The name of the GRA is associated with learning in depth. However there is an aspect of the Gra that implies learning fast. That is saying the words in order and going on without any review until one finishes the whole book. This is implied when he stressed the importance of getting through at least once the whole two Talmuds, Tosefta, Sifrei Sifra, Midrash Rabah, Midrash Tanchuma (I.E. all the oral law from the redaction of the Mishna until the sealing of the two Talmuds.) [this fast learning is brought in the gemara in shabat and tractate avoda zara, in the musar book ways of the rightous and in the conversations of rav nachman chapter 76     ]

 

This later fast approach is generally known to come from the Talmud itself in Shabat page 63 and the musar book The Ways Of The Righteous .

I used the approach of ''saying the words in order and going on'' in Torah learning and also in physics and mathematics; saying the words in order and going on until the end of the book and then review from the beginning --and I learnt a lot more than if I had said ''This is too hard for me'' and given up.  But in Torah, Math, and Physics it is best if one can hear and learn from a teacher.  No matter how much I might have learned in Southern California, there is no question that i would not have understood a thing unless I had gone to those two great NY yeshivot, Shar Yahuv and the Mir and learned from people like Reb Shmuel Berenbaum who really knew the depths of Torah. My only complaint  is that I never got the how to get into the depths of Tosphot that Naftali Yeger had in Shar Yashuv and David Bronson. I suspect that it is not something that one can get unless he has that special kind of I.Q. and talent. But at least, the books of the gedolai Lita [Lithuanian Sages] are around so that one can get a taste of authentic learning. 

[note: I am aware that some people just don't appreciate learning Torah. taste. Maybe to appreciate it one needs a certain kind of  taste. But it might be like many good things--it is an acquired taste.   ]

I do not have the IQ of Rav Naftali Yeger or David Bronson, so i do not see automatically the depths of Tosphot. However i have learned a method for at least begin to see those depths. that method is to review that same exact tosphot every day [once  per day] for a month,

"If you refuse to admit a problem exists, and stonewall any attempt to fix it, then don't complain when someone else fixes it for you."

 When the religious refuse to serve in the Israeli Defense Force, it does not seem to be a result of trust in God, nor from great attachment to learning Torah. It seems to be, '' Let the fry yiden [secular Jews] do it because the are garbage.''   However I am sure that there are some people that learn Torah for its own sake and that trust in God for their needs. But for every one person like that, there are at least a hundred or more who learn in yeshiva in order to get out of serving in the army, and because it provides easy money that the fry yidden have to work for. This scandal has been going on since the creation of the State of Israel. No voice has been raised about the hypocrisy and scandal of this. All I can say is, "If you refuse to admit a problem exists, and stonewall any attempt to fix it, then don't complain when someone else fixes it for you."

 It is a curious fact that the Schrodinger wave equation is not really like any wave equation, but rather like the heat equation --which describes the diffusion of heat through a medium. A wave equation is taking a value for the acceleration of a string and saying that equals the curvature. That is, the second partial  derivative with respect to time equals the second partial derivative with respect to position. The Schrodinger equation on the other hand, is the first partial derivative with respect to time times i equals the second partial derivative with respect to position times i^2. What is the relation between diffusion of heat with the wave?     The first partial derivative with respect to time ought to be the velocity, and in the heat equation in fact tells us the speed the heat spreads. But that is not a wave equation.    In a string it would tell us the velocity of the string equals the curvature.

Schrodinger went to find such a equation because de Broglie had said in his PhD Thesis that an electron ought to have a corresponding wave equation based on E=mc^2 and velocity of a wave = wavelength times frequency, and energy = h times frequency But he never suggested what the equation for that wave.

So the Schrodinger wave equation is the heat equation with an "i" thrown in. Take heat and thrown in an ''i'', and you get an electron wave?     And after all, what is  heat? Kinetic energy of moving particles. Kinetic energy times ''i'' gives you a wave? Or entropy times ''i'' gives you a wave? 

Note: Particles have kinetic energy. So  Schrodinger's wave equation is describing particle's KE  spreading through a medium, i.e a complex medium.  

The Closing of the American Mind

In The Closing of the American Mind, Allan Bloom located the central problem of universities [and as an extension the whole of American society] to  be a essential contradiction of Enlightenment thought. He thought that either things will become clear or the whole of the social studies departments  and humanities departments of university structure will disintegrate.  I have thought because of that, it is necessary to come to some sort of resolution IN PHILOSOPHY. I thought Kant provided the best possible approach, but outside of philosophy departments, he is ignored. He is not as flashy as DEI, Marxism, existentialism, The One Dimensional Man, Eros and Civilization.    And to some degree you can see that part of the fault is in Kant himself--in the B Deduction which there has never been the slightest agreement about what Kant says there. And my favorite version of Kant with the approach of Leonard Nelson is universally ignored. 

