Rambam הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הלכה ד'

You buy 50 crates of wine from Joe. [and you did משיכה and or הגבהה-you lifted  them if that was possible and if not then you pulled them.]  You owe him 50 dollars. Then you are taking with him and he finds out you have 50 sheep you want to sell.  The surprising thing is he can tell you I absolve you of your debt if you sell to me the 50 sheep, and if you agree then he acquires the sheep without doing any action.

So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.


In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind,  And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.

Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.

(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])


The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.

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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים  from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה.  הלוקח lifted  them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them.  The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell.  נמוכר  can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין

So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.



The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

רב שך  says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

 I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at. 
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.


The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from  loan, not a different kind of משכון

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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין  מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה.  (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין  שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק.  עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה  מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas





I hope  the above is clear. We can  see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are  monsters שדין יהודאיים, the so called teachers of Torah,  scourges sent by the Lord to punish a nation that had departed from the true faith,  drunk with lunacy and insanity.  They are best described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs. [Reb Nachman was a great tzadik, but he was not infallible, and he definitely opened to door to the kind of tzadik worship that is pure idolatry that infects his supposed followers. His emphasis of Shmirat Habrit mainly leads to more sin that it helps. Still if a tzadik should be judged by the misuse he is put to, then no tzadik would come out OK.]

The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.

As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform,  and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.

The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.

Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.

The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.

They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.

In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.

{Rambam laws of buying chapter 5 halacah 4 }

 If a person buys some goods, and then owes money. Then the buyer wants to sell stuff of his own {Rambam, Laws of Buying, chapter 5, halacah 4.} and then seller tells him, "Sell it to me, and your debt will be paid." At that point, the original seller does not have to do any act of acquisition. The Raavad as you can imagine disagrees with this (twice). The Gemara in Kidushin  says if this were so, then it would have to work for kidushin (marriage) also. And we know it does not. The Netivot has an answer for the Rambam and Rav Shach also. But  for now I just wanted to state what the problem is just for the sake of information. The problem is that in marrying a woman, one can not do so by a loan. This is  a famous halacha. That is to say: you loaned her money. Then you want to marry her. So instead of giving her a ring you say, "The debt you owes to me is forgiven." That does not work, and the reason is as the Gemara says הלוואה להוצאה נתנה  a loan is given to be spent. [That is the money of the loan already belongs to her.]

So what is the difference between this case and the above case of the buyer and seller? The buyer owes money. The seller then forgives the debt and the property of the buyer goes automatically to the seller.

I confess I did not understand Rav Shach's answer to this problem but I did see how he blew all the other proposed solutions out of the water. His seems to revolve on the money owed by the woman is forgiven as opposed to the money owed by the buyer which creates an act of purchase. I can see that the origins of the money owed in the two cases are different.One is in fact a loan. The other is money owed because of goods bought. Still I have  a hard time understanding why that would make any difference

Can a government force people to provide health care for others?

This goes to an argument between Richard Epstein and Dr. Michael Huemer. There is a legitimate argument for limited government. You have to see that debate. But the basic idea is the need for government is not the same as need for private institutions.
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
My notes on
http://www.breitbart.com/  have mainly been along the lines of Reb Nachman who said to avoid doctors.
There is a lot to go into about this, but the main idea I wanted to say today was simply without any elaboration, that government is not a social contract. That is, there is something different about the need for a government that is not the same as an extension of social contract theory either of the Rashbam in Bava Metzia, nor John Locke nor Rousseau. 

I have to say that Richard Epstein wins the debate here. But that means that since government is a ding an sich a thing in itself its rights of contract are not unlimited. That is more or less what Epstein would say and does say I think. But he is looking at Roman Law and the Constitution of the USA. I am looking into the very essence of government in itself that I think is limited. 

people can be idols and idiots. Sometimes the smartest are the worst.

The religious world seems to have a problem concerning idolatry. And it does not help that the concept itself is fuzzy. And even worse is when people try to define it in such a way that leaves out their particular version of idolatry. 
One particular problem is the accepted belief that is something is authentically Jewish, it  can not be idolatry. And if some is not Jewish, then it automatically comes under the suspicion of being idolatrous. 
But, in fact, an idol of a gentile can be nullified. That is if the gentile himself abandons its worship. Not  Jewish idol.
The basic problems with idolatry are three things. One is the idol itself, another is things offered to the idol and the last is things that are vessels or ornaments  made to serve the idol. People can be things offered to idols, and they do not have to agree to it. As in fact in the days when people were, in fact, offered to idols it was never the case that they agreed. Rather by the time they realized what was happening it was too late to turn around. By joining their cult, one  becomes a thing offered to their idol.

