It has bothered me for some time why a great philosopher -Jurgen Habermas seems to like Marx.
The only explanation that I can see is he likes the idea that means of production {and apparently means and ways of making a living} determine people's morality and world view, instead of the world view determining their means of support like they claim. If this is the whole big deal about Marx--that people are irrational primates, then I don't see what the great news is. Original sin is a doctrine that I have heard of before. People are born into sin and then they excuse it with philosophy. Fine.
(Kelly Ross: "Karl Marx did not have a theory of morality; he had a theory of history. Thus, Marxism was not about right or wrong but about what will happen in history.
and what his theory predicted did not happen. The problem with Marxism was that it has never been willing to accept the discipline of falsification. The Marxist "high tide of prophecy," in Karl Popper's phrase, was perfectly willing to kill people by the millions rather than accept that "wreckers," spies, or some diabolical conspiracy were not responsible for the failure of Marxist economics.")
Maybe what is going on is the idea that desires determine perception--and especially the class one belongs to of better yet the social group. But this is saying the same thing. people desire to be upstanding member of a social group more than life.as the kamikaze pilots of WWII teach us.
OK you can say all I need to do is to read Habermas. But there is the trouble (besides the German language). At blowing Rawls (and the postmodern lunatics) out of the water he is great. But in building his own system he does not seem all that great.
Personally I would like to ask him why he does not spend more effort on John Locke and John Locke's state of Nature?
28.7.12
I think that Nietzsche is not a bad guy.Dress up anything as science, and Americans will believe it. Psychology is the best example of this.
I think that Nietzsche is not a bad guy. He might be my opponent. He might be wrong. But that does not make him bad or have some kind of evil heart. I do think that his critique against morality has some very important points. You might say that I see his critique on morality as actually being pretty astute. I see him kind of like I see Kant in his critique on pure reason. Kant saw the limits of reason, and Nietzsche saw the limits of morality. So today, any defense of Jewish-Christian morality of the Bible definitely needs to take into account the Nietzsche critique if it is to have any validity at all. Otherwise, it is like you are giving a class in the Talmud and someone asks a question and that you can not answer, but you decide to ignore it, or to put down the questioner as if he is too stupid to understand you. Obviously, all your credibility is gone in an instant.
Now I first would like to deal with the issue of logical fallacies in his thought. The fact that people did not create themselves does not contradict the existence of free will. The idea of Nietzsche was that since we are not self created (which he would call being free agents) then we have no free will. In spite of the powerful rhetoric behind his words, this does not logically follow.
This is just one example but the logical fallacies in his thought are numerous. [It is possible to prove that moral relativism is false.] [Actually it is possible to prove relativism itself is false. Not just moral relativism See the essay of John Searle from Berkley.] Rather I would like to mention some of the good points he makes. First he holds that morality is in general a weapon used against others, not a tool of self improvement. In fact, it obvious that this is what he does not like about it. If he would be in fact against morality, then why would this bother him? If it is a lie used by the powerful to subdue their enemies, then what could be wrong with that? If Nietzsche would be against morality, then he should welcome this.-- The point it he hold from Jewish-Christian morality, but he hates how it is misused. I can only agree with him in this.
He is right that people are different. But this is not an argument against morality. I boil milk and broil steak. Milk and steak are different. But this does not make how I cook them to be arbitrary or non objective. Again Nietzsche has a great point, but the logical conclusion is different from what he thinks. [He is of course knocking Kant that wanted to place all morality on one universal principle--much like the ancient Greeks wanted also.]
This I think is relevant for today, since I think it is the Nietzsche critique against morality which is the basic foundation of the Democratic Party in America today. People don't really think too deeply into morals, but they hear that they don't need to be moral and they like what they hear. Especially since psychology has becomes dressed with an air of science and is basically saying the same thing--it gives extra power to this. [To real scientists it has become clear that psychology is a pseudo science and that is why it has been rigorously excluded from the natural sciences.]
No wonder America is slipping.
Mainstream America loves to hallucinate, believing pseudo science. Dress up anything as science, and Americans will believe it. Psychology is the best example of this. Most Americans, for example, believe that financial details don't really matter as long as the spending party continues. (In the last four years, the national debt has risen 17 trillion dollars. That is real money.) Americans believe that you can get something for nothing if you just manage to fool enough people.
I was swamped with scams in the mail when I lived in New York--even Reader's Digest which you would expect to have some standards of decency.
But this I repeat does not make Nietzsche wrong. It just means that someone has to figure out a way of dealing with the issue of morality that takes into account the Nietzsche critique. This is a harder job than it may seem. It does not mean simply refuting his arguments. It means we have to reexamine the entire structure of Christan-Jewish ethics and figure out where and if it is wrong or might need correction.
I have a little more time on the Internet today so let me just at this point at least present my own basic approach to morality. Moral values are objective. They really exist, and are independent of observers.
2. Moral knowledge is an example of universals.
But in this case I go with Maimonides and Aristotle that universals are not independent of particulars --but that they exist.
I know many people will think this strange. After all, you do not bump into moral values as you walk down the street. But on the other hand, you don't often bump into the number two as you walk down the street either.
[Also to prove universals exists: (1) Yellow is a color. (2) The truth of statement (1) depends on the fact that yellow exists . Yellow is a universal. Therefore universals exist. QED]]
This brings me to the idea of argument from authority which is a logical fallacy. The trouble with Orthodox Judaism as it relates to this topic is that the major issue which is all consuming is who is the biggest rabbi --yours or mine. Logic and material evidence are not even considered as evidence. and how do you determine this all important question who is the biggest rabbi? By stories.
The trouble with this is that stories are not evidence. They can be helpful inspiration for what you know already by reason, but they can't cancel out reason or logic.
Now the importance of the Talmud for Christians is simple. I should preface my remarks that I am not saying the Talmud is divine. [It never claims such a thing. This is an orthodox invention.] The importance of the Talmud is simply to understand the basic question it deals with: What do the laws of the Old Testament mean? This is the area that the Talmud excels. To go looking for dumb statements in the Talmud, and thereby disparage the whole thing makes no more sense than doing the same thing with Shakespeare, Hegel or Nietzsche which have plenty of more outrageous and self contradictory statements than the Talmud. Shakespeare if you did not know lionized Brutus- -the murderer of Caesar. I forget which play that was in but the last line (I think maybe it was the play about Mark Anthony) was something like: "Here was a real man"--about Brutus! Oy Veehs Mir!
This is relevant for today's news:
Cathy told the Baptist Press that the company, which puts faith ahead of profits by closing on Sundays, was “guilty as charged” for backing the “biblical definition of a family.”
He later ratcheted up the rhetoric in a radio interview, saying: “I think we are inviting God’s judgment on our nation when we shake our fist at Him and say, ‘We know better than you as to what constitutes a marriage.”