For some reason Allan Bloom did not refer to Kant as a possible solution. But he did suggest that people learn the Republic of a Plato, and that in itself suggest the Kant-Friesian School of thought because the major thesis of Fries is that there is a deep source of knowledge that begins before knowledge based on the outside world or knowledge based on pure reason i.e., non intuitive immediate knowledge. This correlates with Plato who held knowledge is from what we remember from what we knew before we were born. 

The Rambam might be considered a proto Friesian in that he does not think moral principles are derivable from Reason. They had to have been given by GOD at Sinai, but without that, they would not be known at all.

Sunwall writes :"First of all with regard to the primal status of monotheism, Maimonides has ruled out the most powerful argument that could have been made in its favor, that of an innate moral or metaphysical faculty in the human mind. This was a characteristic notion of his own, predominantly Islamic, cultural epoch. This sort of rationalistic anthropology motivated works such as lbn Tufayl's The Life of Hayy, in which the inhabitant of a desert island arrives independently at rational, moral, and monotheistic conclusions. However, Maimonides debars himself from saying "all human beings are natural monotheists" in the same sense that many of his contemporaries would have asserted that "all human beings are natural Muslims" (i.e. when they are born and until they may happen to be perverted by the cultures of non-Muslim societies). Rather in the Guide and elsewhere in his ethical writings, Mairnonides goes to great pains to deny that human beings have any innate metaphysical, and especially, moral intuitions. For Maimonides, although there are moral and metaphysical absolutes, these have been discovered, revealed, or forgotten, within the context of human history as a whole and then transmitted, correctly or otherwise, by tradition. This places the burden of justifying the primal nature of monotheism entirely on historiography."

Utopia the perfect society

 

