(1) The emphasis in the West on words. People tend to take the meaning of the words as the essence of their belief. [text based faith.]  The words of the Torah  and the Talmud are what defines our faith. Even if we do not understand the words.
For this reason it does not seem to me to be  a good idea to engage in  criticism or attacks on someone's faith. That is usually not a good idea unless it is  a case where there are no redeeming characteristics of their faith.

(2) The problem of universals in the West morphed into the problem of meaning starting with  Frege.


(3) One of the problems with Kabalah as a rule is the emptying of words of their meaning and putting in something else. I do not mean this as a critique on the Ari, but later supposed "mystics" that thought they were explaining him while in fact just explaining their delusions. I always found them annoying in their claims of grandeur with nothing to show for it but their own delusions.





[ So let me try to give a brief explanation. Knowledge that we have by our senses cant be checked and verified. Knowledge that is not by the senses might be right but how can we double check it? That is called A priori. If it is by definition then OK. Kant said we have a priori knowledge that is not by definition. How?  But we know it. This refers to the dinge an sich. Things that are but take away all their adjectives what is left? The thing in itself. [As Kant put it: things in themselves. In this realm of things in themselves--reality that we know but we do not know by reason nor by senses there are different areas of value. All form and no content as in mathematical logic. Then all content and no form--God. I hope this leaves my readers satisfied. 










(5) Now for how this relates to me personally.  My own approach is what I learned in the Mir Yeshiva in NY. That is in a nutshell: I go by the Written and Oral Law. That means I go by the Old Testament. But I do not say that I can understand it on my own. I use the Oral Law as my guide for interpretation. But since the Oral Law is a lot to read and understand, I listen to the Rishonim and Geonim as to what is the big message. That is I listen to what Saadia Gaon and Maimonides said it means. That is I defer to argument from authority when it comes to these larger issues. So in  nutshell you now know why the Duties of the Heart  (and other books of Musar of the Rishonim) and the Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam are important to me. The reason is that they settle the issues of interpretation.
So for example I think Monotheism is the approach of the Torah. That is that God is the First Cause and simple. Not a composite. And he made the world something from nothing, not from Himself like a spider weaves a web. From Nothing. Ex Nihilo. And the world is not God. Nor is it any part of God. The reason I think this is not just the literal sense of the Torah. It is I confess because that is how all the rishonim (and the Ari himself) said it means.
But even more so. Now you know why Musar is important to me.  Because more clearly than anything else it clarifies these issues.

I can not understand anything unless I see how it fits into the larger picture. This is not a matter of how hard I concentrate. It is just the way I see things. This was certainly my experience in yeshiva. I had to see the whole Shas in order to understand the slightest little thing in Tosphot. My learning partner on the other had is the kind of person that the big picture distracts him. The only way he understand things is in depth in their place.

You have met both kinds. Probably in high school you may have asked or heard some fellow student ask, "Why is this relevant?" People with philosophical minds are like me. We need to see the big picture and until we do we cant understand a thing. This is like Plato. Universals are out there.. Aristotle puts universals smack in the middle of things.

For this reason it is a good idea in yeshiva to learn in pairs because of this double take aspect.

Now to develop this idea further. Let's say you are like me and you want to--No-you need to see the big picture. But your time is limited. What do you do? You find something small that contains a lot. For example it might take you some time to go through Shas with Rashi, Tosphot Maharsha and Maraham from Lublin. I know this took me a long time and there were lots of dumb interruptions also. So what you do is you get the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. And you learn just one essay there well. You go over it day after day. Once of twice every day. Once you know it well, you are already on your way to know about half of Shas. The reason is it contains both aspects of learning. The in depth and the wide broad horizons.


When someone shows interest in learning Torah I think of giving  to him the book of Rav Shach, the Avi Ezri, and perhaps the book of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik the Chidushei HaRambam, and perhaps  the Chafetz Chaim, [the book about the laws not to slander.] 


