Bava Metzia 14b

In Bava Metzia 14b we find that the Talmudic sage Rav said that in a case where one has bought something from a thief and the property returns to  the owner, that the buyer [party number three] gets the money he paid for it from the thief and the improvement also. Rashi explain that this is a case in which the original property was already improved and the thief damaged the property. So the original owner is getting back the property with zero improvement. Tosphot explains that the case is simply that the property was empty and the buyer improved it, and so when Rav says the thief pays back the improvement, it is a simple case of his giving back the improvement, and the original owner gives back the investment to the buyer.

The idea of Tosphot is that this is not any different from a case where a person goes into someone else's field and plants it. In such a case the owner pays the investment, but not the improvement.
This all seems simple and plain. Now this is also the way the Pnei Yehoshua understands this and it seems like there is no need of any explanation.

The problem here arises when we look at Bava Kama page 95a. It looks like this entire subject in Bava Metzia is going according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir over there, and against Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.--which seems absurd on the face of it. Simply put, it so happens that R. Meir is the one person who holds that improvement goes back to the original owner with the stolen object--not Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Shimon. But if you try to explain the subject in Bava Metzia as if it was going like the halacha (law) in Bava Kama, you encounter major problems. Some of these problems were noted by the Pnei Yehoshua, but there is  a  question  that seems to me to be even more powerful that the questions the Pnei Yehoshua raised. The fact is that Shmuel is the person that argues with Rav in Bava Metzia and he says the third party --the buyer-- does not get back the improvement. If you try to explain this according to Rabbi Yehuda it makes no sense. Of course he does not get back the improvement -- because no one took it from him in the first place!
In short, the whole subject in Bava Metzia seems to be going completely like Rabbi Meir and we know from Tractate Eruvin that this is simply impossible. When there is an argument between Rabbi Meir and or Rabbi Shimon with Rabbi Yehuda the law always is like Rabbi Yehuda.

Here is a different idea on that some page.


 ב''מ יד: יש פה שלשה אנשים: נגזל,גזלן, ולוקח מן הגזלן והקרקע שנגזלה. הקרקע חוזרת לבעלים עם השבח שהשביחה הלוקח. רב אמר שהלוקח גובה מחיר הקרקע ושבחה מן הגזלן. תוספות אומרים שהדין של היורד לתוך שדה חבירו בלי רשות שמקבל היציאה שייך לפה. זה דין של רב בדף קג. ושם רב אומר ידו על התחתונה. זאת אומרת שאם השבח פחות מן היציאה, אז הנגזל משלם את היציאה. ואם היציאה פחותה, אז הוא משלם את היציאה. ועכשיו אפשר להבין כוונת התוספות פה בדף יד:. פה יש שתי אפשריות. א) השבח יותר מן היציאה. ב) השבח פחות מן היציאה. מצב הראשון הוא המצב שרב דיבר עליו. שם הנגזל משלם את היציאה, והגזלן משלם את השבח. [פה כוונת רב היא שהגזלן משלם את השבח היתר מן היציאה, היינו ההפרש. וזה שלא ככוונתו בדף קג. אולי יש פה איזו קושיא?] במצב השני שהשבח פחות, אז הגזלן אינו משלם כלום, והנגזל משלם את השבח. וזאת היא השאלה שלי. למה הגזלן אינו משלם את היציאה? אם אנחנו הולכים לפי מה שכתוב בשטר, אז הוא חייב לשלם את היציאה. אם אנחנו לא הולכים לפי מה שכתוב בשטר (אחריות לאו טעות סופר היא) אז גם השבח אינו משלם

[Looking at this essay later I am not sure why I did not write the first idea in Hebrew.  I think the reason I did not put the first paragraph into Hebrew was  I was thinking along the lines   of Tosphot that the two Gemaras pg 14 and 101 mean the same thing-that the שבח goes to the thief and then to the buyer. But later I decided that that can't be what Tosphot meant. Rather who ever did the שבח gets paid for it. And therefore the whole above essay becomes important again.

Yoseph Yozel Horowitz (from Navaradok) held that trust in God is of prime importance in life.

It is well known that the Yoseph Yozel Horowitz (from Navaradok) held that trust in God is of prime importance in life.
I have claimed that this is a good approach, but it only works if one has held to it as soon as he has heard of it, and not gone away from it. If one starts to depend on his own deeds and intelligence in obtaining life's needs, then one can't go back to trust.

Now the basic approach here is that trust in the concepts of Navardok is not belief nor is it religious frenzy. Nor is it related to the idea of sitting and learning Torah. It is however often mixed up with that, but  conceptually it is unrelated. One can in theory sit and learn Torah all day and be depending on handouts from the Israeli government or from rich Jews in America. One could also be working all day in physics job at New York University, and still be trusting in God.

