17.2.17
a law in the Rambam
Just some fast information about this essay. A woman that is married and sleeps with another man is forbidden to her husband from then on of if was by her desire. If she is the wife of a cohen (priest) even if it as rape she is forbidden to her husband because of the prohibition of prostitute. The word "zona" which in general means prostitute in the Torah means a woman that slept with anyone who is forbidden to her. [that is by a prohibition of the Torah or close relations]
A Sota (unfaithful wife) is a woman who was warned by her husband not to be alone with a certain man, and she was alone with him after that. She drinks the water as mentioned in the book of Numbers right before the section on being a Nazir. At that before she drinks the waters she is forbidden to her husband. If a witness says he saw her sleep with that other man, then she does not drink the waters and must be divorced. [Almost anything can cause her not to drink. It does not have to be a witness. Even a bird flying by that says she was unfaithful.]
Here the Rambam deals with the question is she was warned and was alone and a witness says he saw her with the other man in the act and her husband is a kohen from the seed of Aaron the high priest and her husband did sleep with her after that.
I wanted to share some thoughts about a law in the Rambam. (הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב) Sleeping with a woman who has seen blood and not waited seven days and gone down to to the river gets lashes. Even though it is ערווה it is still is only lashes. If she is known to her neighbors as being a nida (seeing blood) he also gets lashes. The reason: the Rambam uses the words הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same Halacha the Rambam goes on to say this hard thing to understand: She is a Sota (There was קינוי וסתירה [warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with] and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed (she slept with another man -not her husband) and then her husband who is a Kohen sleeps with her, he gets lashes for sleeping with a זונה.
The Raavad says for טומאה not זונה.
A "Zona" זונה is generally translated prostitute but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with from either a לאו negative commandment or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a kohen from the Torah itself,
Now in any case once there is a warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה and he can not sleep with her and if a witness comes ad says he say her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the Sota. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the Rambam come from that she is a זונה? --as the Raavad so rightly asks.Here we believe the one witness so the lashes have to be because of טומאה not זונה
Reb Chaim Soloveitchik answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few Gemaras [like קידושין דף ע''ז] There it says a kohen that sleeps with his sister makes her a זונה. If he sleeps with her again he makes her a חללה. Thus we see the act that makes her a זונה does not confer that status until after the act.] Rav Shach answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here Rav Shach suggest the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly with the beginning of the halacah in which case the Rambam is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of Nida with the famous case of the Mikve there that lacks the volume 40 Seah. Here we have a חזקה to start with,- חזקת כשרות which means חזקת הגוף
What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband. But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this because the idea of עד אחד and קיניו וסתירה to make a חזקה does not seem to work here, because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגןף. But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state.
What I am getting at is that in Nida the Gemara only uses חזקת השתא to go against חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא has another חזקה working with it. But here we have a previous חזקה going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in Nida page 2 Tosphot says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.
After writing the above essay I noticed that Rav Shach might be meaning what my answer is.That it is simply a case of believing one witness.
Now even later I think that Rav Shach did not mean my answer. He specially mention חזקה/ And my answer is rather that the Torah believes עד אחד period.
_________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב. The law is ביאה with a נידה and not waited seven days and טבלה בנהר או מעין gets מכות. Even though she is an ערווה it is still is only מלקות. If she is known to her neighbors as being a נידה he gets lashes. The reason is הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same הלכה the רמב''ם goes on to say this hard thing to understand: There is a case in which she is a סוטה. That is there was קינוי וסתירה warning and she was alone with the man her husband told her not to be alone with, and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed and then her husband who is a כהן slept with her. He gets מכות for sleeping with a זונה.
The ראב''ד says for טומאה, not זונה.
A זונה is generally translated prostitute but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with from either a לאו or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a כהן from the Torah itself,
Now in any case once there is a warning קינוי and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה and he can not sleep with her, and if a witness comes and says he saw her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the סוטה. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the רמב''ם come from that she is a זונה? as the ראב''ד so rightly asks.
רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few גמרות. Instead רב שך answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here רב שך suggests the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly with the beginning of the הלכה in which case the רמב''ם is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of נדה ב' ע''ב with the famous case of the מקוה there that lacks the volume ארבעים סאה. Here we have two חזקות to start with. חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף and we have a חזקה with a witness. What is the normal law of one witness and a חזקה? Is this the reason the רמב''ם gives her a חזקת זונה? Or what else might be going on here? I really do not know.
What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband. But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this, because the idea of one witness and קיניו וסתירה to make a חזקה does not seem to work here because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות, חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגוף. But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state. But in our case it is exactly the state now that is in doubt.
What I am getting at is that in נדה ב' ע''ב the גמרא only uses חזקת השת to go against חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא has another חזקה working with it. But here on the contrary we have two previous חזקות going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.
רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א: כ''ב. החוק הוא ביאה עם נידה ולא חיכה שבעה ימים וטבלה בנהר או מעין מקבל מכות. למרות שהיא מהווה ערווה זה עדיין רק מלקות. אם היא ידועה לשכניה כנידה הוא מקבל מלקות. הסיבה היא הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה. באותה הלכה רמב''ם ממשיך ואומר דבר קשה זה להבין: יש מקרה שבו היא היא סוטה. כלומר היה קינוי (אזהרה) וסתירה, ולאחר מכן עד אחד בא ואמר שראה את המעשה בפועל ולאחר מכן בעלה שהוא כהן שכב איתה. הוא מקבל מכות בגלל זונה.ראב''ד אומר עבור טומאה, לא זונה.זונה מתורגמת זונה בדרך כלל אבל זה לא מעביר את המשמעות בפועל.זונה היא אישה ששכבה עם מי שהיא אסורה לישון אתו בגלל לאו או איסור עשה ובכך אסורה לכהן מן התורה. עכשיו בכל מקרה פעם יש אזהרה קינוי וסתירה. היא בכל מקרה סוטה והוא לא יכול לישון איתה. ואם עד בא ואמר שראה את המעשה, אז היא לא יכולה לשתות את מי סוטה. אז היא אסורה בכל מקרה לבעלה אבל מהיכן הרעיון הזה של רמב''ם כי היא זונה? כמו ראב''ד בצדק שואל. רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם השיב שהיא הופכת זונה על ידי בעלה ששוכב איתה. תשובה זו היא ללא ספק אינה משביעת רצון ונוגדת כמה גמרות. במקום זה רב שך עונה תשובה הרבה יותר טובה. כלומר עד אחד בדרך כלל הוא נאמן באיסורים. זוהי ההצהרה המפורסמת עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אז אנחנו בדרך כלל מאמינים עד אחד במקרה כזה אלא שכאן האישה נשואה ובמצב כזה אנחנו לא מאמינים לעד אחד. אבל כאן רב שך מציע ששילוב של קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד עושה חזקה. וזה מתאימן באופן מושלם עם תחילת ההלכה במקרה שהרמב''ם מדבר על חזקה. מה שאני חושב הוא כי כאן יש לנו מקרה דומה לתחילת נדה ב' ע''ב עם המקרה המפורסם של מקוה שהוא חסר את נפח ארבעים סאה. כאן עם סוטה יש לנו שתי חזקות. חזקת כשרות ואת חזקת הגוף ויש גם עד עד. האם זו הסיבה שרמב''ם נותן לה חזקת זונה? או מה עוד יכול להיות קורה כאן? אני באמת לא יודע. מה שנראה לי נכון הוא זה. כי בדרך כלל אנחנו תמיד מאמינים עד אחד באיסורים. רק במקרה מסוים של אישה החיה עם בעלה אנחנו לא מאמינים עד אחד שיאסור עליה בעלה. אבל כאן אחרי שיש כבר קינוי וסתירה אנחנו כבר לא רוצים לנהוג לפנים משורת הדין, ונשוב לכלל המקורי של עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אני גם חושב כי עד אחד וקינוי וסתירה אינה עושה חזקה. לא נראה שזה עובד כאן, כי גם אם זה יעבוד, זה יהיה הולך נגד השתי חזקות אחרות, חזקת כשרות וחזקה הגןף. אבל גם כאן לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקת השתא של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומרת שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע למצב קודם. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק השאלה,המצב עכשיו מוטל בספק. מה שאני מנסה לומר כי נדה ב' ע''ב הגמרא רק משתמשת עם חזקת השתא ללכת נגד חזקא מעיקרא אם לחזקת דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עמה. אבל כאן להפך, יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות שהולכות נגד חזקת השתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את האיזה כוודאי זונה על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה. אבל גם שם לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקה עכשיו של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומר שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע להקים מדינה קודמת. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק המדינה עכשיו מוטלת בספק. מה אני מנסה לומר כי נדתי ב 'ע''ב גמרא רק משתמש חזק השת ללכת נגד חזקת מעיקרא אם חזק דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עם זה. אבל כאן להפך יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות הולכות נגד חזקת דהשתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב 'ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את זה מובהק על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה.
[On a side note I think in general the law is like Rabainu Tam that Shabat starts 72 minutes after sunset but that is only of you go by the 18 minute "mil". A 24 minute mil puts the night at 96 minutes after sunset. And the disciple of Rabbainu Tam goes Eliezer from Mitz goes by five mil, not four mil which means 2 hours.
I had to write that essay fast before Shabat started. In any case I hope it is clear that my difference with Rav Shach is very minor. I basically accept his answer, but with slight twist.Instead of "Hazaka" I go with the idea of "one witness is believed.' And for all I know this might have been exactly what he was getting at.
A Sota (unfaithful wife) is a woman who was warned by her husband not to be alone with a certain man, and she was alone with him after that. She drinks the water as mentioned in the book of Numbers right before the section on being a Nazir. At that before she drinks the waters she is forbidden to her husband. If a witness says he saw her sleep with that other man, then she does not drink the waters and must be divorced. [Almost anything can cause her not to drink. It does not have to be a witness. Even a bird flying by that says she was unfaithful.]
Here the Rambam deals with the question is she was warned and was alone and a witness says he saw her with the other man in the act and her husband is a kohen from the seed of Aaron the high priest and her husband did sleep with her after that.
I wanted to share some thoughts about a law in the Rambam. (הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב) Sleeping with a woman who has seen blood and not waited seven days and gone down to to the river gets lashes. Even though it is ערווה it is still is only lashes. If she is known to her neighbors as being a nida (seeing blood) he also gets lashes. The reason: the Rambam uses the words הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same Halacha the Rambam goes on to say this hard thing to understand: She is a Sota (There was קינוי וסתירה [warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with] and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed (she slept with another man -not her husband) and then her husband who is a Kohen sleeps with her, he gets lashes for sleeping with a זונה.
The Raavad says for טומאה not זונה.
A "Zona" זונה is generally translated prostitute but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with from either a לאו negative commandment or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a kohen from the Torah itself,
Now in any case once there is a warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה and he can not sleep with her and if a witness comes ad says he say her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the Sota. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the Rambam come from that she is a זונה? --as the Raavad so rightly asks.Here we believe the one witness so the lashes have to be because of טומאה not זונה
Reb Chaim Soloveitchik answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few Gemaras [like קידושין דף ע''ז] There it says a kohen that sleeps with his sister makes her a זונה. If he sleeps with her again he makes her a חללה. Thus we see the act that makes her a זונה does not confer that status until after the act.] Rav Shach answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here Rav Shach suggest the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly with the beginning of the halacah in which case the Rambam is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of Nida with the famous case of the Mikve there that lacks the volume 40 Seah. Here we have a חזקה to start with,- חזקת כשרות which means חזקת הגוף
What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband. But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this because the idea of עד אחד and קיניו וסתירה to make a חזקה does not seem to work here, because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגןף. But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state.
What I am getting at is that in Nida the Gemara only uses חזקת השתא to go against חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא has another חזקה working with it. But here we have a previous חזקה going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in Nida page 2 Tosphot says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.
After writing the above essay I noticed that Rav Shach might be meaning what my answer is.That it is simply a case of believing one witness.
Now even later I think that Rav Shach did not mean my answer. He specially mention חזקה/ And my answer is rather that the Torah believes עד אחד period.
_________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב. The law is ביאה with a נידה and not waited seven days and טבלה בנהר או מעין gets מכות. Even though she is an ערווה it is still is only מלקות. If she is known to her neighbors as being a נידה he gets lashes. The reason is הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same הלכה the רמב''ם goes on to say this hard thing to understand: There is a case in which she is a סוטה. That is there was קינוי וסתירה warning and she was alone with the man her husband told her not to be alone with, and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed and then her husband who is a כהן slept with her. He gets מכות for sleeping with a זונה.
The ראב''ד says for טומאה, not זונה.
A זונה is generally translated prostitute but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with from either a לאו or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a כהן from the Torah itself,
Now in any case once there is a warning קינוי and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה and he can not sleep with her, and if a witness comes and says he saw her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the סוטה. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the רמב''ם come from that she is a זונה? as the ראב''ד so rightly asks.
רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few גמרות. Instead רב שך answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here רב שך suggests the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly with the beginning of the הלכה in which case the רמב''ם is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of נדה ב' ע''ב with the famous case of the מקוה there that lacks the volume ארבעים סאה. Here we have two חזקות to start with. חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף and we have a חזקה with a witness. What is the normal law of one witness and a חזקה? Is this the reason the רמב''ם gives her a חזקת זונה? Or what else might be going on here? I really do not know.
What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband. But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this, because the idea of one witness and קיניו וסתירה to make a חזקה does not seem to work here because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות, חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגוף. But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state. But in our case it is exactly the state now that is in doubt.
What I am getting at is that in נדה ב' ע''ב the גמרא only uses חזקת השת to go against חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא has another חזקה working with it. But here on the contrary we have two previous חזקות going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.
רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א: כ''ב. החוק הוא ביאה עם נידה ולא חיכה שבעה ימים וטבלה בנהר או מעין מקבל מכות. למרות שהיא מהווה ערווה זה עדיין רק מלקות. אם היא ידועה לשכניה כנידה הוא מקבל מלקות. הסיבה היא הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה. באותה הלכה רמב''ם ממשיך ואומר דבר קשה זה להבין: יש מקרה שבו היא היא סוטה. כלומר היה קינוי (אזהרה) וסתירה, ולאחר מכן עד אחד בא ואמר שראה את המעשה בפועל ולאחר מכן בעלה שהוא כהן שכב איתה. הוא מקבל מכות בגלל זונה.ראב''ד אומר עבור טומאה, לא זונה.זונה מתורגמת זונה בדרך כלל אבל זה לא מעביר את המשמעות בפועל.זונה היא אישה ששכבה עם מי שהיא אסורה לישון אתו בגלל לאו או איסור עשה ובכך אסורה לכהן מן התורה. עכשיו בכל מקרה פעם יש אזהרה קינוי וסתירה. היא בכל מקרה סוטה והוא לא יכול לישון איתה. ואם עד בא ואמר שראה את המעשה, אז היא לא יכולה לשתות את מי סוטה. אז היא אסורה בכל מקרה לבעלה אבל מהיכן הרעיון הזה של רמב''ם כי היא זונה? כמו ראב''ד בצדק שואל. רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם השיב שהיא הופכת זונה על ידי בעלה ששוכב איתה. תשובה זו היא ללא ספק אינה משביעת רצון ונוגדת כמה גמרות. במקום זה רב שך עונה תשובה הרבה יותר טובה. כלומר עד אחד בדרך כלל הוא נאמן באיסורים. זוהי ההצהרה המפורסמת עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אז אנחנו בדרך כלל מאמינים עד אחד במקרה כזה אלא שכאן האישה נשואה ובמצב כזה אנחנו לא מאמינים לעד אחד. אבל כאן רב שך מציע ששילוב של קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד עושה חזקה. וזה מתאימן באופן מושלם עם תחילת ההלכה במקרה שהרמב''ם מדבר על חזקה. מה שאני חושב הוא כי כאן יש לנו מקרה דומה לתחילת נדה ב' ע''ב עם המקרה המפורסם של מקוה שהוא חסר את נפח ארבעים סאה. כאן עם סוטה יש לנו שתי חזקות. חזקת כשרות ואת חזקת הגוף ויש גם עד עד. האם זו הסיבה שרמב''ם נותן לה חזקת זונה? או מה עוד יכול להיות קורה כאן? אני באמת לא יודע. מה שנראה לי נכון הוא זה. כי בדרך כלל אנחנו תמיד מאמינים עד אחד באיסורים. רק במקרה מסוים של אישה החיה עם בעלה אנחנו לא מאמינים עד אחד שיאסור עליה בעלה. אבל כאן אחרי שיש כבר קינוי וסתירה אנחנו כבר לא רוצים לנהוג לפנים משורת הדין, ונשוב לכלל המקורי של עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אני גם חושב כי עד אחד וקינוי וסתירה אינה עושה חזקה. לא נראה שזה עובד כאן, כי גם אם זה יעבוד, זה יהיה הולך נגד השתי חזקות אחרות, חזקת כשרות וחזקה הגןף. אבל גם כאן לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקת השתא של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומרת שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע למצב קודם. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק השאלה,המצב עכשיו מוטל בספק. מה שאני מנסה לומר כי נדה ב' ע''ב הגמרא רק משתמשת עם חזקת השתא ללכת נגד חזקא מעיקרא אם לחזקת דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עמה. אבל כאן להפך, יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות שהולכות נגד חזקת השתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את האיזה כוודאי זונה על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה. אבל גם שם לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקה עכשיו של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומר שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע להקים מדינה קודמת. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק המדינה עכשיו מוטלת בספק. מה אני מנסה לומר כי נדתי ב 'ע''ב גמרא רק משתמש חזק השת ללכת נגד חזקת מעיקרא אם חזק דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עם זה. אבל כאן להפך יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות הולכות נגד חזקת דהשתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב 'ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את זה מובהק על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה.
[On a side note I think in general the law is like Rabainu Tam that Shabat starts 72 minutes after sunset but that is only of you go by the 18 minute "mil". A 24 minute mil puts the night at 96 minutes after sunset. And the disciple of Rabbainu Tam goes Eliezer from Mitz goes by five mil, not four mil which means 2 hours.
I had to write that essay fast before Shabat started. In any case I hope it is clear that my difference with Rav Shach is very minor. I basically accept his answer, but with slight twist.Instead of "Hazaka" I go with the idea of "one witness is believed.' And for all I know this might have been exactly what he was getting at.
16.2.17
The religious world is a mess as is well known and yet it came as a shock to me to realize this.
I was really in love heads over heels in love with Torah in the most powerful way possible. But it was like getting a bucket of ice cold water poured over my head to realize how corrupt and dishonest and unholy and unclean the religious world is. The world that claims to be keeping the Torah is not the same as the people that actually keep the Torah.
If the authentic Lithuanian yeshivas are overly cautious about whom they let in their doors it is because they have been burnt too many times and thus err on the side of caution. [Of course the trouble is they end up most often throwing out the sincere people and leaving the hypocrites that have rich parents. Still I think it is obvious that the religious world needs a thorough Chametz cleaning. Throw out every single last bit of chametz leaven is my recommendation.
I was really in love heads over heels in love with Torah in the most powerful way possible. But it was like getting a bucket of ice cold water poured over my head to realize how corrupt and dishonest and unholy and unclean the religious world is. The world that claims to be keeping the Torah is not the same as the people that actually keep the Torah.
If the authentic Lithuanian yeshivas are overly cautious about whom they let in their doors it is because they have been burnt too many times and thus err on the side of caution. [Of course the trouble is they end up most often throwing out the sincere people and leaving the hypocrites that have rich parents. Still I think it is obvious that the religious world needs a thorough Chametz cleaning. Throw out every single last bit of chametz leaven is my recommendation.
15.2.17
Musar movement and Reb Chaim Soloveitchik
I think you can see from the coolness of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and the Chazon Ish towards the Musar movement (Ethics) a kind of unvoiced criticism towards the whole thing. People are eager to jump on any kind of positive statement they or anyone else made about Musar (Ethics) but no one really knows what was the reason for their coolness.
We know from all the books of Musar from the Rishonim, and especially from the Guide for the Perplexed about the importance of good character traits. So no one is doubting that. Rather their question was, "How effective is learning lots of Musar every day in terms of correcting bad character traits?"
I am pretty sure they were not the only ones to question this. Almost anyone who has had any experience with any modern day mashgiach [spiritual adviser] always walks away wondering, "If that is the result of Musar, then what good is it?'' (I can at least say that I have asked myself this question many times.)
For the last few days, I have been wondering about a kind of combination between learning Musar and outdoor skills and survival skills. We already know the entire purpose of the creation of the Boy Scouts was to teach young men good character. And to a large degree it was effective (in the distant past).
I suggest to combine both approaches, Reb Israel Salanter and the Boy Scouts. [My parents encouraged me and my younger brother to go to the Boy Scouts, but we never got very far. I was anyway in those days dealing with school work and other kinds of extra curricular activities and studies. And I had to walk home after school which was a long hike every day. I simply did not have the energy for everything. And I have heard that nowadays teachers assign a lot more homework that they did in my days.
In any case, for health my feeling is there is nothing quite as good as fresh air, sunshine and lots of hiking. And basic thing about camping and survival skills and learning to work with other as team is important for character building--not just learning about good character from books.
We know from all the books of Musar from the Rishonim, and especially from the Guide for the Perplexed about the importance of good character traits. So no one is doubting that. Rather their question was, "How effective is learning lots of Musar every day in terms of correcting bad character traits?"
I am pretty sure they were not the only ones to question this. Almost anyone who has had any experience with any modern day mashgiach [spiritual adviser] always walks away wondering, "If that is the result of Musar, then what good is it?'' (I can at least say that I have asked myself this question many times.)
For the last few days, I have been wondering about a kind of combination between learning Musar and outdoor skills and survival skills. We already know the entire purpose of the creation of the Boy Scouts was to teach young men good character. And to a large degree it was effective (in the distant past).
I suggest to combine both approaches, Reb Israel Salanter and the Boy Scouts. [My parents encouraged me and my younger brother to go to the Boy Scouts, but we never got very far. I was anyway in those days dealing with school work and other kinds of extra curricular activities and studies. And I had to walk home after school which was a long hike every day. I simply did not have the energy for everything. And I have heard that nowadays teachers assign a lot more homework that they did in my days.
In any case, for health my feeling is there is nothing quite as good as fresh air, sunshine and lots of hiking. And basic thing about camping and survival skills and learning to work with other as team is important for character building--not just learning about good character from books.
Western Civilization
To my mind it is clear the the basis is the Bible, Plato, Aristotle -as the basic bricks but the cement was Maimonides, Anselm, Aquinas. The reason I say this is that it is not at all trivial how the put the first three together, or even if it is possible at all. You can see the enormous amount of confusion in involved in this in history.
I should add that I do not think Christians have the right kind of understanding about what was going on with Jesus. However I do think they are right about the emphasis that they place on him.
I must have written about all this sometime in the past but I might as well repeat it just for information's sake.
Mainly after having studied the Ari {Isaac Luria} for a year or so in NY and then seeing and studying the writings of Reb Nachman the whole issue looks different to me than it does to Christians.
I never share my opinion because everyone is already set in their mind pro or con.
Son of Man is rather basic name for זעיר אנפין (Zeir Anpin the sephirah of Tiferet) and another possibility is it refers to יסוד יוסף (Sepherah of Foundation). There is no reason to assume anything more about it. Other people were considered to be unified with some sepherah of Aztilut (Emanation). For example, Avraham is considered to be unified with the sephirah of Kindness. And since the sephirot of Emanation are pure Godliness according to the Zohar thus all the seven shepards are one with G-d. [Avraham, Isaac, Yaakov, Moshe, Aaron, Joseph, David.][This however does not have anything to do with Divine Simplicity. God is not a composite and has no ingredients.] (Bava Sali said his son, Rav Meir Abuchatzeira, was a soul of Emanation.)
[The sephirot of the lower worlds the Zohar says are not Godliness.]
Picking wheat from standing sheaves that no longer need the soil is not forbidden on Shabat. Mixing ground also is not the same as kneading wheat--see the Rosh in Shabat. Washing hands before a meal is according to the Gemara in Chulin a good thing. מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה. "First water is a mitzvah, water in the middle of the meal is allowed, water after the meal is an obligation." Thus the idea that Jesus violated any mitzvah is not supported except by people that do not know the laws.
See the Recognitions and Homilies of Clement to see that Paul [code name Simon Magnus] was against Peter's and James's understanding of Jesus. And Paul's letters have become the consensus even though they are clearly not accurate, nor were they counted as Scripture by any of the early church fathers. (I do not remember the dates involved, but for anyone who wants this is easy to look up.)
I should add that I do not think Christians have the right kind of understanding about what was going on with Jesus. However I do think they are right about the emphasis that they place on him.
I must have written about all this sometime in the past but I might as well repeat it just for information's sake.
Mainly after having studied the Ari {Isaac Luria} for a year or so in NY and then seeing and studying the writings of Reb Nachman the whole issue looks different to me than it does to Christians.
I never share my opinion because everyone is already set in their mind pro or con.
Son of Man is rather basic name for זעיר אנפין (Zeir Anpin the sephirah of Tiferet) and another possibility is it refers to יסוד יוסף (Sepherah of Foundation). There is no reason to assume anything more about it. Other people were considered to be unified with some sepherah of Aztilut (Emanation). For example, Avraham is considered to be unified with the sephirah of Kindness. And since the sephirot of Emanation are pure Godliness according to the Zohar thus all the seven shepards are one with G-d. [Avraham, Isaac, Yaakov, Moshe, Aaron, Joseph, David.][This however does not have anything to do with Divine Simplicity. God is not a composite and has no ingredients.] (Bava Sali said his son, Rav Meir Abuchatzeira, was a soul of Emanation.)
[The sephirot of the lower worlds the Zohar says are not Godliness.]
Picking wheat from standing sheaves that no longer need the soil is not forbidden on Shabat. Mixing ground also is not the same as kneading wheat--see the Rosh in Shabat. Washing hands before a meal is according to the Gemara in Chulin a good thing. מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה. "First water is a mitzvah, water in the middle of the meal is allowed, water after the meal is an obligation." Thus the idea that Jesus violated any mitzvah is not supported except by people that do not know the laws.
See the Recognitions and Homilies of Clement to see that Paul [code name Simon Magnus] was against Peter's and James's understanding of Jesus. And Paul's letters have become the consensus even though they are clearly not accurate, nor were they counted as Scripture by any of the early church fathers. (I do not remember the dates involved, but for anyone who wants this is easy to look up.)
14.2.17
Bava Metzia 97B
Without the actual Gemara in front of me it is hard to write about this from memory. Still I think it is important to bring up the subject at least to remind myself and maybe others.
Tosphot in Bava Metzia brings up that famous phrase that I spilled tons of mega-bites on in my little booklet: "Even without Abyee, we have to say what Abyee said." That is,- that the law of Rav Yehuda in Bava Metzia 97b ברי עדיף (certainty is better) is of Shmuel. [In its own context in Ketuboth that means the law of Rav Yehuda comes from Shmuel. Eventually I settled on the idea that Tosphot means only it is the same law, not that it comes from Shmuel.]
The basic context in this:
Two people come to court. One says you owe me 200 zuz and the other says I do not know. Rav Yehuda says "Certainty wins"
In Bava Kama פרה שנגח an ox gored a cow that was pregnant and its calf is found next to it. We do not know what happened. Did the calf die from the goring or not? If memory serves me I think the owners of the ox were not there but the owner of the cow was and he says it was because of the goring. Shmuel said המוציא החבירו עליו הראיה One who takes money from another needs proof.
In Ketuboth a woman was found not be be virgin after she got married. She says she was raped after Kidushin but before the Chupa so she gets the full ketubah. The husband says it happened before the kidushin. Raban Gamliel says we believe her and Shmuel said the law is like Raban Gamliel.