And people can be idols themselves as we see in Sanhedrin pg 63  האומר עבדוני ואמר כן חייב. (A person says, "Serve me" is killed for seducing to idol worship. A person that agrees and says "yes" is also killed for worshiping an idol.) That is not only is the person that says "Serve me" is an idol and is killed for being a מסית ומדיח, but also the person that agrees and says, "yes" is also killed for serving an idol.

Idols an the vessels that serve them and food and vessels offered to them are forbidden to derive benefit from. They are also unclean [טמא]. What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness if the people that served it nullify it? In all the above cases the uncleanliness disappears except for food offered to the idol. That obviously remains forbidden, but the uncleanliness is a doubt if it goes off.

An idol that is worshiped by gentiles can be nullified and an idol that is worshiped by Jews can not.  What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness? This all starts in Tractate Avoda Zara 52a. R. Yochanan asked  R. Yanai what happens to the uncleanliness of food offered to an idol. The question is asked why did he ask about food? Why not ask about vessels? Vessels are not a question since they can be made pure by dipping them in a river or fresh spring thus the "Tumah" uncleanliness also goes off. Why then did he not ask about the idol itself? The idol itself is not question for since its status as an idol can go off of it when people no longer worship it, then its uncleanliness also goes off. But food is a doubt because it has no way of getting clean by dipping it in a river or ocean or spring.

There the Rambam and Tosphot and the Raavad all hold vessels that were offered to the idol and vessels used to serve the idol can have their uncleanliness taken off. But Rashi explains in that Gemara that vessels can be made pure just like their use for idolatry can be nullified. So Rashi obviously is explains our gemara here as referring on to vessels that are used to serve the idol, not to vessels that were offered to the idol since their prohibition for use never comes off.

Thus it is important not to serve a Jewish idol since the uncleanliness and the prohibition can never come off. We also see this in Sanhedrin circa 65. When a Jew leaves serving  a Jewish idol he dies (because his source of life is cut off.)  We actually since this in gentiles also. Even a gentile when he leaves a cult that he was involved with, he looses his life source and dies spiritually--and sometimes physically. This you always see in people that break away from cults. They never get back on  track no matter how hard they try. Or they just go and join some worse cult.

Each of the different schools of Musar

Each of the different schools of Musar {Ethics} of Reb Israel Salanter emphasized a different facet or face of Musar.  And this tendency I have traced to different aspects of Musar in itself.
This can be confusing. And outside of that there were great people like Reb Chaim Solveitchik that simply did not let Musar into their yeshivas. To Reb Chaim, Yeshiva was for Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot. Full Stop. [This opinion, as far as I know, was shared by the Chazon Ish].

None of them liked the השכלה (Haskalah) which was the Jewish version of the Enlightenment.

The arguments against the Enlightenment itself seem to me to be appropriate the the Jewish version.
That is, starting from Jonathan Swift  up to and including Johann  Georg Hamann and Joseph de Maistre. I think you could include Allen Bloom, because in the long run his book is a critique on the Enlightenment from the aspects of seeings its bad effects (Closing of the American Mind.)

The most powerful critique is of course The Closing of the American Mind . Every sentence in that book contains a whole university education all in itself.

It is for this reason that I see the Rambam as giving a solution to this problem with his balanced approach (1) The Oral and Written Law of Moses (2) Physics (3) Metaphysics. That is he saw each of these as an important component of every persons's education. That is as universal and necessary. Sine qua non. Without which nothing else can happen.

My own approach to Musar is that it is like water. You need it but you do not want to drink so much as to overload your kidneys.
To me is is an essential vitamin, but I can not see how doing it hours every day [as the Musar movement intended] would help anything. There also seems to be no evidence that more that 30 minutes per day helps anything. 
While Reb Israel Salanter was certainly right about the need for character development, learning tons of Musar does not seem to help. If anything, it hurts. 
Instead, I suggest a Jewish version of the Boy Scouts, or like they have in Israel the "Tzofim" [Scouts].

That is to put it all together-- my idea of  a proper education is the Law of Moses [Oral and Written Law] Physics, Metaphysics, Survival Skills, Music.

