Tractate Ketuboth pg 2.  In places where the courts are in session on Monday and Thursday, a virgin must be married on Wednesday. Rashi says the reason is so that if he finds that she is not a virgin, he can come to court the next day, and perhaps witnesses will come to testify about what they might know. Tosphot asks on this from later on on page 9. There R' Elazar said if a person comes to court and says, ''I found my wife to not be a virgin,'' he is believed to forbid her to himself. Then pg. 9 b Abyee brings a proof to R' Elazar. He says we can see R' Elazar is right from the Mishna that says a virgin must be married on Wednesday. The point of Tosphot is that to Rashi he comes to court not because he is believed, but so that witnesses will come. And the question of Tosphot on Rashi is  that Abyee clearly see says that the Mishna is a proof to R' Elazar that he is believed, not that that we do not know whether to believe him or not, and so call witnesses. 

  I am unclear about what the question of Tosphot is. To R Elazar, the Mishna is clear. He is believed to forbid her to himself, but must come to court to bring witnesses in order to make her lose her ketubah. If Tosphot has a question on Rashi, it should be from the opinion  that he is believed even to make her lose her ketubah, and  thus there is no need for witnesses. I am  sure that Tosphot has a question on Rashi, but it is not from Abyee or R' Elazar, but rather from the opinion (of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel and Rav Nahman) that the husband can both forbid his wife to himself and make her to lose the ketubah because a person does not take the trouble to prepare a wedding feast with the intention of ruining it afterwards. Based on that why would he need witnesses? 

I believe that Tosphot understands that Rashi is referring to a wife of a israeli, not the wife of a kohen. And thus Rashi means that since he is believed in the case of a wife of a kohen, then even in the case of the wife of a Israeli, he could come to the court and hope that witnesses would come to clarify the situation. [After all, R. Elazar meant that the husband is believed that he found her not to be a virgin only in the case of the wife of a kohen or a wife that was engaged before the age of three, but not wedded until she came of age.] And because Rashi means this, then Tosphot has his question that if Rashi would be right, then there is no proof from the Mishna even in the case of the wife of a kohen because even if he is not believed , he would still come to court in the hope that witnesses will come.

And thus the statement of Abyee  poses a question on Rashi because to Abyee, the Mishna is a proof to R' Elazar.

After all, if he is coming to court because he might find witnesses, then he might come to court in the case of the wife of a kohen also just to find witnesses. Why should we say that he is believed?  

  To put this more simply, Tosphot is asking this. The way Abyee understands the mishna, he is coming to court because he is believed, not becaue he is hoping for wwitnesses. What ever the case of the Mishna is, it is clear that he comes to court because his plea is believed. ___________________________________________________________________________________

כתובות דף ב.  In places where the courts are in session on Monday and Thursday, a virgin must be married on Wednesday. רש''י says the reason is so that if he finds that she is not a virgin, he can come to court the next day, and perhaps witnesses will come to testify about what they might know. תוספות asks on this from later on on page 9. There ר' אלעזר said if a person comes to court and says, ''I found my wife to not be a virgin,'' he is believed to forbid her to himself. Then בדף ט'  אביי brings a proof to ר' אלעזר . He says we can see ר' אלעזר is right from the משנה that says a virgin must be married on Wednesday. The point of תוספות is that to רש''י he comes to court not because he is believed, but so that witnesses will come. And the question of תוספות on רש''י is  that אביי clearly see says that the משנה is a proof to ר' אלעזר that he is believed, not that that we do not know whether to believe him or not, and so call witnesses. You can ask what the question of תוספות is? To ר' אלעזר, the משנה is clear. He is believed to forbid her to himself, but must come to court to bring witnesses in order to make her lose her כתובה. If תוספות has a question on רש''י, it should be from the opinion that he is believed even to make her lose her בתובה and  thus there is no need for witnesses. It seems to me that תוספות has a good question on רש''י but it is not from אביי or ר' אלעזר .  

I am  sure that תוספות has a question on רש''י, but it is not from אביי or ר' אלעזר, but rather from the opinion (ר' יהודה בשם שמואל) that the husband can both forbid his wife to himself and make her to lose the כתובה because a person does not take the trouble to prepare a wedding feast with the intention of ruining it afterwards. Based on that, why would he need witnesses? 

I believe that תוספות understands that רש''י is referring to a wife of a ישראלי, not the wife of a כהן. And thus רש''י means that since he is believed in the case of a wife of a כהן, then even in the case of the wife of a ישראלי, he could come to the court and hope that witnesses would come to clarify the situation. [After all, ר' אלעזר meant that the husband is believed that he found אשתו not to be a virgin only in the case of the wife of a כהן or a wife that was engaged before the age of three but not wedded until she came of age.] And because רש''י means this, then תוספות has his question that if רש''י would be right, then there is no proof from the משנה even in the case of the wife of a כהן because even if he is not believed , he would still come to court in the hope that witnesses will come. And thus the statement of אביי  poses a question on רש''י because to אביי, the משנה is a proof to ר' אלעזר.

After all, if he is coming to court because he might find witnesses, then he might come to court in the case of the wife of a כהן also just to find witnesses. Why should we say that he is believed?  

To put this more simply, תוספות is asking this. The way אביי understands the משנה, he is coming to court because he is believed, not becaue he is hoping for wwitnesses. What ever the case of the משנה is, it is clear that he comes to court becaue his טענה is believed. כתובות דף ב. במקומות בהם מתקיימים בתי הדין בימים שני וחמישי, בתולה חייבת להינשא ביום רביעי. רש''י אומר שהטעם הוא שאם ימצא שהיא לא בתולה יוכל לבוא למחרת לבית הדין ואולי יבואו עדים להעיד על מה שהם עשויים לדעת. תוספות שואלים על כך מעמוד ט' ע''א שם אמר ר' אלעזר שאם אדם בא לבית המשפט ואומר ''מצאתי שאשתי לא בתולה'', הוא נאמן לאוסרה לעצמו. ואז בדף ט' ע''ב אביי מביא הוכחה לר' אלעזר . הוא אומר שאנחנו יכולים לראות שר' אלעזר צודק מהמשנה שאומרת שבתולה חייבת להתחתן ביום רביעי. הטעם של תוספות הוא שלרש''י הוא בא לבית הדין לא בגלל שמאמינים לו, אלא כדי שיבואו עדים. ושאלת תוספות על רש''י היא שאבי ראה בבירור שהמשנה היא הוכחה לר' אלעזר שהוא נאמן, לא שאין אנו יודעים אם להאמין לו או לא, ולכן נקרא עדים. לא ברור לי מהי שאלת התוספות. לר' אלעזר המשנה ברורה. מאמינים שהוא אוסרה לעצמו, אבל חייב להגיע לבית המשפט (רב יהודה בשם שמואל) להביא עדים כדי לגרום לה לאבד את הכתובה שלה. אם יש לתוספות שאלה על רש''י, זו מדעת  שסובר שהוא נאמן אפילו שהיא תאבד את הכתובה, ובכך אין צורך לעדים. 

אני בטוח שיש לתוספות שאלה על רש''י, אבל זאת לא מאביי או מר' אלעזר, אלא מהדעה שהבעל יכול גם לאסור את אשתו על עצמו וגם לגרום לה לאבד את הכתובה בגלל שאדם לא טורח להכין סעודת חתונה מתוך כוונה להרוס אותה לאחר מכן. בהתבסס על זה, למה שהוא יצטרך עדים

אני מאמין שתוספות מבינים שרש''י מתייחס לאישה של ישראלי, לא לאשתו של כהן. ולפיכך רש''י משמע שמאחר שמאמנים לו במקרה של אשת כהן, אזי גם במקרה של אשת ישראלי יכול היה לבוא לבית הדין ולקוות שיבואו עדים לברר את המצב. [הרי ר' אלעזר התכוון שהבעל נאמן שמצא אשתו לא בתולה רק במקרה של אשת כהן או אישה שהתארסה לפני גיל שלוש אך לא נישאה עד שתבוא לגיל מתאים.] וכיון שזו כוונת רש''י, אזי לתוספות יש שאלתם שאם רש''י צודק, הרי אין הוכחה מהמשנה אפילו בעניין אשת כהן כי אפילו אם הוא לא נאמן, הוא עדיין יגיע לבית המשפט בתקווה שיבואו עדים. ולפיכך האמירה של אביי מעמידה שאלה על רש''י כי לאבי המשנה היא הוכחה לר' אלעזר

והרי אם הוא בא לבית דין כי הוא עלול למצוא עדים, אז הוא עשוי לבוא לבית הדין במקרה של אשת כהן גם רק כדי למצוא עדים. למה נגיד שמאמינים בו?