However, we do find that Schopenhauer made a correct observation that there is no reason to assume that the Will has human good in mind. To him, the Will almost delights in surprising people and acting in unpredictable ways. At first glance these two points of view seem contradictory. I claim they are not.

But first I should mention is that there are sub-levels between the First Cause and the actual physical universe that when these levels intersect this world cause what can be called supernatural effects. But these sub levels are not identical with the First Cause.








To me trust in God is going to university and getting an honest job and working for a living but putting one's trust in God.

But then how does one relate this to Schopenhauer? My answer has always been to this question that even Schopenhauer agrees that there is an aspect of the Will that is beyond the dimension that he talks about in The World As Will and Representation. It is the dimension of the Good. This is mentioned in a last letter of his.

I would like to defend the idea that trust in God is an objective moral value. That is it is something people should do. But it is not something they must do. I.e. I claim there are moral values that are oughts, but not musts. It is a realm of value that is totally separate from Thou must.

On a side note I should mention that just because one is engaged in learning Torah that is no reason not to serve in the IDF [Israeli Defense Force].

Trust in God used to be for me a big factor in my personal decisions.  It is not so any longer because I think that once one has left trust and seen that running after worldly ventures does not work well for him or her, one simply can't get back and change modes at will to "Next World" type of issues. [That means in English "siting and learning Torah."]

That being said, I still think that trust is a pretty good idea.
I  discovered a book  The Level of Man (מדרגת האדם) by Joseph Yozel Horwitz (Novaradok).\

He writes that think that in the Torah are all the answers to all of life's problems. And he does not like the idea of compromise on the idea of learning Torah and devoting one's life to Torah.

I thought that this was a pretty good idea, and took this idea to its outer limits. And as long as I went with pure trust in God, there is no question in my mind that God reciprocated. But when I fell from this idea and decided to depend on my own mind and efforts, that is the second that God removed his Divine Providence from me and left me in the hands of the ways of the world.


OK, what is done is done. Why is this relevant for  people at this point? The answer is that it seems to me that the answer to the problems the Jewish people is facing probably is like Yoseph Horwitz suggested --trust in God. I have seen a lot of other approaches, but this one seems the best.

Now, I am aware  that  learning Torah in recent years has become  means of making money.  But I am also aware that there is no system that can't be abused. [Abuse does not cancel use. It is an old Latin saying: Abusus non tollit usum.  ] Just because there are  those that use the Torah to make  a living, there is no reason to blame the Torah for this.

That all being said we still need to find some kind of safeguard(s) so that Torah should not be used for making money.

On a side note I should mention that just because one is engaged in learning Torah that is no reason not to serve in the IDF [Israeli Defense Force]. We do not find people learning Torah that claim that they are not obligated to marry and bear children.. In fact just the opposite. many people use the fact of their learning Torah  as a means to get marry and make money. Certainly learning Torah does not exempt anyone from doing any mitzvah. That is not including in the halachic definition of learning Torah which implies as a prerequisite that one is keeping the Torah also.



People that use the holy Torah to make their livings are not able to understand the Torah. The Torah is jealous of its honor and does not reveal itself to people that make it a "shovel to dig" with. See the Gra on Pirkei Avot  where he derives the prohibition of using Torah as a means of livelihood from the king Balshatzar [in the book of Daniel] would used the vessels of the holy temple in Jerusalem and was punished.

[The major issue in Israel is that of Islamic Fascism, not land. But this essay was not meant to deal with the problem of Islamic Fascism and my learning partner thought it is a waste of time to do so. Still it seems to me to be a good idea to justify the State of Israel.  Dr Dershowitz, and the Alt Right blogs like Brett Stevens {defending nationalism}.The most telling comment was on one Alt Right blog where one person commented he would love to side with the Muslims in Israel except for the fact that after they would be done with Israel the next person on their list of people to attack would include that person making the comment. In other words Islam is on the march to crush the West. ]

 The Torah is clear about the importance of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.

 There are not many people that are aware of this fact, but I think a precursory reading of the Five Books of Moses should be enough to convince anyone that the bringing of Jews to the Land of Israel is of primary importance in the Torah. You don't even have to read it in Hebrew to see this.
It is the major theme of the Torah.
[In fact it is the one and only major theme of the Torah. The giving of the Ten Commandments was a semi finial, but the theme of bringing the Jews to Israel is the one and only foremost theme of the entire Torah from the beginning to the end.]