There are problems with religion that the counter Enlightenment does not deal with very well. But the experience of living in the religious world has convinced me the truth of Reb Nachman who said most teachers of Torah were demonic.  תלמידי חכמים שדיין יהודאיים. Rav Israel Oddessar the founder of the Na Nach group certainly stressed this point and from what I have seen he was right on the money. So to my view this balanced approach of the Rambam make the most sense.

The problem is this. There are good arguments for the importance of keeping the Law of Moses, the oral and written Law. But as soon as one wants to do that, right away the Satan sends his messengers to mess the whole thing up. Most often the very desire to keep the holy Torah causes people more sin than if they had just remained secular. The way the messengers of Satan get into the door is by  a kind of scam in which they try present themselves as Torah teachers. My impression is that the best thing to do with them is to shoot them on sight. [If not for the problem that that would mess up the drive way or side walk.] The enlightenment did not arrive in a vacuum. Nor did the Rambam decide to combine faith with Aristotle and Plato because of some whim. He saw faith a reason as being so connect that one could not exist without the other. Faith as we see in the religious world  without Plato and Aristotle becomes fanatic insanity --not just for individuals but for whole communities. This is clear to anyone who has lived in a religious community. On the other hand Reason without the Revelation from Sinai is like a iron oven of ice.

Rambam: law of using an object dedicated to the Temple (7:9,10). Bava Metzia page 99, 43 a, tractate Meila page 20.

In terms of the law of Moses I wanted to mention that there is a sacrifice mentioned there for using something that was dedicated to the Temple in Jerusalem. It is one of the five guilt offerings. That is not the same as a sin offering.
The prohibition in the Torah come from the verse "You shall not eat in your gates.. and your vows."
So let us say you have money you have dedicated to the Temple. And you give it to a money changer or shop keeper to safeguard it. If it was wrapped in a way to show it should not be used and the money changer used it, he transgresses the prohibition. If it was not wrapped, and you said nothing to him about it, then no one transgresses the prohibition--to the Rambam. A teaching in pg. 43a the end of chapter המפקיד says you yourself did transgress. Why does the Rambam disagree? Because of a Mishna in Tracate Meila 20 that says simply the money changer does not transgress and stops at that. So we have no problem in understanding the Rambam. His opinion was that the Mishna in מעילה דף כ simply disagrees with the ברייתא. But what is the reasoning of the Rambam?
Rav Shach says the argument between the Mishna and the braita is this. The Braita holds if one gave money to a money-changer that was not wrapped up, it is meant as a loan, and thus when the changer gave it out, he meant it as a change in ownership. But since he had permission to exchange it, the prohibition goes back to the original owner who did not warn him that the money belongs to the Temple.  The Rambam holds however, based on that Mishna, that the money can be used by the changer, but not as a loan to the money changer. The money is not a loan. So at no point was there intention to take the money out of the possession of the Temple.

I should mention there are two types of מעילה. One is taking out of the possession of the Temple, and the other is deriving physical benefit from the object. In our case, there is no physical benefit, so the only question is that of taking the object of the the possession of the Temple.

This I think helps explain the Gemara in Bava Metzia 99 שואל One who borrows an ax of the Temple, if he chopped wood with it he transgress the prohibition, and if he did not chop, then he does not transgress. בקע בו מעל לא בקע בו לא מעל.The idea would be the same as in the case of the חלפן. When one borrows something there is no intention to take it out of the possession of the owner. So only when one uses the ax is does he transgress the prohibition of מעילה

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In terms of the תורת משה I wanted to mention that there is a קרבן mentioned there for using something that was dedicated to the Temple in Jerusalem. It is one of the five קרבן אשם. That is not the same as a קרבן חטאת.
The prohibition in the Torah come from the verse "לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך .. ונדריך."
So let us say you have money you have dedicated to the Temple. And you give it to a money חלפן or shop keeper to safeguard it. If it was wrapped in a way to show it should not be used and the חלפן used it, he transgresses the prohibition. If it was not wrapped, and you said nothing to him about it then no one transgresses the prohibition to the רמב''ם. A teaching in בבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א the end of chapter המפקיד says גיזבר did transgress. Why does the רמב''ם disagree? Because of a משנה in מסכת מעילה that says simply the חלפן does not transgress stops at that. So we have no problem in understanding the רמב''ם. His opinion was that the משנה in מעילה דף כ simply disagrees with the ברייתא. But what is the reasoning of the רמב''ם?
רב שך says the argument between the משנה and the ברייתא is this. The ברייתא holds if one gave money to a  חלפן that was not wrapped up it is meant as a loan and thus when the חלפן gave it out, he meant it as a change in ownership. But since he had permission to exchange it the prohibition goes back to the original owner who did not warn him that the money belongs to the Temple.  The רמב''ם holds however based on that משנה that the money can be used by the חלפן but not as a loan to the חלפן. The money is not a loan. So at no point was there intention to take the money out of the possession of the Temple.