Christians don't need to accept the Talmud. But with a little knowledge of what it is about, all this would not even be an issue.
In fact, you could even just look at the Mishna (the short version written by R Yehuda HaNasi) in Tractate Kritot and see the general rule about what is considered strict and what is considered minor in the Torah. [In short the 36 types of things that one gets the death penalty for are considered strict. You might say.]
Now I first would like to deal with the issue of logical fallacies in his thought. The fact that people did not create themselves does not contradict the existence of free will. The idea of Nietzsche was that since we are not self created (which he would call being free agents) then we have no free will. In spite of the powerful rhetoric behind his words, this does not logically follow.
This is just one example but the logical fallacies in his thought are numerous. [It is possible to prove that moral relativism is false.] [Actually it is possible to prove relativism itself is false. Not just moral relativism See the essay of John Searle from Berkley.] Rather I would like to mention some of the good points he makes. First he holds that morality is in general a weapon used against others, not a tool of self improvement. In fact, it obvious that this is what he does not like about it. If he would be in fact against morality, then why would this bother him? If it is a lie used by the powerful to subdue their enemies, then what could be wrong with that? If Nietzsche would be against morality, then he should welcome this.-- The point it he hold from Jewish-Christian morality, but he hates how it is misused. I can only agree with him in this.
He is right that people are different. But this is not an argument against morality. I boil milk and broil steak. Milk and steak are different. But this does not make how I cook them to be arbitrary or non objective. Again Nietzsche has a great point, but the logical conclusion is different from what he thinks. [He is of course knocking Kant that wanted to place all morality on one universal principle--much like the ancient Greeks wanted also.]
This I think is relevant for today, since I think it is the Nietzsche critique against morality which is the basic foundation of the Democratic Party in America today. People don't really think too deeply into morals, but they hear that they don't need to be moral and they like what they hear. Especially since psychology has becomes dressed with an air of science and is basically saying the same thing--it gives extra power to this. [To real scientists it has become clear that psychology is a pseudo science and that is why it has been rigorously excluded from the natural sciences.]
No wonder America is slipping.
Mainstream America loves to hallucinate, believing pseudo science. Dress up anything as science, and Americans will believe it. Psychology is the best example of this. Most Americans, for example, believe that financial details don't really matter as long as the spending party continues. (In the last four years, the national debt has risen 17 trillion dollars. That is real money.) Americans believe that you can get something for nothing if you just manage to fool enough people.
I was swamped with scams in the mail when I lived in New York--even Reader's Digest which you would expect to have some standards of decency.
But this I repeat does not make Nietzsche wrong. It just means that someone has to figure out a way of dealing with the issue of morality that takes into account the Nietzsche critique. This is a harder job than it may seem. It does not mean simply refuting his arguments. It means we have to reexamine the entire structure of Christan-Jewish ethics and figure out where and if it is wrong or might need correction.
I have a little more time on the Internet today so let me just at this point at least present my own basic approach to morality. Moral values are objective. They really exist, and are independent of observers.
2. Moral knowledge is an example of universals.
But in this case I go with Maimonides and Aristotle that universals are not independent of particulars --but that they exist.
I know many people will think this strange. After all, you do not bump into moral values as you walk down the street. But on the other hand, you don't often bump into the number two as you walk down the street either.
[Also to prove universals exists: (1) Yellow is a color. (2) The truth of statement (1) depends on the fact that yellow exists . Yellow is a universal. Therefore universals exist. QED]]
This brings me to the idea of argument from authority which is a logical fallacy. The trouble with Orthodox Judaism as it relates to this topic is that the major issue which is all consuming is who is the biggest rabbi --yours or mine. Logic and material evidence are not even considered as evidence. and how do you determine this all important question who is the biggest rabbi? By stories.
The trouble with this is that stories are not evidence. They can be helpful inspiration for what you know already by reason, but they can't cancel out reason or logic.
Now the importance of the Talmud for Christians is simple. I should preface my remarks that I am not saying the Talmud is divine. [It never claims such a thing. This is an orthodox invention.] The importance of the Talmud is simply to understand the basic question it deals with: What do the laws of the Old Testament mean? This is the area that the Talmud excels. To go looking for dumb statements in the Talmud, and thereby disparage the whole thing makes no more sense than doing the same thing with Shakespeare, Hegel or Nietzsche which have plenty of more outrageous and self contradictory statements than the Talmud. Shakespeare if you did not know lionized Brutus- -the murderer of Caesar. I forget which play that was in but the last line (I think maybe it was the play about Mark Anthony) was something like: "Here was a real man"--about Brutus! Oy Veehs Mir!
This is relevant for today's news:
Cathy told the Baptist Press that the company, which puts faith ahead of profits by closing on Sundays, was “guilty as charged” for backing the “biblical definition of a family.”
He later ratcheted up the rhetoric in a radio interview, saying: “I think we are inviting God’s judgment on our nation when we shake our fist at Him and say, ‘We know better than you as to what constitutes a marriage.”
Christians don't need to accept the Talmud. But with a little knowledge of what it is about, all this would not even be an issue.
In fact, you could even just look at the Mishna (the short version written by R Yehuda HaNasi) in Tractate Kritot and see the general rule about what is considered strict and what is considered minor in the Torah. [In short the 36 types of things that one gets the death penalty for are considered strict. You might say.]
26.7.12
\
The basic sources of information concerning Nietzsche: The statement “consciousness is a surface.” And the fact that he gets this from Leibniz. [If Leibniz actually meant this is hard to say. He said, “consciousness
(Bewusstheit) is merely an accident of representation"] The there is a debate nowadays between Mattia Riccardi and Paul Katsafanas about some important questions about the meaning of Nietzsche.
She holds of conscious causation, while Paul thinks Nietzsche changed his mind about it, and the other thing that Nietzsche says about consciousness is consciousness is “basically superfluous”. [When it comes to understanding of people, I prefer to go to the original thinkers instead of to the pseudo science of psychology which is just a business of lunatics by lunatics and for lunatics that shall never be divided, while at least Nietzsche had real insights.]
The entire structure of the Eitz Chaim of Isaac Luria --the entire universe and all the higher spiritual worlds and lower depths are all in the human heart. the other place is where is specifically states that what we call the self is the nefesh--the soul--or rather the upper layer of the soul.--the surface layer.plus the fact that he sees the souse of evil extending from the lowest level of simple animal desires up to the it root in holiness== fallen angel in one unbroken string or linkage, .i.e. after the simple animal desires there is a specific spirit that inspires people to do things that have zero desire or please. The sole motivation of this evil inclination is to do wrong because it is wrong. And there is the general middle levels where the sin has some pleasure but the main motivation is because it is evil and the level where people believe they are doing a great mitzvah. The Satan dresses himself up in Mitzvas. There is a level also where one does mitzvas for honor, power, and sex (to get a shiduch marriage opportunity) etc.
