The din Torah (court case) that Reb Nachman had with the Satan was that Reb Nachman would be able to present his advice to the world so people would have the benefit of his ideas-but that his inyan [his "thing"] would be surrounded by a kelipa [evil force] such that who so ever would come into it would be affected by a kelipa of insanity and ugly behavior.

My conclusion is that there really is no reason to be in Uman. It is not just the kelipa of insanity around the ziun itself. It is that it does not seem like the biggest deal in the first place. It does have the effect of getting people away from Gemara  and it does not seem worth it. It does not seem like one gets that much benefit from the whole thing or as much as one loses by dropping out of the yeshiva world. It might save from worse kelipot but besides that I don't know.


 It is not that Reb Nachman did not have some good ideas. Rather there is just too much cult  activity involved. And it seems to me that it entices people away from the straight Lithuanian yeshiva path . And from what I have seen over the years this is universal. No one ever becomes a better person from involvement with it. If anything I think it takes people from otherwise decent things they are doing and tends to degrade them. The ideas themselves of Reb Nachman I tend to think highly of but then people hear about them and get involved with Breslov and that changes them. I have tried to mention some of these issues to people but my impression is it is beyond redemption. 

Ideas in Bava Metzia updated  I wanted to add an answer there on a question on Shmuel that I had asked in my original booklet.

Ideas in Shas


My basic idea about learning Torah is that it is best done at home alone. Get yourself a Gemara and don't depend on there being a Beit Midrash. The problem with depending on some close by synagogue or such for learning is dealing with the kelipot [evil forces]. Unless you are in the area of an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva, the other options are mainly bad-cults or worse. Why bother? 

Torah is Monotheism

I do not seem to be able to get people on board with my idea of Torah being Monotheism. Most people have never heard of it. And the religious world is hopelessly pantheistic. I have no idea from where the problem stems from. Clearly the Gra tried his hand at getting Torah Judaism back in track but failed miserably. His excommunication was and is ignored even by his closest disciples.

No one wants to believe that the Gra knew what he was doing.

The only Institution that I know of that takes the Gra seriously is the yeshiva Aderet Eliyahu in the Old City of Jerusalem. But that place is more concerned with the general path of the Gra more that the issue of the basic world view of Torah.

Worship of tzadikim seems to have gone unnoticed as being a kind of idolatry. And Idolatry is supposed to be forbidden --or thus I thought.

There were people in the past that thought I had the ability to awaken others towards the authentic Torah. But it seems to me today that I missed the boat somehow.
The cults just grow and grow and the truth is just stomped on more and more.

The idea that Torah is Monotheism is basically expressed by Saadia Gaon and the Rambam and all the rishonim that wrote about the basic world view of Torah. Surprisingly enough the Ari agrees with this. The Ari does not attempt to change the world view of Torah in the slightest. But today these facts are ignored and distorted.

Without Torah one can not say that wrong is wrong. And without philosophy one can't say that a cult is  a cult. But the opposite is not true. With philosophy alone one can justify any wrong. With Torah one can justify any cult. Any set of delusions can be justified.

Thus I see the philosophers of the Middle Ages as providing an important function. The combining of Torah with philosophy allows one to say wrong is wrong and also to identify  cults that are disguised as legitimate Torah institutions.

So what I am suggesting is to learn Saadia Gaon, Ibn Gavirol, the Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam, Abravenal (Isaac and Yehuda), Crescas and Joseph Albo with the same rigor and depth as one would do on Gemara Rshi and Tosphot. 

Virtue and knowledge are identical and thus in theory possible to teach. I would like to suggest a  three pronged approach. Musar, Hashkafa world view, outdoor survival skills.

The first idea in that of Israel Salanter. It deals mainly with study of the type of character traits the Torah requires of us. There is a promise of Isaac Blasser that by this study one is cured of physical and spiritual sickness.
The second deals with the study of what kind of world view the Torah has. That started mainly from Saadia Gaon, Ibn Gavirol and included the Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam, and goes up until Joseph Albo, and Cresas. these were the major rigorous thinkers along these lines. The idea here is that the Torah is not an empty vessel that one can put any ideas into it that he wants. It has a specific world view. Agree with it or not, one has to know it. The problems that began with people putting their delusions into the Torah and dressing them up in verses has continued until this day and shows no sign of abating.
The third is outdoor skills. I am thinking of what the Boy Scouts and Girls Scouts used to be doing. That is the idea of instilling good values by means of action, not just words. honor, loyalty, team work, hard work, cleanliness trustworthiness. etc

Lithuanian path

Can you teach virtue? This seems to be the basic idea of what we call "learning Torah." This is something that is dealt with in a Platonic dialogue. On one hand it seems it can't be taught. On the other hand Socrates thought virtue and knowledge are one. And so it can be taught. An at least we can see religions that teach evil and we can see that people in them in fact learn evil.