Confessions of a Utopophobe MICHAEL HUEMER MAY 5 Here, I explain what’s wrong with “ideal theory” in political philosophy.* [ *Based on: “Confessions of a Utopophobe”, Social Philosophy and Policy 33 (2016): 214-34. ] I. Ideal Theory In political philosophy, there is some debate about the relative merits of “ideal” versus “non-ideal theory”. Ideal theory is described in two different ways (sometimes confused with each other): When we’re doing ideal theory, we choose political principles based (partly) on the consequences those principles would have if everyone perfectly complied with them. (I call this “strict compliance theory”.) When doing ideal theory, we try to describe a perfect society. (I call this “perfection theory”.) Sometimes, the distinction is applied just to theorizing about justice, where the ideal theorist is said to choose principles of justice based on the assumption of perfect compliance, or to be describing the perfectly just society. Examples John Rawls In his original position thought experiment, Rawls imagines the parties in the O.P. choosing the principles to govern their society, on the assumption that whatever principles are chosen will be perfectly followed. He also thinks the result tells us what would happen in a perfectly just society. So, when the parties decide that the state should distribute wealth in the way that most benefits the poorest people, they imagine that the government will know how to do that, they will want to do it, there won’t be special interest groups trying to manipulate the wealth redistribution system for their own benefit, people won’t cheat the welfare system by lying about their income, etc. They get to assume all that, not because it’s true, but because Rawls stipulates that we’re doing ideal theory. Joseph Carens Carens came up with a way to make socialism work: Everyone gets taxed such that their pre-tax incomes are equal. In addition, however, suppose that everyone just voluntarily works their hardest to try to maximize their pre-tax income (despite getting no monetary reward for this), out of concern for the good of society. Don’t say that’s unrealistic, because we’re doing ideal theory now. That is what should happen, even if it’s highly unlikely that it will happen. G.A. Cohen Cohen imagines a friendly, socialist camping trip, in which everyone voluntarily shares all resources, and everyone cooperates for the common good. No one expects to get extra rewards for giving benefits to the group, because they’re all friends. This is how society should work. If you complain that this is unrealistic, you’re confusing “should” with “would”. Jason Brennan Brennan responds to Cohen by imagining a friendly, capitalist society in which everyone voluntarily trades with each other, everyone respects each other’s rights, and the poor are fine because people voluntarily contribute to charity to help anyone in need. If you complain that this isn’t how real capitalist societies work, you are again confusing “should” with “would”. II. Why Ideal Theory? Why do some philosophers consider ideal theory interesting or useful? A. “Ideal Theory Sets the Goal” Some say that we have to do ideal theory first, so that we know what goals we are aiming at. Once we know that, we will do some non-ideal theory to figure out how to achieve those aims. Rawls: “until the ideal is identified … nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered.” Stemplowska & Swift: “[W]ithout knowing our long term goal, a course of action that might appear to advance justice . . . might nonetheless make less likely, or perhaps even impossible, achievement of the long-term goal.” Reply: You don’t have to describe the perfect society in order to pursue a useful goal. You can work to reduce particular injustices without knowing what a Perfect Society or Perfect Justice is like. There is no reason to think that doing this would prevent you from attaining societal perfection. Analogy: Your car has a flat tire. You can try to change the tire without first articulating the nature of the Perfect Car. Indeed, discussing what the Perfect Car would be like would be a useless distraction. Nor is there any reason to think that changing the tire would somehow prevent you from attaining vehicular perfection later. B. “Ideal Theory Defines Justice” Maybe I have begged the question by assuming that we can identify particular injustices without a theory of justice. Maybe “injustice” just denotes a departure from perfect justice, and thus we need to know what perfect justice is before we can identify any particular injustices. A. John Simmons: “To dive into nonideal theory without an ideal theory in hand is simply to dive blind, to allow irrational free rein to the mere conviction of injustice and to eagerness for change of any sort.” Reply: We don’t need a theory of perfection in order to identify problems in any other area: If your car has a flat tire, you can know that this is a problem without knowing what a perfect car would be. I know that Ted Bundy was a bad person, even though I don’t know what a perfect person is or what the complete ultimate theory of virtue is. I know that Game of Thrones is a good TV show, despite having no theory of the aesthetic ideal. There’s no obvious reason why justice should be different. C. “Ideal Theory Enables Comparisons” Maybe we need ideal theory to know which injustices are worse than which. John Simmons again: “[T]he priority to be given to grievous (over less grievous) injustices is to be understood in terms of the lexical ordering of the principles of ideal theory violated by the injustices at issue.” Reply: We don’t need a theory of perfection to compare problems, either. E.g., I know the car’s flat tire is a higher priority than the dust on the body, despite having no theory of the perfect car. I know Ted Bundy’s crimes were worse than my jaywalking, despite having no theory of the ideal person. And I know that wrongly imprisoning 500,000 people is a worse injustice than mispronouncing Kamala Harris’ name, despite having no theory of ideal justice. D. “Today’s Utopia Is Tomorrow’s Reality” Humanity has seen dramatic progress over the course of history. For most of history, if someone had described a society like our current society, they would have been dismissed as utopian. So it’s likely that future societies will be much better still. So it makes sense for us to aim high in planning for the future. Maybe we will one day have something close to a perfect society! Reply: The first part is true: the future will probably be vastly better than the present. But that doesn’t mean that we can usefully theorize about a distant future society that is nearly perfect. Compare: Suppose some political philosopher back in 1500 A.D. wrote some treatises about what society should be like in the 21st century, including recommendations for how society should be run, what institutions and policies we should have, etc. Without knowing any details, how useful would you think the 1500 A.D. philosopher’s plans would be to us? I think the reasonable answer is, “Completely useless.” Maybe they’d be of historical interest. But no one would dream of trying to use them. That is how people in 500 years will look at anything we write today about what society should be like in the distant future. Except that our treatises will be even more useless, because society will probably change even more in the next 500 years, because the pace of change has been increasing. Compare: Perhaps one day we will have flying cars with antigravity technology. But thinking about this possibility is of no use when your actual car has a flat tire. Similarly, it is not useful to think about a possible future society in which socialism would work.* [ *Why isn’t thinking about anarcho-capitalism similarly useless? Briefly, I think an-cap is much less utopian than socialism, because it does not require any changes to human nature to work. ] E. Strict Compliance Theory The above discussion concerned perfection theory. What about Strict Compliance Theory, the idea that we should choose political principles based on their consequences in a world of perfect compliance? This is an importantly different idea. Rawls asserts it, but I don’t see any argument for it. Consider two examples: The Recusal Rule: If a judge has a personal relationship with a defendant, he has to recuse himself from the case. We wouldn’t have this rule if everyone always complied with all principles of justice; we wouldn’t need it, since judges would be perfectly impartial and just, even when their friends and family members were involved. Yet obviously, we should have this rule. The Drug War: Many people criticize the drug war for its failure, and for the huge costs that result from noncompliance. E.g., we have hundreds of thousands of people sitting in prison for drug crimes, we have more other crimes, there is increased police corruption, etc. On strict compliance theory, we’d ignore these costs since they wouldn’t happen if everyone complied with the laws. Yet obviously, we shouldn’t ignore them. What matters is the effects of a policy in a world with realistic levels of compliance, not its effects in a world of perfect people. There’s no obvious reason why the principles of justice should work differently. Approximation In science, people sometimes use idealizations; e.g., ignoring air resistance in computing the trajectory of a projectile. This is because the idealization is an approximation to reality (e.g., because it is known that the effect of air resistance is small). It is not done in cases where the idealization would not approximate reality. In the political case, is the “idealization” of a world of perfect compliance at least an approximation to reality? No, it isn’t. Of particular interest to Rawls, the assumptions that government agents have perfect knowledge of and desire to implement the distribution that maximizes the welfare of the poor, and that no one will try to game the system for personal advantage, are not approximations to reality. They are utterly false, and that makes a huge difference to what we should do. III. Utopian Illusions Ideal theorists are prone to three big mistakes. A. Agentless Norms Norms require agents: It cannot be true that A should be done unless there is some particular agent who should do it. Ideal theorists often disregard this, e.g., by talking about what “society” should do. (Society isn’t an agent, so there’s nothing that it “should” do.) E.g., Carens says that we should have a system wherein everyone maximizes their pretax income, while the state enforces equal after-tax incomes. But there is no agent who can bring this about. The state can’t bring it about, since they can’t make all the citizens pure altruists. No citizen can bring it about, since they can’t make their compatriots altruists. And “society” can’t do it, because society isn’t an agent. B. Crazy Standards There is such a thing as too much altruism. E.g., suppose a healthy patient in the hospital wants to donate his heart, lungs, and both kidneys to other patients. We would not say, “That’s wonderful, let’s schedule the surgery!” We would conclude that he was crazy.* [ *See the episode of House, M.D., “Charity Case”. ] That’s similar to (though more extreme than) Carens’ (or the socialists’) idea of the people who just selflessly work for the good of society. That isn’t consistent with a normally functioning human motivational system. C. Excess Abstraction Frequently, ideal theorists such as Rawls try to arrive at political conclusions by starting from general, abstract principles, like “it’s unjust that people have unequal resources due to morally arbitrary differences between them.” This is a highly unreliable way of forming conclusions, because philosophers are almost always wrong about abstract, general principles. Instead, a better approach is to start from widely-shared, strong ethical intuitions about concrete cases, then draw analogies from these cases to more controversial cases. (Examples: (a) The Starving Marvin analogy for immigration; the killer’s accomplice example for gun control, discussed in my other papers.)

