End chapter nine in Bava Metzia בבא מציעא.

End chapter nine in בבא מציעא. There ר' יהודה holds we are not  דורשים טעמא דקרא. Against that opinion is ר' שמעון בן יוחאי holds we go by the reason for the law דורשים טעמא דקרא.  When there is an argument between ר' יהודה and ר' שמעון  the הלכה is like ר' יהודה. In a פסוק in the Torah it says not to marry any of the seven nations. Or more exactly do not give your children in marriage to them so they will not turn the heart of your children towards idolatry. ר' יהודה who does not look at the reason for a verse says we go by the literal meaning. It forbids only the seven (Canaanite) nations. ר' שמעון says it forbids all nations that do idolatry because we go by at the reason for the verse, not by its literal meaning. So why does the רמב''ם decide marriage with all nations that do idolatry is forbidden? The key factor to notice is the case of a king. The פסוק says he should not have many wives "לא ירבה לו נשים". The  חכמים, say that means not to have more than שמנה עשרה 18 wives. ר' יהודה says, he can have as many as he  wants as long as they do not tilt his heart. ר' שמעון says even one that tilts his heart he must not marry. So when it says "לא ירבה לו נשים" it means even like Abigail. רב שך points out that here the חכמים and ר' שמעון agree.  The  sages obviously agree with ר' יהודה that we do not go by the reason for the law.  But here we see ר' יהודה does go by the reason for the law because the reason is written explicitly. So what does ר' שמעון do when the reason is given openly? He  learns from both the regular פסוק, and he learns something extra from the reason. So even though in general the חכמים go with ר' יהודה, but in  a case when the reason for the law is given openly, then they go like ר' שמעון.  This now gives us enough information to explain the  רמב''ם. That is this. When the reason for the law is given openly in the פסוק the חכמים agree with ר' שמעון. And that is exactly the case with intermarriage. So in that case the חכמים will agree with ר' שמעון that all nations that serve idols are forbidden, not just the seven nations. And that is how the  רמב''ם decides. He decides this not because it is the opinion of ר' שמעון but because it is the reason of the חכמים

סוף פרק תשעה בבא מציעא. יש ר' יהודה מחזיק אנחנו לא דורשים טעמא דקרא. נגד הדעת הזאת הוא ר' שמעון בן יוחאי שמחזיק שהולכים לפי סיבת החוק, דורשים טעמא דקרא. כשיש ויכוח בין ר' יהודה ור' שמעון, הלכה היא כמו ר' יהודה. בתוך פסוק בתורה כתוב לא להתחתן עם מישהו שבעת העמים. או לייתר דיוק לא לתת לילדים שלך בנישואים להם כדי שהם לא יהפכו את לב ילדיך כלפי עבודה זרה. ר' יהודה שאינו מהסתכל על הסיבה של פסוק אומר נלך לפי המשמעות המילולית. הוא אוסר רק את שבעת העמים. ר' שמעון אומר שזה אוסר כל הגוים אשר עושים עבודה זרה, כי נלך לפי הסיבה של הפסוק, לא לפי המשמעות המילולית שלו. אז למה עושה את רמב''ם מחליט נישואים עם כל העמים שעושים עבודה זרה אסורה? הגורם המרכזי הוא לשים לב במקרה של מלך. הפסוק אומר שהוא "לא ירבה לו נשים". החכמים אומרים לא יותר משמנה עשר נשים. ר' יהודה אומר שהוא יכול להרבות ככל שהוא רוצה, כל עוד שהן לא נוטות את לבו. ר' שמעון אומר אפילו אחת  שמטה את לבו אסור לו לשאת. אז כאשר הוא אומר לא ירבה לו נשים זה אומר אפילו כמו אביגיל. רב שך מציין שכאן חכמים ור ' שמעון מסכימים. החכמים ברור שמסכימים עם ר' יהודה כי אנחנו לא הולכים לפי הטעם של החוק. אבל כאן אנו רואים ר' יהודה אימו מתחמק מסיבת החוק כי הסיבה כתובה במפורש. אז מה עושה ר' שמעון כאשר הסיבה ניתנת בגלוי? הוא לומד גם את הפסוק הרגיל, והוא לומד משהו נוסף מן הסיבה. אז למרות באופן כללי החכמים אומרים ללכת עם ר' יהודה, אולם במקרה כאשר סיבת החוק ניתנת בגלוי, ואז הם הולכים כמו ר' שמעון. זה עכשיו נותן לנו מספיק מידע כדי להסביר את רמב''ם. כלומר זה. כאשר סיבת החוק ניתנת בגלוי בפסוק החכמים מסכימים עם ר' שמעון. וזה בדיוק המקרה עם נישואי תערובת. אז במקרה זה חכמים  מסכימים עם ר' שמעון כי כל העמים אשר משרתים אלילים אסורים, לא רק שבעת העמים. וזה איך שרמב''ם מחליט. הוא מחליט זה לא בגלל כי זו הוא דעתו של ר' שמעון, אלא משום שזו הדעת של חכמים.