Abyee said the law of Rav Yehuda comes from Shmuel.
Tosphot says even without Abyee we have to say what Abyee is saying.
Tosphot before that said Shmuel in Bava Kama does not believe the owner of the cow because his certainty is weak. He knows the owner was not there and so is not in a position to deny the events.
What I wanted to bring up about all this is the Tospot Rid (Isaiah from Trani) in Ketuboth 12b, He says the the events of Ketoboth and Bava Kama are almost identical. The certainty is weak and in both cases there is חזקת הגוף. חזקה מעיקראת חזקת בתולה וחזקת מעוברת
My question here is if the Tosphot Rid helps in any way to understand our Toshot in Bava Metzia 97?He is after all saying you can not learn from the case in Ketuboth because there is something different there. He does not say what is different. But perhaps what he means is that if we ignore all other factors and simply look at the plea of the woman who is certain perhaps that is what Abyee and Tosphot mean. ברי עדיף (certainty is better).
So what might be possible to say is that תוספות means that even without אביי we look at the fact that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) is the case in כתובות. That is, that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) has some strength as a טענה and that is all that תוספות means here also. That even without אביי we should say the law of רב יהודה is derived from שמואל
What I mean is if we take the תוספות רי''ד into account then we have to say that ברי עדיף over there in כתובות is not because of a חזקה but rather has strength on its own merits. We have to say this because in בבא קמא there is also a חזקה. So there is something about the ברי in כתובות that helps even if we do not know what other factors are involved.
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I think what you have to do here is to look at תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. There on the דף we have a מקווה that is lacking the ארבעים סאה volume. The גמרא uses חזקה דהשתא to push back חזקה מעיקרא but only with a צירוף of another חזקה. On the page תוספות there says either one could push back the time למפרע at least to make a doubt. Therefore in כתובות we believe her even though the חזקה דהשתא pushes back the time frame to before the קידושין. Therefore she is believed only because of ברי עדיף. There are other cases where we do go by חזקה מעיקרא like in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א where the גמרא says let give the calf to מרא קמא but that is because there is no חזקה דהשתא working against it.
Also in בבא קמא the fact of the cow having חזקת מעוברת has against it a חזקה דהשתא so it makes sense to say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה since there is חזקת ממון of the נתבע. Therefore , I think that our תוספות in בבא מציעא makes sense if we look at it in the light of תוספות in נדה That is the law of רב יהודה comes from שמאול even if we do not look at חזקות
אני חושב מה שאתה צריך לעשות כאן הוא להסתכל על תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. יש יש לנו מקווה שחסר הנפח של ארבעים סאה. הגמרא משתמשת עם חזקה דהשתא להדוף חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק עם צירוף של עוד חזקה. בדף הזה תוספות אומרים אפילו אחת מן החזקות יכולה להדוף את הזמן למפרע לפחות לעשות ספק. לכן בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה בגלל שחזקה דהשתא דוחפת בחזרה את מסגרת הזמן לפני הקידושין. לכן היא נאמנת רק בגלל ברי עדיף. ישנם מקרים אחרים שבהם אנחנו הולכים על ידי חזקה מעיקרא כמו בבא מציעא ק' ע''א שבו גמרא אומרת בואו לתת העגל למרא קמא אבל זה בגלל שאין חזקה דהשתא פועלת נגדה.גם בבא קמא בעובדה של הפרה יש חזקת מעוברת אבל יש נגדה חזקה דהשתא כך שזה הגיוני לומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה שכן יש חזקת ממון של נתבע. לכן, אני חושב שלנו תוספות שלנו בבבא מציעא צ''ז ע''ב הגיוני אם נסתכל על זה לאור תוספות בנדה. כך שהחוק של רב יהודה מגיע משמאול גם אם אנחנו לא מסתכלים חזקות.
My question here is if the Tosphot Rid helps in any way to understand our Toshot in Bava Metzia 97?He is after all saying you can not learn from the case in Ketuboth because there is something different there. He does not say what is different. But perhaps what he means is that if we ignore all other factors and simply look at the plea of the woman who is certain perhaps that is what Abyee and Tosphot mean. ברי עדיף (certainty is better).
So what might be possible to say is that תוספות means that even without אביי we look at the fact that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) is the case in כתובות. That is, that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) has some strength as a טענה and that is all that תוספות means here also. That even without אביי we should say the law of רב יהודה is derived from שמואל
What I mean is if we take the תוספות רי''ד into account then we have to say that ברי עדיף over there in כתובות is not because of a חזקה but rather has strength on its own merits. We have to say this because in בבא קמא there is also a חזקה. So there is something about the ברי in כתובות that helps even if we do not know what other factors are involved.
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I think what you have to do here is to look at תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. There on the דף we have a מקווה that is lacking the ארבעים סאה volume. The גמרא uses חזקה דהשתא to push back חזקה מעיקרא but only with a צירוף of another חזקה. On the page תוספות there says either one could push back the time למפרע at least to make a doubt. Therefore in כתובות we believe her even though the חזקה דהשתא pushes back the time frame to before the קידושין. Therefore she is believed only because of ברי עדיף. There are other cases where we do go by חזקה מעיקרא like in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א where the גמרא says let give the calf to מרא קמא but that is because there is no חזקה דהשתא working against it.
Also in בבא קמא the fact of the cow having חזקת מעוברת has against it a חזקה דהשתא so it makes sense to say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה since there is חזקת ממון of the נתבע. Therefore , I think that our תוספות in בבא מציעא makes sense if we look at it in the light of תוספות in נדה That is the law of רב יהודה comes from שמאול even if we do not look at חזקות
אני חושב מה שאתה צריך לעשות כאן הוא להסתכל על תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. יש יש לנו מקווה שחסר הנפח של ארבעים סאה. הגמרא משתמשת עם חזקה דהשתא להדוף חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק עם צירוף של עוד חזקה. בדף הזה תוספות אומרים אפילו אחת מן החזקות יכולה להדוף את הזמן למפרע לפחות לעשות ספק. לכן בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה בגלל שחזקה דהשתא דוחפת בחזרה את מסגרת הזמן לפני הקידושין. לכן היא נאמנת רק בגלל ברי עדיף. ישנם מקרים אחרים שבהם אנחנו הולכים על ידי חזקה מעיקרא כמו בבא מציעא ק' ע''א שבו גמרא אומרת בואו לתת העגל למרא קמא אבל זה בגלל שאין חזקה דהשתא פועלת נגדה.גם בבא קמא בעובדה של הפרה יש חזקת מעוברת אבל יש נגדה חזקה דהשתא כך שזה הגיוני לומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה שכן יש חזקת ממון של נתבע. לכן, אני חושב שלנו תוספות שלנו בבבא מציעא צ''ז ע''ב הגיוני אם נסתכל על זה לאור תוספות בנדה. כך שהחוק של רב יהודה מגיע משמאול גם אם אנחנו לא מסתכלים חזקות.
13.2.17
California
California used to be different. My Dad was there at Cal Tech for his master's degree and then joined the Air Force, the USAF (i.e. WWII). After the war he moved back to join aerospace stuff going on there. The USA was way behind the Soviets in everything related to space including Star Wars (Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI). So my Dad was asked to create a kind of laser communication device between satellites so the Soviets could not eavesdrop on our communications like they could with radio waves. There was a lot of good stuff going on in those days. It was a magnet for talent. The problem is that once it was successful it became a magnet for the wrong types. I knew some really talented people there and I think there still are some great things going on there in Stanford and Cal Tech.
12.2.17
The Rashbam in Bava Batra 175B
בבא מציעא ק' ע''א פרה נמכרה ויולדה ואנחנו לא יודעים מתי. אם לפני שהעסקה נחתמה, אז העגל שייך לבעליה הראשונים. אם לאחר שהעסקה נחתמה, העגל שייך לבעלים השניים. יש ויכוח בין רשב''ם ורבינו יצחק על המילה אלא. זוהי הגמרא: מדוע חזקת מרא קמא לא עוזרת? הגמרא משיבה ",אלא היא סומכוס." סומכוס מחזיק כסף בספק מחולק. כלומר, הגמרא זורקת את הרעיון כי העגל הוא בסמטה. במקום זה הוא ברשות של הבעלים השניים, ועדיין אין חזקת ממון משום המשנה היא כמו סומכוס. זו גרסה אחת. הגרסה האחרת משמיטה את "אלא". בבבא מציעא ק' ע''א לנו חזקא דהשתא יחד עם חזקת רשות. האם ניתן לומר כי תוספות ואת הרשב''ם הם בקו אחד עם דעותיהם במקום אחר? תוספות למעשה מעלה את השאלה הזו בטיעוניו נגד הרשב''ם בהתוספות השניה בדף.] הנושא המרכזי שאני רואה כאן הוא זה: כמה חזקה היא חזקה דהשתא? האם לחזקת השתא לבדה יש מספיק כח להפוך שאלה לספק ועם חזקה אחרת להפוך לודאות? או רק עם עוד חזקא היא יכולה להפוך לספק כפי שהיא עושה נדה ב' ע''ב? הסיבה שאני מזכיר זאת היא כי בבבא מציעא ק 'ע''א יש ויכוח בין הרשב''ם ותוספות אם שמא עם חזקת הרשות מחליטה את הבעלות על העגל או לא. הגמרא המלאה היא זה ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא? בסימטא. (בוא נראה לאן העגל הוא עכשיו? תשובה: זה בסמטה.) אז בואו פשוט לתת אותו לבעל הראשון? זה סומכוס, (או ליתר דיוק זה סומכוס). מה חשוב לשים לב הוא לחכמים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זה אומר שאם זה ברשות של הבעלים השניים אז זה הולך להם אפילו נגד מרא קמא.
רשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב מחזיק גט עם עדים על זה אבל בלי זמן הוא כשר. לא כמו רמב''ם ולא רמב''ן. הדרך שרב שך מבין את זאת היא על ידי נדה ב' ע''ב שבו יש לנו חזקה דהשתא בצירוף עוד חזקה שיכולה לנצח בחלקו חזקה מעיקרא לעשות ספק. כלומר: לעשות ספק כנגד חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק בעזרת חזקה אחרת. לכן במקרה שלנו של גט הכל טוב. אין בעיה של חיפוי על בת אחותו כי ללא זמן על הגט, אין סיבה לדחוף את הזמן של המסמך אחורה בזמן. זה ברור. אבל תוספות אומר נדה ב' ע''ב כי גם לחזקה דהשתא יש כח להביס חזקה מעיקרא לפחות להפוך אותו מצב לספק. אז הבעיה היא זו. הרשב''ם בבבא מציעא מחזיק חזקת רשות יכולה לקבוע את החוק אפילו לסומכוס. לפיכך חזקה היכן העגל הוא עכשיו יכולה להביס חזקת מרא קמא אפילו לסומכוס. עכשיו ברור חזקת רשות אינה חלשה כמו חזקת השתא, אבל הנקודה היא כי כאן יש משהו שמחליש את חזקת הממון, וזו חזקת מרא קמא. הכל יהיה בסדר אם נוכל להפוך את הדעות. אחרי הכל השאלה היחידה היא מה עשוי סומכוס להחזיק לגבי רשות של הבעלים השניים. האם חזקה זו מספיקה לקחת את כל הספקות ולזרוק אותן, ואת הבעלים השניים בכך מקבלים את העגל? רשב''ם מחזיק כן ולכן חזקא דהשתא היא חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. תוספות מחזיק שלא כן הוא. לכן חזקא דהשתא אינה חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. זה נראה יותר כמו הדרך רב שך מבין את הרשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב כי גמרא בנדה ב' ע''ב מחזיקה שחזקה דהשתא צריכה עזרה איתה כדי להיות יעילה. אני לא אומר שום דבר על חכמים. החכמים ממילא אומרים כי חזקת הרשות עובדת. כל מה שאני אומר הוא שהעובדה שחזקת רשות חלשה כאן בבא מציעא ק' ע''א כי יש חזקת מרא קמא נגדה זה נותן לסומכוס את היכולת להגיד שהיא חלשה מספיקה לומר חולקים. אחרי הכל אין ויכוח בין חכנים וסומכוס על מה הן חזקות אלא אם הן חזקות מספיק כדי לקבוע את הבעלות.
The Rashbam in Bava Batra 175B hold the divorce with witnesses on it but no time is Kosher. [Not like the Rambam nor the Ramban.] The way Rav Shach understands this is by Nida 2b where we have a state now that at least can defeat in part to make a doubt a state that comes before, but only with the help of some other state. Therefore in our case of the divorce everything is good. There is no problem of the daughter of his sister because with no time in the document there is not reason to push the time backwards. That much is clear. But Tosphot says right there in Nida 2b that either the state now or a different state can defeat a previous state to at least make it doubtful.
So my problem is this. The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 100b holds חזקת רשות can determine the law . Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא .
[That is why the Gemara says Let's see where it is. That would answer all questions. Then it answers it is in an alley. Then it asks let's give it to the first owner. Answer the Mishna is Sumchos, But that answer implies we leave it in the alley. So if there was חזקת רשות that would answer the question.]
Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון- but the point is that here there is something that weakens the חזקת רשות and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does Sumchos hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות belay all doubts and the second owner thus gets the calf? The Rashbam holds yes and so the חזקא רשות is strong enough to him to determine ownership. Tosphot holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way Rav Shach understands the Rashbam in Bava Batra 175 that the gemara in Nida holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.
I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the sages. The sages in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in Bava Metzia 100b because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to Sumchos some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the sages and Sumchos about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.
The answer here is this: חזקת השתא works with חזקת מרא קמא. The reason is it says the state of affairs now we push back in time. Thus if the cow has given birth we say it gave birth as far back in time as possible. So the Rashbam is being consistent that two two חזקות together are effective to give the calf to the first owner. So we would have to say the mishna is like Sumchos
התשובה כאן היא זו. חזקת השתא עובדת עם חזקת מרא קמא. הסיבה היא שהיא אומרת את מצב העניינים עכשיו אנחנו דוחפים אחורה בזמן. לכן אם פרה הולידה, אנחנו אומרים הולידה ככל אחורה בזמן ככל האפשר. אז רשב''ם אומר ששתי החזקות יחד יעילות לתת וולד לבעל הראשון. אז היינו צריכים לומר המשנה היא כמו סומכוס.