במילים פשוטות יותר, תוספות שואלים את זה. איך שאביי מבין את המשנה, הבעל מגיע לבית המשפט כי מאמינים לו, לא בגלל שהוא מקווה לעדים. לא משנה מה המקרה של המשנה, ברור שהוא מגיע לבית המשפט בגלל שטענה שלו נאמנת.

 za34 midi  [same piece in nwc] 

Gemara Nida 2

 Rav Isar Melzer [book Even Haazel] and Rav Shach {book Avi Ezri} disagree on how to solve a difficult Rambam, and yet both answers have problems with them. [ [Rav Meltzer was a teacher of Rav Shach in Slutzk. Later Rav Shach was a teacher in Kletzk in the yeshiva of the son in law of Rav Meltzer, i.e., Rav Aaron Kotler ]] I realized that both answers can work only if put together. Gemara Nida2. The Mishna says a person went into a mikve [pool] and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled [based on the  assumption that that mikve was okay] are impure. R Shimon says in a private domain they are in doubt. In a public domain they are pure. The Gemara asks from this law: ''a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for separating truma, and was found to be sour. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' R Hanina from Sura says the teaching about barrel is R Shimon. the reason for the sages (the first Tana) is that two Hazakot work together. That is the mikve is now lacking and the person that went into it was unclean. These hazakot [statuses] work together to defeat one hazaka [status] that the Mikve was ok until the minute it was found to be not okay. The Rambam holds by both laws, that of the Mikve, and that of the barrel even though the Gemara holds that both laws contradict each other. Rav Isar Meltzer points out that the mikve is different from the barrel. The only doubt in the case of the mikve is the person or things that went into it. The Mikve itself we know is not OK. So two Chazot can work together to say that what went into it is also not ok. But for the Barrel, we know at least some part of it is definitely truma. So it is a doubt, and we can not use two hazakot to make what was fixed by it  to be definitely not ok when it itself is a doubt. The problem with this answer is that  making the two laws not contradict each other can help the Rambam, but does not answer the fact that the Gemara holds both laws contradict. Rav Shach holds that the Rambam decided the Halacha like the second answer of the Gemara that ignores the issue of Hazaka and rather says the sages and R Shimon differ on how to learn from the beginning of tuma to the end or the opposite. Thus two hazakot against one is not the argument between the sages and R Shimon. So when the Rambam writes like the law of the Mishna about Mikve that what went into it is still unclean, that means it is a doubt. jut like the case of the barrel.  the problem is that the mishna and Rambam both write what went into the Mikve is unclean, not that it is a doubt. The answer to this is that in fact the Rambam did  decide the law like the second answer of the Gemara and both the Mishna on mikve and teaching on the barrel are both the sages, not R Shimon and that two hazakot can work only for the Mikve but not the barrel as Isaar Meltzer pointed out.

Might I add here a side note that I think that since these great roshei yeshiva are no longer with us, we ought to make it a point to learn the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, the Even HaAzel of Rav Isar Meltzer. The Chidushim of Reb Aaron Kotler [of Kletzk] and Rav Shmuel Rozovski [Ponovitch]. i would recommend both learning in depth and also fast. but if for lack of time one can not do both then in depth is more important.--ie learn one whole section of any one of these books one day and then review it the next day and so on for a month. [If some day the ideas of reb shmuel berenbaum [rosh yeshiva of the mir in the usa] are ever printed then I recommend his ideas also]

Later note: After writing the above, I noticed that Rav Shach has a slightly different answer in Laws of Truma where he explains that two hazakot [statuses] always can only make a doubt. Thus the wine that was fixed by the wine in the barrel that became vinegar is only a doubt. [The two hazakot  are the hazaka of the wine being tevel and the hazaka of the barrel that is now vinegar. So we say that backwards in time, it was vinegar at the time it fixed the wine. But the unclean person that went into the mikve is definitely still unclean, because of two hazakot, and also that we learn from sota that a doubt is considered a certainty. That is, the law of sota helps to turn the doubt into a certainty. In this way, the Rambam still must  be going like the second answer in nida page 3 on the question posed on page 2.  ] 

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רב איסר מלצר and רב שך disagree on how to solve a difficult רמב''ם and yet both answers have problems with them. I realized that both answers can work only if put together. גמרא נידה  דף ב' ע''ב . The משנה says a person went into a מקוה  and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled based on the  assumption that that מקוה was okay are impure. ר' שמעון says in a רשות היחיד they are in doubt. In a רשות הרבים they are pure. The גמרא asks from this law: ''a חבית of wine was separated in order to use it for separating תרומה, and was found to be vinegar. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' ר חנינא from סורא says the teaching about חבית is ר' שמעון. The reason for the חכמים ( the first תנא) is that two חזקות work together. That is the מקוה is now lacking and the person that went into it was unclean. These חזקות work together to defeat one חזקה that the מקוה was ok until the minute it was found to be not okay. The רמב''ם  holds by both laws, that of the מקוה, and that of the חבית even though the גמרא holds that both laws contradict each other. רב איסר מלצר points out that the מקוה is different from the חבית. The only doubt in the case of the מקוה is the person or things that went into it. The מקווה itself we know is not OK. So two חזקות can work together to say that what went into it is also not ok. But for the חבית, we know at least some part of it is definitely תרומה. So it is a doubt, and we can not use two חזקות to make what was fixed by it  to be definitely not ok when it itself is a doubt. The problem with this answer is that  making the two laws not contradict each other can help the רמב''ם, but does not answer the fact that the גמרא holds both laws contradict. רב שך holds that the רמב''ם decided the הלכה like the second answer of the גמרא that ignores the issue of חזקה and rather says the תנא קמא and ר' שמעון differ on how to learn from סוטה. Thus two חזקות against one (תרתי לריעתא) is not the   argument between the תנא קמא and ר' שמעון. So when the רמב''ם writes like the law of the משנה about מקוה that what went into it is still unclean, that means it is a doubt, just like the case of the חבית.  The problem is that the משנה  and רמב''ם both write what went into the מקוה is unclean, not that it is in doubt. The answer to this is that in fact the רמב''ם did  decide the law like the second answer of the גמרא, and both the משנה on מקוה and teaching on the חבית are both the תנא קמא, not ר' שמעון and that two חזקות can work only for the מקוה, but not the חבית as רב איסר מלצר pointed out. so what went into the מקוה הוא טמא but wine that מתוקן by the חבית is in doubt. 

Later note: After writing the above, I noticed that רב שך has a slightly different answer in הלכות תרומה where he explains that two חזקות [statuses] always can only make a doubt. Thus the wine that was fixed by the wine in the barrel that became vinegar is only a doubt. [The two חזקות  are the חזקה of the wine being טבל and the חזקה of the barrel that is now vinegar. So we say that backwards in time, it was vinegar at the time it fixed the wine. But the unclean person that went into the מקוה is definitely still unclean, because of two חזקות, and also that we learn from סוטה that a doubt is considered a certainty. That is, the law of סוטה helps to turn the doubt into a certainty. In this way, the רמב''ם still must  be going like the second answer in נידה דף ג' ע''א  on the question posed on דף ב' ע''ב.

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רב איסר מלצר (ה' אישות פרק י' ) ורב שך (ה' סוטה פרק א' ה''ג) חלוקים בדעתם כיצד לפתור רמב''ם קשה ובכל זאת בשתי התשובות יש בעייות. הבנתי ששתי התשובות יכולות לעבוד רק אם הן משולבות יחד. גמרא נידה דף ב' ע''ב . המשנה אומרת שאדם נכנס למקוה שנמצא חסר נפח מלא, כל הדברים הטהורים שטופלו על סמך ההנחה שהמקוה הזו הייתה בסדר הם לא טהורים. ר' שמעון אומר ברשות היחיד שהם בספק. ברשות הרבים הם טהורים. שואלת הגמרא מדין זה: ''חבית של יין הופרד כדי להשתמש בו להפרדת תרומה, ונמצא שהוא חומץ. במשך שלושה ימים, היין שתוקן בסדר. אחר כך ספק.'' ר חנינא מסורא אומר שההוראה על חבית היא ר' שמעון. הסיבה לחכמים (תנא הראשון) היא ששתי חזקות פועלות יחד. זה מקוה שחסרה עכשיו והאדם שנכנס אליה היה טמא. החזקות האלה פועלות יחד כדי להביס חזקה אחת שהמקוה הייתה בסדר עד לרגע שנמצא שהיא לא בסדר. הרמב''ם קובע כשני הדינים, זה של מקוה, ושל החבית למרות שהגמרא סובר ששני הדינים סותרים זה את זה. רב איסר מלצר מציין כי מקוה שונה מהבית. הספק היחיד במקרה של מקוה הוא האדם או הדברים שנכנסו אליו. המקווה עצמה שאנו מכירים אינה בסדר. אז שני חזקות יכולים לעבוד יחד כדי להגיד שמה שנכנס לזה גם לא בסדר. אבל עבור החבית, אנחנו יודעים שלפחות חלק ממנו הוא בהחלט תרומה. אז זה ספק, ואנחנו לא יכולים להשתמש בשתי חזקות כדי לגרום למה שתוקן על ידי זה להיות בהחלט לא בסדר כאשר זה עצמו הוא ספק. הבעיה בתשובה זו היא שעשיית שני ההלכות לא סותרות זו את זו יכולה לעזור לרמב''ם, אבל לא עונה על כך שהגמרא מחזיק ששתי ההלכות סותרות. רב שך סובר שהרמב''ם הכריע את ההלכה כמו התשובה השניה של הגמרא שמתעלם מסוגיית החזקה, ואדרבה אומר התנא קמא ור' שמעון חלוקים כיצד ללמוד מסוטה. לפיכך שתי חזקות כנגד אחת (תרתי לריעתא) אינו הוויכוח בין התנא קמא לר' שמעון. אז כשהרמב''ם כותב כמו דין המשנה על מקוה שמה שנכנס אליו עדיין טמא, זה אומר שזה ספק, ממש כמו התנא קמא. הבעיה היא שהמשנה והרמב''ם כותבים מה שנכנס למקוה טמא, לא שיש ספק. התשובה לכך היא שלמעשה הרמב''ם כן הכריע את הדין כמו התשובה השניה של הגמרא, וגם המשנה על מקוה וגם הוראה על החבית הן התנא קמא, לא ר' שמעון, וששתי חזקות יכולות לעבוד רק עבור מקוה, אבל לא את החבית כפי שציין רב איסר מלצר. אז מה נכנס לקוה הוא טמא, אבל היין המתוקן על ידי החבית שמוטל בספק הוא גם ספק.