I should mention the Tur says simply only the seven nations are forbidden as the simple explanation of the sages is. That is we do not go by the reason for any verse but by what its says openly. Therefore only the seven (Canaanite) nations are forbidden. No other nations.
I can not say that my answer here is what Rav Eleazar  Shach meant in his essay. In any case that is what I thought makes sense based on ideas that were triggered in me when I read his essay.

Take a look yourself at Rav Shach's essay on the Rambam in הלכות אסורי ביאה. Maybe what I wrote here is what he means, but so far I cannot tell.

I am not trying here to go into all the issues. I am simply trying to understand the Rambam. And  I believe the answer here is right. The answer I had before I saw the essay of Rav Shach was really crummy. And other answers I have seen did not hold much water.

Musar (Ethics) from the Middle Ages. Musar pours ice cold water on people's illusions of grandeur and obsessions.

By nature I have always been interested in worldview kinds of issues more so that more practically minded people.  I have tended to see human affairs as downstream from people's world views.
So to understand the basic world view of the Torah is feel is important. The clearest statement of the way the Torah looks at the world I found is best given in books of Musar (books on Ethics) from the Middle Ages and the later classics by the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter.
The reason is the same reason why people get package deals at the supermarket. You could buy all the ingredients of cold cereal in the morning and make it all by yourself, but you would rather that someone else do most of the work of preparation and leave you just to pour the milk. You could in the same way go through the whole Tenach (Old Testament)  and the entire Oral Law, the two Talmuds, the Midrashei Hagada and Midrashei Halacaha until you are about 90 years old and then maybe get a clear enough idea, or you can trust the judgment of the Rishonim, [Mediaeval sages] to have done that work and to offer the same result in simple form. That is Musar.

The importance of the Rishonim [Medieval sages] in this regard is because their view of Torah was without alternative agendas. The problem with achronim [books on world view of Torah written after the Rav Joseph Karo after around 1520] is the trouble of agenda. The purpose is usually not to understand the world view of Torah but to change it into some form more palatable to their tastes and to convince others of their mistakes.
\

You actually see this clearly in practice. Yeshivas that have Musar as art of their seder [schedule] are light years apart from place that do not learn Musar. You only need to walk into a real authentic Litvak yeshiva at in the morning and you get blown away by the powerful spirit of Torah that is there.

One thing Musar is definitely right about, Torah is the religion of good character. {Menschlichkeit.} People of Type A personalities of schizoid personalities are definitely not gong to be drawn towards Musar and will in fact actively oppose it.  Musar pours ice cold water on people's illusions of grandeur and obsessions.  

The trouble with the Jewish religious world is that it is full of demons that infest the teachers.

The trouble with the religious world is that it is full of demons and demons spirits that infest it and especially the teachers. It does not take a genius to see this. If they would be keeping Torah plain and simple like it says, I would have nothing to complain about but the trouble is not just that it is a scam but positively evil.  There are a few exceptions however like the NY Litvak yeshivas and Ponovicth and the religious Zionist yeshivas. But as a rule I think the religious would is just way too much demon possessed.  I might mention that Reb Nachman to his great credit brought up this issue quite often in his Lekutai Moharan and so I am not the only one to notice this problem.

Clearly Reb Nachman had a great vision of what Torah is supposed to be about and his great advice is not confined to just pointing out the evils of תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאיים. {Demonic Torah Scholars}. Still still the fact that the movement based on him got absorbed in the movement the Gra put in Cherem reduces the effectiveness of his advice to almost nothing.  

People do not give enough credit to the Dark Side almost to the degree of denying its existence. Thus that leave them all the more open to it. In the Jewish this is particular common. People always decide their particular leaders has powers from the Bright Side of Holiness. They never consider the opposite. 

vision of the Rambam

I have mentioned the vision of the Rambam, that is to learn every day the Oral Law (the Two Talmuds), the Written Law (the Law of Moses plus the prophets), Physics and Metaphysics.
I want to add to this list, Musar (mediaeval Ethics) plus survival skills.
And to mention that this is to bring to human perfection, but there is no guarantee. You can notice the lacks of each discipline, and think to yourself that the right combination would work wonders and make up for all the lacks.  But that to me does not seem realistic. There still is going to be free will. As Steven Dutch puts it: "I am completely unable to conceive of any legal or social system that can’t be subverted or abused. People who crave power or status will gravitate toward whatever confers those rewards. And they will always discover ways to get the rewards without paying their dues." 