''It is better to sit in one's room and twiddle one's thumbs, rather that to go around looking for mitzvot to do.''

  In the Gemara Megilah  is brought this verse and explanation in Deuteronomy 12, '' These  are the commandments that God has set before you this day..'' ''From here we learn that no prophet can add anything new.'' אין נביא רשאי לחדש דבר מעתה Later I saw  brought from the Gra  the verse ''You have seen that every man who was joined to Baal Peor [an idol], God destroyed,'' that the worship of Baal Peor was to throw feces at it, and some people had done so thinking that it was a mitzvah. From here the Gra also shows that one not ought to go around looking for mitzvot to do. And in the Sidur haGra is brought a statement from Reb Chaim of Veloshin,  ''It is better to sit in one's room and twiddle one's thumbs, rather that to go around looking for mitzvot to do.''

In Deuteronomy 4 it says "Thou shalt not add nor subtract from these commandments" which pretty much sums up this subject.

Gemara Bava Kama 65a Rav said a stolen object is evaluated as it was at the time it was stolen, and the double, four and five time amount  at time standing before the court. The Gemara asks does this disagree with Raba who said if one steals by force a barrel that was worth a zuz and then it goes up in value to four, and then breaks it or drinks it, pays four. But if it broke by itself he pays one zuz. The Gemara answers no. Rather Rav was talking about a case when the object went down in value. The Rambam brings the law of Rav as the Gemara states it. Then he writes one who steals an object not by force and it goes up in value from one to four and breaks it, he pays the double four or five times at the rate of the higher value. But if it broke by itself [like in an earthquake] he pays the double as per the value it was worth at the time it was stolen. The Gra [Choshen Mishpat chapter 354 halacha 3 paragraph 8] asks on this later part when it broke by itself and says this can't be learned from Raba, but rather he pays one zuz as per the time it was stolen, and four zuz to pay for the double. I think the Gra holds that the breaking of the vessel is a long act of stealing, like the Netivot in Choshen Mishpat 34. The reason is thus: he is thinking that since Rav learns his law from a verse, it must apply to all cases. So when the Gemara says Rav said his law only in a case the object went down in value, it means that in a case when it went up in value, and then broken, the time of stealing and time of standing before the court are the same. If it would not have been broken but witnesses came and testified that he stole it, then he would give back the object, and then also it would be evaluated at time of giving it back. But if he gave it back before witnesses testified against him he would give it back without the double according to Rashi on page 68]   I might mention here that the main reason the Gra is saying there is no proof from Raba to the law of the Rambam about when it was broken by itself is that Raba is talking about a case of stealing by force where there is no double.