הערה מאוחרת: לאחר כתיבת האמור לעיל, שמתי לב שלרב שך יש תשובה מעט שונה בהלכות תרומה. שם הוא מסביר ששתי חזקות [סטטוסים] תמיד יכולים רק להטיל ספק. לפיכך היין שנתקן על ידי היין בחבית שהפך לחומץ הוא רק בספק. [שתי החזקות הן חזקה של היין שהוא טבל וחזקה של החבית שהיא עכשיו חומץ. אז אנחנו אומרים שאחור בזמן, זה היה חומץ בזמן שהוא תיקן את היין. אבל הטמא שנכנס למקוה בודאי עדיין טמא, משום שתי חזקות, שלכן אנו למדים מסוטה שספק נחשב וודאי. כלומר, דין סוטה עוזר להפוך את הספק לוודאות. 

באופן זה, הרמב''ם עדיין ודאי הולך כמו התשובה השניה בנידה דף ג' ע''א בשאלה המובאת בדף ב' ע''ב.

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music file za 32

za32 midi    za32 in nwc format   [files go from ''a'' to ''z'' but after ''z'' start again with ''za''. each letter should have about a 100 files. but many were not put on the internet. and many were lost. some early files had names, but after some time they got just a letter.  ]

 Rav Yehuda said (Ketuboth page 76) in a case when one who owns an ox exchanges the  ox with a donkey and then goes and finds the donkey dead, that the owner of the donkey has to bring proof the donkey was alive at the time of the sale. Rami said that the person in whose domain the problem was found has to bring proof. All the rishonim except the RIF and Rambam (Laws of Sales 20) hold that the point of Rami is the owner of the ox has to bring proof because the finding occurred after the exchange was made. However the Rambam holds even to Rami, the owner of the donkey must bring proof. Rav Shach said the reason is that when a sale is made, it is incumbent on the seller the verify that the object he is selling is the object being bought. But this can not help to answer the problem because in the very next halacha, the Rambam brings a case where an animal was sold and it turned out to be traif. There the buyer has to bring proof. If Rav Shach would be correct, then the seller would have to bring proof. Therefore to me it seems that Rav Isar Meltzer was correct when he said the reason the owner of the donkey must bring proof because the donkey has not yet entered the domain of the buyer. The Rambam did not say the "possession" of the buyer but rather the "domain" of the buyer. This is different from the animal that is traif that has already come into the domain of the buyer. 

רב יהודה said בשם שמואל in a case when one who owns an ox exchanges the  ox with a donkey, and then goes and finds the donkey dead, that the owner of the donkey has to bring proof the donkey was alive at the time of the sale. רמי said that the person in whose domain the problem was found has to bring proof. All the ראשונים except the רמב'ם hold hold that the point of רמי is the owner of the ox has to bring proof because the finding occurred after the exchange was made. However the רמב'ם holdS הלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו even to רמי, the owner of the donkey must bring proof. רב שך said the reason is that when a sale is made it is incumbent on the seller the verify that the object he is selling is the object being bought. but this can not help to answer the problem because in the very next הלכה the רמב'ם brings a case where an animal was sold and it turned out to be טריף. There the buyer has to bring proof. If רב שך would be correct, the the seller would have to bring proof. Therefore to me it seems that רב איסר מלצר בספרו אבן האזל was correct when he said the reason the owner of the donkey must bring proof because the donkey has not yet entered the domain of the buyer. The רמב'ם did not say the "possession" of the buyer, but rather the "domain" of the buyer. This is different from the animal that is טריף that has already come into the domain of the buyer. 

כתובות ע''ו ע''ב

רב יהודה אמר בשם שמואל במקרה שבו מי שבבעלותו שור מחליף את השור בחמור, ואז הולך ומוצא את החמור מת, שעל בעל החמור להביא הוכחה שהחמור היה חי בזמן המכירה. רמי אמר שהאדם שבתחום שלו נמצאה הבעיה צריך להביא הוכחות. כל הראשונים מלבד הרי''ף והרמב"ם גורסים שנקודת רמי הוא בעל השור צריך להביא הוכחה כי הממצא התרחש לאחר ביצוע ההחלפה. אולם הרמב"ם מחזיק הלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד וט''ו אפילו לרמי, בעל החמור חייב להביא הוכחה. רב שך אמר שהסיבה היא שכאשר מתבצעת מכירה זה מוטל על המוכר לוודא שהחפץ שהוא מוכר הוא החפץ הנקנה. אבל זה לא יכול לעזור לענות על הבעיה כי בהלכה הבאה הרמב"ם מביא מקרה שבו נמכרה חיה והתברר שהיא טריף. שם הקונה צריך להביא הוכחה. אם רב שך יהיה נכון, המוכר יצטרך להביא הוכחה. לפיכך נראה לי שצדק רב איסר מלצר כשאמר הטעם שעל בעל החמור להביא הוכחה כי טרם נכנס החמור לתחום הקונה. הרמב"ם לא אמר "חזקתו" של הקונה אלא "רשות" של הקונה. זה שונה מהחיה שהיא טריף שכבר נכנסה לתחום של הקונה

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  same file but in nwc format

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   za27 midi     i edited this a little. the first version was with no development in the recapitulation of the main theme.

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The End of Liberalism , published by Michael Huemer, written by Jonathan Anomaly ---Liberalism and Evolution are exact opposites. and biology will always win when pitted against ideology

 Revolutions are hard to predict. Place a box of matches near a flame and eventually one of them will catch fire. With enough tinder the fire will spread, even if it spreads in unpredictable ways. Mass migration in the West is a potent form of tinder.

In August of 2024 spontaneous riots erupted in England and Ireland in response to the murder of children by African migrants. Violent crime has become commonplace in the capitals of Europe, and everyone knows why. But sometimes the brutality of the crime, the dishonesty of the media, and the apathy of the government strikes a nerve. A critical mass of people notice patterns, and they react.

When the data indicates that African migrants commit crime in vastly disproportionate numbers, the response of liberal journalists is to hide the identity of the perpetrators. The response of politicians is to pass new “hate speech” laws making it a crime to notice patterns and talk about the issues openly. We are witnessing the death throes of an ideology – one that was doomed to fail from the beginning.

Liberalism originated in part as a rejection of the unequal application of laws and social privileges to different people. So it is no surprise that liberals prize freedom and equality above hierarchy and tradition.

The liberal ideals of private property, free trade, and religious liberty took root in the United States and France through two bloody revolutions. After a century of conflict and two world wars, most European countries adopted liberal institutions. Other countries followed suit under the pressure of international institutions created after 1945.

In the decades following the second world war, liberal countries in the West enjoyed relative peace and prosperity, along with scientific and social innovation. But disaffection in liberal countries is growing. Even progressive liberals are beginning to take notice that trust in the post-war international order is collapsing.

In a newly published paper, we argue that liberalism is unsustainable – that recent trends toward low social trust, inter-group conflict, and falling fertility stem from liberal institutions and the social norms they tend to produce. While liberal institutions may not be solely responsible for these problems, they are ill-equipped to address them effectively. Liberalism is an evolutionary dead end, even if it fosters opportunities for wealth and innovation in the short run.

Immigration and Social Trust

Liberals treat freedom of movement as a moral default. The core liberal commitment to openness – to the free movement of people capital – tends to break down borders, and incentivize companies and political parties to import far more immigrants than citizens of liberal democracies want.

Large corporations support mass immigration because it brings in skilled workers that increase innovation, and unskilled workers that bring manufacturing costs down. Progressive political parties have incentives to import low-skilled people who are more likely to vote for a party that offers generous welfare benefits. Progressive intellectuals seem to support mass immigration because they believe that diversity is more important than group cohesion.

In this sense, liberal democracies tend to foster mass migration – via powerful interest groups – even if majorities of citizens within those countries oppose it. As this process proceeds, social trust tends to fall. A large meta-study recently showed that more ethnic diversity leads to lower social trust.

As social trust erodes, people volunteer less, and governments spend increasing sums of money supplying public goods with the machinery of the state rather than relying on people to do so through charity and social expectations. Low social trust also predicts higher levels of political corruption, less compliance with government mandates, and more distrust between ethnic groups that inhabit a country.