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The רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב holds the גט with עדים on it but no זמן is כשר. Not like the רמב''ם nor the רמב''ן. The way רב שך understands this is by נדה ב' ע''ב where we have a חזקה דהשתא that can defeat in part a חזקה מעיקרא. That is: to make a doubt against a חזקה מעיקרא , but only with the help of some other חזקה. Therefore in our case of the גט everything is good. There is no problem of the חיפוי על בת אחותו because with no זמן in the גט there is no reason to push the time of the document back in time. That much is clear. But תוספות says in נדה ב' ע''ב that either the חזקת השתא or a different חזקה can defeat a חזקה מעיקרא to at least make it a ספק.
So my problem is this. The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא ק' ע'א holds חזקת רשות can determine the law even to סומכוס. Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.
Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון, but the point is that here there is something that weakens the חזקת ממון and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does סומכוס hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות take away all doubts and the second owner thus gets the calf? The רשב''ם holds yes and so the חזקא שהשתא is strong enough to him to determine ownership. תוספות holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way רב שך understands the רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב that the גמרא in נדה ב' ע''ב holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.
I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the חכמים. The חכמים in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to סומכוס some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the חכמים and סומכוס about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.
[What I am saying here is really an amazingly simple thing. I'm sorry if it sounds complicated. All I am doing is noticing what Rav Shach said about Tosphot and the Rashbam in Gitin (Rambam Hilchot Gitin ch 1 halacha 25) and taking note that that is the reverse of their opinions in Bava Metzia as Tosphot himself points out there that he is going with the idea of חזקא דהשתא needs help to defeat חזקא מעיקרא --just like the Gemara in Nida sounds like. The trouble is in Nida Tosphot says something different. Now Tosphot is a lot of different people so one Tosphot does not have to agree with the other. But with the Rashbam this is curious. Take a look at Tosphot ב''מ ק'ע''א the second one and you will see he raises this exact issue.
[I actually do not remember what Tosphot says. All I know is he brings up the issue in a way that is not obvious at first sight. I hope someday to have a Bava Metzia to be able to check on this. ]
The only thing that I have to add to this that really is anything new is just the question of how this all relates to how I already dealt with this argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot in my little book on Bava Metzia. I sort of remember that I brought the idea of Naphtali Troup is חזקת מרא קמא Is like חזקת איסור and also there is an argument how the second Tosphot relates to the first between the Maharshal and the Maharsha. These things might shed some light on our problem here.
I
רשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב מחזיק גט עם עדים על זה אבל בלי זמן הוא כשר. לא כמו רמב''ם ולא רמב''ן. הדרך שרב שך מבין את זאת היא על ידי נדה ב' ע''ב שבו יש לנו חזקה דהשתא בצירוף עוד חזקה שיכולה לנצח בחלקו חזקה מעיקרא לעשות ספק. כלומר: לעשות ספק כנגד חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק בעזרת חזקה אחרת. לכן במקרה שלנו של גט הכל טוב. אין בעיה של חיפוי על בת אחותו כי ללא זמן על הגט, אין סיבה לדחוף את הזמן של המסמך אחורה בזמן. זה ברור. אבל תוספות אומר נדה ב' ע''ב כי גם לחזקה דהשתא יש כח להביס חזקה מעיקרא לפחות להפוך אותו מצב לספק. אז הבעיה היא זו. הרשב''ם בבבא מציעא מחזיק חזקת רשות יכולה לקבוע את החוק אפילו לסומכוס. לפיכך חזקה היכן העגל הוא עכשיו יכולה להביס חזקת מרא קמא אפילו לסומכוס. עכשיו ברור חזקת רשות אינה חלשה כמו חזקת השתא, אבל הנקודה היא כי כאן יש משהו שמחליש את חזקת הממון, וזו חזקת מרא קמא. הכל יהיה בסדר אם נוכל להפוך את הדעות. אחרי הכל השאלה היחידה היא מה עשוי סומכוס להחזיק לגבי רשות של הבעלים השניים. האם חזקה זו מספיקה לקחת את כל הספקות ולזרוק אותן, ואת הבעלים השניים בכך מקבלים את העגל? רשב''ם מחזיק כן ולכן חזקא דהשתא היא חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. תוספות מחזיק שלא כן הוא. לכן חזקא דהשתא אינה חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. זה נראה יותר כמו הדרך רב שך מבין את הרשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב כי גמרא בנדה ב' ע''ב מחזיקה שחזקה דהשתא צריכה עזרה איתה כדי להיות יעילה. אני לא אומר שום דבר על חכמים. החכמים ממילא אומרים כי חזקת הרשות עובדת. כל מה שאני אומר הוא שהעובדה שחזקת רשות חלשה כאן בבא מציעא ק' ע''א כי יש חזקת מרא קמא נגדה זה נותן לסומכוס את היכולת להגיד שהיא חלשה מספיקה לומר חולקים. אחרי הכל אין ויכוח בין חכנים וסומכוס על מה הן חזקות אלא אם הן חזקות מספיק כדי לקבוע את הבעלות.
The Rashbam in Bava Batra 175B hold the divorce with witnesses on it but no time is Kosher. [Not like the Rambam nor the Ramban.] The way Rav Shach understands this is by Nida 2b where we have a state now that at least can defeat in part to make a doubt a state that comes before, but only with the help of some other state. Therefore in our case of the divorce everything is good. There is no problem of the daughter of his sister because with no time in the document there is not reason to push the time backwards. That much is clear. But Tosphot says right there in Nida 2b that either the state now or a different state can defeat a previous state to at least make it doubtful.
So my problem is this. The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 100b holds חזקת רשות can determine the law . Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא .
[That is why the Gemara says Let's see where it is. That would answer all questions. Then it answers it is in an alley. Then it asks let's give it to the first owner. Answer the Mishna is Sumchos, But that answer implies we leave it in the alley. So if there was חזקת רשות that would answer the question.]
Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון- but the point is that here there is something that weakens the חזקת רשות and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does Sumchos hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות belay all doubts and the second owner thus gets the calf? The Rashbam holds yes and so the חזקא רשות is strong enough to him to determine ownership. Tosphot holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way Rav Shach understands the Rashbam in Bava Batra 175 that the gemara in Nida holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.
I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the sages. The sages in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in Bava Metzia 100b because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to Sumchos some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the sages and Sumchos about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.
The answer here is this: חזקת השתא works with חזקת מרא קמא. The reason is it says the state of affairs now we push back in time. Thus if the cow has given birth we say it gave birth as far back in time as possible. So the Rashbam is being consistent that two two חזקות together are effective to give the calf to the first owner. So we would have to say the mishna is like Sumchos
התשובה כאן היא זו. חזקת השתא עובדת עם חזקת מרא קמא. הסיבה היא שהיא אומרת את מצב העניינים עכשיו אנחנו דוחפים אחורה בזמן. לכן אם פרה הולידה, אנחנו אומרים הולידה ככל אחורה בזמן ככל האפשר. אז רשב''ם אומר ששתי החזקות יחד יעילות לתת וולד לבעל הראשון. אז היינו צריכים לומר המשנה היא כמו סומכוס.
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The רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב holds the גט with עדים on it but no זמן is כשר. Not like the רמב''ם nor the רמב''ן. The way רב שך understands this is by נדה ב' ע''ב where we have a חזקה דהשתא that can defeat in part a חזקה מעיקרא. That is: to make a doubt against a חזקה מעיקרא , but only with the help of some other חזקה. Therefore in our case of the גט everything is good. There is no problem of the חיפוי על בת אחותו because with no זמן in the גט there is no reason to push the time of the document back in time. That much is clear. But תוספות says in נדה ב' ע''ב that either the חזקת השתא or a different חזקה can defeat a חזקה מעיקרא to at least make it a ספק.
So my problem is this. The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא ק' ע'א holds חזקת רשות can determine the law even to סומכוס. Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.
Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון, but the point is that here there is something that weakens the חזקת ממון and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does סומכוס hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות take away all doubts and the second owner thus gets the calf? The רשב''ם holds yes and so the חזקא שהשתא is strong enough to him to determine ownership. תוספות holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way רב שך understands the רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב that the גמרא in נדה ב' ע''ב holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.
I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the חכמים. The חכמים in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to סומכוס some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the חכמים and סומכוס about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.
[What I am saying here is really an amazingly simple thing. I'm sorry if it sounds complicated. All I am doing is noticing what Rav Shach said about Tosphot and the Rashbam in Gitin (Rambam Hilchot Gitin ch 1 halacha 25) and taking note that that is the reverse of their opinions in Bava Metzia as Tosphot himself points out there that he is going with the idea of חזקא דהשתא needs help to defeat חזקא מעיקרא --just like the Gemara in Nida sounds like. The trouble is in Nida Tosphot says something different. Now Tosphot is a lot of different people so one Tosphot does not have to agree with the other. But with the Rashbam this is curious. Take a look at Tosphot ב''מ ק'ע''א the second one and you will see he raises this exact issue.
[I actually do not remember what Tosphot says. All I know is he brings up the issue in a way that is not obvious at first sight. I hope someday to have a Bava Metzia to be able to check on this. ]
The only thing that I have to add to this that really is anything new is just the question of how this all relates to how I already dealt with this argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot in my little book on Bava Metzia. I sort of remember that I brought the idea of Naphtali Troup is חזקת מרא קמא Is like חזקת איסור and also there is an argument how the second Tosphot relates to the first between the Maharshal and the Maharsha. These things might shed some light on our problem here.
I
Bava Metzia 100A, the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot in the light of Rav Shach.
Bava Metzia page 100a.
A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was concluded, the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was concluded the calf belongs to the second owner.
There is an argument between the Rashbam and Rabbainu Isaac about the the word אלא "rather". That is the Gemara asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא [possession of the first owner] [first owner] not help? The Gemara answers, "rather it is Sumchos." [Sumchos holds money in doubt is divided], That means the Gemara throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון [assumption that since it is in the property of the second owner we give it to him] because the Mishna is like Sumchos.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא ("rather"). Then this is what the Gemara says: "Why does מרא קמא [first owner] not help? Because it is Sumchos. That is: it is in an alley, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it-- even against חזקת מרא קמא even to Sumchos. So we have חזקה מעיקרא that pushes the time forwards along with חזקת רשות thus it belongs to the second fellow. What works against this is חזקת השתא since it gave birth we push that back to time and that helps חזקת מרא קמא
What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא [what is the present state of affairs we push backwards as far as possible -like a mikve that lacks 40 S'eah We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured.]. In the beginning of Nida we have חזקא דהשתא can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקא. There is another argument between Tosphot and the Rashbam if that is only in that case of a mikve or if it is a general rule.[Rav Shach mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the Rambam.] Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.
In Bava Metzia pg.100 we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות. It is possible I think to say that Tosphot and the Rashbam are being consistent in Bava Metzia with their opinions in Nida. [Tosphot in Bava Metzia actually brings this up in his arguments against the Rashbam in the second Tosphot on the page.]
The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא Just make a doubt a it does in Nida?
The reason I mention this is that on the page [BM 100] there is an argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot if שמא with חזקת רשות gets the calf or not.
Appendix: The full Gemara is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is Sumchos. [Or ''Rather it is Sumchos."] "It is Sumchos" means we leave it in the alley and there מרא קמא would have answered the question but if it had been in the רשות the the second fellow he would now own the calf even to Sumchos. If the Gemara reads "rather it is Sumchos" that means we reject even the idea of the alley. So to answer the first question Let's see where it is? we answer it is Sumchos and that is why even in the domain of the second fellow, he would not own the calf.
What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא ( the first owner who we know owned it at a certain point in time.)
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בבא מציעא ק' ע''א A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was signed and sealed, then the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was signed, the calf belongs to the second owner.
There is an argument between the רשב''ם and רבינו יצחק about the the word אלא "rather". That is the גמרא asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא not help? The גמרא answers, "rather it is סומכוס." סומכוס holds money in doubt is divided. That means the גמרא throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון because the משנה is like סומכוס.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא. Then this is what the גמרא says: "Why does מרא קמא not help? Because it is סומכוס. That is: it is in an סימטא, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it, even against חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.
What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא like a מקוה that lacks ארבעים סאה. We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured. In the beginning of נדה we have חזקא דהשתא can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקה. There is another argument between תוסות and the רשב''ם if that is only in that case of a מקוה or if it is a general rule. רב שך mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the רמב''ם. Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.
In בבא מציעא ק' ע''א we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות. Is it possible to say that תוספות and the רשב''ם are being consistent in בבא מציעא with their opinions elsewhere? תוספות in actually brings this up in his arguments against the רשב''ם in the second תוספות on the page.]
The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא just make a doubt as it does in נדה ב' ע''ב?
The reason I mention this is that on the page בבא מציעא ק' ע''א there is an argument between the רשב''ם and תוספות if שמא with חזקת רשות gets the calf or not.
The full גמרא is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is סומכוס. Or rather it is סומכוס.