I think the amazing thing about the Rambam is he combined several traits-the visionary prophet, the scholastic attention to detail, the Socratic Critic of logical fallacies he saw in the Kalm and the Warrior against abuses he saw in the religious world.

[The trouble the Rambam saw in the religious world of his time is described in detail in his commentary to Pikei Avot in ch 4. Mainly he saw that the people that invariably go to use the Torah to make money are the types that are incapable of accurately understanding any Gemara or Halacha. They are the most dull, the most stupid, and the most morally depraved. Thus there is no profession open to them except to to use Torah as a means to money, power, and influence. See the Rambam there in Pirkei Avot where he goes into detail, but he also mention this briefly in the Mishne Torah. His description is as accurate now as it was when he wrote it. The bad name they give to Torah makes it almost impossible for anyone to learn Torah sincerely. The religious world is a crooked racket, a fraud, and scam, and invites comparisons to the Mafia. Any sincere believer in Torah would be well advice to stay away from the religious, insane world as far as possible unless he happens to be near an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva, Mir Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, Ponovitch.

I wanted to go into the basic idea of the Rambam in terms of learning. Mainly his program starts as simple as possible. The Mishne Torah itself. [Metaphysics means Aristotle's book called the Metaphysics. Physics also. However I hold modern Physics is included [i.e.Quantum Mechanics, String Theory, Quantum Field Theory]. Similarly in terms of Metaphysics I hold Kant and Hegel are included. Preferably Hegel.] In terms of Torah the main thing after  a basic introduction in Gemara I think Rav Shach's Avi Ezri is the most important thing. 
[If I could complement the religious world for adhering to the Torah I would do so gladly. The trouble is I have found it to be highly inimical to Torah values. They do everything possible to destroy your family and children while at the same time claiming to support family values. See the excommunication that the Gra signed for further information. The problem seems to be the flawed vision of themselves as super human beings gives them a flawed idea of what other people are like. They see the rest of humanity as fit only for servile beasts of burden.]

Concerning the previous essay I would like to say that I think Rav Shach was forced into a difficult position because he had to defend the Rambam and the Rambam equates ערירי and כרת.
I was going to the nearby river to go to the mikve and it occurred to me that I am not forced to answer for the Rambam. Rather based on Rav Shach's insights and the Rashba that he brings, I have a much better answer for the braita in the beginning of Yevamot. That is, that it is going like שמואל ורב אסי and in fact hold עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת.
So my answer would be thus. Just like the Rashba says Shmuel and Rav Assi that hold הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה would be holding that עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת and even for אשת אח מאביו the איסור of אשת אח continues but simply is pushed off by the עשה של יבום. But the הלכה is like רב ור' חנינא that הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. and this is going like the opinion אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. This makes the most sense because normally we understand יבום to be like נדה in the way that after the time of the איסור there is no איסור at all, not that it is pushed away.
\ Rav Shach had available to him a much better answer, but ignored it because he felt the need to make the Rambam fit with everything. But that forced Rav Shach into a position that seems to me to be untenable. When a positive mitzvah pushes off a negative mitavah we do not say the negative mitvah has a time limit. If Rav Shach had not been forced to answer for the Rambam, he could easily have said what I have written here.


_______________________________________________________________________________

My answer for the ברייתא in the beginning of יבמות. That is,  it is going like שמואל ורב אסי and  holds עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת.
So my answer would be thus. Just like the רשב''א says שמואל and רב אסי that hold הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה would be holding that עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת and even for אשת אח מאביו the איסור of אשת אח continues but simply is pushed off by the עשה של יבום. But the הלכה is like רב ור' חנינא that הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. and this is going like the opinion אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. This makes the most sense because normally we understand יבום to be like נדה in the way that after the time of the איסור there is no איסור at all, not that it is pushed away.

תשובתי על הברייתא בתחילת יבמות. , זו הולכת כמו שמואל ורב אסי שמחזיקים עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. אז התשובה שלי תהיה בכך בדיוק כמו שהרשב''א אמר ששמואל ורב אסי מחזיקים הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה וזה יהיה בגלל שקבעו כי עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת ואפילו אשת אח מאביו איסור של אשת אח נמשך, אבל פשוט נדחף על ידי עשה של יבום. אבל הלכה היא כמו רב ור' חנינא כי הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. וזה הולך כדעת אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. זה הכי הגיוני כי בדרך כלל אנחנו מבינים יבום להיות כמו נדה באופן שבו לאחר הזמן של האיסור אין איסור כלל, לא כי הוא נדחף משם.