OK I hope I have not exhausted your patience with me as I get to my point--which is this: For Torah, free will is important. And for Torah, morality is objective.
[How could it not be objective? It could be like if someone says "Redness is not objective because whether a thing is red depends on the nature of the observer and not just on the nature of the object. Saying" Morality is objective" here means: there is some actual state of the world that corresponds to a value judgment.
To prove it is objective I offer this point by Michael Huemer: Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality:
(1) There are moral propositions.
(2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.")
(4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth)
(5) So moral values are part of reality. (which is objectivism"
Another refutation of relativism. You can't even state moral relativism without denying it. Suppose you say
1. All moral truth is relative to the interests and perspective of the person
making the truth claim [like Nietzsche]. or 2. There are no universally valid moral truths. or
3. There are no absolute truths. It looks like in each case you have to exempt the claim itself from the scope of its application. But then you have given up the claim, for the claim was supposed to be universal in in its application. Or else there is one exception to the claim. If there is one why not more?]
The result of there being free will is that consciousness has to be the major battlefield between good and evil. For Nietzsche, the consciousness is superfluous because he does not hold there is any function of the conscious to choose. (Now if Nietzsche holds from free will at all I am not sure, since he might hold of such a thing for the higher man though he denies it in general.] But clearly the place of the choosing is in the deeper layers of the subconscious.
He apparently felt he was waging battles on higher planes of existence. But the place where the final discretion lays is this physical world.
It is interesting to compare all this to Kant in which it seems most of what is going on is on the surface level where reason organizes sensory input into it categories. One would be justified in asking, "Where do this structures of reason come from?"
To both there are independent objective values that the self recognizes
And of course, last but not least, it is very important to understand how all this relates to John Locke and his (and his teacher's (the Earl of Shaftsberry)) idea of the self which in turn is the basis for his type of government.
John Locke's self as is known is the enlightened self [what some people call the bourgeois]. And much as the Left despises this, it is the basis for the American Democracy. The question here is simple. What is wrong with Socialism and Marx and Lenin and Nazism [all based on the concept of the general will of Rosseau and Hegel and as basically setting the pattern for the deeper aspects of the self and ignoring John Locke], and why is this government of superficial, selfish, unenlightened, bourgeois selves of America so successful? [In the ways that it is. I am not claiming there was nothing good about the USSR.]
Nietzsche. To Nietzsche, conscious falsifies
Another subject that is related is the desire to be part of a community which seems to be the direct opposite of the desire to be an individual. And in my opinion the desire to be part of a community is the most fundamental of human desires.--not the enlightened self interest of John Locke. So the question is how does this play out here. With Nietzsche also this is a difficult issue. He was pitted against Democracy which he despised.
The assumed inherent goodness of people [that Rosseau claimed a the state of nature]
The basic sources of information concerning Nietzsche: The statement “consciousness is a surface.” And the fact that he gets this from Leibniz. [If Leibniz actually meant this is hard to say. He said, “consciousness
(Bewusstheit) is merely an accident of representation"] The there is a debate nowadays between Mattia Riccardi and Paul Katsafanas about some important questions about the meaning of Nietzsche.
She holds of conscious causation, while Paul thinks Nietzsche changed his mind about it, and the other thing that Nietzsche says about consciousness is consciousness is “basically superfluous”. [When it comes to understanding of people, I prefer to go to the original thinkers instead of to the pseudo science of psychology which is just a business of lunatics by lunatics and for lunatics that shall never be divided, while at least Nietzsche had real insights.]
The entire structure of the Eitz Chaim of Isaac Luria --the entire universe and all the higher spiritual worlds and lower depths are all in the human heart. the other place is where is specifically states that what we call the self is the nefesh--the soul--or rather the upper layer of the soul.--the surface layer.plus the fact that he sees the souse of evil extending from the lowest level of simple animal desires up to the it root in holiness== fallen angel in one unbroken string or linkage, .i.e. after the simple animal desires there is a specific spirit that inspires people to do things that have zero desire or please. The sole motivation of this evil inclination is to do wrong because it is wrong. And there is the general middle levels where the sin has some pleasure but the main motivation is because it is evil and the level where people believe they are doing a great mitzvah. The Satan dresses himself up in Mitzvas. There is a level also where one does mitzvas for honor, power, and sex (to get a shiduch marriage opportunity) etc.
OK I hope I have not exhausted your patience with me as I get to my point--which is this: For Torah, free will is important. And for Torah, morality is objective.
[How could it not be objective? It could be like if someone says "Redness is not objective because whether a thing is red depends on the nature of the observer and not just on the nature of the object. Saying" Morality is objective" here means: there is some actual state of the world that corresponds to a value judgment.
To prove it is objective I offer this point by Michael Huemer: Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality:
(1) There are moral propositions.
(2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.")
(4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth)
(5) So moral values are part of reality. (which is objectivism"
Another refutation of relativism. You can't even state moral relativism without denying it. Suppose you say
1. All moral truth is relative to the interests and perspective of the person
making the truth claim [like Nietzsche]. or 2. There are no universally valid moral truths. or
3. There are no absolute truths. It looks like in each case you have to exempt the claim itself from the scope of its application. But then you have given up the claim, for the claim was supposed to be universal in in its application. Or else there is one exception to the claim. If there is one why not more?]
The result of there being free will is that consciousness has to be the major battlefield between good and evil. For Nietzsche, the consciousness is superfluous because he does not hold there is any function of the conscious to choose. (Now if Nietzsche holds from free will at all I am not sure, since he might hold of such a thing for the higher man though he denies it in general.] But clearly the place of the choosing is in the deeper layers of the subconscious.
He apparently felt he was waging battles on higher planes of existence. But the place where the final discretion lays is this physical world.
It is interesting to compare all this to Kant in which it seems most of what is going on is on the surface level where reason organizes sensory input into it categories. One would be justified in asking, "Where do this structures of reason come from?"
To both there are independent objective values that the self recognizes
And of course, last but not least, it is very important to understand how all this relates to John Locke and his (and his teacher's (the Earl of Shaftsberry)) idea of the self which in turn is the basis for his type of government.
John Locke's self as is known is the enlightened self [what some people call the bourgeois]. And much as the Left despises this, it is the basis for the American Democracy. The question here is simple. What is wrong with Socialism and Marx and Lenin and Nazism [all based on the concept of the general will of Rosseau and Hegel and as basically setting the pattern for the deeper aspects of the self and ignoring John Locke], and why is this government of superficial, selfish, unenlightened, bourgeois selves of America so successful? [In the ways that it is. I am not claiming there was nothing good about the USSR.]
Nietzsche. To Nietzsche, conscious falsifies
Another subject that is related is the desire to be part of a community which seems to be the direct opposite of the desire to be an individual. And in my opinion the desire to be part of a community is the most fundamental of human desires.--not the enlightened self interest of John Locke. So the question is how does this play out here. With Nietzsche also this is a difficult issue. He was pitted against Democracy which he despised.