But even without this, the fact than Iran wants to wipe out the Jews is an important issue. I was discussing the Cuban Missile crisis yesterday with a person who served in the KGB. I mentioned that the USSR was a totally different type of adversary than the Islamic world. The goal of both the USA and the USSR was to create a decent and fair system for their people. The goal of the Islamic world is to destroy Western Civilization. This was the reason the Russians traditionally always kept Muslims down to a small number. They knew that Muslims when in small numbers act better than anyone. They are more decent and more polite. But after anywhere from 10 to 20 percent things change radically.

I am open to suggestions here if anyone has an idea of how to answer this question on the Rambam. If you think you will be able to open up the book of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and understand his answer on this then be my guest. Please enlighten me! [I see when I wrote this in Hebrew I thought the word for land is masculine which I think was a mistake.]

Leviticus chapter 25 verse 33

"The house shall go out in the jubilee."



Introduction. According to the Rambam, when a serf(מקבל) (a serf here is not a slave. He enters a voluntary agreement to wok and property and take some exact percentage of what grows) leaves his field at the end of his period and a buyer of a field when he returns it in the jubilee year, both keep the improvement (שבח,) [the amount which grew on the field not by itself, but from his efforts]. But if this is the case, then how can the Talmud (in Bava Metzia page 109a) ask why do we not learn serfdom from jubilee?
We do! It is the same law!

Frankly, I have no idea of how Reb Chaim Soloveitchik answers this problem in the Rambam [Maimonides] and I have no idea how to answer it myself. But I have one observation that I think might be useful in finding a solution. [Later sometime after I wrote this blog, I looked at the commentary of the Geon from Vilna(הגר''א) Eliyahu from Vilnius and he answers this question simply and powerfully.]
The thing I noticed about this law is that Maimonides does not mention anything about the sums of money the serf or the buyer put into the field. This is very strange because this is the first thing that you usually deal with in the case of a loaner and a borrower as in Bava Metzia 15b.

I know Reb Chaim has a whole different approach in his Chidushei HaRambam but I do not see how he answers this question; or how his approach could help us in any way.
I am getting so obsessed with this problem that I did not even do my regular math study today. I have been going through all the different possibilities that I can think of and nothing seems to work.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Talmud itself that makes this difficult. It is just the way the Rambam understands the case of a serf and a buyer that makes this difficult. If we would have just the Talmud then it would read thus: Rava  says, a serf does not get the extra growth of  trees [when he decides to terminate his contract]. The Talmud asks on Rava : But in Jubilee the law is that the buyer keeps all extra growth besides the field itself.

(k) Answer (Abaye on behalf of Rava): Jubilee is different, for the Torah said "V'Yatza Mimkar Bayis" - the sale goes back, the improvements do not go back. [The Torah says that in Jubilee the house goes back--not the improvements]
(l) Question: We should learn from Jubilee to a renter!

I am open to suggestions here if anyone has an idea of how to answer this question on the Rambam. If you think you will be able to open up the book of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and understand his answer on this then be my guest. Please enlighten me!

 ב''מ קט. הקדמה. נראה לי שהרמב''ם היה אומר שאף על פי שהדין של קבלנות והדין של יובל שווים לגבי הוצאה ושבח, הם שונים לגבי שבח שקמה. לגבי שבח שקמה, קודם שבע שנים המקבל אינו מקבל כלום אפילו אם עבד עליו. ואחרי שבע שנים הוא מקבל את הכל -גם השקמה בעצמה- אפילו אם לא עבד עליו (רק שעבד על השדה בכלל). ועל הדין הפרטי הזה הגמרא שואלת, "אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל?" עכשיו נכנס ליותר פרטים. המשנה אומרת שהמקבל אינו מקבל את השקמה אם לא עבד על השדה שבע שנים. רבא אמר גם אינו מקבל שבח שקמה. והגמרא שואלת על זה מיובל איפה שאנחנו אומרים "שמין"- זאת אומרת שהלוקח מקבל מה שהשדה הצמיח. ופה הגמרא מתרצת שיובל שונה בגלל גזירת הכתוב "ממכר בית" חוזר, ולא שבח. ואז היא שואלת "אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל?" והיא מתרצת שיובל שונה בגלל עוד סיבה, - הקרקע קנוי ללוקח. מצד עצמה הגמרא ברורה. הלוקח מקבל את מה שהצמיח השדה, ולא המקבל. מה החילוק? והיא מתרצת שהחילוק הוא שיש פסוק. אבל לדעת הרמב''ם, שני הדינים שווים. המקבל והלוקח מקבלים את מה שגדל בגלל העבודה שלהם, ולא את מה שגדל ממילא. רב חיים הלוי שואל את הקושיא הזאת,  אבל לא הבנתי את תירוצו. לי נראה שהרמב''ם היה יכול לתרץ את זאת כך: כשהגמרא שואלת אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל, הגמרא אינה מכוונת לכל מיני שבח, אלא דווקא לשבח אילנות. בשבח אילנות אפילו את מה גדל מחמת עבודתו המקבל אינו מקבל, והלוקח כן מקבל. ועל הפרט הזה הגמרא שואלת את קושייתה