Once this process starts, liberal societies have few resources to deal with the consequences since, by definition, they are committed to remaining neutral on whether any comprehensive moral doctrine or set of social norms should prevail. Non-liberal regimes, by contrast, can use the power of the state to seal off the borders, deport unwanted immigrants, and curb the power of corporations and political parties who contravene the interests of political leaders or the preferences of citizens.

Fertility and Stability

A core commitment of liberalism is that the state must remain neutral on matters related to community and family. Liberal governments cannot privilege one lifestyle or religion over another without giving up their basic commitments.

But in an era in which fertility is falling around the world, this kind of political neutrality may be self-defeating. People who are more religious and more politically conservative have more children within countries. And the same holds true between countries – those that are more religious and conservative have more children than those that are more liberal and secular.

If liberal institutions and the attitudes these institutions shape speed up the rate at which fertility falls, they will be replaced with other institutions and attitudes. And if mass immigration continues, it is likely that this process will accelerate. Within those countries, the religious and conservative citizens will outbreed secular progressives.

Indeed, if current trends continue, Muslims from Africa and the Middle East will become the majority population in many European countries over the next century.

Of course, these trends are not baked in. Things change. Revolutions happen. Societies collapse. Ideologies mutate. And countries go to war – with outsiders or between different groups living within a country. We predict that the current century will see liberalism in retreat, and that governments that call themselves “liberal” will become increasingly illiberal in how they respond to challenges posed by the free movement of people and capital, and the crisis of falling birth rates.

Religion and nationalism are powerful forces. They can lead to conflict within and between groups. But they also seem to promote fertility and social cohesion better than liberal polities do. Ultimately, the winners in the evolutionary game of life are those who reproduce the most, not merely those who accrue power or resources at a particular moment in time.

---

Jonathan Anomaly 

MY OWN  comment on this was written years ago. Liberalism and  Evolution are exact opposites. and biology will always win when pitted against ideology, With evolution  all men are created unequal.

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[same piece in nwc format] 

the notes are in nwc but you can open midi and convert the sound to notes--but without the details.

if you  convert this to mp3, be aware that the instruments have to be changed. what works for midi does not work for mp3,   --example strings at the end of the piece can not work for mp3. they would have to be changed to cello in the bass and many other adjustments. [i would be happy to do this myself but have no access to any mp3 program]

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I share this for anyone to upload and share with others.    

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The question on the Rambam from Yevamot 30a is more severe than is generally known. The problem is the mishna brings the case when a the erva falls to yibum first. The Mishna say if the brother did maamar on her, then her zara [the not related wife] requires halitza. Then Rav Nahman says that according to the opinion there is zika, even just zika will cause the non related wife to require halitza. We hold that there is zika, and so it should be clear  that in this case the non related wife is forbidden even without maamar. Yet the Rambam decided the law opposite from what the gemara states. He writes the non related woman requires halitza if mamar was done on the sister. Then the next mishna brings the case when the non related wife falls to yibum first, and then  she and the sister of the wife fall to yibum together. In that case the Rambam writes even if the non related woman fell to yibum only by means of zika, she requires halitza. However the mishna there states only if maamar was done on her, then she requires halitza. Again the Rambam is deciding the law not like the mishna which says only maamar causes the non related wife to be forbidden yevamot page 30 side A and side B.  There is a difference in law between to different kinds of cases. One case is where a unrelated woman is has fallen to be required in yibum by means of zika. The other case is when the sister of the wife of the brother has fallen to yibum by zika. The second case is lite [to Rashi and Rambam,] and forbidden only if maamar [a statement of kidushin is made on her.--But if all that occurred is zika, then the unrelated woman is permitted]. But the first case is more severe. When it is the unrelated woman that has fallen to yibum by zika then she is certainly forbidden to Rashi and Rambam. And Rav Isar Meltzer brings down the commentary on the Mishna of Rambam who suggests that she might be forbidden even from the Torah.[But to the Rashba she is forbidden only if maamar was done on her--i.e., the second brother asked her to marry him.]

I would like here to explain the two cases in more detail. Case one. Three brothers. Two are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman. The last one died, and so the unrelated woman is now  required to have yibum by means of zika. [Zika is like a magnetic force that pulls on her to either of the remaining brothers]. Then the second brother died. She is totally forbidden to the remaining brother --maybe even from the Torah.  [To Rashi Rambam, not Rashba]. The other case. Three brothers. Two of them are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman. One of the brothers married to a sister died. Now that sister has fallen to yibum to the brother married to the unrelated woman. If that brother did maamar on her [i.e., asked her to marry him] and then died, the third brother cannot marry her. But if the second brother did nothing and said nothing, and then died, then the third brother can marry the unrelated woman.To Rav Shach the difference is because Zika is not marriage even from the words of the sofrim. And the only reason the zara of the erva by means of zika is forbidden is a special gezera on her because she can be mixed up with an zarat Erva. The question that comes to mind here is: Why assume there is any gezera at all? If the Gemara nor geonim bring such a gezera, why assume it exists [as in fact the Rashba says]? I mean to say the Rashba holds the zara of the erva by zika is permitted. Only if Maamar was done is she permitted.]

the way rav isar meltzer answer this question on the rambam is that the rambam holds that our subject on pg 30 is not according to rava on pg 96 that a yavam does yibum when the wife falls to him from one brother, not two. so our case of the non related wife should clearly forbidden since she has fallen from two brothers. however rav shach points out that that applies only when maamar was done on by both brothers, not just zika as he shows from pg 43bThe way Rav Shach understands this Rambam is that he takes the question on why when the erva falls to yibum first and then she forbids her zara to be forbidden only by maamar is the more relevant question. The reason is that the question on why when the zara falls first, she is forbidden even if only by zika, because the gemara implies that that should be so by the statement of rav nahman. The question is rather why the Rambam holds that when the erva falls first, she causes her zara to be forbidden only by maamar. That is openly against the statement of Rav Nahman. The answer Rav Shach gives is zika can forbid a zara only by means of absolute marriage, as if the case when the non related woman falls by zika to an erva who is absolutely married. But when the erva comes to forbid her zara by means of zika alone, then she does not have enough power to do so. The question on this is that this is directly in contraction to Rav Nahman who says in this exact case that the erva can cause her zara to be forbidden even when she fall only by zika. To try to answer this it is possible to suggest that there are two kinds of zika, one from the Torah and the other from the words of the scribe. Thus, Rav Nahman  might mean that the Mishna comes to exclude  that the more severe type of  zika. However on further thought, this can not be so because Rav Nahman said that by the fact that the Mishna forbids only the case when maamar was done on the erva, we see the mishna holds that there is no such thing as zika. That has to exclude also zika derabanan because otherwise the mishna would say also by zika  the erva forbid the non related woman. Thus I think the Keseph Mishna was right that the Rambam meant that zarat erva bezika is forbidden in both  cases and mention this only in one case knowing that the other case could be learned from it by means on an ''all the more so'' kind of logic. That is : if the non related wife falls first and she could be married to either of the brothers married with the sisters, you say if one brother died, she is forbidden in yibum because of the zika, all the more so when the erva falls first and could have yibum with only one brother, then if he dies she can forbid the non related wife to be forbidden by her zika.       

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 There is a difference in law between to different kinds of cases. One case is where a unrelated woman [נכרית] is has fallen to be required in יבום by means of זיקה. The other case is when the sister wife of the brother has fallen to יבום by זיקה. The second case is קל [to רש''י and רמב''ם,] and forbidden only if מאמר [a statement of קידושין is made on her. But if ONLY זיקה occurred , then the נכרית is permitted]. But the first case is more severe. When it is the נכרית that has fallen to יבום by זיקה, then she is certainly forbidden to רש''י and רמב''ם. And רב איסר מלצר brings down the commentary on the משנה of רמב''ם who suggests that she might be forbidden even דאורייתא. [But to the רשב''א she is forbidden only if מאמר was done on her, i.e., the second brother asked her to marry him.] I would like here to explain the two cases in more detail. Case one. Three brothers. Two are married to two sisters, and one to an unrelated woman (נכרית). The last one died, and so the נכרית is now  required to have יבום by means of זיקה. [זיקה is like a magnetic force that pulls on her to either of the remaining brothers]. Then the second brother died. She is totally forbidden to the remaining brother, maybe even אורייתא.  [To רש''י רמב''ם, not רשב''א]. The other case. Three brothers. Two of them are married to two sisters, and one to an נכרית. One of the brothers married to a sister died. Now that sister has fallen to יבום to the brother married to the נכרית. If that brother did מאמר on her [i.e., asked her to marry him] and then died, the third brother cannot marry her. But if the second brother did nothing and said nothing, and then died, then the third brother can marry the נכרית.

The question on the רמב''ם from יבמות ל' ע''א  30  is more severe than is generally known. The problem is the משנה brings the case when a the ערווה falls to יבום first. The משנה say if the brother did מאמר on her, then her צרה [the not related wife נכריתה] requires חליצה. Then רב נחמן says that according to the opinion there is זיקה, even just זיקה will cause the non related wife to require חליצה. We hold that there is זיקה, and so it should be clear  that in this case, the non related wife is forbidden even without מאמר. Yet the רמב''ם decided the law opposite from what the גמרא states. He writes the non related woman requires חליצה if מאמר was done on the sister.