The assumed inherent goodness of people [that Rosseau claimed a the state of nature]
is simply false. Here is one good example of a pure state of state of innocent human life as it is before contaminated by TV and McDonald's; Yanomamo men have two great sports--hunting and war. The patterns of their warfare bear a strange resemblance to those of the langur.
Yanomamo men sneak up on a neighboring village and attack. If they are successful, they kill or chase away the men. They leave the
sexually-capable young women unharmed. But they move methodically through the lean-to-like homes, grabbing babies from the
screaming captives. Like the langurs, the Yanomamo men beat these infants against the ground, bash their brains out on the rocks, and
make the footpaths wet with babies' blood.]
Yanomamo men sneak up on a neighboring village and attack. If they are successful, they kill or chase away the men. They leave the
sexually-capable young women unharmed. But they move methodically through the lean-to-like homes, grabbing babies from the
screaming captives. Like the langurs, the Yanomamo men beat these infants against the ground, bash their brains out on the rocks, and
make the footpaths wet with babies' blood.]
25.7.12
SDI
On the "Life in Israel" blog: there is a comment: "Star Wars(SDI strategic Defense Initiative). I seem to remember that a large part of how Ronald Reagan brought the Soviets to the knees in the '80s was via the Star Wars program. An arms race was created in which the United States and the Soviet union competed to see who could spend more money than the other on weaponry, satellites, and the like. Eventually, the US was able to out-buy the Soviets, and essentially bankrupted the Soviets into collapse."
My comment: "It was not just money. This was battle of Talent. There was a whole sub layer of events concerning Star Wars. First of all it is important to understand that Star Wars was being developed by the USSR and the USA long before either announced it. In fact after the Russians already had a head start with sputnik they leaped ahead with star wars right in the beginning of the 1960's. at that point they had more technology and even more of the mathematics necessary for such a program. America got wind of this and gave subcontracts to private firms like TRW and Hycon to develop a USA Star Wars. These corporations went t to my Dad and hired him to build a laser communication system between satellites so that the Russians could not monitor our communications.(the trouble with radio waves is that they spread. That means the Russian can eavesdrop. Lasers lack that drawback.) By the time Reagan announced it. we had caught up with the Russians and had gone beyond them.
One Russian told me it was battle between the American Jewish scientists and the Russian Jewish scientists.
My comment: "It was not just money. This was battle of Talent. There was a whole sub layer of events concerning Star Wars. First of all it is important to understand that Star Wars was being developed by the USSR and the USA long before either announced it. In fact after the Russians already had a head start with sputnik they leaped ahead with star wars right in the beginning of the 1960's. at that point they had more technology and even more of the mathematics necessary for such a program. America got wind of this and gave subcontracts to private firms like TRW and Hycon to develop a USA Star Wars. These corporations went t to my Dad and hired him to build a laser communication system between satellites so that the Russians could not monitor our communications.(the trouble with radio waves is that they spread. That means the Russian can eavesdrop. Lasers lack that drawback.) By the time Reagan announced it. we had caught up with the Russians and had gone beyond them.
One Russian told me it was battle between the American Jewish scientists and the Russian Jewish scientists.
“In order to overthrow a nation its people must first be disarmed” ~ Karl Marx
The basic idea I had in mind was to go through the development of the idea of Constitution government and especially John Locke's two treaties on government which provided the basis of the USA Constitution. then I wanted to show from treatise two section 214 how the USA government today in not constitutional because it has nullified the rule of law --i.e. the Constitution itself. This it does by the fact that the Supreme Court says that whatever they say is what the Constitution says. this is a downright straightforward lie and is the opposite of the idea of the rule of law. And this is not just in theory. The USA government has pitted itself against the American father, and made women depend on government and not their husbands. This is no accident but contrived. I hold that therefore the government of the USA should be overthrown--or else vote in a president who will uphold the Constitution.
I am sure the next major step of the illegitimate American government will be to try to disarm everyone with a gun.
"ISN’T IT AMAZING that whenever a drunk driver kills people on our streets and highways, the media and all others NEVER point their fingers at the CAR being the CAUSE of the carnage but at the PERSON RESPONSIBLE…..then whenever a GUN is employed in killings, it is the GUN that is the “problem”! ~ Crazy, huh?!!!
Bottom Line: “In order to overthrow a nation its people must first be disarmed” ~ Karl Marx (Notice that Marx mentions nothing about taking motor vehicles away from the people!)"
http://www.propublica.org/
I am sure the next major step of the illegitimate American government will be to try to disarm everyone with a gun.
"ISN’T IT AMAZING that whenever a drunk driver kills people on our streets and highways, the media and all others NEVER point their fingers at the CAR being the CAUSE of the carnage but at the PERSON RESPONSIBLE…..then whenever a GUN is employed in killings, it is the GUN that is the “problem”! ~ Crazy, huh?!!!
Bottom Line: “In order to overthrow a nation its people must first be disarmed” ~ Karl Marx (Notice that Marx mentions nothing about taking motor vehicles away from the people!)"
http://www.propublica.org/
notes on bava metzia page 61
I want to mention here two important points about Tosphot (the first on the page that starts with the words im aino inyan). The major question I see here is that the Maharsha seems to say that Rashi agrees with Tosphot, after Rashi has abandoned the idea of the hava amina ["I would have said"]. But looking at Rashi in the conclusion of the Gemara it seems Rashi is not saying the same thing.
To Tosphot, "Don't take neshech (interest) for money and food" is enough to tell us not to take neshech for money and food. Then the word "neshech" is extra in order to tell you that for "increase" food and money are forbidden. But Rashi says both times the word "neshch" is used it is telling you about the increase because neither are needed for neshach (interest). "Lo tashich" was enough for that.
[i.e. to Tosphot one word interest is to tell you about increase and the other is for a gezera shava.]
But then Rashi is stuck that nothing is left over for a gezera shava. But that is, I think, the exact point of Rashi. You don't need an extra word for a gezra shava. You just need similar words in two places. And this is exactly why Ravina can come along to say we don't need it (until he also uses it at some point later). He could not say that if the word was extra. While to Tosphot the only one word "neshach" is needed for increase (ribit), and the other one for the gezrea shava.
[Rashi would be unable to explain here why you need a verse for the lender at all.(I.e. the verse in Leviticus is not needed. All it should say is to the lender, "Don't take interest," and just use the word "neshech" and that will be enough to make a gezera shava (gezera shava means if the same word is used in two places that means you take the laws of one place and apply them to the other place.) To him you learn all the laws for the borrower and then apply them to the lender by the gezera shava. All you would need for the lender would be to say, "Don't take ribit." But to Tosphot this makes perfect sense since ribit (increase) is written only for money is devarim. So you need the verse in Leviticus to bring in ribit for food for a lender also.]
