Probably the most important thing I learned in yeshiva was the idea of trust in God. That is that it is possible, and even desirable, and perhaps even necessary to sit and learn Torah and to trust in God that He will provide. In an amazing way this worked for me very well, until the day I decided that it is better to work for a living. When that simple decision was made, almost instantaneously the whole situation disintegrated. 
But my view of this is slightly different than the Madragat HaAdam. He was simply against all secular learning period. I hold however from the Rambam approach which requires learning the Oral and Written  Law, Physics and Metaphysics.  But not for Parnasah [making a living] but for themselves.
[In any case, the Madragat HaAdam, Joseph Horvitz is misunderstood. His idea was all you need to do is to sit and learn and God will take care of the rest and that message is exactly what his disciples did. The idea was not to create a movement nor lots of yeshivas. The enormous amounts of Navardok Yeshivas were simply a result of people acting on this philosophy. ]




When I learned this idea at the Mir in NY, no one was saying that one can use Torah to make money, as the religious world does. That is,--- it was always clear that there is a distinction between using Torah for money [as is done universally in the religious world when they are constantly asking for charity and yet never giving it to others in need] --and trusting in God, which is specifically never to ask anyone for money. 
Besides this, it is no mitzvah try and bankrupt the State of Israel and the religious try to do with their false kollels which are just private country clubs.

Therefore what I suggest is to create your own space at home for learning Torah.  Do not wait for the rest of the world to fix itself--especially since the problems are too complex. That is to have a space in your own home for Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot, Musar, and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. In fact, it is better not to go to any of the religious institutions for Torah because by and large, they use Torah to make money, not visa versa. Better a little Torah lishma [for its own sake], rather than a lot of Torah for money.
I am suggesting the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, but it is a good idea to get the basic set of books from Gedolei Litva, that is Reb Chaim's חידושי הרמב''ם, and Naphtali Troup חידושי הגרנ''ט.\

What this will do will hopefully change you to be a more moral and more decent human being, more aware of your obligations between yourself and others and yourself and God. That is in short --better at keeping the Ten Commandments and all of the holy Torah.

Yeshiva as an independent institution from the "kahal" was a great idea at the time but it has deteriorated into using Torah to make Money. Therefore the age of the individual learner has begun--the age when it is best not to be connected or go to any institution o learn Torah bu rather to do it on your own at home.
[Even the great institutions like Ponovitch and the three great NY yeshivas Chaim Berlin, Mir, Torah VeDaat are limited to their areas. Unless you are in walking distance there is not much you can do.]

Socialism In Venezuela. 

The religious world is always looking for pseudo enemies

There are lots of bad things out there. But the religious world uses a kind of misdirection approach to make itself seem better and nicer.
It is always looking for pseudo enemies to make people think if they run into the religious group they will be safe.

This however does not apply to all and every religious group. For example I was in two great yeshivas which were seriously involved in the arduous task of learning and keeping Torah  in an authentic way. [Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY].

The entire question is how to tell the authentic from pretense? [History of a group that follows a certain idea or set of ideas can help to discern, because that history is that idea in itself in motion--coming out from potential into actuality.]

But if one has in fact fallen into a  cult, there is no escape. The only thing one can do and should do is to scream at the top of his or her lungs the real truth. ["All who leave idolatry immediately die." כל הפורש בעבודה זרה מיד מת. That is  a famous statement of the sages. One place I think it is is around Sanhedrin 66. Also the events of the spies that Moses sent show that simple repentance is never a possibility. When they tried to enter Israel in spite of not having God's blessing in order to repent when they refuse to come to Israel with God's blessing--that did not succeed.



Because the religious cults are certainly always seeking for more human sacrifices.   But that is not the top of their Agenda. The top of their agenda is to keep people quite after they have been abuses so that the religious can continue doing what they do best, seduce and subvert the Holy Torah.

Plus it is important to keep on learning and keeping Torah on an individual basis in spite of the bad demons that use Torah as a cover up for their true nature.

