השנייה בבבא בתרא י''ח ע''ב. רבינו יצחק אומר שהשאלה המקורית על רבא מר' יוסי היא שהדבורים גם מזיקים ושרבא חייב להגיד את דינו גם אליבא דר' יוסי. ולכן הגמרא שואלת "היכי משכחת לה?" (איך אנחנו מוציאים את זה?) איך אנחנו מוציאים דבורים ליד הגבול לכתחילה באופן שבעלים של החרדל יכולים לומר לו "מאחר שהדבורים שלך שם (אף על פי שהם גורמים היזק), לכן גם אני אשים את החרדל שלי שמה, אע"ג שגם הם גורמים היזק." זה אי אפשר לדעת רבא האומר שכל דבר שיכול להזיק צריך להרחיק מו המיצר שלשה טפחים. אז רב פפא מתרץ, "זה מצב של לוקח." זאת אומרת לפי רבינו וצחק שהחרדל הוא ליד הגבול, ושהיה שם אפילו קודם שצד השני של החצר נמכר לשכנו. ועכשיו בעלים של החרדל אומרים לבעלים של שדבורים להרחיק את הדבורים שלו שישה טפחים מן הגבול. זה טוב לרבא שהחרדל ליד הגבול בגלל המכירה של צד השני, ורבא בעצמו מדבר במצב אחר שלא הייתה מכירה ויש רק שני שכנים בחצר שיש קו מפריד וכל אחד צריך להרחיק את ההזיק שלו שלשה טפחים מן המצר. מה שקשה בשבילי להבין הוא שרבינו יצחק משנה את המצב של השאלה להיות שהדבורים ליד הגבול למצב של התירוץ שהחרדל ליד הגבול. למה לא להגיד שזה מצב של לוקח והחרדל ליד הגבול והבעלים של החרדל אומר "הרחק את הדבורים שלך שלשה טפחים מן המצר וגם אני אשים את החרדל שלשה טפחים מן המצר." אני חושב שהתשובה לשאלה זו עשויה להיות כזו: השאלה הבאה של הגמרא היא "אם מדובר בקונה, אז מדוע חולקים החכמים? עכשיו אם גם הדבורים עושות נזק, אז פשוט שחכמים יאמרו ברגע שהדבורים כבר שם, אז יש להרחיק את החרדל (שתיהן גורמות נזק זו לזו). רק עכשיו השתנתה ההנחה המקורית, והדבורים אינן נחשבות כגורמות נזק לפי החכמים, ולכן יש להרחיק את החרדל מהן ששה טפחים מאידך, אולי יתכן שהחכמים יאמרו לבעל החרדל להרחיק את החרדל מהדבורים כיון שהדבורים היו שם קודם והן בגבול כי החצר נמכרה לחצי. אז שוב, אני שואל למה זה כל כך פשוט שחכמים לא יאמרו לבעל החרדל להרחיק אותו גם במקרה זה. ולכן אני שואל שוב מדוע תוספות משנים את ההנחה מדבורים על הגבול לחרדל על הגבול מאוחר יותר ראיתי שתוספות שואלים את השאלה הזו בדיוק. למה לא להשאיר את הכל בהנחה המקורית ("הוה אמינא'") במקומו ופשוט לשנות למקרה של לוקח? תוספות עונה שאם הדבורים היו שם בגבול ברשות, אז ר' יוסי לא היה מאפשר החרדל להתקרב. אבל על התשובה הזו, יש לי שאלה. אם תוספות אומר ששניהם צריכים להיות שלושה טפחים מהגבול, אז זה בדיוק מה שרבא אומר (שכל אחד צריך להתרחק מהגבול שלוש טפחים) ותשובת הלוקח בסדר, ואין סיבה לשנות את ה"הוה אמינא". אבל אם תוספות אומר שר' יוסי לא היה אומר שהחרדל יהיה בדיוק ליד לגבול, אז תוספות חוזרת למשנה שאמרה "ר' יוסי מתיר את זה" (הכוונה היא להיות ליד הגבול, אבל שאלת הגמרא הגיעה מהברייתא שלא אמר "ר' יוסי מרשה את זה", אלא "ר' יוסי אמר שבעל החרדל יכול להגיד לבעל הדבורים להרחיק אותן." זה מכוון להיות שלושה טפחים מהגבול. יש כאן גם שאלה קטנה, שהסיבה העיקרית לשנות את ההנחה המקורית הוא בגלל התנא קמא (בשאלה הבאה) שקובעים שהדבורים לא גורמות נזק. אבל זה דילוג קדימה בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי מה מתכוון רבינו יצחק. תשובת רב פפא היא שר' יוסי הוא מקרה של לוקח והחרדל צמוד לגבול, ולמרות שרבינו יצחק משנה את ההנחה המקורית של התנא קמא, גם כך בגישה זו של רב פפא, ר' יוסי סבור שהדבורים גורמות נזק מסוים ולכן על הדבורים להתרחק מהגבול שלושה טפחים. הוא לא אומר שצריך להרחיק כל אחד, גם חרדל וגם דבורים, שלושה טפחים (המרחק יהיה שישה טפחים), אלא רק הדבורים. הסיבה היא שלמעשה אנו שומרים על ההנחה המקורית ש"כל הקודם זוכה". שמכיוון שהחרדל היה שם קודם, הוא יכול להישאר שם. השאלה השנייה של תוספות היא אם אנחנו כבר משנים את ההנחה המקורית שהדבורים עושות נזק לזה את ההנחה שהן לא גורמות נזק, אז למה אנחנו צריכים את התשובה של קונה? זה אומר שתוספות אומר שהחכמים משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלהם, אבל ר' יוסי ישמור על שלו. אז עכשיו אנחנו יכולים לענות על השאלה איך אנחנו מוצאים מצב כזה שבו הדבורים נמצאות ליד הגבול? התשובה היא שאנו מוצאים לפי החכמים שבעל הדבורים שם אותן שם כי הן לא גורמות נזק, ואז ר' יוסי מתנגד שצריך לקחת אותן. ואז תוספות עונה שאם זה היה המצב, אז ר' יוסי לא היה נותן שהחרדל יהיה ליד הגבול. זאת אומרת שאף על פי שהשאלה מתחילה בברייתא, עדיין תוספות מחזיקים שאין הבדל בין המשנה לברייתא. בשניהם, ר' יוסי מחזיק את החרדל יכול להיות ליד הגבול ושהוא יכול להגיד לבעל הדבורים להרחיק אותן בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי לשאול על השאלה והתשובה המקורית של תוספות. אנחנו משנים את המצב לזה שהחרדל צמוד לגבול ותוספות שואלים למה לא לשמור על ההנחה המקורית שהדבורים צמודות לגבול ושהן גורמות נזק ולמרות זאת מאחר ומדובר במכירה, החרדל יכול להיות גם ליד הגבול? תוספות עונה שר' יוסי לא היה אומר במקרה כזה שהחרדל יכול להיות גם בגבול. תהיתי למה לא? אם מדובר במכירה למה החרדל צריך להיות רחוק? למה לא להגיד שמכיוון שמדובר במכירה אז החרדל יכול להיות גם ליד הגבול? התשובה שלדעתי היא שההרשאה שאנו מקבלים ממכירה היא שלפיכך אנו יכולים למצוא משהו שגורם נזק ליד הגבול, אבל זה לא מכוון שלכן דבר שגורם נזק יכול לשים ליד חפץ שהוא בצד השני של הגבול -ברגע שחפץ הזה כבר נמצא שם