Then the next משנה brings the case when the non related wife falls to יבום first, and then  she and the sister of the wife fall to יבום together. In that case the רמב''ם writes even if the non related woman fell to יבום only by means of זיקה, she requires חליצה. However the משנה there states only if מאמר was done on her, then she requires חליצה.  the רמב''ם is deciding the law not like the משנה which says only מאמר causes the non related wife to be forbidden

The way איסר מלצר answer this question on the רמב''ם is that the רמב''ם holds that our subject on  page 30 is not according to רבא on page צ''ו that a יבם  does יבום only when the wife falls to him from one brother, not two. So our case of the non related wife should clearly forbidden since she has fallen from two brothers. However רב שך points out that that applies only when מאמר was done on by both brothers, not just זיקה  as he shows from מ''ג ע''ב

The way רב שך understands this רמב''ם is that he takes the question on why when the ערוה falls to יבום first and then she forbids her צרה to be forbidden only by מאמר is the more relevant question. The reason is that the question on why when the נכרית  falls first, she is forbidden even if only by זיקה, because the גמרא implies that that should be so by the statement of רב נחמן. The question is rather why the רמב''ם holds that when the ערוה falls first, she causes her צרה to be forbidden only by מאמר. That is openly against the statement of רב נחמן. The answer רב שך gives is זיקה can forbid a צרה only by means of absolute marriage, as if the case when the non related woman falls by זיקה to an ערוה who is absolutely married. But when the ערוה comes to forbid her צרה by means of זיקה alone, then she does not have enough power to do so. The question on this is that this is directly in contraction to רב נחמן who says in this exact case that the ערוה can cause her צרה to be forbidden even when she fall only by זיקה. To try to answer this it is possible to suggest that there are two kinds of זיקה, one from the תורה and the other from the words of the סופרים. Thus, רב נחמן  might mean that the משנה comes to exclude  that the more חמור סוג of  זיקה. However on further thought, this can not be so because רב נחמן said that by the fact that the משנה forbids only the case when מאמר was done on the ערוה, we see the משנה holds that there is no such thing as זיקה. That has to exclude also זיקה דרבנן because otherwise the משנה would say also by זיקה  the ערוה forbid the non related woman. Thus I think the כסף משנה was right that the רמב''ם meant that צרת ערוה בזיקה is forbidden in both  cases, and mention this only in one case knowing that the other case could be learned from it by means on an ''קל וחומר'' kind of logic. That is : if the נכרית falls first and she could be married to either of the brothers married with the sisters, you say if one brother died, she is forbidden in יבום because of the זיקה, all the more so when the ערוה falls first and could have יבום with only one brother, then if he dies, she can forbid the non related wife to be forbidden by her זיקה------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------השאלה ברמב''ם ביבמות ל' ע''א  חמורה מהידוע. הבעיה היא שהמשנה מביאה את המקרה כאשר הערווה נופלת ליבום ראשונה. המשנה אומרת אם האח עשה עליה מאמר, הרי צרה שלה חייבת חליצה. ואז רב נחמן אומר שלפי הדעה יש זיקה, אפילו רק זיקה תגרום לאישה הלא קרובה לדרוש חליצה. אנו קובעים שיש זיקה, ולכן צריך להיות ברור שבמקרה זה, האישה הלא קרובה אסורה גם בלי מאמר. אולם הרמב''ם הכריע את הדין הפוך ממה שקובע הגמרא. הוא כותב שהאישה שאינה קשורה דורשת חליצה ​​אם מאמר נעשה על האחות. ואז המשנה הבאה מביאה את המקרה שבו האישה הלא קרובה נופלת ליבום ראשונה, ואז היא ואחותה של האישה נופלות ליבום ביחד. במקרה כזה כותב הרמב''ם גם אם האישה הלא קרובה נפלה ליבום רק באמצעות זיקה, היא דרושה חליצה. אולם המשנה שם קובעת רק אם מאמר נעשה עליה, אז היא דרושה חליצה. הרמב''ם פוסק את הדין לא כמו המשנה שאומרת שרק מאמר גורם לאישה הלא קרובה לאיסורהבדל בחוק בין מקרים לסוגים שונים. מקרה אחד הוא שבו אישה שאינה קרובה [נכרית] היא נאלצה להידרש ביבום באמצעות זיקה. המקרה הנוסף הוא כאשר אחות אחותו של האח נפלה לידי ייבום על ידי זיקה. המקרה השני קל [לרש''י ורמב''ם,] ואסור רק אם מאמר. אבל אם רק זיקה התרחשה, אז הנכרית מותרת]. אבל המקרה הראשון חמור יותר. כשזו הנכרית שנפלה יבום על ידי זיקה, אזי ודאי אסורה לרש''י ורמב''ם. ורב איסר מלצר מוריד את פירוש המשנה של רמב''ם המציע שאולי אסורה אפילו דאורייתא. [אבל לרשב''א אסורה רק אם נעשה בה מאמר, כלומר ביקש ממנה האח השני להינשא לו.] אבקש כאן להסביר את שני המקרים ביתר פירוט. מקרה ראשון. שלושה אחים. שניים נשואים לשתי אחיות, ואחת לאישה לא קרובה (נכרית). האחרון מת, ולכן נדרשת כעת הנכרית לקבל ייבום באמצעות זיקה. [זיקה היא כמו כוח מגנטי שמושך אותה לכל אחד מהאחים הנותרים]. ואז האח השני מת. היא אסורה לחלוטין לאח הנותר, אולי אפילו אורייתא. [לרש''י רמב''ם, לא רשב''א]. המקרה השני. שלושה אחים. שתיים מהן נשואות לשתי אחיות ואחת לנכרית. אחד האחים הנשוי לאחות נפטר. עכשיו האחות הזאת נפלה ייבום לאח הנשוי לנכרית. אם האח ההוא אמר עליה [כלומר ביקש ממנה להינשא לו] ואחר כך מת, האח השלישי לא יכול להתחתן איתה. אבל אם האח השני לא עשה כלום ולא אמר כלום, ואז מת, אז האח השלישי יכול להתחתן עם הנכרית רב שך מסביר ההבל בין אם הערוה זקוקה (שאסורה רק עם מאמר) או הנכרית זקוקה (שאסורה אפילו ע''י זיקה, שזיקה אינה קידושין דרבנן אלא קל ממנה. והוא מביא שסיבת איסורה של נכרית זקוקה היא גזירה מיוחדת שלא יתבלבלו עם צרת ערווה.) הקושיה שיש בזה היא שהרמב''ם המביא בפירוש המשנה שהגמרא והגאונים לא הסבירו מה דינה במצב שהנכרית היא זקוקת הערוה. אם כן למה לנו לחדש גזירה שלא מובא בש''ס? אולי יותר טוב לומר שהרשב''א צדק שהיא אסורה רק אם האח השני עשה מאמר? ">הדרך שבה רב איסר מלצר עונה על שאלה זו ברמב''ם היא שהרמב''ם גורס שהנושא שלנו בעמוד ל' אינו לפי רבא בעמוד צ''ו שבם עושה יבום רק כשהאשה נופלת לו מאח אחד, לא שניים. אז יש לאסור בבירור את המקרה שלנו של האישה הלא קרובה, כי היא נפלה משני אחים. אולם רב שך מציין שזה חל רק כאשר מאמר נעשה על ידי שני האחים, לא רק זיקה כפי שהוא מראה מ''ג ע''בהדרך שבה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם הזה הוא שהוא לוקח את השאלה למה כשהערוה נופלת יבום תחילה ואז היא אוסרת את צרה שלה ליאסר רק על ידי המאמר היא השאלה היותר רלוונטית. הסיבה היא שהשאלה מדוע כשהנכרית נופלת תחילה היא אסורה ולו רק על ידי זיקה, משום שהגמרא רומז שכך צריך להיות על ידי אמירת רב נחמן. השאלה היא דווקא מדוע הרמב''ם סובר שכאשר נופלת הערוה ראשון, היא גורמת לאיסור צרה רק על ידי המאמר. זה נוגד בגלוי את דבריו של רב נחמן. התשובה שרב שך נותן היא זיקה יכולה לאסור על שרה רק באמצעות נישואים מוחלטים, כאילו במקרה שבו האישה הלא קרובה נופלת על ידי זיקה לערוה שנשואה לחלוטין. אבל כשהערוה באה לאסור עליה את צרה באמצעות זיקה בלבד, אז אין לה די כוח לעשות כן. השאלה על זה היא שזה ישר כנגד לרב נחמן שאומר בדיוק במקרה הזה שהערוה יכולה לגרום לאסור לה לצרה גם כשתיפול רק על ידי זיקה. כדי לנסות לענות על זה אפשר להציע שיש שני סוגים של זיקה, האחד מהתורה והשני מדברי הסופרים. לכן, רב נחמן עשוי להתכוון לכך שהמשנה בא להוציא את הסוג החמור יותר של זיקה. אולם במחשבה נוספת, זה לא יכול להיות כך, כי רב נחמן אמר שבעובדה שהמשנה אוסרת רק את המקרה כאשר המאמר נעשה על הערוה, אנו רואים את המשנה גורס שאין דבר כזה זיקה. זה חייב להוציא גם את זיקה דרבנן כי אחרת המשנה תאמר גם על ידי זיקת הערוה אסורה הנכרת (האישה שאינה קרובה). לפיכך אני חושב שהכסף משנה צדק שהרמב''ם התכוון שצרת ערוה בזיקה אסורה בשני המקרים, ומזכיר זאת רק במקרה אחד מתוך ידיעה שאפשר ללמוד ממנו את המקרה השני באמצעות ''קל וחומר'' סוג של היגיון. כלומר: אם נפלה הנכרית תחילה ויכלה להינשא לכל אחד מהאחים הנשואים עם האחיות, אתה אומר אם מת אח אחד אסורה ביבום מחמת הזיקה, על אחת כמה וכמה כשנופל הערוה תחילה ויכולה להיות יבום עם אח אחד בלבד, אז אם הוא ימות, היא יכולה לאסור על האישה הלא קרובה להיות אסורה על ידי זיקה שלה.