[The people that could do the documenting would be Na Nach who are already aware of the problems. The question is how to get rid of the kelipot/shells but to retain the nut. ]

Bava Batra 31

I really did not have a lot to add to this subject but for now I want to introduce it briefly. It relates to a Tosphot in Bava Metzia page 110. But the basic subject is in Bava Batra 31.
Two people come to court. Each one says, ''This land was my father's and I have been on it three years.'' Then two sets of witnesses come to court. One set says it was his father's. The other set says about the other person, "He was on it three years." Raba says , "Why should he have lied? He could have said,  "I bought it from you.  Abyee says, "We do not say 'He could have said' in a place there are witnesses."

[This already brings up the subject of Migo--when do we say "He could have said"? And I tried to deal with that in my little book on Bava Metzia page 98. There it is about  a loan.]

The issue here is that in Tosphot in Bava Metzia one opinion [page 110] is this. If it were so that a person can say that land you have been on for more than three years came to you as a guarantee for a loan, then even without מחאה [protest] within three years, one would always be believed, "that land you are on is mine and you have it because you stole it." For he could have said it is a משכון guarantee and be believed.So believe him now. That is a migo can take out of חזקה [prior possession]

Thus, the argument in תוספות seems to be the connected to the  argument between רבה and אביי. Because in our situation in בבא בתרא, no witness is saying either plaintiff owned the land. Rather, the set of witnesses that said about one plaintiff that he was there for the years of possession. That means he has חזקה. The testimony is that he has a חזקה, not that he has ownership. Thus the argument between רבה and אביי is if there is a מיגו in the place where there are witnesses is connected with case of תוספות.
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תוספות בבא מציעא דף ק''י ע''א But the basic subject is in בבא בתרא דף ל''א.
Two people come to court. Each one says, ''this field was my fathers and I have been on it three years שני חזקה.'' Then two sets of witnesses come to court. One set says it was his father's. The other set says about the other טוען, " he was on it three years. רבה says he could have said, Why should he have lied? He could have said "I bought it from you." אביי says, "We do not say 'He could have said' in a place there are witnesses."

The issue here is that in תוספות בבא מציעא one opinion  is this. If it were so that a person can say that land you have been on for more than three years came to you as a guarantee for a loan, then even without מחאה protest within three years, one would always be believed that land you are on is mine and you have it because you stole it. For he could have said it is a משכון guarantee and be believed. So believe him now. That is a מיגו can take out of חזקה.

Thus, the argument in תוספות seems to be the connected to the  argument between רבה and אביי. Because in our situation in בבא בתרא, no witness is saying either plaintiff owned the land. Rather, the set of witnesses that said about one plaintiff that he was there for the years of possession. That means he has חזקה. The testimony is that he has a חזקה, not that he has ownership. Thus the argument between רבה and אביי is if there is a מיגו in the place where there are witnesses is connected with case of תוספות.
But the difference is this. In בבא בתרא רבה is not saying we believe a מיגו to take of of חזקה. just the opposite.  We believe the person that has the חזקה because he also has a מיגו. It is rather אביי that says we o not even believe him because of his מיגו and also not because of his חזקה.

But w can also see that the person with  the מיגו is in fact taking out of the חזקה מעיקרא  of the other טוען. That is we put his חזקת השתא  and חזקת שלש שנים together with the מיגו to take out of חזקה מעיקרא. I am assuming here that the fact that the land once belonged to his father that at least gives him the standpoint of חזקה מעיקרא
In any case, I think that this argument between רבה and אביי might also depend on the argument in תוספות in נידה whether חזקה מעיקרא וחזקה דהשתא are equal. If that is the case then we can understand רבה that if you add a מיגו to the חזקה דהשתא that can outweigh the חזקה מעיקרא of the other טוען. But if חזקה מעיקרא is stronger then we can understand אביי that does not think putting together a מיגו with חזקה דהשתא can overpower a חזקה מעיקרא. But to him it might be that even so חזקה מעקרא in our case might also not be enough. After all the other טעון was on the land three years
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At any rate, the Gemara goes on. "He says,  'I meant I considered  it as my fathers's '" Ula said טוען וחוזר וטוען  he can make  a plea  and then change it. The people in city of Naharda said he can not make a plea and then change it.. But if  he said it was was fathers's who bought it from your fathers" even the people of Naharda agree. If outside of courts he said  one thing he can change his plea since a person is not used to revealing all that he has to say outside of court.