According to Tosphot one word "neshech" is needed for ribit and the other for a gezera shava. But then you have question, "Why is the verse for the lender [in Leviticus] written at all?" For the lender all you should need is a verse telling you not to take interest and then you can learn all the laws from the borrower. The answer is that "neshech" written by the borrower [in Deuteronomy 23] that refers to ribit is written only for money. This is why Tosphot made a point that the gezera shava is open at both ends [it goes in two directions]. So that you will learn ribit for money from the borrower to the lender and learn ribit for food from the lender to the borrower.
However the question on this is that both words food and money for the borrower are needed for neshach (interest). We don't know which one is to be applied to ribit. All we have to include ribit by a borrower is one word "neshech". We could just as easily say it applies only for food just like it applies only for food for a lender.
The answer to this is that after you have the gezera shava, you do not need the word "food" for interest. So though you could learn from "lo tashich food and money" from the borrower to the lender you only need the word food. The word money then can only come to tell you about ribit. So from the gezera shava you learn ribit food from lender to borrower and ribit money from borrower to lender.
I should mention that the way the Talmud here deal with interest as different from increase it does not look to me that it holds from the previous paragraph about both being the same thing, and the only difference between them is that there are two prohibitions--. This seems to me to be forced. After all there is not lashes for interest so who cares how many prohibitions there are. As Tosphot makes clear on this same page that the only time the Torah will add prohibitions to something is when it makes a difference in the punishment. So I would have to say that that Rashi means only to the opinion [the tana kama of R. Nechemiah and R. Elazar ben Yaakov] on page 62 that there is lashes for taking interest. This seems simple to me even thought I have not seen anyone mention it.
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ב''מ ס''א ע''א
I want to mention here two important points about תוספות ד''ה אם אינו עניין The major question I see here is that the מהרש''א seems to say that רש''י agrees with תוספות, after רש''י has abandoned the idea of the הווא אמינא . But looking at רש''י in the conclusion of the גמרא it seems רש''י is not saying the same thing.
To תוספות, the verse לא תקח נשך כסף ואוכל is enough to tell us not to take נשך for כסך and אוכל. Then the word נשך is extra in order to tell you that for ריבית food and money are forbidden. But רש''י says both times the word נשך is used it is telling you about the ריבית because neither are needed for נשך interest. לא תשיך was enough for that.
I.e. to תוספות one word נשך is to tell you about ריבית and the other is for a גזרה שווה.
But then רש''י is stuck that nothing is left over for a גזרה שווה. But that is, I think, the exact point of רש''י. You don't need an extra word for a גזרה שווה. You just need similar words in two places. And this is exactly why רבינא can come along to say we don't need it, until he also uses it at some point later. He could not say that if the word was extra. While to תוספות the only one word נשך is needed for increase ריבית, and the other one for the גזרה שווה. I think רש''י would be unable to explain here why you need a verse for the מלווה at all. I.e. the פסוק in ספר ויקרא is not needed. All it should say is to the מלווה, a פסוק saying לא תקח נשך and just use the word נשך and that will be enough to make a גזרה שווה. That means if the same word is used in two places that means you take the laws of one place and apply them to the other place. To him you learn all the laws for the לווה and then apply them to the מלווה by the גזרה שווה. All you would need for the מלווה would be to say, לא תקח ריבית. But to תוספות this makes perfect sense since ריבית is written only for money בספר דברים. So you need the verse in ספר ויקרא to bring in ריבית for food for a מלווה also.
According to תוספות one word נשך is needed for ריבית and the other for a גזרה שווה. But then you have question why is the verse for the lender in ספר ויקרא written at all?" For the lender all you should need is a verse telling you not to take נשך and then you can learn all the laws from the borrower. The answer is that נשך written by the לווה in ספר דברים 23 that refers to ריבית is written only for כסף. This is why תוספות made a point that the גזרה שווה is open at both ends, it goes in two directions. So that you will learn ריבית for כסף from the לווה to the מלווה and learn ריבית for אוכל from the מלווה to the לווה.
However the question on this is that both words אוכל and כסף for the לווה are needed for נשך interest. We don't know which one is to be applied to ריבית. All we have to include ריבית by a לווה is one word נשך. We could just as easily say it applies only for אוכל just like it applies only for אוכל for a מלווה.
The answer to this is that after you have the גזרה שווה, you do not need the word אוכל for ריבית interest. So though you could learn from לא תשיך אוכל וכסף from the לווה to the מלווה you only need the word אוכל The word כסף then can only come to tell you about ריבית. So from the גזרה שווה you learn ריבית for אוכל from מלווה to לווה and ריבית money from לווה to מלווה.
I should mention that the way the תלמוד here deal with interest as different from increase it does not look to me that it holds from the previous paragraph about both being the same thing, and the only difference between them is that there are two לאווין. This seems to me to be דוחק. After all there is not מלקות for ריבית so who cares how many prohibitions there are? As תוספות makes clear on this same page that the only time the תורה will add prohibitions to something is when it makes a difference in the punishment. So I would have to say that that רש''י means only to the opinion [the תנא קמא of רבי נחמיה and רבי אלעזר בן יעקב on page 62 that there is מלקות for taking interest. This seems simple to me even thought I have not seen anyone mention it.
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ב''מ. גמרא: סא. אם אינו ענין. המהרש''א משמע שרש''י ותוספות לא חולקים אחרי שרש''י עזב את ההווא אמינא. אבל כשאני הסתכלתי בסוף הגמרא, היה נראה לי שרש''י ותוספות לא אומרים אותו דבר. לדעת התוספות "לא תשיך נשך אוכל נשך כסף" מלמדת אותנו שלא לקחת נשך אוכל או כסף. ומילת "נשך" השניה היא מיותרת לומר שגם בשביל מרבית אוכל וכסף אסורים. אבל רש''י אומר ששתי הפעמים שמילת "נשך" מוזכרת, הן להגיד לנו הדין לגבי מרבית,- בגלל שהן לא נצרכות להגיד הדין של נשך. היה מספיק בשביל זה המילים, "לא תשיך".
אבל רש''י צריך לתרץ הקושיא שאין שום דבר מיותרת לגזרה שווה. אבל נראה לי שרש''י כשיטה לא צריכים מילה מיותרת בשביל גזרה שווה. צריכים רק אותה מילה בשני מקומות. [יש מחלוקת בזה. יש אומרים שגזרה שווה צריכה להיות מופנה מצד אחד ויש אומרים שהיא צריכה להיות מופנה משני הצדדים.]
וזה בדיוק הסיבה שרבינא יכול לבא ולהגיד שלא צריכים את הגזרה שווה. הוא לא היה יכול להגיד את זה אם המילה היתה מיותרת.