I saw this Gra brought in Rav  Isar Metlzer's Even haAzel, , and I have been looking at Rav Shach' approach to this halacha and also a book called Afikei Yam from a sage in Europe who discussed thi halacha with Reb Chaim of Brisk.. So far I have not seen anyone suggest the reason for the Gra might be becaue he holds by the same opinion as the Netivot. [This is opposed to the Ketzot who holds breaking the vessel after stealing it is obligated because of causing damage. Rav Shach asks on that opinion from very powerful arguments. at any rate, everyone of the achronim are trying to answer the question of the Gra.  ]

In the meantime I am wondering why the Gemara does not answer that Rav is talking about paying back a sheep and Raba is talking about paying back in money. This is how the Gemara later on page 66 answers a question on Rav and it seems to me before I get to look into it that the same answer should apply to the question from Raba on Rav. [answer to rabbainu izhak the gemara means like it says on pg 65. the difference is between hen the thief fattened up the sheep and when it went up in value in th marketplace.]

I might mention here the reason the Gra disagrees with the Rambam is that the Gemara did not ask any question from when vessel broke by itself, only from when he broke the vessel, and it answered that question .  It was never bothered by double, four or five times the value of the animal because that doe not apply in a case of theft by force.  

You might look at R. Isar Meltzer who brings a Rosh that there can be theft after theft which is clearly  the opinion of the Gra and Rav Shach on this halacha. But R. Isar Melzer holds like the Ketzot and uses that to explain the Rambam. He   explains the Rambam based on  Rabbainu Tam. I can see a point here. That is, if he breaks the vessel on purpose when it was worth four, then he has to pay four.  But if it broke by itself, then he just pays for the theft, and breaking according to its value at the time he stole it. Later on Rav Shach seem to agree that there can be an obligation of damage even for a stolen object in the first chapter of theft and lost objects. 

Let me mention here what R Isar  Meltzer is saying. That is,  that later on on page 61a the Gemara brings a Braita that says  double four and five go by the time of theft. Then asks if that disagrees with Rav? It answers no. Because one case is live animals and the other is money. Rabainu Tam says that means the braita is talking about when the object went up in value. Thus when it goes up from one to four, the double four and five still go by  the time of theft. That is exactly what the Rambam writes about the case when the object went up in value, and then it broke by itself. But if he broke it on purpose, he pays four  because of causing damage.      

___________________________________________________  ___________________________

בבא קמא ס''ה ע''א רב said a stolen object is evaluated as it was at the time it was stolen, and the double, four and five time amount  at time standing before the court. The גמרא asks does this disagree with רבה  who said if one steals by force a barrel that was worth a זוז and then it goes up in value to four זוז, and then breaks it or drinks it, pays four? But if it broke by itself he pays one זוז. The  גמרא answers no. Rather רב was talking about a case when the object went down in value. The רמב''ם הלכות גניבה א' הלכה י''ד brings the law of רב as the  גמרא states it. Then he writes one who גונב an object not by force and it goes up in value from one to four and breaks it, he pays the double four or five times at the rate of the higher value. But if it broke by itself [like in an earthquake] he pays the double as per the value it was worth at the time it was stolen. The גר''א asks on this later part when it broke by itself and says this can't be learned from רבה, but rather he pays one זוז as per the time it was stolen, and four זוז to pay for the double. I think the גר''א holds that the breaking of the vessel is a long act of stealing, like the נתיבות in חושן משפט ל''ד . The reason is thus: he is thinking that since רב learns his law from a verse, it must apply to all cases. So when the גמרא says רב said his law only in a case the object went down in value, it means that in a case when it went up in value, and then broken, the time of stealing and time of standing before the court are the same. If it would not have been broken but witnesses came and testified that he stole it, then he would give back the object, and then also it would be evaluated at time of giving it back. But if he gave it back before witnesses testified against him he would give it back without the double according to רש''י on page 68] 

I might mention here that the main reason the גר'א is saying there is no proof from רבה to the law of the רמב''ם about when it was broken by itself is that רבה is talking about a case of גזילה by force where there is no double.

In the meantime I am wondering why the גמרא doe not answer that רב is talking about paying back a sheep and רבה is talking about paying back in money. This is how the גמרא later on page ס''ו ע''א answers a question on רב and it seems to me (before I get to look into it) that the same answer should apply to the question from רבה on רב.

I might mention here the reason the גר''א disagrees with the רמב''ם is that the גמרא did not ask any question from when vessel broke by itself, only from when he broke the vessel, and it answered that question .  It was never bothered by double, four or five times the value of the animal because that doe not apply in a case of theft by force.  

 ר' איסר מלצר  brings a רא''ש that there can be theft after theft which is clearly  the opinion of the גר''א and רב שך on this הלכה. but רב איסר מלצר  holds the כמו הקצוות החושן and uses that to explain the רמב''ם. and though I can not see how he   explains the רמב''ם based on a variation on ר''ת and the ר''י I can see a point here. That is--if he breaks the vessel on purpose when it was worth four then he has to pay four.  But if it broke by itself, then he just pays for the theft and breaking according to its value at the time he stole it. 