I should mention there are two types of מעילה. One is taking out of the possession of the Temple and the other is deriving physical benefit from the object. In out case there is no physical benefit so the only question is that of taking the object of the the possession of the Temple.
This I think helps explain the גמרא בבא מציעא צ''''ט ע''א that says השואל an ax of the Temple. בקע בו מעל לא בקע בו לא מעל.The idea would be the same as in the case of the חלפן. When one borrows something there is no intention to take it out of the possession of the owner. So only when one uses the ax is does he transgress the prohibition of מעילה

בתורת משה יש קרבן של המשתמש במשהו שהוקדש לבית המקדש בירושלים. זהו אחד מחמשת קרבן אשם. זה לא אותו הדבר כמו קרבן חטאת. האיסור בתורה בא מן הפסוק "לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך .. ונדריך." אז בואו נגיד שיש לך כסף שאתה הקדשת לבית המקדש ונתתו לגיזבר והוא נותן את הכסף לחלפן או בעל חנות כדי להגן עליו. אם זה היה עטוף דרך להראות שזה לא אמור לשמש בו והחלפן השתמש בו, הוא עובר איסור. אם זה לא היה עטוף, ואתה אמרת לו לא כלום, על זה אז אף אחד לא עובר את האיסור לדעת רמב''ם. אבל ההוראה בבבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א בסוף פרק המפקיד אומרת הגיזבר עשה עבירה ומעל. מדוע רמב''ם לא מסכים? בגלל משנה במסכת מעילה שאומרת פשוט החלפן לא מעל נקודה. אז אין לנו בעיה בהבנת רמב''ם. דעתו היתה כי המשנה במעילה דף כ' פשוט חולקת על הברייתא. אך מהו ההיגיון של רמב''ם? רב שך אומר הטיעון בין המשנה ואת ברייתא הוא זו. לברייתא אם אחד  נתן כסף לחלפן שלא היה עטוף היטב זה נועד כהלוואה ולכן כאשר החלפן החליף את זה, הוא התכוון ברצינות כשינוי בעלות. אבל מאז הוא קיבל רשות ללכת להחליף אותו האיסור חוזר לבעלים המקורים שלא הזהירו כי הכסף שייך לבית המקדש. רמב''ם מחזיק בשיטה מבוסתס אולם על כי המשנה שהכסף יכול לשמש את החלפן אבל לא כהלוואה אל החלפן. הכסף הוא לא הלוואה. אז בשום שלב לא היה כוונה לקחת את הכסף מתוך החזקה של בית המקדש. אני צריך להזכיר ישנם שני סוגים של מעילה. אחד הוא לוקח מתוך חזקת  המקדש והשני נובע מיתרון פיזי מהאובייקט. במקרה שלנו אין שום תועלת פיזית. אז השאלה היחידה היא לקחת את האובייקט מרשותו של בית המקדש. זה עוזר להסביר את הגמרא בבא מציעא צ'' ט ע''א שאומרת השואל גרזן של בית המקדש. בקע בו מעל, לא בקע בו לא מעל. הרעיון יהיה אותו הדבר כמו במקרה של החלפן. כאשר אחד ישאל משהו אין כוונה לקחת את זה מתוך החזקה של הבעלים. אז רק כאשר האדם משתמש בגרזן הוא עובר על איסור המעילה.

מה שאני עושה כאן הוא לעשות יותר מאשר ספקולציות. אני אומר כאן יש לנו הוכחה על מה שקורה ב''מ צ''ט ע''א. כל העניין הזה כאן של רב שך עולה בבירור  אשר השואל אינו נוטל מתוך החזקה של בית המקדש

The basic idea here was mentioned before in my blog. But what I am doing here is to do more than speculation. I am saying that here we have a proof about what is going on in the Gemara Bava Metzia page 99. This whole idea here of Rav Shach shows clearly that borrowing is not taking out of the possession of the Temple. In fact the relation between our Gemara on Page 99 and what Rav Shach says about the exchange of meila is so clear I am surprised he did not mention it himself!