אבל לתוספות, רק מילת נשך אחת נצרכת לריבית [מרבית], ונשך השניה היא באה בשביל הגזרה שווה.
אגב, לרש''י כאן יש קושיא, למה צריכים שום פסוק בשביל הלווה? לרש''י לומדים את כל הדינים של הלווה, ואז אומרים שהם שייכים למלווה גם כן. לא היה צורך להגיד בשביל הלווה שום דבר חוץ מן "לא תקח ריבית".
אבל לתוספות אין קושיא בגלל שריבית נכתבה בשביל כסף לבד (בספר דברים). ולכן צריכים את הפסוק בספר ויקרא להביא ריבית בשביל אוכל בשביל לווה גם כן
To Tosphot, "Don't take neshech (interest) for money and food" is enough to tell us not to take neshech for money and food. Then the word "neshech" is extra in order to tell you that for "increase" food and money are forbidden. But Rashi says both times the word "neshch" is used it is telling you about the increase because neither are needed for neshach (interest). "Lo tashich" was enough for that.
[i.e. to Tosphot one word interest is to tell you about increase and the other is for a gezera shava.]
But then Rashi is stuck that nothing is left over for a gezera shava. But that is, I think, the exact point of Rashi. You don't need an extra word for a gezra shava. You just need similar words in two places. And this is exactly why Ravina can come along to say we don't need it (until he also uses it at some point later). He could not say that if the word was extra. While to Tosphot the only one word "neshach" is needed for increase (ribit), and the other one for the gezrea shava.
[Rashi would be unable to explain here why you need a verse for the lender at all.(I.e. the verse in Leviticus is not needed. All it should say is to the lender, "Don't take interest," and just use the word "neshech" and that will be enough to make a gezera shava (gezera shava means if the same word is used in two places that means you take the laws of one place and apply them to the other place.) To him you learn all the laws for the borrower and then apply them to the lender by the gezera shava. All you would need for the lender would be to say, "Don't take ribit." But to Tosphot this makes perfect sense since ribit (increase) is written only for money is devarim. So you need the verse in Leviticus to bring in ribit for food for a lender also.]
According to Tosphot one word "neshech" is needed for ribit and the other for a gezera shava. But then you have question, "Why is the verse for the lender [in Leviticus] written at all?" For the lender all you should need is a verse telling you not to take interest and then you can learn all the laws from the borrower. The answer is that "neshech" written by the borrower [in Deuteronomy 23] that refers to ribit is written only for money. This is why Tosphot made a point that the gezera shava is open at both ends [it goes in two directions]. So that you will learn ribit for money from the borrower to the lender and learn ribit for food from the lender to the borrower.
However the question on this is that both words food and money for the borrower are needed for neshach (interest). We don't know which one is to be applied to ribit. All we have to include ribit by a borrower is one word "neshech". We could just as easily say it applies only for food just like it applies only for food for a lender.
The answer to this is that after you have the gezera shava, you do not need the word "food" for interest. So though you could learn from "lo tashich food and money" from the borrower to the lender you only need the word food. The word money then can only come to tell you about ribit. So from the gezera shava you learn ribit food from lender to borrower and ribit money from borrower to lender.
I should mention that the way the Talmud here deal with interest as different from increase it does not look to me that it holds from the previous paragraph about both being the same thing, and the only difference between them is that there are two prohibitions--. This seems to me to be forced. After all there is not lashes for interest so who cares how many prohibitions there are. As Tosphot makes clear on this same page that the only time the Torah will add prohibitions to something is when it makes a difference in the punishment. So I would have to say that that Rashi means only to the opinion [the tana kama of R. Nechemiah and R. Elazar ben Yaakov] on page 62 that there is lashes for taking interest. This seems simple to me even thought I have not seen anyone mention it.
______________________________________________________________________________
ב''מ ס''א ע''א
I want to mention here two important points about תוספות ד''ה אם אינו עניין The major question I see here is that the מהרש''א seems to say that רש''י agrees with תוספות, after רש''י has abandoned the idea of the הווא אמינא . But looking at רש''י in the conclusion of the גמרא it seems רש''י is not saying the same thing.
To תוספות, the verse לא תקח נשך כסף ואוכל is enough to tell us not to take נשך for כסך and אוכל. Then the word נשך is extra in order to tell you that for ריבית food and money are forbidden. But רש''י says both times the word נשך is used it is telling you about the ריבית because neither are needed for נשך interest. לא תשיך was enough for that.
I.e. to תוספות one word נשך is to tell you about ריבית and the other is for a גזרה שווה.
But then רש''י is stuck that nothing is left over for a גזרה שווה. But that is, I think, the exact point of רש''י. You don't need an extra word for a גזרה שווה. You just need similar words in two places. And this is exactly why רבינא can come along to say we don't need it, until he also uses it at some point later. He could not say that if the word was extra. While to תוספות the only one word נשך is needed for increase ריבית, and the other one for the גזרה שווה. I think רש''י would be unable to explain here why you need a verse for the מלווה at all. I.e. the פסוק in ספר ויקרא is not needed. All it should say is to the מלווה, a פסוק saying לא תקח נשך and just use the word נשך and that will be enough to make a גזרה שווה. That means if the same word is used in two places that means you take the laws of one place and apply them to the other place. To him you learn all the laws for the לווה and then apply them to the מלווה by the גזרה שווה. All you would need for the מלווה would be to say, לא תקח ריבית. But to תוספות this makes perfect sense since ריבית is written only for money בספר דברים. So you need the verse in ספר ויקרא to bring in ריבית for food for a מלווה also.
According to תוספות one word נשך is needed for ריבית and the other for a גזרה שווה. But then you have question why is the verse for the lender in ספר ויקרא written at all?" For the lender all you should need is a verse telling you not to take נשך and then you can learn all the laws from the borrower. The answer is that נשך written by the לווה in ספר דברים 23 that refers to ריבית is written only for כסף. This is why תוספות made a point that the גזרה שווה is open at both ends, it goes in two directions. So that you will learn ריבית for כסף from the לווה to the מלווה and learn ריבית for אוכל from the מלווה to the לווה.
However the question on this is that both words אוכל and כסף for the לווה are needed for נשך interest. We don't know which one is to be applied to ריבית. All we have to include ריבית by a לווה is one word נשך. We could just as easily say it applies only for אוכל just like it applies only for אוכל for a מלווה.
The answer to this is that after you have the גזרה שווה, you do not need the word אוכל for ריבית interest. So though you could learn from לא תשיך אוכל וכסף from the לווה to the מלווה you only need the word אוכל The word כסף then can only come to tell you about ריבית. So from the גזרה שווה you learn ריבית for אוכל from מלווה to לווה and ריבית money from לווה to מלווה.