Later on רב שך seem to agree that there can be an obligation of damage even for a stolen object in the first chapter of גזילה ואבדה. 

Let me mention here what רב איסר מלצר is saying. That is,  that later on on page ס''א ע''א the גמרא brings a ברייתא that says  double, four and five, go by the time of theft. Then asks if that disagrees with רב? It answers no. Because one case is live animals and the other is money. רבינו תם says that means the ברייתא is talking about when the object went up in value. Thus when it goes up from one to four, the double four and five still go by  the time of theft. That is exactly what the רמב''ם writes about the case when the object went up in value, and then it broke by itself. But if he broke it on purpose, he pays four  because of causing damage.      

בבא קמא ס''ה ע''א רב אמר חפץ גנוב מוערך כפי שהיה בעת גניבתו, והסכום הכפול, ארבע וחמשה בזמן שעומד לפני בית הדין. שואלת הגמרא האם זה חולק על רבה שאמר שאם גונבים בכוח חבית ששווה זוז ואז היא עולה בערכה לארבע זוז, ואחר כך שובר אותה או שותה, משלם ארבעה.

.אבל אם נשבר מעצמו הוא משלם זוז אחד

הגמרא עונה שלא. אלא רב דיבר על מקרה שבו החפץ ירד בערכו. הרמב''ם הלכות גניבה א' הלכה י''ד מביא את דין רב כפי שקובע הגמרא. אחר כך כותב מי שגונב חפץ שלא בכוח והוא עולה בערכו מאחד לארבע ושובר אותו, משלם את הכפול ארבע או חמש פעמים בשיעור הערך הגבוה יותר. אבל אם נשבר מעצמו [כמו ברעידת אדמה] הוא משלם את הכפל לפי השווי שהיה שווה בזמן גניבתו. שואל הגר''א [שו''ע חושן משפט שנ''ד הלכה ג'ס''ק ח' ] על החלק המאוחר הזה מתי שנשבר מעצמו, ואומר לא ניתן ללמוד זאת מרבה, אלא משלם זוז אחד לפי שעת גניבה, וארבע זוז משלם בגלל הכפל. אני חושב שהגר''א גורס ששבירת הכלי היא מעשה ארוך של גניבה, כמו הנתיבות בחושן משפט ל''ד. הטעם הוא כך: הוא חושב שמאחר שרב לומד את דינו מפסוק, הוא חייב לחול על כל המקרים. אז כשהגמרא אומר רב אמר דינו רק במקרה שהחפץ ירד בערכו, משמע שבמקרה שעלה בערכו, ואחר כך נשבר, זמן הגניבה וזמן העמידה בפני בית הדין הם אותו זמן. אם זה לא היה נשבר אבל באו עדים והעידו שהוא גנב אותו, אז היה מחזיר את החפץ, ואז גם זה היה מוערך בזמן החזרתו. אבל אם החזירו קודם שהעידו עליו עדים יחזירו בלא הכפל ע"פ רש"י בעמוד 68. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהסיבה העיקרית שהגר"א אומר אין הוכחה מרבה לדין הרמב"ם היא שרבה מדבר על מקרה גזילה בכוח שבו אין כפל.

בינתיים אני תוהה למה הגמרא לא עונה שרב מדבר על החזר כבש ורבה מדבר על החזר בכסף. כך עונה הגמרא בהמשך עמוד ס''ו ע''א על שאלה על רב, ונראה לי (לפני שאספיק לעיין בזה) שאותה תשובה יכולה לחול על השאלה מרב על רב

אני יכול להזכיר כאן את הסיבה שהגר"א חולק על הרמב"ם היא שהגמרא לא שאל שום שאלה משעה שנשבר הכלי מעצמו, רק משעה ששבר את הכלי, והוא ענה על השאלה הזאת. מעולם לא הפריע לו ערך כפול, פי ארבעה או חמישה, כי זה לא חל במקרה של גזילה בכוח.

ר' איסר מלצר מביא את הרא''ש שאוחז שיכולה להיות גניבה אחר גניבה וזה ברור לדעת הגר''א ורב שך על ההלכה הזו. אבל רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כמו הקצוות החושן ומשתמש בזה כדי להסביר את הרמב''ם. ולמרות שאיני יכול לראות כיצד הוא מסביר את הרמב"ם על סמך וריאציה של ר"ת והר"י, אני יכול לראות כאן נקודה. כלומר--אם שבר את הכלי במזיד כשהיה שווה ארבע, אז צריך לשלם ארבעה. אבל אם הוא נשבר מעצמו, אז הוא רק משלם על הגניבה והשבירה לפי ערכו בזמן שגנב אותו

בהמשך נראה שהרב שך מסכים שיכול להיות חיוב מזיק גם על חפץ גזול בפרק הראשון של גזילה ואבודה.