The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b

The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b says that the original question on Rava from R. Yose holds that the bees also cause damage, and hold that Rava has to say his law also according to R. Yose. so, the gemara asks, "How can we find bees next to the border in the first place in such a way that the owner of the mustard can tell him 'since your bees are next to the border even though they cause damage, I will also put my mustard there even though they also cause damage.'" This cannot be according to Rava who says anything that causes damage has to be three handbreadths away from the border. Then Rav Papa answers, "It is a case of a buyer." That means (to Rabainu Izhak) that the mustard is next to the border and it was there when the other side of the property was sold, and now the owner of the mustard is telling the owner of the bees to go 6 handbreadths away from the border. This is now good to Rava that the mustard is next to the border because of the sale of the property on the other side, but Rava himself is talking about a case where there was no sale and there are just two people in a courtyard that has a division line and each one has to be three handbreadths away from the border. What is unclear to me is why Rabbainu Izhak changes the arrangement from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there. Why not say that it is a case of a sale, and the owner of the mustard says, "Put your bees three cubits from the border, and I will put my mustard three cubits from the border." I think the maharam from lublin explains this in his clear explanation of this tophot, however i have not yet been able to understand him. i hope to get to the litvak beit midrash where there is a Bava Batra and Reb Aaron Kotler' ''Chidushei Reb Aaron'' to help me understand this Rabbainu Izhak [who is in fact explaining the approach of his grandfather, Rashi, who is short in his explanation of this subject.] I might mention here that Reb Aaron Kotler actually says that Rashi and Ri Migash are almost, but not quite identical in this approach. That being the case, this means that this approach of Rabbanu Izhak in our Tosphot is very close to the actual halacha in the shulchan aruch of rabbainu Yosef Karo who follows the Rambam who follows his rav, the Ri Migash. I think the answer to this question might be this: the next question of the gemara is, “If it is a case of a buyer, then why do the sages disagree? Now if the bees also do damage, then it is simple that the sages would say once the bees are there already, then the mustard must be kept away (they both cause damage to each other). Only now the original assumption has changed, and the bees are not considered to cause damage according the sages, and so it makes sense that the mustard should be kept away from them 6 handbreaths On the other hand, it is perhaps possible that the sages might say to the owner of the mustard to keep the mustard away from the bees since the bees were there first and are at the border because the yard was sold at the diving line. so again, I ask, why is it so simple that the sages might not say to the owner of the mustard to keep it away even in this case? And so, I ask again why does Tosphot change the arraignment? Later I saw that Tosphot asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("hava amina'”) in its place, and just change to a case of a sale [buyer]? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If Tosphot means that R. Yose would have said that both need to be three handbreadths from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three handbreadths) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "hava amina". But if Tosphot means that R. Yose would not have said the mustard would be right next to the border, then Tosphot is going back to the Mishna that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of the Gemara came from the braita that did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. There is also a slight question on Tosphot here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the sages that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is kipping ahead. _________________________________________________________________________________________ (Later I saw that תוספות asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("הוה אמינא'”) in its place and just change to a case of a לוקח? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If תוספות means that ר' יוסי would have said that both need to be three טפחים from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three טפחים) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "הוה אמינא". But if תוספות means that ר' יוסי would not have said the mustard would be exactly next to the border, then תוספות is going back to the משנה that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of theגמרא came from the ברייתאthat did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. That can mean three .טפחים There is also a slight question on תוספות here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the תנא קמא that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is skipping ahead.) On the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Rabbainu Izhak means. The answer of Rav Papa is that R Yose is a case of a buyer and the mustard is next to the border, and even though rabbainu izhak is changing the original assumption of the sages, even so in this approach of Rav Papa, R. Yose holds that the bees do some damage and so the bees should kept away from the border three handbreadths. He is not saying that each one, both mustard and bees should be kept three handbreadths away (the distance would be six handbreadths). Rather only the bees. The reason is that in fact we are keeping with the original assumption that “first come first served.” That since the mustard was there first, it can stay there. The second question of tosphot is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that Tosphot is saying the sages are changing their original assumption, but that R. Yose keeps his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? The answer is we find it according to the sages that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then R Yose objects that they ought to be taken away. Then tosphot anwers that if this was the case then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the braita, still Tosphot holds there is no difference between the mishna and the braita, R Yose holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away (the second question of תוספות is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that תוספות is saying the חכמים are changing their original assumption but that ר' יוסי keep his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? the answer is we find it according to the חכמים that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then ר' יוסי objects that they ought to be taken away. Then תוספות answers that if this was the case then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the ברייתא, still תוספות holds there is no difference between the משנה and the ברייתא. In both, ר' יוסי holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away ) On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask about the original question and answer of Tosphot. We change the situation to that the mustard is next to the border and Tophot asks why not keep the original assumption that the bees are next to the border and that they cause damage and even so since it is a case of a sale, the mustard can be also next to the border? Tophot answers that R Yose would not have said in that case that the mustard can be also at the border. I wondered why not? If it is a case of a sale why should the mustard have to be far away? Why not say that since it is a case of a sale, then the mustard can also be next to the border? The answer I think is that the permission we get from a sale is that therefore we can find something that causes damage next to the border, but it does not imply that therefore some that causes damage can but put next to an object on the other side of the border once that object is already there.

I have been looking at the subject of the mustard and the bees in Bava Batra 18b. My learning partner David Bronson would have spent at least a month on each Tosphot there. But I see there are a few other approaches that make the subject to require at least a year. R. Akiva Eiger, Rav shach and Reb Aaron Kotler each have a whole booklet on the subject because of the difficulty in the subject. See also Rav sharira Gaon. And the RiMigash

I have been looking some interesting writing of Rav Jacob Emden. It is true that he allows a girlfriend type of relationship but not exactly in the way you might think, Rather the idea is that he comes and lives with her man in his home. It is not to be casual. [see Chronicles I chapter 2 verses from 45 46 and onward. He thinks that there is good reason for a zava to need to be tovel in a natural spring as Rashi and some geonim say. I might mention that this is not stated in Leviticus. In Leviticus a natural spring is only mentioned with a zav. However there is a hekish between zav and zava in the Gemara that would seem to mean that a zava needs a natural spring. If you count like the Rambam all women will be zavot. [No one sees blood exactly from day 19 to 25 every single month. But if you count like the Ramban, almost no women will ever be zavot. They do not usually see seven days and then again three more ] And where could you find a natural spring anyway? The sea does not count as a natural spring