So the basic idea of the braita in Torah Kohanim I am leaving exactly as it sounds that there is a difference between the brother from the mother and the brother from the father and that both their wives are in כרת but the wife of the brother from the mother is not in ערירי. So in essence  the Rambam comes out OK also. That is the Rambam holds that both on the wife from the brother from the mother and the wife of the brother from the father have כרת and thus both are required a sin offering.
In any case I have never felt I had to answer for the Rambam at all cost. And we do not need to say he disagrees with the Braita in Torat Kohanim anyway.  And in any case I believe Rav Shach answers the Rambam somewhere else in the Avi Ezri in a different fashion.

The basic thing is this. Though the whole kind of learning of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik to justify the Rambam is great and amazing, still my orientation from the beginning of yeshiva in Shar Yashuv in NY and also my books on Bava Metzia and Shas have mainly been to concentrate on understanding Tosphot.  If an answer for the Rambam comes up--as it has often, then I am happy. But I am not aiming for that.
However when it comes to the Guide for the Perplexed, I think that was the Rambam's best work and led the way to synthesizing Faith and Reason. Clearly Aquinas owes to him and to Saadia Gaon a great debt, and so does all Western Civilization. Aquinas, I should mention, did not always quote Maimonides by name, for example in his proof of the existence of God [which I think is accepted he derived from Maimonides] he does not quote his name. But he does quote his name in other cases, as when giving the reasons for the commandments of the Torah. In any case, clearly the Rambam was able to bring Aristotle into the mainstream, and not just as a side note to Plato.

Maimonides and Saadia Gaon are the founders of a balance between Faith and Reason. Before that one approach of the other was over emphasized. And often they were considered incompatible.
The vision of the Rambam is still far beyond the sight of this generation. His four fold approach of learning the Written Law of Moses, the Two Talmuds, Physics and Metaphysics is still too radical for anyone to accept. I fear it will take a long time --if ever--for people to catch up with his vision

So all together the actual question that Tosphot raises on that Braita in the beginning of Yevamot along with my answer here would be this:

I wanted to introduce a famous subject that comes up in the beginning of Yevamot. This will help to answer a question I asked in the beginning of Yevamot that I wrote in my little booklet חידושי הש''ס


It is the question of אשת אחיו מאמו the wife of a brother from the mother, not from the father. The Rambam says simply that אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering. [I mean if one slept with her.]  he does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת [being cut off from one's people if done on purpose and required a sin offering if done by accident.] This is clearly not like the Torah Kohanim that Tosphot brings in the beginning of Yevamot. That statement from the book reads thus, The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא"[she is a  woman that has seen blood.] Torah Kohanim asks why compare her to a נדה?  Because just like a נדה  has a time of permission so does she--that is if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother.
So the Rambam obviously rejects this braita/teaching.

Rav Shach suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the Gemara that was rejected. [Yevamot 41]
הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה (like Shmuel and Rav Assi) The reason for this the Rashba says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off. But the Halacha in the Gemara itself is הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת (Rav and R. Chanina) and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to Yibum there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the mitzvah of yibum never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory so the prohibition has a time limit.   Therefore the Braita of Torat Kohanim that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no permission does not apply. Thus we see that braita is going like a rejected opinion in the Gemara.

Thus my question in the beginning of yevamot also has an answer.
That is that original braita there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the Gemara of Shmuel and Rav Assi 

{I wanted to introduce a  subject that comes up in the beginning of יבמות. This will help to answer a question I asked in the beginning of יבמות.[Mainly what I am doing here is simply saying that braita at the beginning of yevamot is not the halacha and in fact it hold עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת as Tosphot and the Old Tosphot both point out. So in stead of answering the question I simply say that braita is rejected. It is the question of אשת אחיו מאמו. The רמב''ם says simply that אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering. [I mean if one slept with her.]  he does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת,  and required a sin offering if done by accident. This is clearly not like the law in תורת כהנים that תוספות brings in the beginning of יבמות. That statement from the book reads thus, The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא". The תורת כהנים  asks why compare her to a נדה?  Because just like a נדה  has a time of permission, so does she, that is if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother.So the רמב''ם obviously rejects this teaching. רב שך suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the גמרא that was rejected, יבמות מ''א. That is הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה like שמואל and רב אסי. The reason for this the רשב''א says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off. But the הלכה in the גמרא itself is הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת like רב and ר' חנינא and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to יבום there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the מצוה of יבום never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory, so the prohibition has a time limit.  Therefore, the law of תורת כהנים that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no היתר does not apply. Thus we see that law of תורת כהנים is going like a rejected opinion in the גמרא.
Thus my question in the beginning of יבמות also has an answer. That is that original teaching there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the גמרא of שמואל and רב אסי.}