The Rashbam says if he said outside of court ''the land is yours' then he can not change that in court.
but if he said "it never was your father's" [in direct contradiction to the witnesses but not a direct admission.] then he can change that plea.

Rav Akiva Eigger has a doubt about a different subject which is relevant to this,
The law is if one says "I never borrowed " and witnesses said he borrowed and paid back, it is as if he said I never paid back. But is that because I it is like a complete admission or just and implied admission?

The Rambam says about this last case "If he said in court 'I never borrowed' it is admission" thus it is clear he holds it is only implied admission, and therefore if he said it outside of court, he can change his plea. That is it is not straightforward admission. That is like the Rashbam. The Rashba (Rav Shelomo ben Aderet) and Rabbainu Yona said even if he said it outside of court, he can not change his plea in court. Thus they think of it as a explicit admission.

The problems here are so many I could not even begin to count them,but like I said I only wanted to introduce the subject for now.


תוספות בבא מציעא דף ק''י ע''א. הנושא הבסיסי הוא בבבא בתרא דף ל''א. שני אנשים מגיעים לבית המשפט. כל אחד אומר, "השדה זה היה של אבותיי ואני עובד שם שני חזקה, שלוש שנים." ואז שני סטים של עדים באים לבית המשפט. קבוצה אחת אומרת ששדה זה היה לאביו. הסט השני אומר על טוען האחר, "הוא היה על שדה זה שלוש שנים. רבה אמר למה לשני לשקר? הוא היה יכול לומר, "קניתי את השדה הזה ממך."  אביי אמר," אנחנו עושים לא אומרים 'הוא היה יכול לומר' במקום שישנם עדים". כאן הבעיה היא כי תוספות בבא מציעא דעה אחת היא זו. אם זה היה כך שאדם יכול לומר כי הקרקע שיש לך כבר למעלה משלוש שנים בא לך כערובה להלוואה, אז גם בלי מחאת מחאה בתוך שלוש שנים, אחד תמיד יהיה אמין בטענה "הקרקע שאתה עליה היא שלי ויש לך את זו כי אתה גזלת אותה" עבור שהוא היה יכול לומר את זו היא ערובת משכון ושיאמין. אז מאמינים לו עכשיו. זהו מיגו יכול להוציא חזקה. לפיכך, טיעון תוספות נראה את מחובר להוויכוח בין רבה ואביי. כי במצב שלנו בבבא בתרא, לא אף עד אומר שהתובע היה בעל האדמה. במקום זאת, הקבוצה של עדים שאמרו על תובע אחד שהוא היה שם לשלשת השנים. כלומר, יש לו חזקה. העדות היא כי יש לו חזקה, לא כי יש לו בעלות. לכן הוויכוח בין רבה ואביי הוא אם יש מיגו במקום שבו יש עדים קשורים במקרה של תוספות. אבל ההבדל הוא זה. בבבא בתרא רבה הוא לא אומר שאנחנו מאמינים מיגו לקחת של של חזקה. רק להפך. אנו מאמינים האדם שיש לו את החזקה כי יש לו גם מיגו. זה לא לאביי שאומר שאנחנו אפילו לא מאמינים לו בגלל מיגו שלו וגם לא בגלל החזקה שלו. אבל ניתן גם לראות כי האדם עם מיגו הוא למעשה לוקח מתוך חזקה מעיקרא של טוען האחר. כלומר שמיגו שלו עם חזקת השתא, ואת החזקה של שלש שנים יחד יכולים להוציא מחזקת מעיקרא. אני מניח כאן כי העובדה שהקרקע שייכת פעם לאביו שלפחות נותן לו מבחינת החזקה מעיקרא. בכל מקרה, אני חושב כי מחלוקת בין רבה ואביי אולי גם תלוי טיעון בתוספות בנידה ב: אם חזקה מעיקרא וחזקה דהשתא שווות. אם זה נכון אז נוכל להבין רבה שאם תוסיף מיגו אל חזקת השתא שזה יכול להכריע את חזקא מעיקרא של טוען האחר. אבל אם חזקה מעיקרא חזקה, אז נוכל להבין את אביי שלא חושב להרכיב מיגו עם חזקה דהשתא כדי להכניע חזקה מעיקרא. אבל לו  יכול להיות שגם כך חזקה מעקרא בענייננו אולי גם לא יספיק. אחרי שהטוען השני היה שם בשלוש שני חזקה.