I should mention that the way the תלמוד here deal with interest as different from increase it does not look to me that it holds from the previous paragraph about both being the same thing, and the only difference between them is that there are two לאווין. This seems to me to be דוחק. After all there is not מלקות for ריבית so who cares how many prohibitions there are? As תוספות makes clear on this same page that the only time the תורה will add prohibitions to something is when it makes a difference in the punishment. So I would have to say that that רש''י means only to the opinion [the תנא קמא of רבי נחמיה and רבי אלעזר בן יעקב on page 62 that there is מלקות for taking interest. This seems simple to me even thought I have not seen anyone mention it.
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ב''מ. גמרא: סא. אם אינו ענין. המהרש''א משמע שרש''י ותוספות לא חולקים אחרי שרש''י עזב את ההווא אמינא. אבל כשאני הסתכלתי בסוף הגמרא, היה נראה לי שרש''י ותוספות לא אומרים אותו דבר. לדעת התוספות "לא תשיך נשך אוכל נשך כסף" מלמדת אותנו שלא לקחת נשך אוכל או כסף. ומילת "נשך" השניה היא מיותרת לומר שגם בשביל מרבית אוכל וכסף אסורים. אבל רש''י אומר ששתי הפעמים שמילת "נשך" מוזכרת, הן להגיד לנו הדין לגבי מרבית,- בגלל שהן לא נצרכות להגיד הדין של נשך. היה מספיק בשביל זה המילים, "לא תשיך".
אבל רש''י צריך לתרץ הקושיא שאין שום דבר מיותרת לגזרה שווה. אבל נראה לי שרש''י כשיטה לא צריכים מילה מיותרת בשביל גזרה שווה. צריכים רק אותה מילה בשני מקומות. [יש מחלוקת בזה. יש אומרים שגזרה שווה צריכה להיות מופנה מצד אחד ויש אומרים שהיא צריכה להיות מופנה משני הצדדים.]
וזה בדיוק הסיבה שרבינא יכול לבא ולהגיד שלא צריכים את הגזרה שווה. הוא לא היה יכול להגיד את זה אם המילה היתה מיותרת.
אבל לתוספות, רק מילת נשך אחת נצרכת לריבית [מרבית], ונשך השניה היא באה בשביל הגזרה שווה.
אגב, לרש''י כאן יש קושיא, למה צריכים שום פסוק בשביל הלווה? לרש''י לומדים את כל הדינים של הלווה, ואז אומרים שהם שייכים למלווה גם כן. לא היה צורך להגיד בשביל הלווה שום דבר חוץ מן "לא תקח ריבית".
אבל לתוספות אין קושיא בגלל שריבית נכתבה בשביל כסף לבד (בספר דברים). ולכן צריכים את הפסוק בספר ויקרא להביא ריבית בשביל אוכל בשביל לווה גם כן
24.7.12
I want to mention here a thought I had about the Talmud
I want to mention here a thought I had about the Talmud Bava Metzia. Actually I would prefer to write this in Hebrew first but I can't do that right now so. So here it is in English.
I basically want to say that there is an argument between Rashi and Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 61a [first Tosphot on the page] and that I think it comes out a draw between them. The reason is that Rashi can explain Ravina better but Tosphot can answer the question, "Why do you need a verse for the lender?" [The verse for the lender in in Leviticus] Perhaps in this case it would be easier to start with toshot because he is a lot more simple than Rashi. To Tophot: you know interest for money and food by the words "Don't take interest for money and food" [lo tashich]. Simple. Then there is an extra word "interest" that you don't need. So you use it for increase (ribit). Then there is another extra word "interest" that you don't need. So you use it for a gezara shava from the borrower to the lender.
So far so good. But then you could ask on Tosphot, "You have only one word for learning to increase. So how do we know that it applies to both money and food?" The answer is elegant. Because this is why Tophot made sure to emphasize that the gezra shava is open at both ends. So that you learn increase in money from the borrower to the lender and increase in food from the lender to the borrower.
So Tosphot comes out perfect as usual. No surprise here.
The question is with Rashi. In spite of the fact that the Maharsha says that Rashi and Tosphot do not disagree in the conclusion of the Braita-- clearly they do. Rashi uses both words interest [neshach] for ribit. [The Maharsha means Rashi does agree with Tosphot that "lo tashich" was enough to tell us interest]. So to Rashi, I ask, why do you need any verse for the lender besides just saying to the lender "Don't take interest." Why do you need to go on to mention increase in food and interest in money for if you learn everything from the lender?
But I started this essay saying that Rashi and Topshot is a draw, because Rashi can explain Ravina. Ravina says you don't need the gezera shava and learns out everything for the lender from the verse about the lender. This is fine if there is no extra word. But if one extra word exists-- interest by the borrowers--as it does for Tosphot, then how can Ravina disagree with it?
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בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א
I basically want to say that there is an argument between רש''י and תוספות on בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א, first תוספות on the page, and that I think it comes out a draw between them. The reason is that רש''י can explain רבינא better but תוספות can answer the question, "Why do you need a verse for the מלווה?" The פסוק for the מלווה in in ויקרא .Perhaps in this case it would be easier to start with תוספות because he is a lot more simple than רש''י. To תוספות: you know נשך for כסף and אוכל by the words "Don't take ריבית for money and food" [לא תשיך]. Then there is an extra word "ריבית" that you don't need. So you use it for ריבית. Then there is another extra word "נשך" that you don't need. So you use it for a גזרה שווה from the לווה to the מלווה.
So far so good. But then you could ask on תוספות, "You have only one word for learning to ריבית. So how do we know that it applies to both כסף and אוכל?" Because this is why תוספות made sure to emphasize that the גזרה שווה is open at both ends. So that you learn ריבית in money from the borrower to the lender and ריבית in food from the lender to the borrower.
So תוספות comes out perfect as usual. No surprise here.
The question is with . רש''י . We have רש''י that uses both words נשך for ריבית. . So to רש''י I ask, why do you need any פסוק for the מלווה besides just saying to the מלווה "Don't take ריבית." Why do you need to go on to mention ריבית in אוכל and נשך in כסף for if you learn everything from the מלווה?
רש''י can explain רבינא. We have that רבינא says you don't need the גזרה שווה and learns out everything for the מלווה from the verse about the מלווה. This is fine if there is no extra word. But if one extra word exists "ריבית" by the לווה as it does for תוספות, then how can רבינא disagree with it?
בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א
יש ויכוח בין רש''י ואת תוספות על בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א, תוספות הראשון בדף. רש''י יכול להסביר רבינא טוב אבל תוספות יכול לענות על השאלה, "למה אתה צריך פסוק עבור המלווה?" הפסוק עבור המלווה הוא בויקרא. להערכת תוספות אתה יודע נשך עבור כסף ואוכל על ידי המילים "אל תיקח ריבית עבור כסף ומזון" לא תשיך. אז יש מילה נוספת "ריבית" שאתה לא צריך. אז אתה משתמש בו עבור ריבית. ואז יש עוד מילה אחת מיותרת "נשך" שאתה לא צריך. אז אתה משתמש בו עבור גזרה שווה מן הלווה אל המלווה.