What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא
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בבא מציעא ק' ע''א פרה נמכרה ויולדה ואנחנו לא יודעים מתי. אם לפני שהעסקה נחתמה וחתומה, אז העגל שייך לבעליה הראשונים. אם לאחר שהעסקה נחתמה, העגל שייך לבעלים השניים. יש ויכוח בין רשב''ם ורבינו יצחק על המילה אלא. זוהי הגמרא: מדוע חזקת מרא קמא לא עוזרת? הגמרא משיבה ",אלא היא סומכוס." סומכוס מחזיק כסף בספק מחולק. כלומר, הגמרא זורקת את הרעיון כי העגל הוא בסמטה. במקום זה הוא ברשות של הבעלים השניים, ועדיין אין חזקת ממון משום המשנה היא כמו סומכוס. זו גרסה אחת. הגרסה האחרת משמיטה את "אלא". בבבא מציעא ק' ע''א לנו חזקא דהשתא יחד עם חזקת רשות. האם ניתן לומר כי תוספות ואת הרשב''ם הם בקו אחד עם דעותיהם במקום אחר? תוספות למעשה מעלה את השאלה הזו בטיעוניו נגד הרשב''ם בהתוספות השניה בדף.] הנושא המרכזי שאני רואה כאן הוא זה: כמה חזקה היא חזקה דהשתא? האם לחזקת השתא לבדה יש מספיק כח להפוך שאלה לספק ועם חזקה אחרת להפוך לודאות? או רק עם עוד חזקא היא יכולה להפוך לספק כפי שהיא עושה נדה ב' ע''ב? הסיבה שאני מזכיר זאת היא כי בבבא מציעא ק 'ע''א יש ויכוח בין הרשב''ם ותוספות אם שמא עם חזקת הרשות מחליטה את הבעלות על העגל או לא. הגמרא המלאה היא זה ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא? בסימטא. (בוא נראה לאן העגל הוא עכשיו? תשובה: זה בסמטה.) אז בואו פשוט לתת אותו לבעל הראשון? זה סומכוס, (או ליתר דיוק זה סומכוס). מה חשוב לשים לב הוא לחכמים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זה אומר שאם זה ברשות של הבעלים השניים אז זה הולך להם אפילו נגד מרא קמא.
A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was concluded, the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was concluded the calf belongs to the second owner.
There is an argument between the Rashbam and Rabbainu Isaac about the the word אלא "rather". That is the Gemara asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא [possession of the first owner] [first owner] not help? The Gemara answers, "rather it is Sumchos." [Sumchos holds money in doubt is divided], That means the Gemara throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון [assumption that since it is in the property of the second owner we give it to him] because the Mishna is like Sumchos.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא ("rather"). Then this is what the Gemara says: "Why does מרא קמא [first owner] not help? Because it is Sumchos. That is: it is in an alley, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it-- even against חזקת מרא קמא even to Sumchos. So we have חזקה מעיקרא that pushes the time forwards along with חזקת רשות thus it belongs to the second fellow. What works against this is חזקת השתא since it gave birth we push that back to time and that helps חזקת מרא קמא
What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא [what is the present state of affairs we push backwards as far as possible -like a mikve that lacks 40 S'eah We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured.]. In the beginning of Nida we have חזקא דהשתא can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקא. There is another argument between Tosphot and the Rashbam if that is only in that case of a mikve or if it is a general rule.[Rav Shach mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the Rambam.] Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.
In Bava Metzia pg.100 we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות. It is possible I think to say that Tosphot and the Rashbam are being consistent in Bava Metzia with their opinions in Nida. [Tosphot in Bava Metzia actually brings this up in his arguments against the Rashbam in the second Tosphot on the page.]
The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא Just make a doubt a it does in Nida?
The reason I mention this is that on the page [BM 100] there is an argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot if שמא with חזקת רשות gets the calf or not.
Appendix: The full Gemara is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is Sumchos. [Or ''Rather it is Sumchos."] "It is Sumchos" means we leave it in the alley and there מרא קמא would have answered the question but if it had been in the רשות the the second fellow he would now own the calf even to Sumchos. If the Gemara reads "rather it is Sumchos" that means we reject even the idea of the alley. So to answer the first question Let's see where it is? we answer it is Sumchos and that is why even in the domain of the second fellow, he would not own the calf.
What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא ( the first owner who we know owned it at a certain point in time.)
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בבא מציעא ק' ע''א A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was signed and sealed, then the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was signed, the calf belongs to the second owner.
There is an argument between the רשב''ם and רבינו יצחק about the the word אלא "rather". That is the גמרא asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא not help? The גמרא answers, "rather it is סומכוס." סומכוס holds money in doubt is divided. That means the גמרא throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון because the משנה is like סומכוס.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא. Then this is what the גמרא says: "Why does מרא קמא not help? Because it is סומכוס. That is: it is in an סימטא, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it, even against חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.
What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא like a מקוה that lacks ארבעים סאה. We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured. In the beginning of נדה we have חזקא דהשתא can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקה. There is another argument between תוסות and the רשב''ם if that is only in that case of a מקוה or if it is a general rule. רב שך mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the רמב''ם. Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.
In בבא מציעא ק' ע''א we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות. Is it possible to say that תוספות and the רשב''ם are being consistent in בבא מציעא with their opinions elsewhere? תוספות in actually brings this up in his arguments against the רשב''ם in the second תוספות on the page.]
The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא just make a doubt as it does in נדה ב' ע''ב?
The reason I mention this is that on the page בבא מציעא ק' ע''א there is an argument between the רשב''ם and תוספות if שמא with חזקת רשות gets the calf or not.
The full גמרא is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is סומכוס. Or rather it is סומכוס.
What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא
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בבא מציעא ק' ע''א פרה נמכרה ויולדה ואנחנו לא יודעים מתי. אם לפני שהעסקה נחתמה וחתומה, אז העגל שייך לבעליה הראשונים. אם לאחר שהעסקה נחתמה, העגל שייך לבעלים השניים. יש ויכוח בין רשב''ם ורבינו יצחק על המילה אלא. זוהי הגמרא: מדוע חזקת מרא קמא לא עוזרת? הגמרא משיבה ",אלא היא סומכוס." סומכוס מחזיק כסף בספק מחולק. כלומר, הגמרא זורקת את הרעיון כי העגל הוא בסמטה. במקום זה הוא ברשות של הבעלים השניים, ועדיין אין חזקת ממון משום המשנה היא כמו סומכוס. זו גרסה אחת. הגרסה האחרת משמיטה את "אלא". בבבא מציעא ק' ע''א לנו חזקא דהשתא יחד עם חזקת רשות. האם ניתן לומר כי תוספות ואת הרשב''ם הם בקו אחד עם דעותיהם במקום אחר? תוספות למעשה מעלה את השאלה הזו בטיעוניו נגד הרשב''ם בהתוספות השניה בדף.] הנושא המרכזי שאני רואה כאן הוא זה: כמה חזקה היא חזקה דהשתא? האם לחזקת השתא לבדה יש מספיק כח להפוך שאלה לספק ועם חזקה אחרת להפוך לודאות? או רק עם עוד חזקא היא יכולה להפוך לספק כפי שהיא עושה נדה ב' ע''ב? הסיבה שאני מזכיר זאת היא כי בבבא מציעא ק 'ע''א יש ויכוח בין הרשב''ם ותוספות אם שמא עם חזקת הרשות מחליטה את הבעלות על העגל או לא. הגמרא המלאה היא זה ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא? בסימטא. (בוא נראה לאן העגל הוא עכשיו? תשובה: זה בסמטה.) אז בואו פשוט לתת אותו לבעל הראשון? זה סומכוס, (או ליתר דיוק זה סומכוס). מה חשוב לשים לב הוא לחכמים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זה אומר שאם זה ברשות של הבעלים השניים אז זה הולך להם אפילו נגד מרא קמא.
11.2.17
the father of Trump
I know of at least one story in which the father of Trump helped someone. My father-in-law had a few unpleasant run ins with the Nazis in Western Poland until he escaped to the East and was caught by the Red Army. His papers said was a German Jew, so they sent him to a labor camp in Siberia. [I do not know why they simply did not enlist him like his brother Shmuel. I think the reason may have been that Bill (Binyamin) had German papers while his brother had Polish papers ] Since he could fix almost anything they made him in charge. After the war he came to the USA with no money and no job, and he knew no one, and it was the father of Trump that hired him and helped him get set up. He knew Rita [who had been on the Kindertransport, the only time the Nazis let Jewish children go to England.] Her parents survived by going Far East and came to California. So after the war Rita went from NY to CA, and Binyamin [Bill Finn] joined her there.[Bill changed his name when he got to the USA from some Jewish name that I forgot.]
That is the basic story. I met their oldest daughter in my second year in high school in Mr. Smart's orchestra practice.
We were friends all through high school but things only got serious after I went to yeshiva Shar Yashuv in NY with her letters. Then by the time I got to the Mir she came to NY and began calling me for different reasons. We were married after two years at the Mir and I learned there in kollel for another few years until the idea of making Aliya to Israel came along.
That is the basic story. I met their oldest daughter in my second year in high school in Mr. Smart's orchestra practice.
We were friends all through high school but things only got serious after I went to yeshiva Shar Yashuv in NY with her letters. Then by the time I got to the Mir she came to NY and began calling me for different reasons. We were married after two years at the Mir and I learned there in kollel for another few years until the idea of making Aliya to Israel came along.
10.2.17
Learning Torah.
Rav Shach in the introduction to the Avi Ezri mentions the importance of learning Torah in several contexts. This type of idea really became common in the Lithuanian yeshiva world after the time of the Gra. It is kind of the basic "culture" (if you can call it that) of the Litvak yeshiva world. It is is based on statements in the Mishna, Gemara, Midrashim, and Zohar. The most commonly known statement to this effect is the Mishna אלו דברים that ends with תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם. ["The Mitzvah of learning Torah goes above all other mitzvot."] [The basic idea I mentioned about culture is this. In the Litvak world the idea of learning Torah is not just a slogan the essential element. It is the essential goal in life. There is this, however, only in authentic yeshivas. Some people have found they can make good money by pretending to be on this wavelength and so try to make copycat yeshivas without the spirit. ]
The trouble is to discern real Torah from Torah of the Sitra Achra [Torah of the Kelipot, Dark Side.]
What I mean by this is a statement from Reb Nachman that once there is found a true tzadik (saint), there come many copycats to try to get the same level of money and success they see the true tzadik got. This same idea goes for yeshivas. After there were authentic Litvak yeshivas like Voloshin, Mir, Ponovitch and Brisk, there came copycats that seem to learn Torah but in fact only learn Torah of the Dark Side, demonic Torah.
What makes the false Torah places particularly pernicious is they makes learning Torah for sincere people almost impossible.
However most Litvak places are pretty straightforward as to what they are about. If you have any kind of Lithuanian yeshiva in your area I do not urge caution, but assume it is OK. There surely are exceptions but you do not have to worry about them unless it comes to your attention.
Torah is incidentally against sin. The hope in learning Torah is know what sin is, and to stop doing it. It is not to lift up people, and to be positive and make people feel good. That is, to feel comfortable and not to feel bad about sin. There is an alternative Torah that is taught nowadays that is made to make people feel good and to get the money keep coming in. That is not the Torah of God. When you hear teaching that is against authentic Torah, run for your life. The first verse in Tehilim says "I did not sit in the seat of the scoffers." I stay away from counterfeit Torah for I am afraid of God's punishment for sin.
[Sin is incidentally, how the Torah defines sin. It is not how people try to redefine sin in order to fit their lust for money. Therefore the best way to keep Torah is to learn Musar [basic Torah ethics]. ]
The trouble is to discern real Torah from Torah of the Sitra Achra [Torah of the Kelipot, Dark Side.]
What I mean by this is a statement from Reb Nachman that once there is found a true tzadik (saint), there come many copycats to try to get the same level of money and success they see the true tzadik got. This same idea goes for yeshivas. After there were authentic Litvak yeshivas like Voloshin, Mir, Ponovitch and Brisk, there came copycats that seem to learn Torah but in fact only learn Torah of the Dark Side, demonic Torah.
What makes the false Torah places particularly pernicious is they makes learning Torah for sincere people almost impossible.
However most Litvak places are pretty straightforward as to what they are about. If you have any kind of Lithuanian yeshiva in your area I do not urge caution, but assume it is OK. There surely are exceptions but you do not have to worry about them unless it comes to your attention.
Torah is incidentally against sin. The hope in learning Torah is know what sin is, and to stop doing it. It is not to lift up people, and to be positive and make people feel good. That is, to feel comfortable and not to feel bad about sin. There is an alternative Torah that is taught nowadays that is made to make people feel good and to get the money keep coming in. That is not the Torah of God. When you hear teaching that is against authentic Torah, run for your life. The first verse in Tehilim says "I did not sit in the seat of the scoffers." I stay away from counterfeit Torah for I am afraid of God's punishment for sin.
[Sin is incidentally, how the Torah defines sin. It is not how people try to redefine sin in order to fit their lust for money. Therefore the best way to keep Torah is to learn Musar [basic Torah ethics]. ]
the child of a Jewess and a gentile
Tosphot holds in at least three places in Shas that the child of a Jewess and a gentile is not Jewish. [for example Kidushin 75 Tosphot first words ור''י סבר לה כר''ע וכו נינהו.
Also יבמות ט''ו ע''ב תוס' ד''ה אמוראי
This is obviously not like the Rambam.
This is obviously relevant nowadays to groups that pride themselves on being Jewish when in fact it can be shown historically they are descended from mixtures like this. If people's sense of pride and identity was rather their effort to learn and keep the holy Torah --that would a lot better. This whole idea of Jewish pride seems vacant to me.
Sephardim have a private approach to Ashkenazim. They say Ashkenazim are not Jewish, but they feel they have to pretend. But they definitely feel they are not the same tribe nor kosher.[Any Ashkenazim in Sephardi community will experience an enormous amount of pressure to leave. There will always be at least one Sephardi determined to get rid of the Ashkenazim at all cost.] Still in all history books about the original conquest of Islam, the general rule was Muslims took Jewish wives as spoils of war. Therefore Spanish Jewry when exiled to North Africa always made a point to write ס''ט ספרדי טהור in cases when they could trace their lineage father from father back to people that were certainly Jewish. That is why ס''ט is how the Rambam signed his name and Bava Sali also.
Outside of a few amazing people like Bava Sali the general problem in the Sefardi world stems from their origins from Muslims. This seems to create a kind of problem that still exists. If they would simply be committed to keeping Torah then I would have nothing to say, but instead their commitment in Israel seems to be to find fault in Ashkenazic Jew and then to try to kick them out.
As one fellow mentioned to me they have the trait of Sedom and Amora [That fellow I believe is from the family of Bava Sali--at least I know his wife is a granddaughter of Bava Sali's older brother David. The one that was martyred.]