______________________________________________________

The question of sexual relations with אשת אחיו מאמו the wife of a brother from the mother, not from the father. The רמב''ם says simply that if one slept with אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering.  He does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת  This is clearly not like the תורת כהנים that תוספות brings in the beginning of יבמות. That statement   is thus: The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא".  תורת כהנים asks why compare her to a נדה?  Answer: Just like a נדה  has a time of permission, so does אשת אחיו. That MEANS if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother. TO THIS way of thinking, a wife of a brother from a mother is not included in the prohibition of sex with the wife of a brother.  

The רמב''ם obviously rejects this ברייתא.

רב שך suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the גמרא יבמות מ''א that was rejected. This is the opinion of שמואל ורב אסי 
הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה. The reason for this  rejection is the רשב''א says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת,  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off.  But the הלכה  is כרב ור' חנינא שהותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת  and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to יבום there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the מצווה of יבום never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory, so the prohibition has a time limit.   Therefore the ברייתא of תורת כהנים that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no permission does not apply. Thus we see that ברייתא is going like a rejected opinion in the גמרא.

Thus my question in the beginning of יבמות also has an answer.
That is that original ברייתא there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the גמרא of שמואל and רב אסי 

------------------------------------------------------------------------

{I wanted to introduce a  subject that comes up in the beginning of יבמות. This will help to answer a question I asked in the beginning of יבמות.[Mainly what I am doing here is simply saying that ברייתא at the beginning of יבמות is not the halacha, and it holds עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת as תוספות and the תוספות ישנים both point out. So instead of answering the question I simply say that ברייתא is rejected. It is the question of אשת אחיו מאמו. The רמב''ם says that אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering. He does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת,  and required a sin offering if done by accident. This is clearly not like the law in תורת כהנים that תוספות brings in the beginning of יבמות. That statement from the book reads thus, The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא". The תורת כהנים  asks why compare her to a נדה?  Because just like a נדה  has a time of permission, so does she, that is if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother. So the רמב''ם obviously rejects this teaching. רב שך suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the גמרא that was rejected, יבמות מ''א. That is הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה like שמואל and רב אסי. The reason for this the רשב''א says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off. But the הלכה in the גמרא itself is הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת like רב and ר' חנינא and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to יבום there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the מצוה of יבום never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory, so the prohibition has a time limit.  Therefore, the law of תורת כהנים that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no היתר does not apply. Thus we see that law of תורת כהנים is going like a rejected opinion in the גמרא.
Thus my question in the beginning of יבמות also has an answer. That is that original teaching there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the גמרא of שמואל and רב אסי.}

What a human being ought to be?

It was pointed out to me by several people that the religious world seems to be afflicted with a tremendous amount of קטנות המוחין. Small mindedness. Pettiness.  After my learning partner pointed this out and then someone else that was in Uman for Rosh Hashanah I began to wonder why this is the case?

I do not have any answer for this but this very question leads me to wonder what a human being ought to be? To my mind the Rambam and my parents dealt with this question in the best way. 
That is with the Rambam we know one's education ought be in four areas: (1) תנ''ך Old Testament (2) the Entire Oral Law-the Two Talmuds, Sifra, Sifri, Tosephta, Midrash Raba etc. (3) Physics (4) Metaphysics. This we already know from the Rambam. What my parents add to this picture is the idea of Menchlichtkeit and balance. That is hard to describe but mainly it means at it basic level good wholesome character traits. But on a higher level it means being everything a person ought to be. To see beyond the cave. [I have to add to this the basic books of the Musar Movement  which are the books of Musar from the Middle Ages and the books of the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter]

I any case let me say what I think about the Rambam. To get through that material I think what the Talmud says is the idea idea לגמור והדר ליסבר to finish the material and then to go back and do it in more depth. So every time you finish let's say for example the Talmud you add one commentary. Lets say you did it once with Rashi. So the next time you add Tosphot. The third time you do the Maharsha. etc. 
[That is more or less what I do anyway. The first time doing Shas i have to admit I had to do Tosphot because that was part of the basic learning in Shar Yashuv and the Mir. But I found Tosphot very hard to understand. On the other hand I can not say to skip Tosphot because I can see that unless people at at struggle with Tosphot when they are 18-22 years old, they will never get it otherwise. It has to be embedded at early ages.]