Rasputin has gotten a terrible reputation for no reason. When nothing else could cure the son of the tzar, Rasputin did help. He rightly told the tzar not to get involved in WWI and not persecute the Jews. [The pogroms had started long before Nichols II.] And it was true what he told the tzar what if his death would be by him or anyone in extended family, that the tzar himself and his family would not survive after that more than one year

za63 midi B flat majorditto in nwc format

za61 F Major midi za61 nwc

I would like to suggest that the first mishna in Bava Batra is like sumchos and that this is in fact what the Gemara itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? And the Gemara answers "It is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them." That means: I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof, so now the mishna comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a stam mishna like sumchos is not unusual like the mishna in bava kama about an ox that gores a cow and the mishna in Bava Mezia page 100, and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the tosphot understands the question of the gemara to be like sumchos, but say that the sages would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "he grabbed it after the doubt had arisen" in which case the sages would agree with sumchos". But then I think tosphot must mean that obviously the answer of the gemara is going like sumchos. Then Tosphot finds a way that the answer of the gemara would go also with the sages. and thus, they explain that when the gemara says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. and thus, the one in whose domain it is has a migo, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain and therefore both sumchos and the sages would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the migo disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. Tosphot also mentions that Rashi holds a similar view that the question of the Gemara is like sumchos. However, Rashi is still different from Tosphot. Tosphot holds sumchus would say to divide because it is a case of deraraa demomona. But Rashi says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of Rashi explains the Rambam who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. () And this is like the Gemara in Bava Batra page 3 that says the case of the Mishna Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this Rashi it Is clear that even though they built the wall but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to Rashi and the Rambam. To Tosphot, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard Now that we see the mishna is like sumchos , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The mishna says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be derara demomona and sumhos says to divide only in a case of derara demomona _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to suggest that the first משנה in בבא בתרא is like סומכוס and that this is in fact what the גמרא itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? and the גמרא answers it is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them. That means I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof. so now the משנה comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a סתם משנה like סומכוס is not unusual like the משנה in בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א about an ox that gores a cow and the משנה in בבא מציעא page ק', and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the תוספותunderstands the question of the גמרא to be like סומכוס, but say that the חכמים would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק" in which case the חכמים would agree with סומכוס ". But then I think תוספות must mean that obviously the answer of the גמרא is going like סומכוס. Then תוספות finds a way that the answer of the גמרא would go also with the חכמים. and thus, they explain that when the גמרא says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. And thus, the one in whose domain it is has a מיגו, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain. And therefore both סומכוס and the חכמים would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the מיגו disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. ד תוספות also mentions that רש''י holds a similar view that the question of the גמרא is like סומכוס. However, רש''י is still different from תוספות. The reason is תוספות holds סומכוס would say to divide because it is a case of דררא דממונא. But רש''י says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of בבא מציעא where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of רש''י explains the רמב''ם who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. And this is like the גמרא in בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א that says the case of the משנה Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this רש''י it Is clear that even though they built the wall, but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly, and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to רש''י and theרמב''ם . To תוספות, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard.Now that we see the משנה is like סומכוס , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The משנה says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be דררא דממונא and סומכוס says to divide only in a case of דררא דממונא ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ אני רוצה להציע שהמשנה הראשונה בבא בתרא היא כמו סומכוס וזה בעצם מה שהגמרא עצמה מציעה כשהיא שואלת אם החומה נופלת, מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. זה לא ברור מאליו? והגמרא עונה זה בא לומר לנו שזה הדין גם כשהאבנים נופלות לצד החצר של רק אחד מהם. כלומר אולי חשבת שהדין הוא כמו החכמים שמי שמוציא מתחום חברו צריך להביא הוכחה. אז עכשיו המשנה באה להגיד לנו כסף שיש בו ספק מחלקים. אני יכול להזכיר שיש סתם משניות כמו סומכוס. זה לא יוצא דופן כמו המשנה בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א על שור שנגח פרה והמשנה בבא מציעא עמוד ק'. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהתוספות מבינים את שאלת הגמרא כמו סומכוס, אבל אומרים שהחכמים יסכימו לגישתו כאן במקום שאין לאף אחד טענה יותר מהשני ושמדובר ב"תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק". "במקרה זה החכמים יסכימו עם סומכוס". התשובה של הגמרא הייתה הולכת גם עם החכמים וכך, הם מסבירים שכאשר הגמרא אומר שהקיר נפל לחצר של רק אחד מהם, זה אומר שהוא נשאר שם זמן רב בתחום שלו הוא בעל מיגו, הוא היה יכול לומר שקניתי אותו והוא יאמין כי זה היה כל כך ארוך בתחום שלו ולכן גם סומכוס וגם החכמים היו אומרים שזה יהיה שייך לזה חוץ מהעובדה שנדרשים שניהם לבנות את החומה ולכן המיגו נעלם והקיר מתחלק שווה בשווה ביניהם. תוספות מזכירה גם שרש''י מחזיק בדעה דומה ששאלת הגמרא היא כמו סומכוס. אולם רש''י עדיין שונה מתוספות. הטעם שתוספות מחזיק הוא שסומכוס היה אומר לחלק כי מדובר בדרא דממונא. אבל רש''י אומר שהם מחלקים כי החצר שייכת לשניהם, וכך דומה הדבר בתחילת בבא מציעא ששניהם אוחזים בחפץ. וגישה זו של רש''י מסבירה את הרמב''ם שאומר במקרה שהכותל נופל מחלקים בשווה "הויאל שמקום הכותל משל שניהם". הסיבה היא בגלל שהמקום שייך לשניהם, ולכן הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. וזהו כגמרא בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א שאומר המשנה היא בחצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה. ברש''י זה מכוון שאף שבנו את החומה, אבל אין זה אומר שחילקו בעלות בחצר. שניהם עדיין מחזיקים בו במשותף, ולכן אם החומה נופלת, הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. אולם זה רק לרש''י ותרמב''ם. לתוספות מחלקים שווה גם אם חילקו בעלות החצר עכשיו כשאנחנו רואים שהמשנה הוא כמו סומכוס, אפשר לשאול "אז למה הם מתחלקים רק בגלל 'לכן'?" (המשנה אומר שהם בונים את החומה אם בגלל שהם חייבים או בגלל שהם מסכימים לעשות את זה) לכן אם החומה נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. אפשר לענות על זה כך. אם לא יצטרכו לבנות את החומה במשותף, לא היה ספק לבית המשפט של מי החומה? בית המשפט יכול היה להניח שרק אחד בנה אותו בעצמו. ולכן לא יהיה דררא דממונא, וסומכוס אומר לחלק רק במקרה של דררא דממונא

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Tractate Bava Batra page 2A and page four

