Bava Metzia the Mishna on page 97 and the Mishna on page 100

I do not have a question but more like a comment. In Bava Metzia page 97 we have the mishna about the cow and we say the mishna is either telling us ברי ושמא ברי עדיף or עסק שבועה ביניהם. In the next Mishna about the cow giving birth the Gemara right away makes it like סומכוס.

So what I wanted to ask was is the Mishna on page 100 also ברי ושמא ברי עדיף? It seems it is to Tosphot. Because the first Tosphot on the page has חזקת רשות+ טענת שמא= לא זכה. Thus this is clearly to this opinion of Tosphot a case of ברי ושמא ברי עדיף. But then we have to ask just like the Gemara did on page 97 what about the opinion that לאו ברי עדיף? We would here also have to say עסק שבועה ביניהם. And it is hard to say that this is a case where there is a עסק שבועה. Perhaps it is because of מודה במקצת?

Also it is not clear why the first Mishna would be the חכמים and the second on סומכוס. How is it that Rabbi Yehuda Nasi would change his opinion in the middle of  a chapter? It seems clear that the first Mishna also would have to be like סומכוס.

Plus we have the opinion of the ר''י Rabbainu Isaac חזקת רשות+ שמא= זכה and we would have to see how that fits with the Mishna on page 97.
Here is a link to the little booklet that God granted to me to write on Bava Metzia

And a link to a small book that God granted to me to write on the Gemara 
Book on Shas
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 In בבא מציעא דף צ''ז we have the משנה וסוגיא about the cow and we say the משנה is either telling us ברי ושמא ברי עדיף or עסק שבועה ביניהם. In the next משנה about the cow giving birth the גמרא right away makes it like סומכוס.

So what I wanted to ask was is the משנה דף ק' ע''א also ברי ושמא ברי עדיף? It seems it is to תוספות. Because the first תוספות on the page has חזקת רשות+ טענת שמא= לא זכה. Thus this is clearly to this opinion of תוספות a case of ברי ושמא ברי עדיף. But then we have to ask just like the גמרא did on page צ''ז what about the opinion that לאו ברי עדיף? We would here also have to say עסק שבועה ביניהם. And it is hard to say that this is a case where there is a עסק שבועה. Perhaps it is because of מודה במקצת?

Also it is not clear why the first משנה would be the חכמים and the second on סומכוס. How is it that רבי יהודה הנשיא would change his opinion in the middle of  a chapter? It seems clear that the first משנה also would have to be like סומכוס.

Plus we have the opinion of the ר''י  שחזקת רשות+ שמא= זכה and we would have to see how that fits with the משנה דף צ''ז .


 בבא מציעא דף צ''ז. יש לנו את המשנה וסוגיא על הפרה ואנחנו אומרים שהמשנה היא אומרת לנו ברי ושמא ברי עדיף או עסק שבועה ביניהם. במשנה הבא ק. על לידת הפרה הגמרא מיד עושה את זה  כסומכוס. אז מה רציתי לשאול היא אם המשנה דף ק' ע''א גם ברי ושמא ברי עדיף? נראה שזה כן תוספות. מכיוון שהתוספות הראשונה בדף אומרים חזקת רשות + טענתי שמא = לא זכה. לכן זה ברור לדעה זו של תוספות מקרה של ברי ושמא ברי עדיף. אבל אז עלינו לשאול בדיוק כמו הגמרא עשתה בעמוד צ''ז מה לגבי הסברה כי "לאו ברי עדיף"? היינו כאן גם חייב לומר עסק שבועה ביניהם. וזה קשה לומר כי מדובר במקרה שבו קיים עסק שבועה. אולי זה בגלל מודה במקצת? כמו כן לא ברור מדוע המשנה הראשונה תהיה כחכמים והשני כסומכוס. איך זה שרבי יהודה הנשיא היה שינה את דעתו באמצע הפרק? נראה ברור כי המשנה הראשונה גם היא צריך להיות כמו סומכוס. בנוסף יש לנו את דעתו של ר''י שחזקת רשות + שמא = זכה והיינו צריך לראות איך זה משתלב עם משנת דף צ''ז.

Worship of Tzadikim. Bait and Switch. The hiding of the actual beliefs. First draw people in by seeming Kosher and then switching.

A good deal of the problems involved with worship of tzadikim involves the problem of delusion.


That is we don't know whether that particular tzadik has real revelations of if his revelations are delusions. And on the same hand he might very well have delusions and yet be very charismatic.