Also יבמות ט''ו ע''ב תוס' ד''ה אמוראי
This is obviously not like the Rambam.
This is obviously relevant nowadays to groups that pride themselves on being Jewish when in fact it can be shown historically they are descended from mixtures like this. If people's sense of pride and identity was rather their effort to learn and keep the holy Torah --that would a lot better. This whole idea of Jewish pride seems vacant to me.
Sephardim have a private approach to Ashkenazim. They say Ashkenazim are not Jewish, but they feel they have to pretend. But they definitely feel they are not the same tribe nor kosher.[Any Ashkenazim in Sephardi community will experience an enormous amount of pressure to leave. There will always be at least one Sephardi determined to get rid of the Ashkenazim at all cost.] Still in all history books about the original conquest of Islam, the general rule was Muslims took Jewish wives as spoils of war. Therefore Spanish Jewry when exiled to North Africa always made a point to write ס''ט ספרדי טהור in cases when they could trace their lineage father from father back to people that were certainly Jewish. That is why ס''ט is how the Rambam signed his name and Bava Sali also.
Outside of a few amazing people like Bava Sali the general problem in the Sefardi world stems from their origins from Muslims. This seems to create a kind of problem that still exists. If they would simply be committed to keeping Torah then I would have nothing to say, but instead their commitment in Israel seems to be to find fault in Ashkenazic Jew and then to try to kick them out.
As one fellow mentioned to me they have the trait of Sedom and Amora [That fellow I believe is from the family of Bava Sali--at least I know his wife is a granddaughter of Bava Sali's older brother David. The one that was martyred.]
9.2.17
T-18 A Major T18 in midi format the reason for offering this in midi beside the mp3 is in case anyone wants to see or copy the notes, they can download the notes in midi. these were written in nwc which i would also share if people had access to it but it is a private compony.
8.2.17
But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards?
There are unique individuals that may not have any talent, but stand in some kind of test.נסיון. The archetype example is Avraham [Abraham the patriarch]. And by that they merit to some kind of Divine light, or revaluation, or Divine Spirit. One recent example would be Bava Sali.
But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards? You can not undo the damage because if you already know your mistake then the same issue can not be a test. You can not give a student after after he has glance at the answers.
In my opinion the best thing to do is to work on correcting the areas you made a mistake
But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards? You can not undo the damage because if you already know your mistake then the same issue can not be a test. You can not give a student after after he has glance at the answers.
In my opinion the best thing to do is to work on correcting the areas you made a mistake
Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant,
Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant, but I think they really have to be learned together. Kind of Like Plato and Aristotle. There are aspects of things that Kant brings out which to me seem very important that you can miss in Hegel
The most obvious example is the limits of reason--even pure reason. Now to Kant "pure reason" merely means not based on observation. But to me it seems the implication is clear that he was saying even pure reason in itself, not just human reason.
Red used to be thought of as in the object. Descartes noticed there are things that are not really in the object itself but depend on the subject observing. Kant noticed all characteristics depend on the subject. So what is left? The thing in itself.
Also universality and necessity as abstract ideas can not be derived by induction, no matter how many times you see them.
Kant argues against universality and necessity are not in objects, while universality and necessity are true, as in mathematics and natural science.
As Hegel puts it: "But if universality and necessity do not exist in external things, the question arises “Where are they to be found?” Kant maintains that they must be that they must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, “I”. This, simply expressed, is the main point in the Kantian philosophy. What makes them valid is that the object depends on the subject for its character."
Thus reason can not enter into "unconditioned reality" (things in themselves) that in no way is connected with physical objects.
To Hegel the kind of dialectical method used by Socrates is the very nature of reason in itself and allows reason to progress clearly and definitely into un-conditioned reality.
The most obvious example is the limits of reason--even pure reason. Now to Kant "pure reason" merely means not based on observation. But to me it seems the implication is clear that he was saying even pure reason in itself, not just human reason.
Red used to be thought of as in the object. Descartes noticed there are things that are not really in the object itself but depend on the subject observing. Kant noticed all characteristics depend on the subject. So what is left? The thing in itself.
Also universality and necessity as abstract ideas can not be derived by induction, no matter how many times you see them.
Kant argues against universality and necessity are not in objects, while universality and necessity are true, as in mathematics and natural science.
As Hegel puts it: "But if universality and necessity do not exist in external things, the question arises “Where are they to be found?” Kant maintains that they must be that they must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, “I”. This, simply expressed, is the main point in the Kantian philosophy. What makes them valid is that the object depends on the subject for its character."
Thus reason can not enter into "unconditioned reality" (things in themselves) that in no way is connected with physical objects.
To Hegel the kind of dialectical method used by Socrates is the very nature of reason in itself and allows reason to progress clearly and definitely into un-conditioned reality.
.
The way the Stanford Encyclopedia puts it: Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “things in themselves” Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it, shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself.
[In any case I should mention I learned at lot from Dr. Kelly Ross and his particular approach to Kantian philosophy. And I see Kant as being a kind of umbrella and bringing out important points.]
The way the Stanford Encyclopedia puts it: Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “things in themselves” Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it, shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself.
[In any case I should mention I learned at lot from Dr. Kelly Ross and his particular approach to Kantian philosophy. And I see Kant as being a kind of umbrella and bringing out important points.]
So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law?
That is we know the American Constitution is valid from the basic standpoint of: (1) a contract which is binding. (2) The law of the country is the law. [Bava Batra ch 3. This is brought in the Rambam as being applicable much more than you would expect.](3) It embodies natural law as understood by the Rambam {Maimonides} and Saadia Gaon.
So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law? What kind of perspective would this bring? [ Probably an emphasis on traditional values and private property and limited power of the state]
In yeshiva I always considered Talmud law to the same thing as objective morality. And the civil laws of the state I thought of as more or less irrelevant. I am pretty sure this was the general attitude. And I still consider that Talmud law to be basically Revelation--but not exactly. After all it is Revelation combined with human reasoning trying to figure out how keep the written law.
Still the whole concept of a State and its laws is morally relevant even on the personal level. Richard Epstein makes a very strong case against libertarians in regard to the State.
[A lot of Israeli judges have the Talmud in their private chambers.]
One thing about this is false and demonic teachers of Talmud sprout up all the time like mushrooms after a rain. Unless you can really tell the difference between the real authentic holy teachers of Torah from Litvak places like Ponovitch or Brisk, and the Sitra Achra/Dark Side teachers, it is just not worth it to get involved. The religious world is basically mentally ill and therefore choose their leaders according to the higher degree of mental illness.
panic of the Left
What adds to the panic of the Left is that their intellectual support collapsed. I still remember how Socialism was considered the only intellectual wave of the future. It was like Ayn Rand said--the people follow where the thinkers lead.
The weight of reason no longer leads towards socialism. Post Modernism is dead. Classical education, free market, STEM, traditional Torah and Biblical values are thankfully on the rise.
When people stop believing in a system it collapses.
It is the same basic thing that happened in the USSR, --people stopped believing in the system.
I am very grateful to God that in my high school classics were learned. And what was not officially learned was still considered important. Job, Chaucer, etc. Even in music the teacher, Mr. Smart was very much into classical music. But not just him. It was the same in elementary school and even in Idyllwild Music Camp. So I am a big fan the the Trivium and Quadrivium.
The weight of reason no longer leads towards socialism. Post Modernism is dead. Classical education, free market, STEM, traditional Torah and Biblical values are thankfully on the rise.
When people stop believing in a system it collapses.
It is the same basic thing that happened in the USSR, --people stopped believing in the system.
I am very grateful to God that in my high school classics were learned. And what was not officially learned was still considered important. Job, Chaucer, etc. Even in music the teacher, Mr. Smart was very much into classical music. But not just him. It was the same in elementary school and even in Idyllwild Music Camp. So I am a big fan the the Trivium and Quadrivium.
7.2.17
Bava Metzia 14b
There is some connection between what I wrote in Bava Metzia 14 and Rav Shach concerning a Ketubah. [Rav Shach's essay is found in the Avi Ezri on אישות laws of marriage]
In short the Rambam says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies they all have equal right to מזונות [cakes] even if he married them one after the other because they are getting מזונות [cake and staples] from מטלטלים (movable property). The Raavad said even if the situation would be such that they get mezonot (cake) from land (non movable property). [The idea here is that in the Ketubah (marriage contract) the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries. There is no such stipulation in case of divorce however. This rule is sadly ignored today in most courts of law.]
At any rate, the ראב''ד (Raavad) brings from לווה ולווה וקנה (someone borrowed and then borrowed again from someone else and then bought property which is considred collateral for the loan) to show that the שיעבוד (right to collect cake and staples from the movable property) of all the wives is equal. And the Magid Mishna (commentary on the Rambam) disagrees with the Raavad. He adds if the Raavad would be right then the same would apply to the Ketubah itself
Rav Elazar Shach says that the Raavad is right because the obligation of the ketubah is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the ketubah is because they were married. The obligation of mezonot is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a lender borrower and the borrower buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the lender would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the lender go after?
If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first.It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of Tosphot in Bava Metzia.
But what does the Rambam hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting mezonot [their meals] from movable property that there is no order of who gets what first. But in case of land there is an order. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.
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There is some connection between what I wrote in בבא מציעא י''ד:ב and רב שך concerning the כתובה.
In short the רמב''ם says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies, they all have equal right to מזונות even if he married them one after the other, because they are getting מזונות from מטלטלים. Movable property. The ראב''ד said even if the situation would be such that they get מזונות from land. The idea here is that in the כתובה the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries.
At any rate, the ראב''ד brings from לווה ולווה וקנה to show that the שיעבודof all the wives is equal. And the מגיד משנה disagrees with the ראב''ד. He adds if the ראב''ד would be right then the same would apply to the כתובה itself
רב שך says that the ראב''דmakes sense because the obligation of the כתובה is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the כתובה is because they were married. The obligation of מזונות is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a מלווה לווה and the לווה buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the מלווה would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the מלווה go after?
If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first. It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of תוספות in בבא מציעא.
But what does the רמב''ם hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting מזונות from מיטלטלים that there is no סדר גבייה. But in case of קרקע there is an סדר. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.
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הקשר בין בבא מציעא י''ד: ורב שך בדבר הכתובה. בקיצור רמב''ם אומר שאם יש לך אדם שיש לו כמה נשים ולאחר מכן מת, יש להן את כל הזכות השווה במזונות אפילו אם הוא היתחתן אתן אחת אחרי השניה, משום שהן מקבלות מזונות מן מטלטלים. הראב''ד אמר גם אם המצב יהיה כזה כי הן מקבלות מזונות מקרקע. הרעיון כאן הוא כי בכתובה הבעל מחייב את רכושו לתמוך בה במקרה שהוא מת עד שהיא נישאת מחדש. בכל מקרה, את ראב''ד מביא מן הדין "לווה ולווה וקנה" להראות כי שיעבוד של כל הנשים שווה. והמגיד משנה חולק על ראב''ד. הוא מוסיף אם ראב''ד יהיה תקין, אז אותו חוק יחול על הכתובה עצמה. רב שך אומר כי הראב''ד הגיוני, כי חובתה של הכתובה היא לא אותו הדבר כמו מזונות. חובתה של הכתובה משום שהם (הוא והן) היו נשואים. חובת מזונות היא כי הוא מת. החובות מתחילות בתקופות זמן שונות.
כך במקרה (בבבא מציעא יד:) של מלווה ולווה והלווה קונה שדה ומוכר אותו ולאחר מכן קונה אחר. בשלב זה מלווה ילך אחרי השדה השני. אבל אז הלווה מוכר את שדה השני. לאחר איזה מהם עושי המלווה ללכת? אם נלך לפי זמן שהחובה מתחילה, אז ברור החובה על השדה הראשון באה קודם. זה היה בבעלות הלווה לפני שהוא קנה את השדה השני. זוהי התשובה הראשונה של תוספות בבבא מציעא יד:. אבל מה הרמב''ם מחזיק? הוא אומר רק במקרה שבו הנשים מקבלות מזונות מן המיטלטלים שאין סדר גבייה. אבל במקרה של קרקע קיים סדר. לפיכך נראה שהוא גם הולך לפי הרעיון הזה שאנחנו מסתכלים במי הייתה נשואה ראשונה וכך נסתכל כאשר ההתחייבות נכתבה
In short the Rambam says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies they all have equal right to מזונות [cakes] even if he married them one after the other because they are getting מזונות [cake and staples] from מטלטלים (movable property). The Raavad said even if the situation would be such that they get mezonot (cake) from land (non movable property). [The idea here is that in the Ketubah (marriage contract) the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries. There is no such stipulation in case of divorce however. This rule is sadly ignored today in most courts of law.]
At any rate, the ראב''ד (Raavad) brings from לווה ולווה וקנה (someone borrowed and then borrowed again from someone else and then bought property which is considred collateral for the loan) to show that the שיעבוד (right to collect cake and staples from the movable property) of all the wives is equal. And the Magid Mishna (commentary on the Rambam) disagrees with the Raavad. He adds if the Raavad would be right then the same would apply to the Ketubah itself
Rav Elazar Shach says that the Raavad is right because the obligation of the ketubah is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the ketubah is because they were married. The obligation of mezonot is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a lender borrower and the borrower buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the lender would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the lender go after?
If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first.It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of Tosphot in Bava Metzia.
But what does the Rambam hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting mezonot [their meals] from movable property that there is no order of who gets what first. But in case of land there is an order. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.
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There is some connection between what I wrote in בבא מציעא י''ד:ב and רב שך concerning the כתובה.
In short the רמב''ם says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies, they all have equal right to מזונות even if he married them one after the other, because they are getting מזונות from מטלטלים. Movable property. The ראב''ד said even if the situation would be such that they get מזונות from land. The idea here is that in the כתובה the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries.
At any rate, the ראב''ד brings from לווה ולווה וקנה to show that the שיעבודof all the wives is equal. And the מגיד משנה disagrees with the ראב''ד. He adds if the ראב''ד would be right then the same would apply to the כתובה itself
רב שך says that the ראב''דmakes sense because the obligation of the כתובה is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the כתובה is because they were married. The obligation of מזונות is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a מלווה לווה and the לווה buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the מלווה would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the מלווה go after?