   za21 midi   za21 nwc

 Yevamot 3b. The Gemara derives from ''on her'' that yibum is permitted only with the wife of one's brother. That is from the two verses, "You shall not take the sister of your wife upon her in her lifetime," and the verse "If one's brother dies without children, the remaining brother shall marry his wife (shall come upon her)  to establish his name in Israel."

The gemara asks perhaps we should use the gezera shava of the double use of the word ''upon her'' to tell us just like yibum is permitted with the brother's wife, so should it be permitted with the other forbidden relations if one's brother who is married with them dies without seed.  The gemara answers that we would think they are permitted anyway even without a verse because a positive command overrides a negative command. {Yibum should override their prohibition.} So why does the Torah add the word ''upon her''. It must be to tell us that only the brother's wife is permitted, not any of the other fifteen types of forbidden relations. The old Tosphot asks on this that now that we know a positive command does not override a negative command that has karet, therefore we already know all the other fifteen type of forbidden relations are forbidden. So we should be forced to use the word "upon her" to tell us  that they are permitted in yibum.

It occurred to me according to the Rashba that the brother's wife is permitted in yibum because the time of her prohibition has a limit. That limit is when the brother dies without children. Then she is permitted because there is no prohibition, not because a positive command overrides a negative command. But the Torah only sets this time limit for the prohibition of the brothers wife, not for the prohibition of any of the other fifteen types of forbidden relations. Therefore the question of Tosphot remains valid. That is that now that we know all the other fifteen types of forbidden relations are prohibited, the only possible use of the word ""upon her" would be to permit them in a place of yibum.

[rav shach brings this idea of the rashba in forbidden relations chapter 2 halacha 1 ]

 i think that for some of these reasons i have mentioned here that, david bronson in uman suggested to me that the words ''upon here''might be a ''what do we find'' [מה מצינו], not a gezera shava

 

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 יבמות ג' ע''ב. The גמרא derives from ''עליה'' that יבום is permitted only with the wife of one's brother. That is from the two verses "You shall not take the sister of your wife on her in her lifetime," and the verse "If one's brother dies without children, the remaining brother must marry his wife (shall come upon her)  to establish his name in Israel."

The גמרא asks perhaps we should use the גזרה שווה of the double use of the word ''עליה'' to tell us just like יבום is permitted with the brother's wife, so should it be permitted with the other עריות if ones brother who is married with them dies without seed.  The גמרא answers that we would think they are permitted anyway (even without a verse) because a positive command overrides a negative command. {יבום should override their prohibition.} So why does the תורה add the word ''עליה''. It must be to tell us that only the brother's wife is permitted, not any of the other fifteen types of עריות. The תוספות ישנים asks on this that now that we know a positive command does not override a negative command that has כרת, therefore we already know all the other fifteen types of עריות are forbidden. So we should be forced to use the word "עליה" to tell us  that they are permitted in יבום.

It occurred to me according to the רשב''א that the brother's wife is permitted in יבום because the time of her prohibition has a limit. That limit is when the brother dies without children. Then she is permitted because there is no prohibition, not because a positive command overrides a negative command. But the תורה only sets this time limit for the prohibition of the brothers wife, not for the prohibition of any of the other fifteen types of עריות. Therefore the question of תוספות remains valid. That is that now that we know all the other fifteen types of עריות are prohibited, the only possible use of the word ""עליה" would be to permit them in a place of יבום. 

 i think that for some of these reasons חברותא שלי  הציע, that the word ''עליה ''might be a מה מצינו, not a גזירה שווה

יבמות ג' ע''ב. הגמרא לומדת מ''עליה'' שיבום מותר רק עם אשת אחיו. כלומר משני הפסוקים "לא תקח עליה את אחות אשתך בחייה", והפסוק "אם ימות אחיו בלי ילדים, חייב האח הנותר לשאת את אשתו (יבוא עליה) להקים את שמו בישראל. הגמרא שואלת אולי צריך להשתמש בגזרה שווה (השימוש הכפול במילה ''עליה'') כדי לומר לנו בדיוק כמו יבום מותר עם אשת האח, כך יש להתיר עם שאר העריות אם אחיו שנשוי איתם מת בלי זרע. הגמרא עונה שהיינו חושבים שהם מותרים בכל מקרה (גם בלי פסוק) כי ציווי חיובי גובר על ציווי שלילי. {יבום צריך לבטל את האיסור שלהם.} אז למה התורה מוסיפה את המילה 'עליה''. צריך לומר לנו שרק אשת האח מותרת, לא כל אחד מחמש עשרה סוגי העריות האחרים. התוספות ישנים שואלות על זה שעכשיו כשאנחנו יודעים פקודה חיובית לא עוקף פקודה שלילית שיש לה כרת, לכן אנחנו כבר יודעים שכל חמישה עשר סוגי העריות האחרים אסורים. אז זה צריך להכריח אותנו להשתמש במילה "עליה" כדי לומר לנו שהם מותרים ביבום. עלה בדעתי שלדעת הרשב''א שאשת האח מותרת ביבום משום שלזמן איסורה יש גבול. הגבול הזה הוא כשהאח מת בלי ילדים. ואז היא מותרת כי אין איסור, לא כי ציווי חיובי גובר על ציווי שלילי. אבל התורה קובעת רק מגבלת זמן זו לאיסור אשת האחים, ולא לאיסור של אף אחד מחמשה עשר סוגי העריות האחרים. לכן שאלת התוספות נשארת בתוקף. כלומר שכעת, כשידוע לנו שכל שאר חמשה עשר סוגי העריות אסורים, השימוש היחיד האפשרי במילה "עליה" יהיה להתיר אותם במקום יבום

אני חושב שמכמה מהסיבות האלה חברותא שלי הציע, שהמילה "עליה" עשויה להיות מה מצינו, לא גזירה שווה.

Friesian School --All 20th Century Philosophy is a futile attempt to escape from under the shadow of Kant and Hegel

 I have been thinking about philosophy and over time I have seen the wisdom of the Friesian School with some reservation. The reasons for my reservations  are that it seems incomplete. It builds on Kant but Fries saw that the categories could not be derived from Aristotelian Logic but rather needed an internal source -not based on   what is "out there".Thus came the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge. But the revival of this school of thought  did not fare well when relativity came along and knocked a few black holes in Newtonian Space. So Bernays [a disciple of Leonard Nelson] the founder of the second Friesian School  saw that something needed to be corrected. Then came Dr Kelley Ross with his web site advocating for the Friesian approach. There the most important part of that site is the PhD Thesis. He lays out there a modification and development of the Friesian approach.

Philosophy is not absurd even though it tends to lead very smart people into very odd conclusions. It is best to take a limited idea of how far reason can go. Brouwer (the discoverer of the fixed point theorem) after he proved this very important theorem discovered "Philosophy" and decided that "Philosophy" would frown on his proof. [He had been persuaded that anything that can not be measured empirically can not have meaning.] It is amazing what nonsense, smart people can be convinced of.   

But the most recent and powerful voice for intuitive non immediate knowledge spends time knocking Hegel from a political point of view.  But later Hegel made a lot of  sense in his Encyclopedia.

All 20th Century Philosophy is a futile attempt to escape from under the shadow of Kant and Hegel  

 za2 midi  za2nwc

 za4 nwc This nwc file is in case anyone wants to see the notes with the instruments. But you need a nwc format to see them. The next file--the midi is to hear, but it also can be used to see the notes. [I did not post any music for  along time because of a tragedy that occurred.]

za4 midi  

za5 midi   za5 nwc

za3 nwc  za3 midi

 za20 nwc   za20 midi

 za19 midi        

 za19 nwc

 za8 midi      za8 nwc    [somewhat edited towards the end.]

 za9 midi    za 9 nwc 

za10 =a midi music file and the nwc version with notes

 za10 midi za10 nwc

the reason for the za designation is i started naming music files with a1 to a100 then b1 to b100  to z1 to z100. then stopped until a short time ago when i started again [do not ask where all the files went. i do not know. some were posted on the internet. ] . i did very little writing of music except in high school and only started again in the 1990's

music file za15

 za15 midi  za15 nwc  [The nwc file has the notes.]

