religious fanaticism and the worship of dead people. Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

 There is a point to what many people say about religious fanaticism. I.e. that it is insane. And that is a true point. And also well justified by observation. But the opposite extreme seems  also somewhat off. The way I think is best to deal with this issue is to find the good and throw out what is wrong. [One good way to see this issue is like Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School where religious belief comes under the category of immediate non intuitive knowledge. So where as id one find the path towards holiness that has the most energy and light, the problem is if one misses the target even by the slightest amount he or she falls into the Dark Side where the energy and power of evil is infinite. And even worse is the fact that these two opposite poles are often contained in the same person. (as people often have that characteristic of containing opposite in one body.)

[Another problem in the religious world is the worship of dead people. In Torah we find that there is a prohibition of worship of any other gods besides the One and only First Cause. The religious worship other gods but they get away with this because they pretend that what they are doing is not idolatry. They clothe their worship of dead people in Jewish religious clothing and that is supposed to make it OK.]

Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.

בכורות דף נ''ו ואבי עזרי של רב שך הלכות שקלים

 I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the אבי עזרי of רב שך in הלכות of שקלים. It is this in the רמב''ם there is this approach to מעשר בהמה. Sheep or cows come into the domain of יורשים it is is not obligated. That is where is disagrees with the ראב''ד. But in the domain, what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated.  The question רב שך has on this רמב''ם is based on the משנה that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. רב שך asks would it not be more of a חידוש to say that the inheritors that   divide are מחויבים if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה. The lack of understanding on my part is this. The משנה certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly רב שך here is understanding the רמב''ם that that משנה is coming to tell us יש ברירה. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. On one hand I can see the point of רב שך. In the way of the רמב''ם, that משנה has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear. What I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the מעשר for animals is that there is a change in domain, from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain..

It occurred to me later today to mention that my basic point is that there is not much difference with the brothers going into a new partnership of coming out of one when it comes to the issue of "breira". If אין ברירה [no choosing] then going into one is the same as coming out, and same is there is choosing. While Rav Shach's question revolves on the idea that there is a difference. Going into a new partnership he holds is clearly like they are buyers. But not coming out of one. But if we hold "there is choosing", it ought not to make a difference. Rav Shach is saying since there is choosing the mishna could have simply told us coming out of the partnership does not change anything and they are still obligated in maasar behama. [As the Mishna obviously hold that way anyway.] So why come onto the next case of rejoining? [It is doubtful to me why this should be different] Rav Shach holds that this is where the mishna tells us there is choosing and this new partnership is what makes them obligated.

בכורות נ''ו רמב''ם הלכות שקלים

תמהתי על נושא מסוים באבי עזרי של רב שך בהלכות של שקלים. זה ברמב''ם יש גישה זו למעשר בהמה. כבשים או פרות נכנסים לרשות של יורשים הם לא מחויבים. שם הוא לא מסכים עם הראב''ד. אך מה שנולד ברשות היורשים חייב. השאלה שיש לרב שך על רמב''ם זה מבוססת על הנושא שאם היורשים מתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב, הם אינם חייבים במעשר. רב שך שואל האם זה לא יהיה יותר חידוש לומר שיורשים שמתחלקים הם מחויבים אם המשנה באה לומר לנו יש ברירה. חוסר ההבנה מצדי הוא זה. המשנה בהחלט מחזיקה יש ברירה. האחים עדיין חייבים במה שנולד בזמן הצטרפותם. ההצטרפות  השנייה היא זו שגורמת להם לא להיות חייבים. ברור שרב שך כאן מבין את הרמב''ם שאותו משנה בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. אבל נראה שכך או אחרת זה לא אומר כלום אם האחים מתחלקים. מצד אחד אני יכול לראות את הטעם של רב שך. בדרך של הרמב''ם, אותו משנה צריכה ללכת על פי הדעה שיש ברירה. כי אם לא [כלומר אם החוק יהיה אין ברירה], אז כאשר האחים מתחלקים הם ייחשבו כקונים שלא יהיו חייבים במעשר בהמה. ובכל זאת קשה לומר שגם לפי אין ברירה שההתחייבות שכבר הייתה עליהם לתת כל חיה עשירית תיעלם. מה שאני מתכוון. הדרך הרגילה בה אנו מבינים שאנשים שקונים אינם חייבים במעשר בהמה היא שיש שינוי בתחום, מאדם אחד לאחר. אבל כאן בעלי חיים שנולדו כשהאחים היו ביחד הם עכשיו בבעלות זה או אחר בלבד. זה לא ממש שינוי בעלות.