If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first. It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of תוספות in בבא מציעא.
But what does the רמב''ם hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting מזונות from מיטלטלים that there is no סדר גבייה. But in case of קרקע there is an סדר. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.
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הקשר בין בבא מציעא י''ד: ורב שך בדבר הכתובה. בקיצור רמב''ם אומר שאם יש לך אדם שיש לו כמה נשים ולאחר מכן מת, יש להן את כל הזכות השווה במזונות אפילו אם הוא היתחתן אתן אחת אחרי השניה, משום שהן מקבלות מזונות מן מטלטלים. הראב''ד אמר גם אם המצב יהיה כזה כי הן מקבלות מזונות מקרקע. הרעיון כאן הוא כי בכתובה הבעל מחייב את רכושו לתמוך בה במקרה שהוא מת עד שהיא נישאת מחדש. בכל מקרה, את ראב''ד מביא מן הדין "לווה ולווה וקנה" להראות כי שיעבוד של כל הנשים שווה. והמגיד משנה חולק על ראב''ד. הוא מוסיף אם ראב''ד יהיה תקין, אז אותו חוק יחול על הכתובה עצמה. רב שך אומר כי הראב''ד הגיוני, כי חובתה של הכתובה היא לא אותו הדבר כמו מזונות. חובתה של הכתובה משום שהם (הוא והן) היו נשואים. חובת מזונות היא כי הוא מת. החובות מתחילות בתקופות זמן שונות.
כך במקרה (בבבא מציעא יד:) של מלווה ולווה והלווה קונה שדה ומוכר אותו ולאחר מכן קונה אחר. בשלב זה מלווה ילך אחרי השדה השני. אבל אז הלווה מוכר את שדה השני. לאחר איזה מהם עושי המלווה ללכת? אם נלך לפי זמן שהחובה מתחילה, אז ברור החובה על השדה הראשון באה קודם. זה היה בבעלות הלווה לפני שהוא קנה את השדה השני. זוהי התשובה הראשונה של תוספות בבבא מציעא יד:. אבל מה הרמב''ם מחזיק? הוא אומר רק במקרה שבו הנשים מקבלות מזונות מן המיטלטלים שאין סדר גבייה. אבל במקרה של קרקע קיים סדר. לפיכך נראה שהוא גם הולך לפי הרעיון הזה שאנחנו מסתכלים במי הייתה נשואה ראשונה וכך נסתכל כאשר ההתחייבות נכתבה
6.2.17
Navardok yeshivas
The way Navardok yeshivas were first made was by two students from the yeshiva just showing up in some town and sitting and learning Torah without asking for any favors. [It was part of that path to trust in God so asking people for favors was out.] I wonder if perhaps a similar approach is possible today. If there is no authentic Litvak yeshiva nearby then at least I suggest an hour a day of learning Torah [Old Testament, Mishna, Talmud, Midrash, and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.].That is to restart the whole idea of Torah for its own sake, and trust in God.
In fact doing this at home is better as a rule. That means to have a session every day in Tenach, Mishna, Gemara, and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.
In essence Navardkok consisted of two complementary concepts (1) to learn Torah without monetary compensation. (That is known as "Torah Lishma," for it's own sake, not for the sake of anything else.) (2) Trust in God without effort. That is to trust in God without doing anything to get that help. That is not to do what is called Hishtadlus "השתדלות". (The the מדרגת האדם by Rav Joseph Horwitz-the Alter of Navardok for details.)
The reason this is important is: to receive the yoke of Torah really there is a need of a Beit Midrash where one can learn Torah without being bothered. But the religious world itself needs a thorough house cleaning. It is full of Chametz/leaven. That is the leaders as a rule are demons from the Hell and that tends to leave a bad effect on the regular people. So in a practical sense, I would not walk into any religious place but pray in a Conservative or Reform. The only kind of religious place I would walk into would be an authentic Litvak yeshiva. [There are very few of these. In the USA the only ones that are true and authentic are in New York. In Israel there are only Ponovitch and its branches or startups from people that learned in Ponovitch. ]
[The basic idea of learning Torah Lishma is not to use Torah for money. So to large degree all the yeshivas in Israel that do so are lying as the Rambam wrote (commentary of Chapters of the Fathers, Pirkei Avot, chapter 4). Still the ironic thing is when they do learn for its own sake, then I think there is mitzvah to give. I think this is clear in a few places in the Gemara.]
The false yeshivas use Torah to justify their sins and lies and covetousness and lust for money. They way they do this is to justify sin to make people feel good and positive. They say "We do not want any doom and gloom here. We want only positive messages. No Musar here."
The sin of the religious world is to use Torah to justify their lust for money. So I go no where near them.
[The classical example is the history (in the book of Kings) of Achav and Chizkia and the four hundred prophets that said, "You will be successful." Chizkiah however thought they were lying. So the called a prophet of God, Michayahu. He came and said also "Go up and you will be successful." Achav said to him How many times have I told you tell me only the truth in the name of God. Michaya said, "OK, you really want the truth? The truth is --you will not return alive." Achav said to Chizkia you see he always speaks bad about me. He is always negative.
In fact doing this at home is better as a rule. That means to have a session every day in Tenach, Mishna, Gemara, and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.
In essence Navardkok consisted of two complementary concepts (1) to learn Torah without monetary compensation. (That is known as "Torah Lishma," for it's own sake, not for the sake of anything else.) (2) Trust in God without effort. That is to trust in God without doing anything to get that help. That is not to do what is called Hishtadlus "השתדלות". (The the מדרגת האדם by Rav Joseph Horwitz-the Alter of Navardok for details.)
The reason this is important is: to receive the yoke of Torah really there is a need of a Beit Midrash where one can learn Torah without being bothered. But the religious world itself needs a thorough house cleaning. It is full of Chametz/leaven. That is the leaders as a rule are demons from the Hell and that tends to leave a bad effect on the regular people. So in a practical sense, I would not walk into any religious place but pray in a Conservative or Reform. The only kind of religious place I would walk into would be an authentic Litvak yeshiva. [There are very few of these. In the USA the only ones that are true and authentic are in New York. In Israel there are only Ponovitch and its branches or startups from people that learned in Ponovitch. ]
[The basic idea of learning Torah Lishma is not to use Torah for money. So to large degree all the yeshivas in Israel that do so are lying as the Rambam wrote (commentary of Chapters of the Fathers, Pirkei Avot, chapter 4). Still the ironic thing is when they do learn for its own sake, then I think there is mitzvah to give. I think this is clear in a few places in the Gemara.]
The false yeshivas use Torah to justify their sins and lies and covetousness and lust for money. They way they do this is to justify sin to make people feel good and positive. They say "We do not want any doom and gloom here. We want only positive messages. No Musar here."
The sin of the religious world is to use Torah to justify their lust for money. So I go no where near them.
[The classical example is the history (in the book of Kings) of Achav and Chizkia and the four hundred prophets that said, "You will be successful." Chizkiah however thought they were lying. So the called a prophet of God, Michayahu. He came and said also "Go up and you will be successful." Achav said to him How many times have I told you tell me only the truth in the name of God. Michaya said, "OK, you really want the truth? The truth is --you will not return alive." Achav said to Chizkia you see he always speaks bad about me. He is always negative.
5.2.17
Rambam 21:10 מלווה ולווה Laws of Lending and Borrowing
Rambam 21:10 מלווה ולווה Has been a confusing halacha for me for a long time. I did not realize that the Magid Mishna had actually explained it simply,-- even though he left it with צ''ע (not clear why it is so.)
The basic idea is the same case that I have mentioned before in this blog many times. You have a lender a borrower and someone that bought a field from the borrower after the loan.
If the field is regular [not a guarantee for the loan] the lender gets it in case of default and 1/2 the improvements and in Halacha 21:1 he does not even pay for the expenses.
In Halacha 2:10 [when the field is collateral for the loan] the way the Magid Mishna explains it if the expenses are more than the improvement he gets half the improvement and pays nothing. If the improvement is more than the expenses, he can take all the improvement and pay for the expenses.
This would not be worth the time writing if not for the fact that the Rambam there is so unclear.
The way to see this in the Rambam is in the wording. The first part of the halacha is clear. The שבח is more than the הוצאה so the בעל חוב says "my field made the שבח" so he is claiming all the שבח and pays the הוצאה. Clear enough. But then: The שבח is less than the הוצאה he collects 1/2 from the בעל חוב and 1/2 from the מוכר. That is where the Magid Mishna and Rav Shach come in. At that point the בעל חובis coming by the claim of normal שיעבוד by which he has only a right to half the שבח as it says in Bava Batra. Still the בעל חוב gets the field with everything on it --all the שבח - but he has to pay only for a half and the other half he has a right to. So the part he has a right to the לוקח has to collect from the מוכר as per the same agreement "What I buy will be משועבד to this חוב."
It is clear but only with Magid Mishna and Rav Shach. [In any case the part the part that the בעל חוב is collecting because of מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה he is not paying for. The only part he pays for it that which comes because it is part of the field. So with regards to 21:1 where the Rambam brings two opinions if the בעל חוב pays for the הוצאה in the normal case that the field is not collateral he is going like the opinion he does not have to pay.]
In any case there is still a lot to talk about in this halacah as you can see in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and I have had occasion to bring this up also in my notes on Shas, and I also recall that Reb Chaim Soloveitchik brought it up.
This is what I wrote about this about a year ago:
ב''מ קי: ב''מ י''ד: בבא בתרא קנז: הסוגיה כאן הוא בב''מ יד: ובבבא בתרא קנז: יש מחלוקת בין תוספות בב''מ ותוספות בבא בתרא. המחלוקת תלויה בסברת רב חיים הלוי מבריסק. הסברא היא זאת: לפי דעת הרמב''ם, בדיון של מַלְוֶה לווה ולוקח (ויש ברירת מחדל) שהמַלְוֶה גובה רק חצי השבח (השיפוצים) וחצי נשאר אצל הלוקח בגלל ששיעבוד שניהם עובר דרך הלווה. אבל המַלְוֶה גובה את כל השבח שגדל ממילא בגלל ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמו ישיר, ולא דרך הלווה [שהוא המוכר]. (זאת אומרת שאחר שהשיעבוד חל על השדה, הוא נשאר שם, ואינו שם בגלל המשכה של כח המוכר.) זאת היא סברת תירוץ הראשון בתוספות בבא בתרא במצב שלנו איפה שהמַלְוֶה גובה את הקרקע מן הלוקח, אף על פי שיש קרקע אחרת ללוקח השני. הסיבה היא ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. מצד השני, תירוץ השני ותוספות ב''מ יד: אוחזים שאם יש לוקח שני, המַלְוֶה צריך לגבות ממנו בגלל ששיעבודו הולך דרך המוכר, ואינו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. ועכשיו מחלוקת שני שתירוצים היא מחלוקת ראשונים. שהסברא של תירוץ הראשון היא שיטת הרמב''ם לפי פירושו של רב חיים ברמב''ם. והרמב''ן והראב''ד חולקים על הרמב''ם. ותירוץ השני ותוספות בב''מ יד: הולכים לפי שיטת הראב''ד והרמב''ן
ואין להקשות על זה מדברי הרמב''ן שכתב שהמַלְוֶה אומר: "ארעאי [הקרקע שלי] השביח", בגלל שכוונת הרמב''ן היא שבגלל שיעבודו על הלווה הקרקע נחשב של המַלְוֶה והשיעבוד בא דרך הלווה
להבין את מה הרמב''ם יחזיק כאן קשרתי את החוק הזה לחוק של לווה ולווה וקנה. קודם כל יש שני תרחישים בתוספות. אחד מהם הוא שבו השדה השני נקנה לאחר הגבייה. אם זה המקרה שלנו אז יש קשר ברור לדין לווה ולווה וקנה. במקרה שלנו יש מַלְוֶה וקונה ולמַלְוֶה כמובן יש שיעבוד ראשון. אבל אם שדה השני נקנה לאחר הגבייה, אז שיעבוד של שניהם באים כאחת [באותו הזמן]. זה כמעט אותו המקרה. אבל אנחנו יודעים מה רמב''ם אומר בלווה ולווה וקנה, שהם חולקים את השדה. אם זה אותו העיקרון אז למה החוק כאן לא יהיה אותו הדבר
תירוץ: יכול להיות שזו כן דעת הרמב''ם שיכול לגבות מאיזה מהם שהוא רוצה. זה כמו בלווה ולווה וקנה שיש לנו ספק ומניחים הברירה בידם לפי פירוש הרמב''ם
אבל יש תרחיש אחר בתוספות. כלומר, כאשר השדה השני היה בבעלות בעת הגבייה (או של הלווה או של לוקח השני). כאן אפשר רמב''ם מחזיק כמו חוות דעתו של תוספות שמַלְוֶה חייב לגבות את שדה הראשון או השני. אנחנו לא באמת יודעים מלשון רמב''ם. כל מה שאנחנו יודעים הוא שהרמב''ם אינו מחזיק אותו שהוא מצב של אפותיקי (או משכון) להלוואה.
That is I had gone back and forth on the idea if this is related to לווה ולווה וקנה as you can see. And in the end I guess I decided it was.
I do not recall if it was there in that place but I do know I used Rav Shach's idea about the difference between what grows on its on and what grows by means the efforts of the buyer. In any case I wanted to bring up this halacah because of the clarity the Magid Mishna and Rav Shach both bring to it.
I should mention that שיעבוד of a field whether a field that is collateral or just plain is the same when it comes through מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד that is the buyer and the lender divide the שבח.
The basic idea is the same case that I have mentioned before in this blog many times. You have a lender a borrower and someone that bought a field from the borrower after the loan.
If the field is regular [not a guarantee for the loan] the lender gets it in case of default and 1/2 the improvements and in Halacha 21:1 he does not even pay for the expenses.