הרשו לי להזכיר כאן את מה שאומר ר' איסר מלצר. כלומר, שבהמשך בעמוד ס''א ע"א מביאה הגמרא ברייתא שאומרת כפול ארבע וחמש הולכים  לפי זמן הגניבה. ואז שואל אם זה לא מסכים עם הרב? זה עונה לא. כי מקרה אחד הוא חיות והשני זה כסף. רבינו תם אומר משמע שהברייתא מדברת כשהחפץ עלה בערכו. לפיכך כשהוא עולה מאחד לארבע,  כפל ארבע וחמש עדיין הולכים לפי שעת הגניבה. זה בדיוק מה שכותב הרמב"ם על המקרה כשהחפץ עלה בערכו, ואז הוא נשבר מעצמו. אבל אם שבר במזיד, משלם ארבעה מחמת בגלל גרימת נזק

Rambam in Laws of Theft, Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in Tosfot

 The Rambam in Laws of Theft  chapter 1 halacha 15 holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke but  pays the whole amount. The Raavad holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 96 in tosfot holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11 that the thief can pay in movable objects' and the Raavad does not disagree there. Therefore it seems that the Rambam intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. And it seems that the Raavad holds that one evaluates the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court.

However this can not be thus because in ch. 1 halacha 14, the Rambam writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore' I think when the Rambam writes in Laws of Theft 3:11 that the thief can pay in movable objects, he must mean like the Tosphot, Rashi and Rosh that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

I noticed that Rav Isar Meltzer  has some very deep insights on this subject. I have not had a chance yet to dig into his approach. I see Rav Shach also has some important insights here, and apparently I need to understand the Gra here who has a different approach than the Rambam. Plus there is an argument between the Ketzot haChoshen and the Netivot which is relevant here along with the Gemara in Ketuboth page 34. 

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The רמב''ם in הלכות גניבה  פרק א' הלכה ט''ו holds one does not evaluate the value of an object that a thief stole and broke, but  pays the whole amount. אין שמין לגנב. The ראב''ד holds that applies only to the value of the object, not the double that the thief is obligated to pay.

The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא צ''ו בתוספות   holds a thief can pay in what ever is worth money, and it seems that the Rambam agree with that as he writes in Laws of Theft chapter 3 halacha 11. The ראב''ד does not disagree there. Therefore, the רמב''ם intends that one does not evaluate the value of the object at the time of the theft, but rather later at the time of standing in court. Then one evaluates the worth of such an object that one would buy in the market. The ראב''ד holds that one evaluate the double at the time of the theft. This all applies to when the value of such an object has changed from the time of the theft until the time of being in court 

However this can not be thus because in פרק א' הלכה י''ד  the רמב''ם writes if a thief steals an object and breaks it, and it goes down in value, then the thief pays according to the amount it was worth at the time of the theft and the double according to the time he stands before the court. 

Therefore I think when the רמב''ם writes in בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א that the thief can pay in movable objects מיטלטלים, he must mean like the תוספות רש''י ורא''ש that that means whole vessels, not just anything worth money. 

הרמב''ם בהלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה ט''ו מחזיק לא מעריכים את שוויו של חפץ שגנב גנב ושבר, אלא משלם את כל הסכום. אין שמין לגנב. הראב''ד קובע שזה חל רק על ערך החפץ, לא הכפל שהגנב מחויב לשלם. הרשב''ם בבא מציעא מחזיק גנב יכול לשלם בכל מה ששווה כסף, ולכאורה הרמב"ם מסכים עם זה כפי שהוא כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם במטלטלים, והראב''ד לא חולק שם. לפיכך לכאורה כוונת הרמב''ם שאין להעריך את שווי החפץ בשעת הגניבה, אלא מאוחר יותר בשעת עמידה בבית הדין. ואז מעריכים את השווי של חפץ כזה שאפשר לקנות בשוק. ולכאורה הראב''ד סבור כי מעריכים את הכפיל בזמן הגניבה. כל זה חל כאשר ערכו של חפץ כזה השתנה מרגע הגניבה ועד למועד היות הגנב בבית המשפט 

 

אולם זה לא יכול להיות כך כי בפרק א' הלכה י''ד הרמב''ם כותב אם גנב גנב חפץ ושבור אותו, והוא יורד בערכו, אז הגנב משלם לפי הסכום שהיה שווה באותו זמן של הגניבה, והכפל לפי הזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית הדין

 לכן אני חושב שכאשר הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות גניבה פרק ג' הלכה י''א שהגנב יכול לשלם בחפצים מיטלטלין, הוא חייב להתכוון כמו התוספות רש''י ורא''ש שזה אומר כלים שלמים, לא סתם כל דבר ששווה כסף

 

 

the situation in Israel

My feeling about the situation in Israel is that people ought to learn Torah. This is based on an event recounted in the Gemara. There was an excessive tax decree that was being collected by the Roman rulers. so all the Jewish citizens that were ignorant of Torah of the city came to R. Yehuda to see if he would contribute. He said 'Run away.' ,They said "If we do so, you will be left alone." He said that is ok. Some did so. Then more came and he repeated 'Run away.' Finally  all the ignorant people ran away, and the Romans nullified the decree. R Yehuda said ''All problem that come into the world, all come only because of people ignorant of Torah.'' 