But this is a delicate question. On one hand you know what you will be learning if you go into electrical engineering or if you go to become a blacksmith or car repair man. This was the whole point of Socrates. Learning and teaching virtue is not the same thing. He concluded that he knew of no one that knew what virtue is or who could teach it. I am in a similar situation. The closest thing that I saw was the basic path of my parents. "Menschlichkeit" .
That is to the idea of striving to be  a whole and moral decent human. That is the Ten Commandments.

 A close approximation to this is the Litvak [Lithuanian] yeshiva path.

But the Lithuanian path has a kind of problem that I can't exactly put my finger on. But the problems seem to be the copycats that try to pretend they are real yeshivas but are certainly not learning the Holy Torah but bags of delusions.

The problem is simple. Cults. "Learning Torah" is just a code word for cults that are trying to get your children..

Virtue seems to be what you learn when you learn a vocation. But institutions that are supposed to be dealing with mental and spiritual health seem to be traps for the innocent. Psychiatrists's expertise seems to be in making people mentally ill, and religious organizations seem to excel in making sick, religious fanatics.

The Mishna in Bava Metzia 100a Tosphot "demain eved"

The Mishna in Bava Metzia 100a says when you have a seller and a buyer of a slave and they are both sure of their pleas then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. When both are unsure then they divide. The Gemara asks but we don't take an oath on slaves? Rav answered the money of  a slave. Shmuel said a slave in his garment. Tosphot asks on the opinion of Rav how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא! In my notes on this {Ideas in Bava Metzia chs 8 and 9} I mentioned that this question of Tosphot does not like the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia. Rather Tosphot is going like the Gemara in Bava Batra. I mean to say that Tosphot here is saying that Sumchus would not say to divide unless it is a case of דררא דממונא. This is like the Gemara in Bava Batra. But in the beginning of Bava Metzia the Gemara concludes that if Sumchus said his din in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so would he say so in a case that is not דררא דממונא

This question had been bothering me for years. So I was very happy when I realized what Tosphot was doing.  

So fine Tosphot then finds a way to show the case of Rav is one of דררא דממונא. There were witnesses that heard the agreement and saw money exchanged but did not see how much money was exchanged.

But then we get to Shmuel. I asked where is the דררא דממונא in the case of Shmuel. No money was exchanged. For that is the whole point of Shmuel.

What I wanted to say today was simply that Shmuel is going like the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia in which holds the opinion that Sumchus said his din in both cases--whether there is דררא דממונא or not.  That is to say that Rav and Shmuel are disagreeing about the opinion of Sumchus. And this disagreement is reflected in these two opposing Gemaras, one in Bava Metzia and the other in Bava Batra.

_______________________________________________________________________



The משנה in בבא מציעא דף ק' ע''אsays when you have a seller and a buyer of a slave and they are both sure of their pleas then the seller takes an oath that he sold the smaller slave. When both are unsure then they divide. The גמרא asks but we don't take an oath on slaves? רב answered the money of  a slave. שמואל said a slave in his garment. תוספות asks on the opinion of רב how can they divide? It is not דררא דממונא! In my notes on this I mentioned that this question of תוספות is not like the גמרא in the beginning of בבא מציעא. Rather תוספות is going like the גמרא in בבא בתרא. I mean to say that תוספות here is saying that סומכוס would not say to divide unless it is a case of דררא דממונא. This is like the גמרא in בבא בתרא. But in the beginning of בבא מציעא the גמרא concludes that if סומכוס said his דין in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so would he say so in a case that is not דררא דממונא

This question had been bothering me for years. So I was very happy when I realized what תוספות was doing.  

So fine תוספות then finds a way to show the case of רב is one of דררא דממונא. There were witnesses that heard the agreement and saw money exchanged but did not see how much money was exchanged.

But then we get to שמואל. I asked where is the דררא דממונא in the case of שמואל. No money was exchanged. For that is the whole point of שמואל.

What I wanted to say today was simply that שמואל is going like the גמרא in the beginning of בבא מציעא in which holds the opinion that סומכוס said his din in both cases--whether there is דררא דממונא or not.  That is to say that רב and שמואל are disagreeing about the opinion of סומכוס. And this disagreement is reflected in these two opposing גמרות, one in בבא מציעא and the other in בבא בתרא.