2 music files

 za16 midi   za16 nwc  za12 midi za12 nwc

za11 nwc n za11 midi not editedot edited

 An ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time][note 2] is obligated in half damages. To R. Akiva half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox (note 1), it is sanctified. [Bava Kama 33a]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain, he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, --he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it, but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court, even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [Tosphot bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that day, but on a different day even months  before that time so and so killed. The false witnesses are killed because even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. Makot pg 5a. Tosphot is difficult to understand here, but the Tosphot Shantz makes the intention clear.] And the question is even stronger according to the approach of Rabainu Chananel and the Rambam that the ox itself is not owned by the owner of the wounded cow until standing in court. You can see this in the Rambam by the fact that he holds that if the ox went up in value by itself, the owner of the cow does not receive any more money than the half damages. Laws of Damages 7:12  

This seems like an obvious question, but I bring it up just in case. I still have to see the great Litvak sages who deal with this subject and I suspect that Rav Shach might very well bring this up. Besides him, I see there are a few other important Litvak sages that have written on Bava Kama [Rav Nachum of the Mir, Rav Shmuel of Ponovitch, and the Even Haazel by R. Isar Meltzer. bli neder, i will try to see what they write on this difficult subject   [Sadly the roshei yeshiva at the Mir in NY did little or no writing. At least they made tapes of Reb Shmuel Berenbaum's last seven years of classes,-- but it would take a massive amount of effort to get them into readable Hebrew.--all classes were in Yiddish.]

Possible answer: Rambam laws of vows 12:10 if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, hametz and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the sages made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. so here in our case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. the cases are different, still I think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.

Another possible answer is that perhaps this Gemara is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the Gemara that says that R.Akiva holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the Gemara would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty, and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court ) I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the gemara is like the opinion that 1/2 damages is monetary so to R Akiva the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it. 

I noticed in Rav Shach laws of buying and selling 22 law12 that the Rambam and Tosphot hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it, he only needs to own the animal and so our gemara here might hold that way.--later after writing this blog i noticed the Tosphot Rabbainu Peretz brings up this issue    

     

(note 1) This means that  a person says, "This object is dedicated to the Temple". Sometimes this might  mean he sanctifies an animal as a sacrifice. But it can mean the object is given to the Temple. Then the people in charge of the Temple can use the object or they can sell it and use the money for the upkeep of the Temple/   

note 2 exodus 21; verse 35

later note: I saw today the Rosh brings up this issue in Tosphot HaRosh. He brings from Rav Meir Halevi that the sanctification goes back in time,-  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as Tosphot points out) that is like Abyee (in Pesachim page 30), not like Rava. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like Rava and thus against the halacha (established rule).

Later note the Rambam brings this gemara straight even though in our Gemara the question being asked and answered is according to R Ishmael. [laws of damages chapter 8 law 6 ] So the Rambam understands this is coming according to R. Akiva. Thus when the gemara says the ox is an collateral [apotiki] that would answer my question since the law of an collateral [apotiki] is that it is in the domain of the lender. So in our case the animal is considered to be in the domain of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the Rambam considers the collateral [apotiki] to be in the domain of the lender? Answer The Rambam writes the law of the collateral [apotiki] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. [laws of lender and borrower 21:10] But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it. The case came before Rav and Rav said "Go pay the planter, and the planter gets the least amount whether the expense or profit." (Later Rav changed his mind, but this was the first decision).Now the field there was in the domain of its owner, and the Rav said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [apotiki] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his domain. /

Now I see that Rav Shach also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at Rav Shach laws of loans 21 law 10 I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the improvement, and only pays for the expense. But when the expense is more than the improvement, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its expense, and its improvement," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the improvement, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend. on what the lender wants. If the case is that of ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the expense and gets the improvement. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the improvement. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of Rav Shach here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the Rambam about an apotiki] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why does the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a lender comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the Rambam himself holds that the borrower does not have to pay back future fields improvement or expense unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so.[laws of loans 18:1 ] The Rambam holds that even though lack of writing shiabud is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the cost of the field. But for future acquisitions improvement and expense, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the borrower wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

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 an ox that gores a cow [and it is the first time] is obligated in half damages. To ר'  עקיבא half the ox already belongs to the owner of the cow so if that owner sanctifies 1/2 the ox, it is sanctified. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. My question here is the principle that if one has an object that is not in his domain he can not sanctify it. [The normal such case is one has given over an object to his friend to guard, and the friend denies it, he can not sanctify it because הוא שלו אינו ברשותו he owns it but it is not in his domain.] The question here seems strong because Tosphot says the owner of the ox is not actually obligated until he stands in court even though the 1/2 ox belongs to the damaged person. [תוספות bases  that on false witnesses that say so and so killed on Sunday. Other witnesses say to them you could not have seen that because you were with us on that, but on a different day [even months  before that time] so and so killed. the false witnesses are killed. Even though the event already happened, and the murderer had killed, still he was not brought to court. So the false witnesses are killed. מכות ה' ע''א

Answer. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' if a woman says to her husband the work of her hands is sanctified to Him who made them, he still can benefit from the work of her hands because they are under obligation to him. This is so even though freeing a slave, חמץ and and sanctification override monetary obligation, but the חכמים made the obligation to  the husband  to be stronger. So here in A case of an ox that causes damage,  the owner of the cow should be able to sanctify the ox because the ox is at least under obligation to him sanctifying the ox should override the ownership of the owner of the ox. Even though this is a stretch, i think i might answer my question 

the cases are different, still i think this might be the answer. [the case of the wife is that she owns her hands but they are under obligation to her husband so her sanctifying them should be stronger than in our case where the owner of the cow owns the ox but it is not in his domain.      

Another possible answer is that perhaps this גמרא is going like the opinion that half damages is monetary. And this would fit in better with the language of the גמרא that says that ר' עקיבא holds the owners of the ox and cow are partners, and it is hard to say that something owned together by partners is not in the domain of one of them. (And thus the גמרא would be explained according to the opinion that half damages is a penalty (קנס) and thus the owner of the cow does not have any ownership of the ox until standing in court) .I think this last sentence was written wrong and that I meant to say the גמרא is like the opinion that חצי נזק  is monetary so to ר' עקיבא the owner of the injured cow can sanctify it.     

I noticed in רב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב  that the רמב''ם and תוספות hold for holiness of body, the animal does not need to be in the domain of the one who sanctifies it. He only needs to own the animal.  Our גמרא here might hold that way.

Later note: I saw today the רא''ש brings up this issue in תוספות הרא''ש. He brings from רב מאיר הלוי that the sanctification goes back in time,  from the time he acquires the animal back to the time he sanctified it. But (as תוספות points out) that is like אביי (in פסחים ל'), not like רבא. and it is hard to say that our whole subject here is coming not like רבא and thus against the הלכה (established rule).

     

Later note. The רמב''ם brings this גמרא straight even though in our גמרא the question being asked and answered is according to ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. So the רמב''ם understands this is coming according to ר' עקיבא. Thus when the גמרא says the ox is an collateral אפותיקי that would answer my question, since the law of an collateral [אפותיקי] is that it is in the רשות of the מלווה. So in our case, the animal is considered to be in the רשות of the person that owns the damaged cow.    How do I know the  רמב''ם  considers the collateral אפותיקי to be in the רשות of the lender? Answer: The רמב''ם writes the law of collateral [אפותיקי] to be that the lender has to pay the least amount to the buyer, whether the expenses or the improvement. The מגיד משנה on the רמב''ם did not find a source for this. But to me it seems plain that it comes from the law of one who goes into a field of someone else and plants it (bava mezia 101a ). The case came before רב and רב said "Go pay the planter and the planter gets the least amount," (whether the expense or profit). (Later רב changed him mind, but this was the first decision). Now the field there was in the domain of its owner and  רב said to pay the minimum. So here too, the owner of the damaged cow is the owner of the ox which is an collateral [אפותיקי] and so he can sanctify the ox  since it is in his רשות. [It might be that רב changed his mind because the case there was that the field was owned and set aside for planting , so רב decided the owner had more of an obligation than  regular collateralץ   ]

Now I see that רב שך also brings that Gemara Bava Mezia 101 side a as the source for the Rambam but after looking at רב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י. I think there is some aspect of his answer there that is hard to understand. He says when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that the field belongs to him, and so he gets all the שבח, and only pays for the הוצאה. But when the הוצאה is more than the שבח, the lender comes with the idea that that the lender wrote, ''What ever I will buy, and a lender collects, I will pay for it, and its הוצאות, and its שבח," the buyer of the field and the lender both have equal claim on the שבח, so they divide it. The problem I see with this is that the law should not depend on what the lender wants. If the case is that of  ''It is my field,'' then that is that; and he pays the הוצאות and gets the שבח. If the case is ''What I will buy," then he and the buyer should divide the שבח. If the case comes from the law in Bava Mezia 101a , then over there it does not depend on what the owner wants.-