 The thing is the book of Rav Shach is a bit expensive. in Israel it is about $60 for the five volumes, but in NY who knows how much it could be. \

Yevamot 3b

The ברייתא says how do we know the the sister of one's wife is forbidden in יבום? It answers that it says "עליה" in ויקרא and עליה in דברים concerning יבום. This looks like a גזירה שווה. A גזירה שווה means the same word is used in two different places. So we apply the laws of one place to the other place unless there is some specific reason that undoes the גזירה שווה.




One alternative way to look at this ברייתא is to say that it has nothing to do with a גזירה שווה. It is rather thinking like this. We find that the wife of one's brother is forbidden even after one brother is gone. And yet we find that in the specific case of יבום she is permitted. So we should allow all forbidden relations in the case of יבום. So now we need the extra word "עליה" to tell us that she is forbidden. That is to say that the ברייתא is thinking of a מה מצינו what we find in one place we automatically expand to other places unless we can find specific reason to limit its application , not a גזירה שווה. The problem with this is that this would work even with just the word "עליה" all by itself.. The ברייתא definitely refers to the fact that the same word is used in both places to derive its law. So it definitely means a גזירה שווה.

And if this is גזירה שווה then the result is a קשה. The normal גזירה שווה puts the laws of one place into the other place and visa versa. That would put the "עליה" from יבום into forbidden relations and make them all forbidden only in a case of יבום!

That is we have a question because a  גזירה שווה in general goes both directions.
Answer. Actually if a גזירה שווה goes in both directions is a debate. Here the נרייתא holds  with the opinion the גזירה שווה goes only in one direction.

הברייתא אומרת איך אנחנו יודעים שאחותו של אשתו  אסורה היבום? והיא עונה שהפסוק אומר "עליה" בויקרא ועליה בדברים בנוגע ליבום. זה נראה כמו גזירה שווה. גזירה שווה פירושו  המילה  זהה משמשת בשני מקומות שונים. אז אנחנו מיישמים את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, אלא אם כן קיים טעם ספציפי כי לפחות את כח הגזירה השווה. דרך חלופית אחת להסתכל על ברייתא זו היא לומר שזה לא קשור עם גזירה שווה.  די לחשוב ככה. אנו מוצאים כי אשתו של אחיו (של אחד) אסורה אפילו אחרי שהוא  נפטר. ובכל זאת אנו מוצאים כי במקרה הספציפי של יבום היא מותרת. אז אנחנו צריכים לאפשר לכל היחסים האסורים במקרה של יבום להיות מותרים. אז עכשיו אנחנו צריכים את מילה אחת מיותרת "עליה" לספר לנו שהיא אסורה. כלומר כי ברייתא הוא חושב על מה מצינו מה אנו מוצאים במקום אחד אנו מרחיבים באופן אוטומטי למקומות אחרים, אם לא נצליח למצוא סיבה ספציפית להגביל את תחולתו, לא גזירה שווה. הבעיה עם זה היא כי זה יעבוד גם אם רק הייתה המילה "עליה" לבדה.  את ברייתא בהחלט מתייחס לעובדה כי אותה המילה משמשת בשני המקומות לגזור את  החוק שלה. אז זה בהחלט אומר שזה גזירה שווה. ואם זה גזירה שווה, אז התוצאה היא קשה. הגזירה שווה הרגילה מעמידה את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, ולהיפך. זה היה גורם לשים את "עליה" של יבום לתוך היחסים ולעשות את כולם אסורים רק במקרה של יבום! כלומר יש לנו שאלה משום גזירה שווה  הולך לשני הכיוונים. תשובה. למעשה אם גזירה שווה הולכת בשני הכיוונים הוא ויכוח. כאן נראה שהברייתא  בדעת שהגזירה השווה סובבת רק לכיוון אחד.