And the emotional appeal might be great while at the same time have zero validity objectively.
 It is hard to separate these variables.
And when they are trying to make converts they don't say they worship the tzadik.
On the contrary they will emphatically deny it.


The secrets are  only for the initiated.


A good deal of the difficulties is because of numinous reality. And numinous reality is has potent emotional appeal and it sometimes is from the realm of holiness and sometimes from the realm of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and sometimes it is simply delusions. The trouble with pseudo tzadikim is that delusions are allergic. People pick them up from their delusional leader.


Where does this problem come from? To me it seems clear that the people that were able to see the problem decided instead to be silent or acquiesce. Rav Shach was the only one who saw clearly and he was ignored and still is. [Along with the Gra.] Now some people have taken the Gra seriously. That is the Zilverman's in the Old City. But they are a small  minority. Some people take Rav Shach seriously, but that is only in Ponovitch. Outside of these places I have never heard of anyone that considers worship of tzadikim to be  a problem.


And why is this that they were silent. I can answer this with confidence. It was because their expertise was not in Jewish philosophy. People like Reb Shmuel Berenbaum thought of themselves as too small to deal with השקפה issues. Most had never even read the major works of Jewish Philosophy like Ibn Gavirol,  the Guide, or Joseph Albo. [For this reason I made it a point to get some background in the Guide and Saadia Gaon and basic world view ideas of the Geonim and Rishonim. Their world view is very unlike  you could imagine.]

And there is no indication that anyone after the Ari was anything within light years of the Ari. They have emotional appeal, but nothing as far as objective reality goes.


In any case we have a whole set of problems that have not been dressed very well. The nature of delusions, the nature of pseudo tzadikim, and the urge to worship pseudo tzadikim. The best I could do to get anywhere in this was to study different groups like Hindu cults and hope that that would give me some insight. As far as I got, still did not seem to matter much. No one in any case was really willing to listen. In any case, because these issues are not resolved,the best thing is to get the basic set of medieval thought, the Guide of the Rambam, Saadia Gaon's Emunot VeDeot, Abravenal, Joseph Albo, Crescas and get a decent idea of what Torah teaches in terms of world view. [It is not worship of tzadikim for one thing. But there is  a lot more to it.]

See Steven Hassan Escape from Cults

Bait and Switch is what he identifies as the major cult characteristic and this in fact seems to be the case. The hiding of the actual beliefs. First draw people in by seeming Kosher and then switching.
As for my own study of cults I found Steven Hassan helpful.

There is a simple test for cults. There is an objective change in character that can be seen.
When one joins a group like a Lithuanian yeshiva the change in "Midot" [Character traits for the better is obvious to all.] When on the other hand one joins a cult the change in character is also obvious. Who can's see how people's traits change for the better when they join a place like the Mir or Chaim Berlin? And places and groups that worship some tzadik. The deterioration in character is clear even to people in the group and takes effect almost immediately. And this has nothing to do with what you think of the tzadik. For all you know the tzadik might very well be a true tzadik. Still the effect on people's character is unmistakable. It is not necessarily that they become bad people. But their character changes towards something ugly. Some undefinable ugliness takes over their personality. Or in other groups some strange kind of cruelty and sadism  enters into their souls.

I should mention I did a lot of reading on this but I do not feel comfortable in going into detail about the Sitra Achra [the Dark Side]. I would hope that my warnings here should be enough.

Bava Metzia page 100A and 100B

I am not sure how to put this. But it seems to me to be important to point out what must have been bothering the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 100. And this also must have bothered Tosphot. Even though neither brought it up but still it must have been in the back of their minds. The question is in the Mishna [BM 100a] we have what amounts to המוציא מחברו עליו הריאה  and right after that חולקים

That is for the case when the seller is sure and the buyer is doubtful the seller takes and oath and when both are doubtful they divide. Surely the Gemara and Tosphot must have been bothered with this. Especially Tosphot. Because to Tosphot the entire idea of דררא דממונא is specifically when there is a doubt to Beit Din even without their pleas. And here in the Mishna the only difference between the two cases is only in the pleas. And Tosphot brings from Bava Batra that the only time Sumchus says his law is only when it is  דררא דממונא. So we have what has to have seemed a direct contradiction in the Mishna.