I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach [in the only law in Laws of Shekalim that there is a chapter in the Avi Ezri]. It is this in the Rambam there is this approach to tithe of animals [every tenth animal must be given away]. It comes into the domain of inheritors it is is not obligated. [That is where is disagrees with the Raavad.] But in the domain --i.e. what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated [That is both to the Raavad and Rambam.] The question Rav Shach has on this Rambam is a different. The question is based on the fact that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. Rav Shach asks would it not be more of a "chidush" [new idea] to say that the inheritors that   divide are obligated if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה [what is divided reveals what was already divided in potential in the past.].

The lack of understanding on my part is this. The mishna certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly Rav Shach here is understanding the Rambam that that mishna is coming to tell us something about there is "braira"  יש ברירה or there is not braira [choosing]. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. 

On one hand I can see the point of Rav Shach. In the way of the Rambam, that mishna has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה [there is choosing]. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to   אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear.

I think you can see what I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the maasar for animals is that there is a change in domain--from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain.

 The fact of my accepting way of learning of saying the words and going on [mentioned in the Musar book אורחות צדיקים ורב נחמן the Ways of the Righteous and Rav Nahman Conversations 76  ] does not mean I see no place for intense review and in depth learning. It is just that this sort of in depth type has never been clear to me how to go about it. One of the many ways I have tried is this. Once I get to a place in a book where things simply stop making any sense to me [let's say for example in Algebraic Topology] it is at that point that I figure I need to do review. So I simply start where I am already holding and go back page by page to the very beginning. That seems to work for some subjects. But Tosphot is more self contained. You do not need to know every other Tosphot in Shas in order to understand one. So in terms of that kind of learning I would take just one particular Tosphot or some chapter in the Avi Ezri or Rav Haim of Brisk, and just review that one chapter day after day. So it seems to me that in depth learning depends on the subject.

 z4 A minor

z4 midi file

z4 nwc

Metaphysics

 One finds in some rishonim the importance of Metaphysics. Mainly that would be Ibn Pakuda [author of the Obligations of the Hearts], Binyamin the doctor [author of Maalot HaMidot], Rambam and others. [They do not see this as bitul Torah [waste of time that should be used for learning Torah].] So while clearly they are referring to the discipline, still I would say the main reference is the Book Metaphysics by Aristotle.

So what does that mean for today? My impression is that this discipline has developed in three different directions. Kant (along the lines of Leonard Nelson); Hegel; G.E. Moore. That is I would not venture to say which of these is right because each school seems to have very great and important points. But not the whole picture. 

[The Kant Friesian school tends towards reason in areas of physical reality. It is in spiritual reality it tends towards a sort of fifth sense [non intuitive immediate perception. While Hegel agrees totally with these realms of spiritual reality, he holds that reason can penetrate even there.  The G.E. Moore School simply holds that that way that Hume limited the range of reason is just not so. So he is like Hegel.]

[So in philosophy it seems you have the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson. Then Hegel and then G.E. Moore. It is hard to know which one is correct, but all have something to add to understanding.

 There is an aspect of Hegel that is similar to the Kantian School of Fries and Leonard Nelson. That is in the self contradictions in every thought and every aspect of being things. 

So it seems to me that these two traditions are not as contrary as one might think at first.

In the Leonard Nelson approach this beyond logic and reason occurs in the dinge an sich, the areas beyond possibilities of experience. In Hegel the contradictions are in every stage of being and are resolved only in the Absolute [God]. So to me, it seems these are not all that different. 

[I mean in terms of metaphysical reality. But as for how we know stuff, there is a difference.]