Rambam laws of Neighbors chapter 2 law 18, he says "since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both." And in chapter 3 law 3 he says "If a neighbor surrounds another neighbor, and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in, then that other neighbor has to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence is partly on the land of the other neighbor." You see the Rambam holds the possession of the land is what determines the ownership. The case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls, the stones are divided equally between them. What I am getting at here is this is surprising. The Gemara in Bava Batra has a few approaches to the Mishna about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is "Who has to pay for the fence?," and "How much?," but the question of "On who's land is the fence?" is never mentioned in Bava Batra nor in Bava Kama page 20 {There is a book of lectures of Rav Nachum of the Mir and a book by Rav shach that try to understand what the approach of the Rambam is. The reason the Rambam requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the Ramban and Tosphot bava kama page 58 hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in Bava Mezia, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the Rambam holds (according to the Kesef Mishna laws of theft and loss chapter 10, law 5) the neighbor can say take your trees away and I will not pay for them. But here if the wall I already on his property we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it I a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in bava mezia page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount __________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , he says since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both. And in פרק ג' הלכה ג'he says if a neighbor surrounds another neighbor and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in then that other neighbor צריך to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence Is partly on the land of the other neighbor. You see the רמב''ם hold the possession of the land what determines the ownership. the case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls the stones are divided equally between them/ what I am getting at here is this is surprising. The גמרא in בבא שתרא has a few approaches to the משנה about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is who has to pay for the fence, and how much, but the question of on who's land is the fence is never mentioned in בבא בתרא nor in בבא קמא The reason the רמב''ם requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor (ניקף) is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the רמב''ן and תוספות בבא קמא page נ''ח hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in בבא מציעא ק''א, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the רמב''ם holds (according to the כסף משנה laws of גזילה and אבידה chapter י', law ה') holds the neighbor can say "Take your trees away and I will not pay for them." But here if the wall already on his property, we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it is a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in בבא מציעא ק''א page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , הוא אומר כיון שמקום החומה שייך לשניהם, אם נפל החומה, המקום והאבנים שייכים לשניהם. בפרק ג' הלכה ג' הוא אומר אם שכן מקיף שכן אחר ומציב גדר מסביב לקרקע שלו כך שגם הקרקע של שכנו מגודרת אוטומטית, אז השכן השני צריך לשלם חצי מההוצאה. עם זאת, זה חל רק אם גדר זו נמצאת בחלקה על הקרקע של השכן השני. אתה רואה שהרמב''ם מחזיק שחזקה בקרקע היא מה שקובעת את הבעלות. המקרה של החוק הראשון הוא שאם שני אנשים חולקים חצר ומעמידים חומה, אם היא נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה מה שאני מתכוון כאן זה שזה מפתיע. בגמרא בבא בתרא יש כמה גישות למשנה לגבי שכן אחד שמקיף אחר. השאלה היא מי צריך לשלם על הגדר, וכמה, אבל השאלה על אדמת מי נמצאת הגדר לא מוזכרת בבא בתרא ולא בבא קמא הסיבה שהרמב''ם מחייב שהחומה תהיה בחלקה על אדמת השכן המוקף (ניקף) היא לדעתי משום שהוא מחזיק בדין זה מדין מי שנכנס לשדה של חברו ונוטע עצים. כך מחזיקים הרמב''ן ותוספות בבא קמא דף נ''ח. אם החומה לא תהיה על אדמת השכן, אזי דין זה לא היה רלוונטי כלל. אבל גם אם זה בא מהחוק הזה בבא מציעא ק''א, זה עדיין לא יהיה מקביל בדיוק, כי הרמב''ם מחזיק (לפי הכסף משנה גזלה ואבדה פרק י', חוק ה') יכול השכן לומר "קח את העצים שלך ואני לא אשלם עליהם". אבל כאן אם הקיר כבר על הנכס שלו, אנחנו מניחים שזה בסדר מבחינתו שהשכן השני שם אותו שם. ולכן זה מקרה שזה בסדר מבחינתו (ניחא ליה) ולכן הוא צריך לשלם חצי הסכום. כמו המקרה בבא מציעא ק''א עמוד ק''א שבו הוא משלם את מלוא הסכום, [אבל אם הוא באמת לא רוצה את העצים שם, אבל עדיין לא מוכן להכריח את השני לקחת אותם, אז הוא משלם את הסכום הכי נמוך.

