I was disturbed by problems in faith and almost immediately after that I discovered the Kant Friesian site on the Internet of Dr Kelley Ross. [I might have the order of events mixed up. It could be the first time I noticed Dr Ross was in his essay on Spinoza.] In any case his approach to issues of faith and what is called numinous value helped me immensely.
Still however, I do admit that that school of thought [based on Kant and Leonard Nelson] seems a bit too dismissal of Hegel.

In any case, I realized that there are lots of problems in faith that seem to beyond the realm of reason to answer; and also there seem to be values in faith which seem beyond reason to comprehend.
So the whole idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge makes a lot of sense to me.

[I might mention that the approach of Dr Ross is named after Kant and Fries, but is very much based also on Schopenhauer and Popper.]

This is more or less all part of German Idealism. But it intersects with John Locke and natural law in terms of self, the autonomous individual.  English thought all through that time was going in totally different directions. That is,- a lot of the intellectual energy of the English was spent on Protestant issues and the crown. You can more or less trace a straight line in English thought from Henry VIII and the English Dissidents, Daniel Defoe, until the Constitution of the USA.

But there is a point where both streams of thought intersect in natural law and the autonomy of the individual.

The issue of human rights was a major topic in England from the aspect of the King's right as opposed or separate from  Parliament and Parliament as different from the Commons and that as different from the People. All these issues were later reflected in Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson.
[It did not all start just with John Locke.] 

Jeremiah (23) has a tirade against the pastors of Israel and so does Ezekiel (22).  So in the Gemara itself we find a complaint against the judges of Israel. [All troubles that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel. That is at the end of tractate Shabat. And they bring another verse for a proof.] So when the Ran of Breslov says that the supposed authorities in Torah Law are demons, it should come as no surprise. Even though I was a bit shocked when I first saw this, subsequent events proved it all too well.   [It comes up more often that you would imagine. You can see it also in the Ari {Isaac Luria} and yet I managed to miss the warning until too late.

In any case, I do wonder what really the Ran meant. Does it mean they are possessed? Or that they are simply not human. But whatever he means, the warning seems clear. So why is it ignored?

The connection with Rishonim that warn about tying Torah to money seems relevant. After all, it was the cause of the very first complaints against the Rambam that he had published a warning like this in his commentary on the Mishna. [In Pirkei Avot he goes into length about this.] Later on in Mishne Torah he repeats his warning. [However the major anti Rambam thing was later and it seems to have been because of the Guide.]
[The Mishna that the Rambam talks about is this דאשתמש בתגא חלף One who uses the crown passes away and the Rambam explains that means they lose their portion in the next world. That seems to mean they lose their soul and that would probably be along the same lines that the Ran of Brelov was talking about as far as I can tell.] 

fanaticism is not the path of Torah

Hegel  noted that philosophy tends to be one sided because each philosophy is  a reaction to what came before it. A similar tendency I noted with numinous value. One generation reacts against the over amount of abuse on one side of things and goes overboard on being secular. Then the next generation sees the problem with that, and overreacts and goes in the opposite direction.

The ideal is to find the right balance of values.

[I mean to say like Reb Nahman from Breslov suggested that over excitement in the service of God is also an evil inclination. That is to say fanaticism is not the path of Torah. As God told Moses to warn the people not to go up into the mountain or even to touch it. Saloplsky  says the same exact thing about obsession with numinous value is a sign of  a schizoid personality. That is a whole long lecture in his series.]

The problem with exact rules and an order of daily sessions in the service of God is the subject object aspect that Kant brings. That is objective rules will apply to different people according to their root souls and essential traits and tendencies differently.
Still there are general principles that apply across the board. To have good traits (Midot Tovot).
But plenty of things that at first glance might seem to be worthy practices can often be distractions -to divert one's attention from what is really important.

כל הדרכים בחזקת סכנה All paths are dangerous. No path in the service of God is safe. There are no guarantees.

In the book of Job we find that the Satan is constantly going around the world to see whom he can trick an seduce and fool to think good is evil and evil good. The most dangerous thing is to imagine that one is immune.

[Still the best set of guidelines that I know about is the basic path of Musar. That is to learn the essential set of Medieval Musar books that are well known in Litvak yeshivas.]

U-62 E Flat Major  U-64 D Minor   

U-62 in midi format   u62 nwc  u64 in midi format  u64 nwc

If one marries a girl he thinks is a virgin and it turns out she is not then  one opinion is she is not married. Another is she loses the כתובה of מאתים and gets only מנה. Or gets no כתובה at all?