So Tosphot explains the Mishna is a case of דררא דממונא. But that only takes care of the end of the Mishna. What about the case where the seller is sure and takes and oath? That has to also be דררא דממונא Because it is the same case in everything except the pleas. And yet if it is דררא דממונא we know Sumchus has to say חולקים to divide. What I think here is that the Gemara and Tosphot are both depending on the Gemara back on page 97B without saying openly that they are doing so. That is we have to say that ברי ושמא ברי עדיף or it is a case of עסק שבועה ביניהם  as I already explained in my notes that is is a case of מודה במקצת

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I am not sure how to put this. But it seems to me to be important to point out what must have been bothering the גמרא in בבא מציעא דף ק. And this also must have bothered תוספות. Even though neither brought it up but still it must have been in the back of their minds. The question is in the משנה בבא מציעא ק' ע''א we have what amounts to המוציא מחברו עליו הריאה  and right after that חולקים

That is for the case when the seller is sure and the buyer is doubtful the seller takes and oath and when both are doubtful they divide. Surely the גמרא and תוספות must have been bothered with this. Especially תוספות. Because to תוספות the entire idea of דררא דממונא is specifically when there is a doubt to בית דין even without their pleas. And here in the משנה the only difference between the two cases is only in the pleas. And תוספות brings from בבא בתרא that the only time סומכוס says his law is only when it is  דררא דממונא. So we have what has to have seemed a direct contradiction in the משנה.

So תוספות explains the משנה is a case of דררא דממונא. But that only takes care of the end of the משנה. What about the case where the seller is sure and takes and oath? That has to also be דררא דממונא Because it is the same case in everything except the pleas. And yet if it is דררא דממונא we know סומכוס has to say חולקים to divide. What I think here is that the גמרא and תוספות are both depending on the גמרא back on page צ''ז ע''ב without saying openly that they are doing so. That is we have to say that ברי ושמא ברי עדיף or it is a case of עסק שבועה ביניהם  as I already explained in my notes that is is a case of מודה במקצת

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נראה לי חשוב להצביע על מה שהיה בוודאי מטריד את הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ק. וזה גם כנראה הטריד את תוספות. למרות שהם לא העלו את זה, אבל עדיין זה בטוח שהיה  בדעתם. השאלה היא המשנה בבא מציעא ק' ע''א יש לנו מצב של  המוציא מחברו עליו הריאה, ומיד אחר כך הדין של חולקים.  במקרה כאשר המוכר הוא בטוח והקונה ספק המוכר לוקח שבועה, וכאשר שניהם  בספק הם מחלקים. אין ספק שהגמרא ותוספות הוטרדו מזה. במיוחד תוספות. כי בשביל תוספות כל הרעיון של דררא דממונא הוא במיוחד כאשר יש ספק אל בית דין אפילו בלי הטיעונים שלהם. והנה במשנה ההבדל היחיד בין שני המקרים הוא רק הטיעונים. וגם תוספות מביא מן הגמרא בבבא בתרא כי המצב היחיד שסומכוס אומר החוק שלו היא רק כאשר הוא דררא דממונא. אז יש לנו מה צריך נראה סתירה ישירה במשנה. אז תוספות מסבירה את המשנה הוא מקרה של דררא דממונא. אבל זה פותר רק של סוף המשנה. מה לגבי המקרה שבו המוכר הוא בטוח  ונשבע? זו צריכה להיות גם דררא דממונא משום שזהו אותו המקרה בכל המשנה פרט הטיעונים. ובכל זאת אם זה דררא דממונא אנחנו יודעים שסומכוס אומר לחלק. מה שאני חושב כאן הוא כי הגמרא ותוספות שניהם סמכו על הגמרא  בעמוד צ''ז ע''ב. כלומר אנחנו צריכים לומר כי ברי ושמא ברי עדיף או שזה מקרה של עסק שבועה ביניהם כפי שכבר הסבירתי בהערות שלי כי זה מקרה של מודה במקצת.

Learning Books on Ethics

The school of thought of Israel Salanter was holding that by learning Musar [Ethics] something of what is learned gets absorbed. This was their idea of how to gain character improvement. And I would have to say that I think this idea at least helped me. I was first at a Litvak yeshiva that did not have Musar and I felt the lack. I can to some degree also see the drawbacks --that it can go off into crazy directions. Still I am happy for what ever Musar I was able to learn and practice.

[Reb Chaim Soloveitchik did not want Musar introduced into yeshivas and to a degree you can see today how Musar can get off track. Still I think the best approach is that of Musar.

Why is it that all religious commentaries on the Torah are so superficial and trite?