za59 F Major midi za59 in nwc format

Bava Mezia page 2 side B. the last Tosphot on the page

Let me present the Gemara Bava Mezia page 2 side B and the last Tosphot on the page. Our mishna says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The gemara asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox, or not. The gemara asked, “Then perhaps our Mishna is not like sumchos, because our mishna says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox, sumchos says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is derara demomona (so they divide without an oath). {Derara demomona means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The gemara asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is derara demomona, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the mishna is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." Tosphot says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that sumchos says to divide without an oath is that is a case of derara demomona. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about rav Nahman said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, derara demomona only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of derara demomona, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to-do with derara demomona. The question I have here I that the gemara say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of derara demomona, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of derara demomona. We see the gemara wants to say that in our case, the lack of derara demomona means we should divide without an oath The gemara is not asking here that we should divide like the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of derara demomna is what the gerama says should cause dividing without an oath—not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of derara demomona should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this mut be the reason of Rabbainu Tam who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment. However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have till found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the gemara says there is a "all the more so from derara demmona to lack of derara demomona".This is different from the way rabbainu tam is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it i a different kind of case of holding the object It occurred to me that this must be the reason of rabbainu Tam to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their pleas instead of the other opinion of the Rashbaam and Rabbaainu Jona that it means relevance of money. For if there is no doubt to the court then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind of holding onto the object, then stll it would be sensible to have each take an oath and all the more so if each has no relavance to the object. so the Gemara wouldmaake sence in either way _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב and the last תוספות on the page. Our משנה says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The גמרא asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox או not. The גמרא asked, “Then perhaps our משנה is not like סומבוס, because our משנה says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox סומכוס says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is דררא דממונא (so they divide without an oath). { דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The גמרא asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is דררא דממונא, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the משנה is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." תוספות says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that סומכוס says to divide without an oath is that is a case of דררא דממונא. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about רב נחמן said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, דררא דממונא only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of דררא דממונא, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to do with דררא דממונא. The question I have here I that the גמרא say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. We see the גמרא wants to say that in our case, the lack of דררא דממונא means we should divide without an oath The גמרא is not asking here that we should divide ץlike the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of דררא דממונא is what the גמרא says should cause dividing without an oath; not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of דררא דממונא should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this be the reason of רבינו תם who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the גמרא says there is a "all the more so from דררא דממונא to lack of דררא דממונא ".This is different from the way ר''ת is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it is a different kind of case of holding the object. Also if דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות then lack of דררא דממונא meaans there i a doubt only becaue of their טענות and so thee ought to be an a oath. It occurred to me that this must be the reason of רבינו תם to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות instead of the other opinion of the רשב''ם and רבינו יונה that it means שייכות of money. For if there is no doubt to the court, then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind ofשייכות onto the object, then stll it would be sensible that neither takes an oath and all the more so if each has no שייכות to the object. so the גמרא would make sence in either way ______________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב ותוספות אחרון בדף. המשנה שלנו אומרת ששני אנשים אוחזים בבגד מתחלקים עם שבועה. שואלת הגמרא ממקרה של שור דופק פרה, ונמצא עוברה בסמוך לה, ואין אנו יודעים אם היא הולידה מוקדם בגלל השור או לא. שאלה הגמרא "אז אולי המשנה שלנו לא כמו סומבוס, כי המשנה שלנו אומרת לחלק את ערך הבגד בשבועה, ואילו במקרה של השור סומכוס אומר לחלק בלי שבועה". תשובה: המקרה של השור הוא דררא דממונא (ולכן מחלקים בלא שבועה). { דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק לבית הדין גם בלי הטענות שלהם.} הגמרא שואלת "האם אין זה "על אחת כמה וכמה"? אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשיש דררא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה כשאין? תשובה: המשנה היא מצב של שבועה שנגזרה על ידי הסופרים. תוספות אומר שהטעם למקרה של שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שהם מחלקים בשבועה הוא בגלל שהם מחזיקים בו. פרשת שור שנגח פרה ונמצא סמוך לה העגל שטרם נולד ושסומכוס אומר לחלק בלא שבועה הוא בגלל הדין של דררא דממונא. במקרה של סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה רב נחמן אמר "מי שחזק מקבל אותה", כי שם אף אחד לא אוחז בסירה. כלומר דררא דממונא רק אומר לנו לחלק בלא שבועה. אם לא מדובר בדרא דממונא, הרי שהדין תלוי אם שני האנשים אוחזים בחפץ או לא, ואין לזה קשר לדררא דממונא. השאלה שיש לי כאן אני שהגמרא אומר אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשמדובר בדרא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה שיחלקו בלא שבועה כשאין זה דררא דממונא. רואים שהגמרא רוצה לומר שבמקרה שלנו חסרון דררא דממונא אומר שצריך לחלק בלי שבועה. הגמרא לא שואל כאן שנחלק כמו במקרה של שור שנגח כי בעצם כן מחלקים. ההבדל היחיד הוא השבועה. ולכן חסרון דררא דממונא הוא מה שהגמרא אומר צריך לגרום לחלוקה בלא שבועה; לא העובדה שהם מחזיקים את הבגד אולי תשיב שחוסר דררא דממונא לא צריך להיות כשלעצמו סיבה לחלוקה. אני חושב שזו הסיבה של רבינו תם שאומר שהסיבה לחלוקה היא שהם מחזיקים את הבגד עם זאת, אני מאמין ששותפי ללמידה היה מוצא את התשובה הזו כלא מספקת. הסיבה היא שהגמרא אומרת שיש "על אחת כמה וכמה מדררא דממונא לחסרון דררא דממונא". זה שונה מהדרך שבה ר''ת לומד שהסיבה שמחלקים את הבגד אינה ''על אחת כמה וכמה" סוג של היגיון, אבל בגלל שזה סוג אחר של מקרה של החזקת האובייקט כמו כן אם דררא דממונא משמע שיש ספק לבית הדין בלא טענותיהם אזי חסר דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק רק בגלל טענותיהם, ולכן צריך להיות שבועה עלה בדעתי שזו חייבת להיות הטעם של רבינו תם להחזיק דררא דממונא משמע יש ספק לבית הדין בלא מחלוקתם במקום דעתו האחרת של הרשב''ם ורבינו יונה שמשמעותה כמות גדולה של כסף. שהרי אם אין ספק לבית הדין, אז אין סיבה לגרום לאיש להישבע, עם זאת, אפילו אם זה אומר שלכל אחד יש סוג של שייכות על החפץ, אז עדיין יהיה הגיוני שאין צריכים להישבע שבועה, ועל אחת כמה וכמה אם לכל אחד אין זכות לחפץ. אז הגמרא יהיה הגיוני בכל דרך

za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format Music has been numbered from 1 to 100 in each series A to Z. Then started again from "za". However many files are missing or lost. Most were never put on line. There are however older files with names like black hole or anything I could think of at the time. There is a file by the name of mathematics and another by name "orchetra"--for that it was written for

misuse of a philosophy. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs

If every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory, but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed. Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular, the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently, and held that one need to learn the Organum of Aristotle (known by the name of the seven wisdoms). It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam are ignored. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs. To be clear, I prefer the distilled approach of Kelley Ross who combines Kant with Leonard Nelson and Schopenhauer. But, I still see great value in Hegel and a more modern great thinker, Michael Huemer of the Intuitionist approach. still I think the Kelley Ross approach is the best.{friesian.com.} Reichenbach had more sense than the Friesian school when it came to Relativity, so to be able to create a consistent system, the Friesian school did not have much to work with until Kelley Ross who managed to put together the various strands of thought into a consistent system. [However he is ignored in Germany, which is sad. For that approach needs modification.] Rav Nachman of Breslov dismissed learning philosophy completely, and there is a good point to that as we can see nowadays how crazy it can get. But still, I see great values in a few of them, e.g. the minor dialogoes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fries, Hegel,Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross.