In terms of a regular מקח טעות [purchase by mistake] there seems to be a similar disagreement of opinion in בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. If one buys an ox for plowing and it turns out to be unsuitable because it is not tamable. So the deal is off, but what about the money given to the seller. Does he owe the money as would a borrower? Or is there not deal at all and if he spends he money it is considered that he is  a מזיק? The רשב''ם considers that money is owed even though he thinks of the seller as a מזיק. That is confusing enough all by itself. If the seller is  a מזיק, then it ought to be the case that if the money is still around, then he gives it back; and if not, he pays like any מזיק. And that is in fact exactly what the ר''י says. Thus it is in fact hard to know what the רשב''ם is thinking here. The רשב''ם brings from a ר' חננאל  and that ר' חננאל does seem to consider the  מקח טעות  as being akin to a regular debt. That  is the seller pays back money if he has and שווה כסף if not. That at least makes sense. In any case, what I am trying to say is if the seller is considered to be a מזיק that means he does not own the money. So before he spends the money, it still belongs to the buyer. So then why would it not make a difference if he gives back that money or other money? If the seller would be thought to be a בעל חוב, then I can understand why giving back any money is the same as giving back the actual coins of the transaction. But if he is thought to be a מזיק then the coins were not his at any time.


אם אחד מתחתן עם נערה שהוא חושב היא בתולה ומתברר שהיא לא אז דעה אחת היא שהיא לא נשואה. דעה אחרת היא שהיא רק מאבדת את הכתובה של מאתים ומקבלת רק מנה. או אולי אינה מקבלת שום כתובה בכלל? במונחים של מקח טעות רגיל [רכישה בטעות] נראה שיש חילוקי דעות דומות לאלו הדעות בבבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. אם אחד קונה שור לחריש ומתברר כי הוא אינו מתאים משום שהוא אינו בַּר אִלוּף. אז העסקה מבוטלת, אבל מה עם הכסף הנתון למוכר. האם הוא חייב את הכסף כלווה? או האם הוא נחשב כמזיק? הרשב''ם סבור כי  המוכר נחשב מזיק, אבל לא משנה איזה כסף הוא מחזיר. אם המוכר הוא מזיק, אז זה צריך להיות כך שאם הכסף הוא עדיין ברשותו, אז הוא מחזיר אותו; ואם לא, הוא משלם כמו כל מזיק. וזה למעשה בדיוק מה ר''י אומר. לכן קשה לדעת מה הרשב''ם חושב כאן. רשב''ם מביא מן ר' חננאל וכי ר' חננאל כנראה שוקל את המקח טעות כמו חוב רגיל. כלומר המוכר משלם כסף [איזה כסף שיהיה] אם יש לו, ואת שווה כסף אם לא. זה הגיוני. בכל מקרה, מה שאני מנסה לומר הוא שאם המוכר נחשב להיות כמזיק זה אומר שהוא אינו בעלים של הכסף. אז לפני שהוא מוציא את הכסף, זה עדיין שייך לקונה. אז למה זה לא משנה אם הוא נותן בחזרה את כסף או כסף אחר? אם המוכר יהיה נחשב להיות בעל חוב, אז אני יכול להבין למה להחזיר איזה כסף זהה להחזיר את המטבעות בפועל של העסקה. אבל אם הוא נחשב להיות מזיק המטבעות לא היו שלו.  

I do not have a Gemara Ketuboth. However I recall the issue over there if one marries a girl he thinks is a virgin and it turns out she is not that one opinion is she is not married. Another is she loses the Ketubah of 200 and gets only 100. [Or gets no Ketubah at all?]

In terms of a regular מקח טעות [purchase by mistake] there seems to be a similar disagreement of opinion in Bava Batra 92

If one buys an ox for plowing and it turns out to be unsuitable because it is not tamable. So the deal is off, but what about the money given to the seller. Does he owe the money as would a borrower? Or is there no deal at all, and if he spends he money, it is considered that he is  a מזיק [a person that causes damage]?

The Rashbam considers that money is owed even though he thinks of the seller as a מזיק [one that causes damage]. That is confusing enough all by itself. If the seller is  a מזיק [damager], then it ought to be that if the money is still around, then he gives it back;- and if not, he pays like any מזיק [damager]. And that is in fact exactly what the Ri says.

Thus it is in fact hard to know what the Rashbam is thinking here.

The Rashbam brings from a Rav Hananel from Rome [not the other famous one that I think taught the Rif.] and that Rav Hananel does seem to consider the  מקח טעות {a deal done by mistake} as being akin to a regular debt. That  is the seller pays back money if he has and שווה כסף if not.That at least makes sense.

To be short I am not sure how to understand the Rashbam and I also wonder if in fact one can tie this into the case in Ketuboth.

[I also am wondering why when I was learning Ketuboth in Shar Yashuv in NY that the connection with Bava Batra escaped me. To me today it seems highly relevant.]

In any case what I am trying to say is if the seller is considered to be a מזיק that means he does not own the money until he spends it. So before he spends it it still belongs to the buyer. So then why would it not make a difference if he gives back that money or other money? If the seller would be thought to be a בעל חוב then I can understand why giving back any money is the same as giving back the actual coins of the transaction. But if he is thought to be a מזיק the the coins were not his at any time. {I figure there must be an answer for this but it escapes me this minute.}