The sin of Adam and Eve. The Ari goes into this in detail but his explanations are characteristic of the Ari. That is:- he explains the types of damage that was caused to Nukva {the Female} and to Zeir Anpin etc. It is not a very satisfying explanation.

Reb Chaim Vital in the beginning of Eitz Chaim say the sin was being occupied with the tree of knowledge of good and evil instead of the tree of life. The Rishonim have also a few explanations.

But what I have wished for was something more thematic. Something that would do more than make superficial sense. And that is not just on that part of the Torah, but on the whole Torah. In spite of this wish, I have never found such  thing.

I mean  something like you would hear from your English literature teachers about  Shakespeare or the Book of Job.

I am not sure how to explain this. But I am not looking for moral lessons, nor "gematriot," nor spiritual revelations. Rather something that you would hear in a Literature Class about Dostoevsky or from a Philosophy professor about the plays of Plato.

Like: "What was the snake thinking? "What was Eve thinking? How can you prove what you are saying, and not just make random speculations? Why did they not die that day? What did Adam hope to gain?" I have wished for something related to the text and not just people using the text to launch into some crusade. And sadly throughout my studies I have never found anything like that.

In other words, when you were in English Literature, what did the teacher talk about in the Book of Job? He or she would ask "What was Job saying? What were the arguments of his friends? How did they differ? How can you show and prove that that is what they were saying? How did Job answer his friends?"

So the same here with Adam and Eve.

Why is it that all religious commentaries on the Torah are so superficial and trite?

I would love to re-read my notes that I took in High School about the Book Of Job just to see how the teacher was analyzing it and see if I can gain any insight about how to see the patterns and motivations in other books of the Torah. The problem is all the commentaries cover up the hidden layers by means of their "explanations"\

I should mention that I brought up this problem with my learning partner and he suggested that Nachmanides fills this role. And from what I have heard from him this seems right. He in fact seems to deal with the basic themes and hows how they are developed within the context of the Torah itself.
The good thing for English speaking people is  Nachmanides on the Torah is in English

worship of people

The major thing which is troubling about groups that present themselves keeping Torah but are idolaters-they is they worship their tzadik-is the hypocrisy aspect of it. The way I see it is that people can either try to keep the laws of the Torah which includes the second of the Ten Commandments "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me" or not claim that are trying to keeping Torah and trying to get money constantly from secular Jews to support their supposedly superior life style.

But you can't say this openly nowadays because it is obvious. People only want to hear something complex because of "Physics Envy." The fact that the truth is sometimes obvious does not matter. People want it t be complicated.


I am not sure however how far to go with this. There still remains the question that some of the people like Reb Nachman were tzadikim. The fact that they are also objects of idol worship does not invalidate that. But it does invalidate the groups that do the idolatry.

The Gra put the whole group  into excommunication which has legal implications.For example one is not allowed to pray in a minyan with them. Nor learn Torah from them. Not teach them Torah. Nor sit within four yards of them. The laws differ between חרם and נידוי. [Cherem and Nidui] "Cherem" can be translated as excommunication. "Niduy "is rebuke. The category the Gra put them into was חרם excommunication.

An example of חרם is what you find in the Gemara with Rabbi Eliezer. Though he was clearly a tzadik still the excommunication had halachic validity as he he himself knew and acted accordingly He did not deny the validity of the excommunication.


There is a question how far to go with this. To what extent is it even possible?

Furthermore I want to point out that I would not be mentioning this if not for the damage these groups cause. That is what I suggest is that the excommunication only reflects an objective reality that is there regardless of the excommunication. Not that the Cherem made them bad but they were bad before the cherem. The cherem only addresses the issue of how to act.

The best way to deal with this issue is to learn the basic subject of idolatry from the Gemara itself. That is mainly the Gemara in Sanhedrin on page 63. Learning that sugia in depth helped me come to clarity about this issue.

Outside of that Gemara it is possible to see the problem by the ugliness of their deeds. That is hard to explain. Mainly I mean that it is one ugly deed then that is just a "קושיא" a question. But by that prevalence  of ugly deeds it is possible to draw a conclusion that there is something about the energy that produces ugly deeds as predictable as the setting of the sun and just as often. And it is not bad deeds. Bad deeds are just wickedness. But there is something ugly about their deeds that is not exactly wicked. It is just that their actions are ugly. There is something wrong with them that you hand put your finger on exactly. And it is not just as it applies to one person of the other. Since it is often and constant and perennial you can conclude that there is some ugly energy producing these ugly people and ugly deeds.

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