In Halacha 2:10 [when the field is collateral for the loan] the way the Magid Mishna explains it if the expenses are more than the improvement he gets half the improvement and pays nothing. If the improvement is more than the expenses, he can take all the improvement and pay for the expenses.
This would not be worth the time writing if not for the fact that the Rambam there is so unclear.
The way to see this in the Rambam is in the wording. The first part of the halacha is clear. The שבח is more than the הוצאה so the בעל חוב says "my field made the שבח" so he is claiming all the שבח and pays the הוצאה. Clear enough. But then: The שבח is less than the הוצאה he collects 1/2 from the בעל חוב and 1/2 from the מוכר. That is where the Magid Mishna and Rav Shach come in. At that point the בעל חובis coming by the claim of normal שיעבוד by which he has only a right to half the שבח as it says in Bava Batra. Still the בעל חוב gets the field with everything on it --all the שבח - but he has to pay only for a half and the other half he has a right to. So the part he has a right to the לוקח has to collect from the מוכר as per the same agreement "What I buy will be משועבד to this חוב."
It is clear but only with Magid Mishna and Rav Shach. [In any case the part the part that the בעל חוב is collecting because of מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה he is not paying for. The only part he pays for it that which comes because it is part of the field. So with regards to 21:1 where the Rambam brings two opinions if the בעל חוב pays for the הוצאה in the normal case that the field is not collateral he is going like the opinion he does not have to pay.]
In any case there is still a lot to talk about in this halacah as you can see in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and I have had occasion to bring this up also in my notes on Shas, and I also recall that Reb Chaim Soloveitchik brought it up.
This is what I wrote about this about a year ago:
ב''מ קי: ב''מ י''ד: בבא בתרא קנז: הסוגיה כאן הוא בב''מ יד: ובבבא בתרא קנז: יש מחלוקת בין תוספות בב''מ ותוספות בבא בתרא. המחלוקת תלויה בסברת רב חיים הלוי מבריסק. הסברא היא זאת: לפי דעת הרמב''ם, בדיון של מַלְוֶה לווה ולוקח (ויש ברירת מחדל) שהמַלְוֶה גובה רק חצי השבח (השיפוצים) וחצי נשאר אצל הלוקח בגלל ששיעבוד שניהם עובר דרך הלווה. אבל המַלְוֶה גובה את כל השבח שגדל ממילא בגלל ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמו ישיר, ולא דרך הלווה [שהוא המוכר]. (זאת אומרת שאחר שהשיעבוד חל על השדה, הוא נשאר שם, ואינו שם בגלל המשכה של כח המוכר.) זאת היא סברת תירוץ הראשון בתוספות בבא בתרא במצב שלנו איפה שהמַלְוֶה גובה את הקרקע מן הלוקח, אף על פי שיש קרקע אחרת ללוקח השני. הסיבה היא ששיעבודו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. מצד השני, תירוץ השני ותוספות ב''מ יד: אוחזים שאם יש לוקח שני, המַלְוֶה צריך לגבות ממנו בגלל ששיעבודו הולך דרך המוכר, ואינו חל על הקרקע בעצמה. ועכשיו מחלוקת שני שתירוצים היא מחלוקת ראשונים. שהסברא של תירוץ הראשון היא שיטת הרמב''ם לפי פירושו של רב חיים ברמב''ם. והרמב''ן והראב''ד חולקים על הרמב''ם. ותירוץ השני ותוספות בב''מ יד: הולכים לפי שיטת הראב''ד והרמב''ן
ואין להקשות על זה מדברי הרמב''ן שכתב שהמַלְוֶה אומר: "ארעאי [הקרקע שלי] השביח", בגלל שכוונת הרמב''ן היא שבגלל שיעבודו על הלווה הקרקע נחשב של המַלְוֶה והשיעבוד בא דרך הלווה
להבין את מה הרמב''ם יחזיק כאן קשרתי את החוק הזה לחוק של לווה ולווה וקנה. קודם כל יש שני תרחישים בתוספות. אחד מהם הוא שבו השדה השני נקנה לאחר הגבייה. אם זה המקרה שלנו אז יש קשר ברור לדין לווה ולווה וקנה. במקרה שלנו יש מַלְוֶה וקונה ולמַלְוֶה כמובן יש שיעבוד ראשון. אבל אם שדה השני נקנה לאחר הגבייה, אז שיעבוד של שניהם באים כאחת [באותו הזמן]. זה כמעט אותו המקרה. אבל אנחנו יודעים מה רמב''ם אומר בלווה ולווה וקנה, שהם חולקים את השדה. אם זה אותו העיקרון אז למה החוק כאן לא יהיה אותו הדבר
תירוץ: יכול להיות שזו כן דעת הרמב''ם שיכול לגבות מאיזה מהם שהוא רוצה. זה כמו בלווה ולווה וקנה שיש לנו ספק ומניחים הברירה בידם לפי פירוש הרמב''ם
אבל יש תרחיש אחר בתוספות. כלומר, כאשר השדה השני היה בבעלות בעת הגבייה (או של הלווה או של לוקח השני). כאן אפשר רמב''ם מחזיק כמו חוות דעתו של תוספות שמַלְוֶה חייב לגבות את שדה הראשון או השני. אנחנו לא באמת יודעים מלשון רמב''ם. כל מה שאנחנו יודעים הוא שהרמב''ם אינו מחזיק אותו שהוא מצב של אפותיקי (או משכון) להלוואה.
I do not recall if it was there in that place but I do know I used Rav Shach's idea about the difference between what grows on its on and what grows by means the efforts of the buyer. In any case I wanted to bring up this halacah because of the clarity the Magid Mishna and Rav Shach both bring to it.
I should mention that שיעבוד of a field whether a field that is collateral or just plain is the same when it comes through מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד that is the buyer and the lender divide the שבח.
problem with Islam
I noticed the problem with Islam but only after it was brought to my attention in the most unpleasant ways possible. Personal experience. Before that I had assumed as many others that we are all just people underneath our skins and everyone really just wants the same things security and happiness. I had to learn the hard way what Brett Stevens is suggesting apparently simply from thinking things out thoroughly.
It might be considered a fault of mine to give people and groups the benefit of a doubt long after they have shown their true colors.
But on the other hand when I finally do decide that some group is bad, then at least I being a reliable source.
It might be considered a fault of mine to give people and groups the benefit of a doubt long after they have shown their true colors.
But on the other hand when I finally do decide that some group is bad, then at least I being a reliable source.
4.2.17
The Mishna says כל המקבל עליו עול תורה מעבירים ממנו עול מלכות ועול דרך ארץ "The yoke of government and the yoke of the way of the world is removed from one who accepts on himself the yoke of Torah."
I took this to heart a few years ago thinking that I needed to get back to Torah.
Then I noted the Rambam brings this idea in an expanded way in Laws of Repentance ch 9, where he brings the idea that "all fears" are removed from one that accepts the yoke of Torah. This is the same idea but in a more general sense.
This idea can be used by unscrupulous people that try to get money out of secular Jews. Still abusus non tolit usum. Abuse does not nullify use. And I can see that there is a great need to sit and learn Torah.
Since the really great and authentic Lithuanian kinds of Yeshivas based on the Gra are few and far and the evil yeshivas that are hot beds of the sitra achra [the Dark Side] are close and many, thus there really is no choice but to get yourself the basic set of Torah and learn at home. The most important I think is Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which contains the basic principles of how to learn and most of the basic principles of Torah.
But in case people are reading this that might need a more basic introduction: the best of introductory books I have seen are those of Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsh --that is his book, the Horev. After that The English Soncino Talmud I think is great. I am not exaggerating. The translations there are works of genius. After that the best book of Jewish Law is the Tur with the Beit Yoseph. I really loved learning that book with the Bach also.
I took this to heart a few years ago thinking that I needed to get back to Torah.
Then I noted the Rambam brings this idea in an expanded way in Laws of Repentance ch 9, where he brings the idea that "all fears" are removed from one that accepts the yoke of Torah. This is the same idea but in a more general sense.
This idea can be used by unscrupulous people that try to get money out of secular Jews. Still abusus non tolit usum. Abuse does not nullify use. And I can see that there is a great need to sit and learn Torah.
Since the really great and authentic Lithuanian kinds of Yeshivas based on the Gra are few and far and the evil yeshivas that are hot beds of the sitra achra [the Dark Side] are close and many, thus there really is no choice but to get yourself the basic set of Torah and learn at home. The most important I think is Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which contains the basic principles of how to learn and most of the basic principles of Torah.
But in case people are reading this that might need a more basic introduction: the best of introductory books I have seen are those of Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsh --that is his book, the Horev. After that The English Soncino Talmud I think is great. I am not exaggerating. The translations there are works of genius. After that the best book of Jewish Law is the Tur with the Beit Yoseph. I really loved learning that book with the Bach also.
Race mixing
Stephen Gould suggested the fact of female choice as being an important factor--that is when there is freedom for the female of a species to choose upward that tends to bring the species to a higher level.
In any case, the problem with mixing that I see is that race is the beginning of one species being divided into two or more. That means race mixing is going directly against Nature and fighting against nature usually results in Nature winning the battle.
In any case, the problem with mixing that I see is that race is the beginning of one species being divided into two or more. That means race mixing is going directly against Nature and fighting against nature usually results in Nature winning the battle.
3.2.17
reason can perceive universals
To me it seems reason can perceive universals. I tend to go with Michael Huemer on this and Hegel also. The idea that there is some upper limit to reason Hegel answered by means of a dialectical approach. [That is Hegel does not really hold of what is called intellectual intuition and is like Kant on that score. But he holds by thinking reason penetrates into the ding an sich by a dialectical process.]
As Bryan Caplan pointed out Kant is based on Hume and Hume assumes that all reason can do is perceive contradictions. He never proves this but just accepts it as an axiom. But clearly Reason does much more. It recognizes general principles. Thus the whole basis of Kant falls away. Still there is much in the Intuitionist school of Michael Huemer that seems like quietism and does not address the issues raised by Kant--like how does reason go further? For this we need Hegel.
That is the Intuitionists deals with Kant's question how can reason perceive synthetic a priori like this: It just does. Period. clearly Huemer is more subtle than that and goes with probability. He is an amazing writer but still things there that needs critique.
[I would rather not go into this, but just look up Hegel and Huemer's writings Prichard's, John Searle, and the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed. You will see with this background what I mean.] [When the Rambam says to learn Metaphysics, I think that though he meant the set of books of Aristotle by that name, this should be applied to Kant and Hegel.]
[I should mention I have tried hard to defend the Kant/Fries school of Kelley Ross, but in the end I have had to go with Hegel. It is not necessarily one particular problem. Kelley Ross is an amazing thinker, but to me Hegel just makes a lot more sense.]
There is a Jewish mother blog "Mother in Israel" that suggested on her blog Hegel a long time ago that I ignored because I had found some important insights on Kelley Ross's Kant Fries site. The thing I think that got me most interested in Hegel was when I realized his jargon was philosophical an that statements taken out of context or poorly understood did not constitute a true critique. Also just seeing some of the problems in Kant that simply are not well answered brought me around to seeing the importance of Hegel. That is in a nut shell: The critiques on Hegel I thought were not accurate.
It occurs to me I was never very impressed with implanted knowledge especially since it can't be falsified-not with any of the things Kant though were unconditioned, but even things like Math. Still all in all Dr Kelley Ross is an amazingly thorough thinker. I still have to go with Hegel.
As Bryan Caplan pointed out Kant is based on Hume and Hume assumes that all reason can do is perceive contradictions. He never proves this but just accepts it as an axiom. But clearly Reason does much more. It recognizes general principles. Thus the whole basis of Kant falls away. Still there is much in the Intuitionist school of Michael Huemer that seems like quietism and does not address the issues raised by Kant--like how does reason go further? For this we need Hegel.
That is the Intuitionists deals with Kant's question how can reason perceive synthetic a priori like this: It just does. Period. clearly Huemer is more subtle than that and goes with probability. He is an amazing writer but still things there that needs critique.
[I would rather not go into this, but just look up Hegel and Huemer's writings Prichard's, John Searle, and the Rambam's Guide for the Perplexed. You will see with this background what I mean.] [When the Rambam says to learn Metaphysics, I think that though he meant the set of books of Aristotle by that name, this should be applied to Kant and Hegel.]
[I should mention I have tried hard to defend the Kant/Fries school of Kelley Ross, but in the end I have had to go with Hegel. It is not necessarily one particular problem. Kelley Ross is an amazing thinker, but to me Hegel just makes a lot more sense.]
There is a Jewish mother blog "Mother in Israel" that suggested on her blog Hegel a long time ago that I ignored because I had found some important insights on Kelley Ross's Kant Fries site. The thing I think that got me most interested in Hegel was when I realized his jargon was philosophical an that statements taken out of context or poorly understood did not constitute a true critique. Also just seeing some of the problems in Kant that simply are not well answered brought me around to seeing the importance of Hegel. That is in a nut shell: The critiques on Hegel I thought were not accurate.
It occurs to me I was never very impressed with implanted knowledge especially since it can't be falsified-not with any of the things Kant though were unconditioned, but even things like Math. Still all in all Dr Kelley Ross is an amazingly thorough thinker. I still have to go with Hegel.
Hegel as opposed to Leftism
I think the left made its progress by taking the name of Hegel in vain and misappropriating some of his slogans and and misunderstanding him (maybe on purpose) to fit. That is,-- if all they had was Rousseau, that would not have been enough.
So one step in the right direction I believe is to retake the battle field. They have got Hegel? Then take him back. Show how he was opposite to everything the left is about.
And after all is said and done even the real intellectuals of the Left were aware they had to repudiate Hegel. Just for an example with Hegel morals are real and objective and can be perceived by reason, though not directly. Hegel is a plain rebuke to Hume who limits reason to perceiving contradictions.
So one step in the right direction I believe is to retake the battle field. They have got Hegel? Then take him back. Show how he was opposite to everything the left is about.
And after all is said and done even the real intellectuals of the Left were aware they had to repudiate Hegel. Just for an example with Hegel morals are real and objective and can be perceived by reason, though not directly. Hegel is a plain rebuke to Hume who limits reason to perceiving contradictions.
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