אבל אז אתה יכול לשאול על תוספות, "יש לך רק מילה אחת ללימוד ריבית. אז איך אנחנו יודעים שזה חל על הכסף ואוכל?" בגלל זה הוא מדוע תוספות טרחה להדגיש כי הגזרה השווה פתוחה בשני קצותיו. אז יש לך ללמוד ריבית בכסף מהלווה למלווה וריבית במזון מן המלווה ללווה.
השאלה היא עם רש''י. יש לנו את שרש''י משתמש במילת נשך עבור ריבית. אז לרש''י למה אתה צריך כל פסוק עבור מלווה לבד. רק תאמר אל מלווה "אל תיקח ריבית." למה אתה צריך ללכת על להזכיר הריבית באוכל ונשך בכסף אם אתה לומד כל דבר מן המלווה?
רש''י יכול להסביר רבינא. יש לנו את זה שרבינא אומר שאתה לא צריך את הגזרה השווה ולומד את הכל עבור המלווה מהפסוק של המלווה. זה בסדר אם אין מילה אחת מיותרת. אבל אם מילה נוספת קיימת כזו "ריבית" על ללווה אז איך זה יכול להיות שרבינא לא מסכים עם זה.
I basically want to say that there is an argument between Rashi and Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 61a [first Tosphot on the page] and that I think it comes out a draw between them. The reason is that Rashi can explain Ravina better but Tosphot can answer the question, "Why do you need a verse for the lender?" [The verse for the lender in in Leviticus] Perhaps in this case it would be easier to start with toshot because he is a lot more simple than Rashi. To Tophot: you know interest for money and food by the words "Don't take interest for money and food" [lo tashich]. Simple. Then there is an extra word "interest" that you don't need. So you use it for increase (ribit). Then there is another extra word "interest" that you don't need. So you use it for a gezara shava from the borrower to the lender.
So far so good. But then you could ask on Tosphot, "You have only one word for learning to increase. So how do we know that it applies to both money and food?" The answer is elegant. Because this is why Tophot made sure to emphasize that the gezra shava is open at both ends. So that you learn increase in money from the borrower to the lender and increase in food from the lender to the borrower.
So Tosphot comes out perfect as usual. No surprise here.
The question is with Rashi. In spite of the fact that the Maharsha says that Rashi and Tosphot do not disagree in the conclusion of the Braita-- clearly they do. Rashi uses both words interest [neshach] for ribit. [The Maharsha means Rashi does agree with Tosphot that "lo tashich" was enough to tell us interest]. So to Rashi, I ask, why do you need any verse for the lender besides just saying to the lender "Don't take interest." Why do you need to go on to mention increase in food and interest in money for if you learn everything from the lender?
But I started this essay saying that Rashi and Topshot is a draw, because Rashi can explain Ravina. Ravina says you don't need the gezera shava and learns out everything for the lender from the verse about the lender. This is fine if there is no extra word. But if one extra word exists-- interest by the borrowers--as it does for Tosphot, then how can Ravina disagree with it?
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בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א
I basically want to say that there is an argument between רש''י and תוספות on בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א, first תוספות on the page, and that I think it comes out a draw between them. The reason is that רש''י can explain רבינא better but תוספות can answer the question, "Why do you need a verse for the מלווה?" The פסוק for the מלווה in in ויקרא .Perhaps in this case it would be easier to start with תוספות because he is a lot more simple than רש''י. To תוספות: you know נשך for כסף and אוכל by the words "Don't take ריבית for money and food" [לא תשיך]. Then there is an extra word "ריבית" that you don't need. So you use it for ריבית. Then there is another extra word "נשך" that you don't need. So you use it for a גזרה שווה from the לווה to the מלווה.
So far so good. But then you could ask on תוספות, "You have only one word for learning to ריבית. So how do we know that it applies to both כסף and אוכל?" Because this is why תוספות made sure to emphasize that the גזרה שווה is open at both ends. So that you learn ריבית in money from the borrower to the lender and ריבית in food from the lender to the borrower.
So תוספות comes out perfect as usual. No surprise here.
The question is with . רש''י . We have רש''י that uses both words נשך for ריבית. . So to רש''י I ask, why do you need any פסוק for the מלווה besides just saying to the מלווה "Don't take ריבית." Why do you need to go on to mention ריבית in אוכל and נשך in כסף for if you learn everything from the מלווה?
רש''י can explain רבינא. We have that רבינא says you don't need the גזרה שווה and learns out everything for the מלווה from the verse about the מלווה. This is fine if there is no extra word. But if one extra word exists "ריבית" by the לווה as it does for תוספות, then how can רבינא disagree with it?
בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א
יש ויכוח בין רש''י ואת תוספות על בבא מציעא ס''א ע''א, תוספות הראשון בדף. רש''י יכול להסביר רבינא טוב אבל תוספות יכול לענות על השאלה, "למה אתה צריך פסוק עבור המלווה?" הפסוק עבור המלווה הוא בויקרא. להערכת תוספות אתה יודע נשך עבור כסף ואוכל על ידי המילים "אל תיקח ריבית עבור כסף ומזון" לא תשיך. אז יש מילה נוספת "ריבית" שאתה לא צריך. אז אתה משתמש בו עבור ריבית. ואז יש עוד מילה אחת מיותרת "נשך" שאתה לא צריך. אז אתה משתמש בו עבור גזרה שווה מן הלווה אל המלווה.
אבל אז אתה יכול לשאול על תוספות, "יש לך רק מילה אחת ללימוד ריבית. אז איך אנחנו יודעים שזה חל על הכסף ואוכל?" בגלל זה הוא מדוע תוספות טרחה להדגיש כי הגזרה השווה פתוחה בשני קצותיו. אז יש לך ללמוד ריבית בכסף מהלווה למלווה וריבית במזון מן המלווה ללווה.
השאלה היא עם רש''י. יש לנו את שרש''י משתמש במילת נשך עבור ריבית. אז לרש''י למה אתה צריך כל פסוק עבור מלווה לבד. רק תאמר אל מלווה "אל תיקח ריבית." למה אתה צריך ללכת על להזכיר הריבית באוכל ונשך בכסף אם אתה לומד כל דבר מן המלווה?
רש''י יכול להסביר רבינא. יש לנו את זה שרבינא אומר שאתה לא צריך את הגזרה השווה ולומד את הכל עבור המלווה מהפסוק של המלווה. זה בסדר אם אין מילה אחת מיותרת. אבל אם מילה נוספת קיימת כזו "ריבית" על ללווה אז איך זה יכול להיות שרבינא לא מסכים עם זה.
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