אבל מלשון הרמב''ם אינו משמע כן. הרמב''ם כתב לגבי שבח שיקמה שאם המקבל לא עבד עליו, הוא לא מקבל אותו. בתחלה חשבתי שאולי רק אחרי התירוץ של הגמרא שהלוקח קנה את הקרקע [לא כמו שהגמרא חשב בתחלה שהוא כמו שוכר] אז הגמרא השווה את דין הלוקח עם דין המקבל בגלל שגזירת הכתוב משווה אותם. אבל יש קושיא על התירוץ הזה בגלל שכל קושיית הגמרא נבנית על בסיס ששמין ללוקח, ולא למקבל. זאת אומרת, גם בתחלה וגם בסוף הגמרא אוחזת את השיטה שדינם שונה.
בתחלה היה נראה לי שאי אפשר לתרץ את הקושיא הזאת בגלל שכל כיוון הגמרא הוא כנגד הרעיון שדינם שווה. הגמרא מתחילה עם המושג שיובל וקבלנות הם שונים, והיא שואלת "למה יהיו שונים?" והיא מתרצת את זה: הם שונים בגלל שיש פסוק. אבל עדיין היא לא יכולה להסתפק עם זה. ואז היא מוצאת עוד סיבה שיהיו שונים. ואחר כל זה, איך אפשר לומר שהם שווים? התירוץ לזאת היא מוכלת בשתי מילים של הגר''א. הוא כתב שהמילה "אילנות" ברמב''ם (שכירות פרק ח' הלכה י') היא טעות סופר. וצריך לומר רק "שבח", ולא "שבח אילנות". זאת אומרת שלגבי שבח בכלל הדין של יובל וקבלנות הם שווים כמו שכתב הרמב''ם.  אבל מה שקשה לגמרא היא הדין של שבח אילנות ששם אין דינם שווה. לגבי יובל שבח אילנות שווה לשבח רגיל. [אם הוא עבד עליו הוא מקבל אותו-ואם לא,לא.] אבל לגבי קבלנות, אפילו אם המקבל עבד על שבח אילנות, הוא אינו מקבל אותו. ואז גמרא משתדלת למצוא סיבה שיובל וקבלנות יהיו שונים.

In the strictest sense of keeping Torah, we do find that attachment with God is a primary principle in Torah--along with the Ten Commandments.  We  find the major things the Torah is concerned with are: (1) Bringing the Jewish people into the Land of Israel,  (2) Attachment with God, (3) Fear of God, (4) Love of God, and (5) The Ten Commandments. Now there are lots of commandants in the Torah besides the  ten, but the ten are considered to be the roots of all the others.


"What does God want from you but to fear and love God and to walk in his ways and do his commandments?" (Deuteronomy)

"לדבקה בו" to be attached with God is mentioned twice in Deuteronomy as a command. Though in a practical sense this means to be attached with 'Torah scholars" תלמידי חכמים still אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and that is how the author of Sefer Yeraim  a disciple of Rabbainu Tam describes it.

Lithuanian Jewish world

 Now in the book of R. Chaim from Voloshin, Nefesh HaChaim, we see a definite emphasis on learning Torah specifically.









 people make a mistake in making a tzadik and his ideas the center of attention instead of the Law of Moses which should be our focus.

But once you get the idea that the Law of Moses should be the center of our attention, it is hard to get away from the Lithuanian approach.. After all, there are lot of laws in the Old Testament and the book itself obviously requires a logical analysis. And so far I have not heard of anyone who has come up with a more rigorous logical analysis of the laws of Moses outside of the Babylonian Talmud. For example we have several verse in Exodus discussing the obligations of  a person that  guarding something and the object is lost. Another example in Shabat. Clearly we need a good definition of what it means to keep  Shabat. And in this area it looks like  that driving on Shabat is a problem because driving involves of the use of a combustion engine.

If Christians would come up with a better analysis of the Laws of Moses than the Talmud then I would be happy to discuss this. But in general Christians do not feel under the obligation to keep the laws of the Torah, and so do not spend a lot of effort in defining them.

We Jews however are under the obligation to keep the Laws of Moses and so it is in our best interest to understand how to keep them.
If there is any group that seems to take a balanced approach to Torah it seems to be Conservative Jews. Mesorati Jews seems to take these obligations more seriously than other Jewish groups.