r20 6-8 time e minor

There are a good deal of Aristotle's  concepts bantered about in mystic books that at the same time claim metaphysical knowledge of the world. And which tend to knock Aristotle as a know nothing ignoramus. The Ether, the four elements, substance and form. The Ari himself I can excuse for just placing his revelations in the mental structure of his time. He does not claim anything beyond his own formulation of the metaphysical structure of the world. But books that knock Aristotle while at the same time using his concepts seem to be ill informed.
[We can make a good guess from where the concepts come from since there are many possible ways of understanding the metaphysical and physical nature of the world. It does not have to be four elements and ether and substance and form. For example you can have the 1000 systems of totally different metaphysics from China, none of which have any of the above concepts. Or you can have Buddhist philosophies of no substance, or the 6 schools of Hindu thought. Once people are obviously borrowing from Aristotle, you might think they would have the manners not to insult him, and claim that they themselves came up with the ideas on their own. It is like cheating on a test and then claiming the other guy stole it. There is little that is more despicable.


If they would have some deep knowledge of the world you would think they might have noticed things like atoms!

I had some ideas about yeshivas which I thought to share . The idea is that I see the Litvak yeshiva as a great and important ideal but it saddens me that the ideal have been perverted into bureaucracy and cults. My suggestion is to revive the original idea. So here are my thoughts:

The basic idea of a yeshiva is the Oral Law. That is the purpose is to get a decent idea of how to keep the Torah.The way I see it the best approach to this problem was formulated well by the Lithuanian kind of yeshiva. That is I expect there to be flaws and bureaucracy and all the normal human problems that go along with any human institution. But overall I think the idea is sound. And you do not need a large investment for such a thing. You can put tons of money into Jewish institutions and come out with nothing but rot. The reason is the most important thing is missing--the Idea.
Without the idea or with the wrong idea all you get is a cult or tzadik worship,
It is the idea of a yeshiva that makes it what it is.

So what is the idea? It is Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot. Period.
In a practical vein this means a morning session from 10:00 to 2:00 and and afternoon session from 3:30 to 8:00.  About a hundred years ago the question of adding a little bit of learning Ethics came up. And also at some point someone decided to add a small Halacah session. But these were additions onto the main idea.

Kollel is a perversion of this idea and something that all gedolai Israel would have opposed if it had been brought up during a time when there were still people around that knew better. [That is you never pay people to learn. The whole concept is as absurd as paying someone to pray.]

What people did in NY was to go to Brooklyn Collage in the afternoon. This was sanctioned by Rav Hutner. This was in order to learn a vocation. Torah with Derech Eretz.

So in any case what you need is a straight forward Litvak yeshiva in every town and hamlet. Where there is Torah then there is everything of value.

On the other hand the lack of authentic Torah opens the door to cults which mimic true Torah but whose inner essence is satanic. These cults are sadly the main body of religious world today.
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I should mention that the ideas here took me a long time to come to. I admit I was part of the kollel at the Mir Yeshiva in NY. But on the other hand there really was nothing wrong with that. They were simply accepting government grants. No one was claiming that learning Torah could be used making money. It was clearly charity. If the yeshivas in Israel would be run the same way I would have no objection.

Unconditioned realities. The trouble with understanding morality is that of knowing any unconditioned realities. This is the source of moral contradictions. Just as Kant said that when pure reason ventures into the real of unconditioned realities contradictions automatically pop up.


The objects of experience are individual, particular, and concrete, while, on the other hand, the objects of thought, or most of the kinds of things that we know even about individuals, are general and abstract, i.e. universals.

So he shifted from the regular Neo Platonic approach which had been begun by Saadia Gaon and went to Aristotle. That gives knowledge of individual things since universals are in the individual. From there there will be higher levels of pure reason that can conceive of higher things.


Appendix. Aristotle by putting the forms inside of things helped bridge between objects of experience and universals. And other levels of knowledge that are concepts alone. It goes from the Oral Law, to Maase Breshit מעשה בראשית and from that to Maase Merchava מעשה מרכבה