I asked Dr. Kelly Ross:
I wonder if  in the thought of Kant and Fries it is possible to draw a direct connection between the dinge an sich and non intuitive immediate knowledge.

His answer: Kant and Fries thought that Reason related directly to things-in-themselves, and non-intuitive immediate knowledge was knowledge from Reason for Fries.  So, yes.

I: The thing in itself is beyond empirical experience but knowledge of its existence seems to a kind of knowledge; while the immediate non intuitive kind of knowledge is more related to the synthetic a priori, first principles, and universals.

Dr. Kelly Ross : There are aspects of things-in-themselves that Kant already thought were only known through Reason.  Morality, in the first place.  Because of morality, he thought that God, freedom, and immortality were implied.  I only think that works well with freedom.  But the general principle is that unconditioned realities are possible among things-in-themselves but not among phenomena.  God, freedom, and immorality all involve unconditioned realities.

I: Is it possible that it is this non intuitive immediate knowledge that knows the dinge an sich?

Dr. Kelly Ross: The problem with our dealing with things-in-themselves, according to Kant, is that there cannot be a consistent theory of transcendent objects without generating antinomies.  I think that is still a good principle, and you can see the page on antinomies at

But there is more to the transcendent than metaphysical paradoxes.  Neither Kant nor Fries knew how to deal with the principles of actual religions, e.g. ritual requirements such as baptism or observing the Sabbath.  See "Nelson and Religion" at for the problems with the Kant-Friesian attitude.


(1) What I was getting at was that I think non intuitive immediate knowledge knows the existence of the dinge an sich, but reason knows universals. [I probably did not state this clearly enough in my question.]

(2) Also what I was trying to say was that even though the way Kant gets to the dinge an sich is different than how he treats the question of a priori synthetic knowledge, still they both seem connected.

(3) Are not unconditioned realities in the category of the thing in itself? And at least as far as Kant the dinge on sich is rather common place things. It is just we can get to what those things really are. But is it not so that we understand universals about those things? For example the laws of physics? What perhaps Kelly Ross is saying is that at a certain  common place things start to generate contradictions. For example Quantum Mechanics. The actual equations are exact and simple and local. [Correlation is not the same as causation.]
Here is Lubos's statement about this

Entanglement is nothing else than the quantum variation of the concept of correlation. It either represents any correlation between two subsystems that is properly described and understood in the language of quantum mechanics; or it refers to those correlations that make the subsystems behave differently than anything in classical physics.\