I know you could argue with all this. I imagine if I was learning with David Bronson he would challenge every single assumption here. He would first attack the idea that because it was on one of the plaintiff' father's that does not necessarily make it  חזקה מעיקרא. Plus plenty of other objections I was thinking of as I was writing this.

He would also wonder about if the fact one person was there three years if that makes it חזקה דהשתא. And probably a few tons of other objections. Anyway there tons of problems here that I just can not imagine right now how to handle.

I generally agree with economists of the Austrian school and the Chicago school in some ways. 
Especially the idea that people respond to incentives. But the kind of incentives they respond to is one point of contention. It is not that people are out to seek their own benefit and thus form a society and trade in order to maximize their benefits. Rather I think people are out looking for an altar to sacrifice themselves and other people on.... some human being or some cause  they have to agree with, and if anyone disagrees they will go to war to make them agree. Religious people that present themselves as loving and kind, are actually out to bring in human sacrifices to their leaders. They use the kindness as bait the same way you put a tasty worm on a fish hook.

It has been said people were born to freedom but everywhere are in chains. As de Masitre  said that is as sensible as saying sheep who are born carnivorous are none the less everywhere eating grass. If you want to know what people are born to, then look as what they do, not what you think they ought to do. 

The Sitra Achra [the realm of Evil] we already know has great power to make itself seem sweet and lovely for the moment,

With Kant all you really have is knowledge based on observation or not based on observation. [a posteriori or a priori].
This comes from Hume. But this to a large degree accepts a very secular idea of the ''self''. The Self that is not a soul is a secular thing. It has no spiritual intuitions, spiritual connections.
This creates a very false self image of what a person is or ought to be for every single individual. It does not automatically deny knowledge based on spiritual intuition but it does so by implication.

This means that people looking into their own lives and trying figure out things tend to miss a significant aspect of their own self being that they can not take into account because they believe it has no relevance nor even reality. Even when they are interested in Torah this makes them incapable of accounting for what they might be doing right or wrong. They also will tend to look at others as selves, but not souls. [Allan Bloom went into this in great depth in his book, The Closing Of The American Mind].

In my own case there were spiritual connections that I had with my parents and Israel and Torah and the Infinite Light  of the Divine Presence, that I ignored because of not being able to take them into account in my mental processing. That led me to ignore the most significant aspects of Torah.  

This is not to minimize the danger of the fact that all intuitions are subject to error. The Sitra Achra [the realm of Evil] we already know has great power to make itself seem sweet and lovely for the moment, though in the end it is bitterness and gall.

I am also quite aware of soul connections that are not at all felt in any sense but are none the less quite real. 

structure of medieval society

Allen Bloom (The Closing of the American Mind) compared the structure of medieval society as a Gothic Cathedral with the vast amounts of pushes and pulls and strains all balancing out. Trying to undo the natural order causes the whole thing to come tumbling down --since we do not know what makes society tick. Thus he saw the Enlightenment as leading to an eventual collapse of the social contract as he thought was happening around 1990.

Our state of understanding how any human society works is on the order of medieval medicine -that all their theories were wrong, and anything any doctor would do would automatically cause more damage than leaving the patient alone. Medicine has advanced a little  since then,- but all our theories of how human society works are clearly  100% wrong; and anything anyone does to improve things just leads to the patient's death all the sooner.