) ב''מ ק: יש לשאול: שמואל צריך לעבור דרך כל ארבע בבות האלה של המשנה, היינו (1) ברי וברי, (2) שמא וברי, (3) ברי ושמא, (4) שמא ושמא. אז מה הוא עושה עם שמא ושמא? כסף לא נתחלף. רק שני גברים נכנסים לבית דין עם ספק על בגד עם חלק נוסף,- אם החלק הנוסף גם היה מוכל במחירה. איפה הדררא דממונא (כמו שתוספות ניסו למצוא תירוץ לרב)? תשאיר את החלק איפה שהוא. למה חולקים?

המשנה בבבא מציעא דף ק' ע''א אומרת כשיש  מוכר וקונה של עבד והם שניהם בטוחים על הטיעונים שלהם אז המוכר לוקח שבועה כי הוא מכר את העבד הקטן. כאשר הם לא בטוחים אז הם מחלקים את כסף שיש ספק בו. הגמרא שואלת אבל אנחנו לא נשבעים על עבדים? רב ענה דנים על שיווי הכספי של עבד. שמואל אמר עבד בבגדו. תוספות שואלים על חוות דעת של רב איך הם יכולים לחלק? זה לא דררא דממונא! שאלה זו של תוספות לא כמו הגמרא בתחילת בבא מציעא. במקום זה תוספות הולכים כמו הגמרא בבא בתרא בחזקת הבתים. אני מתכוון לומר כי תוספות כאן אומרים כי סומכוס לא הייה אומר לחלק אלא אם כן הוא מקרה של דררא דממונא. זה כמו הגמרא בבא בתרא. אבל בתחילה של בבא מציעא ב: הגמרא מסכמת שאם סומכוס אמר הדין שלו במקרה של דררא דממונא, אז על אחת כמה וכמה היה אומר את דינו כאשר המצב אינו דררא דממונא.   ואז תוספות מוצאים דרך להראות שהמקרה של  רב  הוא כן דררא דממונא. היינו שהיו עדים ששמעו את ההסכם וראו כסף הוחלף, אבל לא ראו כמה כסף הוחלף. אבל אז מגיעים לשמואל. שאלתי איפה הוא דררא דממונא במקרה של שמואל. אין כסף שהוחלף.  זה כל העניין של שמואל. מה שאני רוצה לומר  פשוט כי שמואל הוא הולך כמו הגמרא בתחילה בבא מציעא  המחזיקה בדעה שסומכוס אמר את הדין שלו בשני מקרים - אם יש דררא דממונא או שלא. כלומר רב  שמואל הם חולקים על דעתו של סומכוס. חילוקי דעות אלה משתקפים בשתי גמרות אלה המנוגדות, אחת בבבא מציעא והשניה בבבא בתרא

_________________________________________________________________________________

There are still problems. Problem 1: In my notes I mention that the gemara here is depending on the gemara on page 97. This brings to mind the fact that even the gemara there is problematic. The Gemara there suggests perhaps the reason for the mishna is because certainty and doubt certainty is better.  But the amazing question is that certainty and doubt certainty wins the case with no oath and the mishna says on 97 and also page 100 certainty wins with an oath! That is not the same thing!
Another stark problem is Tosphot Demai Eved. Tosphot asks "but it is not Drara DeManona?" The fact is that Tosphot is asking on Rav. That seems to mean that on the Mishna itself Tosphot would not have asked their question. That means Tosphot in OK if the question had been a large slave or a small slave.That apparently Tosphot would have accepted that it is Drara DeMamona. Only because Rav said the price of the slave is the question did Tosphot then ask "But it is not Drara Demmona."

Besides all that I looked over my notes on that Tosohot and this page of Gemara and I wrote things that today I do not understand. What did I mean "by dividing there is no difference between Sumchos and the Sages?" Was I referring to the idea of the Rashbam that when it is in one person's domain everyone agrees?
I also wrote on the question what about Shmuel? Tosphot answers the question where is the Drara DeMamona by Rav but never even raises the question by Shmuel. I answered this cryptic phrase maybe Tosphot would answer like they answered for Rav. But what ever I was thinking when I wrote that seems to be impossible. What ever Tosphot answered for Rav was because Rav was talking about an exchange of cash. You can not answer that Samuel is also talking about an exchange on currency because that is not the answer of Shmuel. [It might be that Tosphot is thinking that as long as the question is about physical objects like a garment of slave that that is Drara Demamona. Only the fact that Rav says the mishna refers to an exchange on money then the question comes up where is the Drara Demamina?] Or was I referring to the debate if Sumchus said his law in the case of both  certainly and doubt or just one on page 100a?
In any case it is safe to say that I have not even begun to scratch the surface of this Tosphot and this page of Gemara.