the first mishna in Bava Batra המשנה הראשונה בבבא בתרא

Tosphot holds in first mishna in Bava Batra the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of derara demomona. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “We both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the gemara says openly that that is not a case of derara demomona. Now the case of derara demomona, Tosphot often says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their pleas, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the gemara in Bava Batra (page 35 side B) holds` derara demomona is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the gemara in Bava Metzia (page 3) says derara demomona is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in Bava Batra where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of derara demomona to be when they object could belong to both. later note: Rav shach brings Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 97b and the beginning of perek 10 that derara demomona is that each is considered to be holding the object. The Rabbainu Yona (bava batra page four and page 35) (who is brought by Rav Isar Meltzer) holds derara demomona is that the object is tied or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the rashbam and Tur as brought by Rav Nachum of the Mir ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of derara demomona in Bava Batra 35a that it means both might own the object. But if you hold derara demomona is like the gemara in Bava Mezia page 3a that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the ketzot HaChoshen that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two gemaras differ about derara demomona is possible to see in the language in Bava Batra 35 "it [the field that each claim that it belong to him] cannot be derara demomona because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so derara demomona means it can belong to both. In Bava Metzia page 3a it says "THE garment that both are holding cannot be derara demomona because it might belong to both" Thus if it can belong to both together then it cannot be derara demomona I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________ תוספות holds in first משנה in בבבא בתרא the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of דררא דממונא. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “we both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the גמרא says openly that that is not a case of דררא דממונא.. Now, the case of דררא דממונא, often תוספות says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their טענות, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the גמרא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) holds דררא דממונא is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the גמרא in בבא מציעא (page ג') says דררא דממונא is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in בבא בתרא where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of דררא דממונא to be when the object could belong to both. note: רב שך brings תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב and the beginning of פרק י' הבית והעליה that דררא דממונא is that each is considered to be holding the object. The רבינו יומה (who is brought by רב איסר מלצר) holds דררא דממונא is that the object is שייך or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the רשב''ם and טור as brought by רב נחום of the מיר ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of דררא דממונא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) that it means both might own the object. But if you hold דררא דממונא like the גמרא in בבא מציעא page ג' ע''א that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the קצות החושן that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two גמרות differ about דררא דממונא is possible to see in the language in בבא בתרא ל''ה "it cannot be דררא דממונא because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so דררא דממונא mean it can belong to both. In בבא מציעא ג' ע''א it says it cannot be דררא דממונא because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be דררא דממונא I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תוספות אוחז במשנה ראשונה בבבא בתרא דין חומה בחצר בין שני שותפים מתחלק שווה בשווה כיון שהוא דין דררא דממונא. אבל אם היו מחלקים כי שניהם נחשבים כמחזיקים בחומה, אז אם אחד אומר "בניתי את כל החומה", והשני אומר "שנינו בנינו", אז יצטרכו לחלק אותו שלושה רבעים, ורביעית, כמו במקרה של שניים אוחזים בבגד ששם מחלקים שלוש רביעיות ורביעית (כשאחד אומר "הכל שייך לי" והשני אומר "שנינו הבעלים שלו"). (ושם עם שניים אוחזים בבגד, הגמרא אומר בגלוי שזה לא דין דררא דממונא.) עכשיו, במקרה של דררא דממונא, פעמים רבות תוספות אומרים שזה מקרה שלבית הדין יש ספק גם בלי ההסבר שלהם, ולכן שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה בלי בהתייחס לטענות שלהם. כעת הגמרא בבבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''ב מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא כאשר החפץ שהם מתווכחים עליו יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, ואילו הגמרא בבא מציעא (דף ג') אומר דררא דממונא הוא רק כאשר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אלא צריך להיות שייך רק לאחד או לשני, לא לשניהם. לכן, אני חושב שהחוק בבא בתרא שבו הם מחלקים את הקיר באופן שווה חייב לקבוע שההבנה של דררא דממונא היא כשהחפץ יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. הערה: רב שך מביא תוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב ותחילת פרק י' הבית והעליה שדררא דממונא הוא שכל אחד נחשב מחזיק את החפץ. רבינו יונה (בבא בתרא דף ד' ול''ה) (שהביאו רב איסר מלצר) מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא שהחפץ הוא שייך או קשור לכל אדם.(זו גם גישתם של הרשב''ם וטור כפי שהביאו רב נחום מהמיר) אבל, בכל אופן, אני חושב שדין חלוקת החומה הולך בבירור עם הרעיון של דררא דממונא בבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''א) שפירושו של שניהם יכולים להיות בעל החפץ. אבל אם תחזיק דררא דממונא כמו הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ג' ע''א שזה אומר שהחפץ לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אז דין חלוקת הכותל צריך להיות כמו קצות החושן כלומר משום שכל אחד מהם נחשב כמחזיק את הקיר אציין כאן שזה ששני הגמרות נבדלים לגבי דררא דממונא אפשר לראות בלשון בבא בתרא ל''ה "לא יכול להיות זה דררא דממונא כי אם זה שייך לאחד זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשני ואם זה שייך להאחר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לראשון". אז דררא דממונא מתכוון שזה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. בבבא מציעא ג' ע''א כתוב "שזה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא כי זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם" לכן אם זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם יחד אז זה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא אני רוצה להוסיף כאן נקודה שהיא כנראה פשוטה, אבל אני עדיין לא יודע את התשובה. מה אם בחצר אין מספיק מקום שיש חוק שבו אחד יכול להכריח את השני לחלק? {כלומר, אין לו ארבע אמות לכל אחד.} אז אם בכל זאת ישים חומה, האם אתה מחלק את האבנים אם החומה נופלת ולמי שהעמיד את החומה אין הוכחה שהוא עשה את העבודה לבד

za57 E minor midiza57 E minor nwc format

za56 E Flat Major midi za56 nwc

Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot. I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam

There was a great scholar in the Mir who I have just discovered, a Rav Nachum. I  can see great importance in learning his ideas and I might mention here that while Rav shach and Rav Isar Zalman Meltzer generally concentrated their efforts in understanding the Rambam, Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot as was my learning partner, David Bronson in Uman, and also Rav Naftali Yegger in the yeshiva shar Yashuv in New York.  I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David bronson took a definite I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David Bronson took a definite stand that, "Tosfot is always right." Period. But I think that I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam. I think that both Rambam and Tosphot are important. I would like to take use this internet platform to suggest to learn Rav shach and Rav Nachum in each subject, and I also believe that there is a connection between their approaches. however i recommend the approach of balance with a combination of learning in depth along with quike learning--doing the review many time.

za555 midi in A Minor za55 in nwc

za54 midi same file in nwc

to combine tea and coffee

It is obvious` that the rise of the ancient Chinese empire was due to tea. and it was` that same thing that gave rise to the British empire. however, it was coffee that was the direct cause of the rise of Germany in the 1700's and 1800' because obviously coffee is better than tea in giving that first punch. However, I believe that we all should learn from the English custom of having a set tea time every day and in fact having a "nice tea often." The first thing the English did on D-day when they were part of the advance on Nazi Germany was to boil a pot of tea until their commanding officer told them first to fight the Nazis, and then have tea. But, I think the best idea is to combine tea and coffee in the same cup since each one gives a specific and different kind of energy. However, I must also add that immediately after having tea with any kind of sugar, one must brush his or her teeth since bacteria in the mouth love sugar.

Without a doubt Nietzsche is the most powerful prose writer in the German language, and possibility in any language [much beyond any writer that I have seen]. However powerful and convincing he is, every jot and tittle of his writing` is philosophy for angry adolescents, not a word of truth. Instead, I recommend reading Chesterton, the Anti-Nietzschean. [Convincing and powerful does not equal True--as any lawyer or politician can tell you.] ll

Where is Marxism?