There is another question that is possible to raise on the answer of רב שך here. [I.e. the answer he brings for the decision of the רמב''ם about an אפותיקי] That is this: In the case of when the improvement to the field is less than the expense and the lender gets all the improvement but pays back half to the buyer, why doe the borrower not have to pay back the expense? After all, he writes "I will pay back their price and improvement and expense if a מלווה comes to collect the field" The answer to this question is that the רמב''ם himself holds that the לווה does not have to pay back these future acquisition unless he writes in the document openly that he will do so. The רמב''ם holds that even though lack of writing שיעבוד is a mistake of the scribe, still that only applies to the fields that he owns at the time of the loan. But for future fields, these have to be written openly. So in our case, if the לווה wrote that he will pay these back, then fine. He will do so. But if not then not,  

שור שנגח פרה [וזו פעם ראשונה] חייב בחצי נזק. לר' עקיבא חצי השור כבר שייך לבעל הפרה אז אם הבעלים הזה מקדש 1/2 מהשור, הוא מקודש. [בבא קמא ל''ג ע''א]. השאלה שלי כאן היא העיקרון שאם יש לאדם חפץ שאינו בתחום שלו הוא לא יכול לקדש אותו. [המקרה הרגיל כזה הוא שאדם נתן חפץ לחברו כדי לשמור, והחבר מכחיש אותו, הוא לא יכול לקדשו כי הוא אינו ברשותו. הוא הבעלים שלו, אבל זה לא בתחום שלו.] השאלה כאן נראית חזקה כי תוספות אומר שבעל השור אינו חייב בפועל עד שיעמוד בבית דין אף על פי שחצי השור שייך לניזוק. [תוספות מבססים את זה על עדי שקר האומרים כך וכך הרגו ביום ראשון. עדים אחרים אומרים להם שלא יכולתם לראות את זה כי הייתם איתנו ביום זה, אלא ביום אחר [אפילו חודשים לפני הזמן הזה] כך וכך הרגו. עדי השקר נהרגים. למרות שהאירוע כבר קרה, והרוצח הרג, עדיין הוא לא הובא לבית המשפט. אז עדי השקר נהרגים. מכות ה' ע''א

והשאלה עוד יותר חזקה לפי גישת ר' חננאל והרמב''ם שהשור עצמו אינו בבעלותו של בעל הפרה עד שעומד בבית דין. אתה יכול לראות זאת ברמב''ם בכך שהוא קובע שאם השור עלה בשווי ממילא, אין בעל הפרה מקבל יותר כסף מחצי הנזק. בהלכות נזקי ממון ז' הלכה י''ב

תשובה. רמב''ם הלכות נדרים י''ב הלכה י' אם אשה אומרת לבעלה מקודשת מעשה ידיה למי שעשה אותן, עדיין יוכל להפיק תועלת מעבודת ידיה כי הן חייבות לו. כך אף על פי ששחרור עבד, חמץ והקדש גוברים על חיוב ממון, אבל החכמים עשו את החיוב לבעל להיות חזק יותר. אז כאן במקרה של שור הגורם נזק, בעל הפרה צריך להיות מסוגל לקדש את השור כי השור לפחות מחויב עליו ולכן קידוש השור צריך לעקוף את בעלות בעל השור.

המקרים שונים, אבל עדיין אני חושב שזו יכולה להיות התשובה. [ענין האישה הוא שהיא בעלת ידיה אבל הן מחויבות לבעלה ולכן הקדש שלהן צריך להיות חזק יותר מאשר במקרה שלנו שבעל הפרה הוא בעל השור אבל זה לא ברשותו

תשובה אפשרית נוספת היא שאולי הגמרא הזו הולכת כמו הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי. וזה ישתלב טוב יותר עם לשון הגמרא האומר שר' עקיבא מחזיק בעלי השור והפרה שותפים, וקשה לומר שדבר שבבעלות שותפים יחד אינו ברשות אחד מהם. . הגמרא כפי הדעה שחצי נזק הוא כספי ולכן לר' עקיבא יכול בעל הפרה הפצועה לקדש את השור.

שמתי לב ברב שך הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה י''ב שהרמב''ם והתוספות מחזיקים לקדושת הגוף, אין הבהמה צריכה להיות ברשות המקדש אותה, הוא רק צריך בעלות. הגמרא שלנו כאן עשויה להחזיק כך..

היינו שהגמרא מכוונת לקדושת הגוף וזה לפי רב אשי בכתובות נ''ט שמסיק רב אשי שם קונמות קא אמרת שאני קונמות שקדושת הגוף נינהוא וכן משמע בתוספות קידושין ס''ג ד''ה וידיים וכן פסק הרמב''ם בנדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' לפי פירוש הכסף משנה

הערה בהמשך: ראיתי היום שהרא"ש מעלה את הנושא הזה בתוספות הרא"ש. הוא מביא מהרב מאיר הלוי שהקדשה חוזרת אחורה בזמן,- מרגע שהוא רוכש את הבהמה חזרה להקדשה. אבל (כפי שמציינים תוספות) שזה כמו אביי (בפסחים דף ל'), לא כמו רבא. וקשה לומר שכל הנושא שלנו כאן בא לא כמו רבא ובכך נגד ההלכה (הלכה קבע)

הערה מאוחרת יותר. הרמב''ם מביא את הגמרא הזה ישר למרות שבגמרא שלנו השאלה הנשאלת והתשובה היא לפי ר' ישמעאל שאינו ההלכה. אז הרמב''ם מבין שזה בא לפי ר' עקיבא. לפיכך כשהגמרא אומר שהשור הוא אפותיקי זה יענה על שאלתי, כיון שדין בטחונות הוא שהוא ברשות המלווה. אז במקרה שלנו, השור תם נחשב ברשותו של האדם שבבעלותו הפרה החבולה. איך אני יודע שהרמב''ם רואה את (הבטחונות) אפותיקי ברשות המלווה? תשובה: הרמב''ם כותב את דין ה אפותיקי שהמלווה צריך לשלם לקונה את הסכום הנמוך ביותר, בין ההוצאות ובין ההשבחה. (הלכות מלווה ולווה כ''א הלכה י') המגיד משנה ברמב''ם לא מצא מקור לכך. אבל לי זה נראה פשוט שזה בא מהחוק של מי שנכנס לשדה של מישהו אחר ונוטע אותו בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א. הגיע המקרה לפני רב ורב אמר לו "לך תשלם את הנוטע, והנוטע יקבל את הסכום הכי פחות", (בין אם ההוצאה או הרווח). (מאוחר יותר שינה אותו רב, אבל זו הייתה ההחלטה הראשונה). עתה השדה שם היה ברשות בעליו ואמר רב לשלם את המינימום. אז גם כאן, בעל הפרה החבולה הוא בעל השור שהוא משכון [אפותיקי] ולכן הוא יכול לקדש את השור כיון שהוא ברשותו. [יכול להיות שרב שינה את דעתו כי המקרה שם היה שהשדה בבעלותו ומופרש לנטיעה, ולכן החליט רב שלבעלים יש יותר חובה מאשר בטחונות רגילים]

עכשיו אני רואה שרב שך מביא גם את אותה גמרא בבא מציעא ק''א ע''א כמקור לרמב"ם אבל לאחר עיון ברב שך מלווה ולווה פרק כ''א הלכה י', אני חושב שיש איזשהו היבט בתשובה שלו שם שקשה להבין. הוא אומר כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהשדה שייך לו, ולכן הוא מקבל את כל השבח, ומשלם רק עבור הוצאה. אבל כשההוצאה היא יותר מהשבח, המלווה בא עם הרעיון שהמלווה כתב, ''מה שאקנה, ומלווה יגבה, אני אשלם על זה, ועל הסכום שלו, והשבח שלו", ולרוכש השדה ולמלווה יש תביעה שווה על השבח. אז הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא שהחוק לא צריך להיות תלוי במה שהמלווה רוצה. אם השדה שלו, אז זה הוא זה, והוא משלם את ההוצאות ומקבל את השבח. אם המקרה מגיע מהחוק בבבא מציעא ק''א ע''א , אז שם זה לא תלוי במה שהבעלים רוצה.

יש עוד שאלה שאפשר להעלות על תשובת רב שך כאן. [כְּלוֹמַר. התשובה שהוא מביא להכרעת הרמב''ם על אפותיקי] כלומר: במקרה שהשבחת השדה קטנה מההוצאה והמלוה מקבל את כל ההשבחה אבל מחזיר חצי לקונה, מדוע הלווה לא צריך להחזיר את ההוצאה? הרי הוא כותב "אחזיר להם את מחירם והשבחתם והוצאה אם ​​יבוא מלווה לגבות את השדה." התשובה לשאלה זו יכולה להיות  שהרמב''ם בעצמו גורס שהלווה אינו חייב להחזיר את קניינים עתידים אלא אם כן כתב כן. הרמב''ם גורס שלמרות שחוסר כתיבה שיעבוד הוא טעות של הסופר, עדיין זה מתייחס רק  לשדה שכבר יש לו. לכן יכול להיות  שלמען שיפור והוצאות על אפותיקי, אלה צריכים להיכתב בגלוי. אז לענייננו, אם הלווה כתב שיחזיר את אלו, אז בסדר. הוא יעשה זאת. אבל אם לא, אז לא