Where is Marxism? Argentina was plunged into a devastating economic crisis in December 2001/January 2002, from communist policies that led to a collapse in output, high levels of unemployment, and political and social turmoil? In the cannibalism Venezuela? In the millions of murdered people under Stalin and Meo Zedong? Or is in books?? Of course, if you ask a Marxist, they will tell you true communism has never been tried. However, if you compare anything in this world to paradise, and claim that true paradise is what Marxism promises, well then, Marxism will win. But, if you compare anything in the world to paradise, then nothing will win

Bava Batra page 3a. Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 10

I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of Rav Isar Meltzer about the Rosh [rav ]. The Rosh holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners) they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the Rosh entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the Rosh. The question then what is the reason for the Rambam? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both Rav shach and Rav Isar meltzer explain the reason is that to the Rambam this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of Rav Isar Meltzer that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” [so to the Rambam there is no need to say Go and acquire (which is a command, and command is not needed when there is anyway implicit agreement) but both need to go and take pessession since both already have the property jointly. so it is not aqcuiring by barter exchange but by division] ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of רב איסר מלצר about the רא''ש. The רא''ש holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners), they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the רא''ש entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the רא''ש. The question then what is the reason for the רמב''ם? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both רב שך and רב איסר מלצר explain the reason is that to the רמב''ם this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” הטעם הוא Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of רב איסר מלצר that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” [so to the רמב''ם there is no need to say לך חזק וקקני (which is a command, and command is not needed when there is anyway implicit agreement) but both need to go and take בעעלות since both already have the property jointly. so it is not aqcuiring by חליפין but by חלוקה] הברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול לגבי גישתו של רב איסר מלצר לגבי הרא''ש. הרא''ש מחזיק בחצר זו (שאין בה ארבע אמות לכל אחד מהשותפים), הם מסכימים לחלוקה לפי החלפה (קנין חליפין). זה כשלעצמו מסביר את הרא''ש לגמרי. עם החלפה, אף אחד לא צריך להגיד "לך ותרכוש" (לך חזק וקני) ואתה צריך רק אחד שילך ויאחז בחצי שלו. כך שאין אי בהירות לגבי הרא''ש. השאלה אם כן מה הסיבה לרמב''ם? למה שניהם צריכים להשתלט, אבל אף אחד לא צריך להגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש?" לשם כך מסבירים גם רב שך וגם רב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שלרמב''ם זו לא רכישה על ידי החלפה, אלא חלוקה של מה שכבר יש לשניהם. לכן, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש", אולם שניהם צריכים להשתלט על המחצית שלהם. עכשיו אתה יכול לשאול מדוע הם לא צריכים לומר, "לך לרכוש?" הטעם הוא כי אתה צריך את זה רק כאשר אחד מוכר נכס לשני, והשני משתלט לא מול המוכר. זה הולך לפי הרעיון של רב איסר מלצר שלומר "לך ורכש" פירושו פקודה ישירה שנצטרך במקרה של רכישה. אבל גם בלי הפקודה הזו, עדיין יש הסכמה מרומזת לרכישה. אבל אם במילים האלה יש רק משמעות של הסכם לרכוש, אז גם עם חלוקת רכוש נצטרך שאחד יגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש לכן לרמב''ם אין צורך לומר לך חזק וקני (שזה פקודה, ואין צורך בפקודה כשממילא יש הסכמה מרומזת) אלא שניהם צריכים ללכת ולקחת בעלות שכן לשניהם כבר יש את הקניין ביחד. אז זה לא נרכש על ידי חליפין אלא על ידי חלוקה

page 3a of Bava Batra

There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page 3a of Bava Batra. Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief, or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the Rosh, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the Rosh this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the Rambam both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “Go and make an acquisition.” To Rav Isar Meltzer, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “Go and acquire”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “Go and acquire” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to Rav Shach the reason of the Rosh is that the Rosh considers this a case of acquisition by exchange where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “Go and acquire.” But Rav Shach and Rav Isar Meltzer agree that the reason for the Rambam is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “go and acquire,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what Rav Isar Meltzer holds here about the opinion of the Rosh, it is from exchange or from agreement?" Rav Shach mentions that the law is that even in dividing, you only need one to take his share. He however does mention that that might be only in a case when the courtyard is big enough for four cubits to come to each one. But from this we can understand the Rosh, who says even if just one divides that is enough. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________]_________________________ There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page דף ג' ע''א of בבא בתרא Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief (סודר), or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the רא''ש, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the רא''ש this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the רמב''ם both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “לך חזק וקני.” To רב איסר מלצר, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “לך חזק וקני.”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “לך חזק וקני” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to רב שך the reason of the רא''ש is that the רא''ש considers this a case of acquisition חליפין where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “לך חזק וקני.” But רב שך and רב איסק מלצר agree that the reason for the רמב''ם is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “לך חזק וקני,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what רב איסר מלצר holds here about the opinion of the רא''ש, it is from exchange or from agreemenT? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ יש נושא שארצה להציג בדף דף ג' ע''א בבא בתרא. שני אנשים מחזיקים יחד חצר ורוצים לחלק אותה, למרות שהיא קטנה. למעשה, הוא כל כך קטן שארבע אמות לא ילכו לשניהם. ולמעשה, במקרה זה, הם לא יכולים להכריח זה את זה להתחלק. אבל הם רוצים להתחלק בכל זאת. הם יכולים לעשות רכישה על ידי מטפחת (סודר), או אפילו בלי רכישה במטפחת על ידי שכל אחד יכניס לחלק שהוא רוצה ולעשות שם רכישה על ידי עשיית גדר או נעילה או פירוק גדר. לרא''ש רק אחד צריך לעשות רכישה. הסיבה היא שמכיוון ששניהם מחזיקים בו במשותף, לאחר שאחד לוקח חלק אחד, השני מקבל את החלק השני באופן אוטומטי. לרא''ש זה דומה או אולי זהה לרכישה בהחלפה (חליפין). לרמב''ם שניהם צריכים לעשות רכישה. אבל לשניהם אין צורך לומר לשני "לך חזק וקני". לרב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שבמקרים כלליים של רכישת קרקע צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כאן אין מדובר ברכישה רגילה, אלא בחלוקת מה שכבר מחזיקים במשותף. ובביטוי "לך חזק וקני" יש במרומז את המשמעות של נתינת חזקה ישירות, לא רק הסכמה לתת לאחר לרכוש. (ובענייננו, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש" כיון ששניהם מחזיקים בו, אבל צריך להיות הסכם לתת לשני לרכוש.) אולם לרב שך טעם הרא''ש הוא שהרא''ש רואה בזה מקרה של רכישה על ידי חליפין כאשר וכאשר שותף אחד רוכש, השני רוכש אוטומטית מבלי לומר "לך חזק וקני". אבל רב שך ורב איסר מלצר מסכימים שהסיבה לרמב''ם היא שזה חלוקת מה שכבר יש להם, ולכן לא צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כל אחד צריך להחזיק בחציו כפי שאתה יכול לדעת, אני לא בטוח מה רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כאן לגבי דעת הרא"ש, זה מחילופין או מהסכמה רב שך מזכיר שהדין הוא שגם בחלוקה צריך רק אחד שייקח את חלקו. עם זאת, הוא מזכיר שזה יכול להיות רק במקרה שבו החצר גדולה מספיק כדי שארבע אמות יגיעו לכל שותף. אבל מכאן אפשר להבין את הרא''ש, שאומר גם אם רק אחד מחלק די בכך.

za53 B minor in midi za53 in nwc

za52 in C minor

za52 midi za52 nwc

Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76. Also see the teaching: "All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of flesh and blood are removed from him."

I have a few approaches to learning that I would like to recommend. sometimes one approach seems best and other times another. One way I mentioned in the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76 to say the words and go on. Even if one does not understand immediately he will eventually understand when he goes on to the end of the book and then reviews it many times. This I found helpful not just in Gemara but also in some of the important commentaries on the Talmud, like Rav Shach' Avi Ezri and Rav Isar Meltzer; Even Haazel. I also have used this method in math and physics. another method was low methodical saying the words of every page or even every sentence forwards and backwards and in fact that method helped me get though my course at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. Another method is what is in fact practiced in the secular world of listening to lectures by experts in the subject. That one is probably the best since it really was the reason for any success at Polytechnic and also at the Mir in NY where I heard classes and lectures by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. I highly doubt if I had been able to get anywhere in these subjects without listening to the experts. Study alone at home was helpful in getting ready to absorb the message, but the real quality learning was from listening to lectures. Can you imagine if I had been able to play the violin by learning books? Obviously not. It had to be by learning from the best. on. Even though this approach to learning is effective in Torah, Math and Physics, still i would like to place a special emphasis on the Mishna: All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of people are removed from him. My learning partner (David Bronson mentioned to me the importance of this teaching.)

Bava Metzia page 2a, 3a, 37b. Rambam Laws of two people arguing in court ch 9, law 7. Laws of Robery ch four, law 10.

I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of rav shach in the rambam. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). [The case of theft is one wants to give back an object that he stole, but does not know from which one of two people he stole it. The case of buying is one sold an object to two people and does not remember to which one of them. The case of holding is two people are holding an object, and each one says, "It belongs to me." In each case you divide the value of the object.] These are the three cases the Rambam says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding an object for two people, and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The Rambam does not make the sort of difference of the Ri Migash. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] The difference according to Rav Shach is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the Gemara and brought in Tosphot that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that certainly can not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when he says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the Rambam and the Gemara. The Rambam says they divide and the Gemara on page 37b says “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer is the case of holding an object for two people. There each is certain, and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that Rav Shmuel Rozovski says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt, and that there comes the laws money that is in doubt stays in its place as the R’’an suggests. But what would be the difference between theft and a deposit if both are certain and neither is holding it and yet the case of theft you divide and the deposit stays put? I can answer somewhat like the gemara says how ca you compare theft with a deposit? the case of theft is such that there is no reason to leave the object in the hands of he who stole it. Even if there is no proof for either side and even if one is lying and even if the division can’t be correct, still you give it to them both a and they divide it between themselves. (That is not the same as when the court itself divides the value in half and gives a half to both parties.) But in the case of a deposit both gave their object to him by their own volition. Now there is no way of knowing to whom belong the part that is argued over, therefore it stays in its place. That is because it is where the actual owner put it. Until proof is brought, that is where it stays. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of רב שך in the רמב''ם. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). These are the three caseS the רמב''ם says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding aפקדון for two people and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The רמב''ם does not make the sort of difference of the ר''י מיגש. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] Even though the רמב''ם does not mention the idea of the גמרא of where there is definitely a liar, nor the idea of the division might be correct it, still he might hold with these ideas as I will mention soon. But the main difference according to רב שך is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the גמרא and brought in תוספות that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that can certainly not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when it says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the רמב''ם and the גמרא. The רמב''ם says they divide and the גמרא on page ל''ז ע''בsays “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer the case of holding an object for two people. there each is certain and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that רב שמואל רוזובסקי says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt and that there comes the law המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיהas the ר''ן suggests. But רב שך can answer that you divide when they are certain and also because the law what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him and like the גמרא says the division might be true and there is not a liar for a certainty. But in the case of holding an object for two people, even though each one is certain, but neither is holding it and there is a liar for sure and the division can not be correct. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ בבא מציעא ב' ע''א ג' ע''א ל''ז ע''ב רמב''ם טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', גזילה פרק ד' חלכה י יש שלושת המקרים שהרמב''ם אומרכל אחד מחלק.[[המקרה של גזלה הוא שרוצה להחזיר חפץ שגנב, אבל לא יודע מאיזה אחד משני אנשים הוא גנב אותו. במקרה של קנייה הוא מכר חפץ לשני אנשים ואינו זוכר למי מהם. המקרה של תופסים הוא שני אנשים מחזיקים חפץ וכל אחד אומר "זה שייך לי". בכל מקרה אתה מחלק את הערך של האובייקט]] המקרה שבו אתה לא אומר זאת הוא במקרה של החזקת פיקדון לשני אנשים ולא ידוע למי שייך. שם אתה אומר שהחלק שמתווכחים עליו צריך להישאר במקומו. הרמב''ם אינו עושה את סוג ההבדל של הר''י מיגש. [אם שניהם מחזיקים בו, מחלקים אותו, אבל אם לא, הוא נשאר במקומו.] אף על פי שהרמב''ם לא מזכיר את רעיון הגמרא איפה בהחלט יש שקרן, וגם לא את רעיון שהחלוקה עשויה להיות נכונה, ובכל זאת הוא עשוי להחזיק ברעיונות האלה כפי שאציין בקרוב. אבל עיקר ההבדל לפי רב שך הוא שכשהם בטוחים מחלקים את החפץ. ותוכל לראות שזה הולך כרעיון הגמרא והביא בתוספות שמה שיש ביד אדם שייך לו. אבל זה בהחלט לא יכול להיות המקרה אם הוא עצמו בספק. אדרבא, מניחים שזה שייך לו כשאומר ''זה שייך לי בוודאות'' ולמעשה, במקרים שכל אחד מחזיק בו ובמקרה של מכירה, הם בטוחים. רק במקרה של גניבה יש לומר שהם מחלקים כשהם בטוחים, וזה נשאר במקומו כשהם בספק. [זה יענה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם לגמרא. הרמב''ם אומר שהם מחלקים והגמרא בדף ל''ז ע''ב אומר "נשאר במקומו".] השאלה שרעיון זה לא יענה במקרה של החזקת חפץ לשני אנשים. שם כל אחד בטוח ואתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו. אני מתאר לעצמי שזאת הסיבה שרב שמואל רוזובסקי אומר את ההיפך כלומר, המקרה שבו אתה מחלק הוא בגלל ספק וששם מגיע החוק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה כמו שהר''ן מציע אני מבין שזה לא בדיוק מה שרב שך אומר, (הוא משווה הרמב''ם עם הר''י מיגש שהעיקר תלוי באוחזים) אבל אני עדיין סומך מ על הרעיון הבסיסי שלו שאתה מחלק כששניהם בטוחים. אבל אני יכול לראות מה קבע הרב שמואל רוזובסקי [שמחלקים כששניהם בספק] כי הוא סומך על הרעיון של רב חיים מבריסק שצריכים לקיים ''החזרת החפץ'', מה שיכול להיות אם שני הצדדים מוטלים בספק, אך לא היכן שאחד משקר