''Torah''in this sense means the Old Testament and all of the books of the Oral Law written from about 160 AD until 500 AD. Those books written by the sages of the Mishna and Gemara all bring the authentic oral law. but no books written later can be called Torah. At most, the better of them can be counted as learning Torah in so far that they attempt to explain the Oral and Written Law.  ''Just like you can not add to the law of Moses and the prophets, so you cant add to the oral law.''  [Letter to Yemen of Maimonides ]

However there is learning of the Seven Wisdoms [Quadrivium,  Trivium] that are important to understand Torah, the Gra said ''One who lacks knowledge of any of the seven wisdoms, will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold.''] [SO the natural sciences are important. The rest of secular subjects are Bitul Torah. ]

  The Mishna Bava Kama 49b. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. Rashi writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a braita [law not contained in the Mishna] that says R. Ishmael said one who opens a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. R. Akiva said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. Raba said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only R. Akiva says he is liable, but R. Ishmael says he is not liable. So Rashi is going like Raba. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to Rashi (since he abandoned his domain)therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then Rav Josef said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, R. Akiva  said he is  not liable and R. Ishmael said he is  liable.  So this Rashi is only going like R Ishmael not, R Akiva, for the pit is totally in a public domain

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The משנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. One digs  pit in a public domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. רש''י writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a ברייתא  that says ר' ישמעאל said one who חופר a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain or visa versa is liable. ר' עקיבא said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. רבה said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only ר' עקיבא says he is liable, but ר' ישמעאל says he is not liable. So רש''י is going like רבה. since the main body of the pit is in a public domain and the opening is also in a public domain according to רש''י since he abandoned his domain, therefore everyone agrees he is liable. But then רב יוסף said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, ר' עקיבא  said he is  not liable and ר' ישמעאל said he is  liable.  So this רש''י is only going like ר' ישמעאל not, ר' עקיבא, for the pit is totally in a public domain

המשנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. חופר בור ברשות הרבים ופותח אותו ברשות פרטית הוא אחראי. רש''י כותב שם שהוא נטש את רשותו. יש ברייתא שאומר ר' ישמעאל אמר מי שחופר בור ברשות פרטית ופותח אותו ברשות הרבים או להיפך חייב. אמר ר' עקיבא החופר בור בשטח פרטי שלו ואחר כך נוטש רשותו, אבל לא הבור חייב. רבה אמר שכולם מסכימים שפתיחת בור ברשות הרבים היא באחריות. אבל על חפירת בור בשטח פרטי, רק ר' עקיבא אומר שהוא חייב, אבל ר' ישמעאל אומר שאינו חייב. אז רש''י הולך כמו רבה. כיון שעיקר הבור הוא ברשות הרבים וגם הפתח הוא ברשות הרבים לפי רש''י כיון שנטש את רשותו, לפיכך מסכימים כולם שהוא חייב. אבל אז רב יוסף אמר שכולם מסכימים אם הוא חפר בור בשטח פרטי, הוא אחראי. אבל ברשות הרבים אמר ר' עקיבא אינו חייב ור' ישמעאל אמר שהוא חייב. אז הרש''י הזה הולך רק כמו ר' ישמעאל לא, ר' עקיבא, כי הבור הוא לגמרי ברשות הרבים

learning Torah equals all the other commandments.

 One of the unfamiliar ideas of the Gra is that every word of learning Torah equals all the other commandments. The Mishna in tractate Peah brings this in short without going into it but the Gemara Yerushalmi explains in great detail that every word of Torah equals all the other commandments. That means that even if one would keep all the commandments of the Torah with the greatest love and fear of God, with the greatest degree of burning love and attachment with God, still if you would place all that one one side of a scale and just one word of Torah on the other, they would be equal in weight. All the more so if you would place two words of Torah on the opposite side that scale would immediately tip over to the side of the two words of Torah. however if there is a commandment   that can not be done by someone else, then one ought to interrupt learning to fulfill it and then return to learning as brought also in the Yerushalmi where one person sent his son to learn Torah in Tiberias and heard that he was involved in helping burying the dead. He asked his son' "Did I send you there to bury the dead or to learn Torah? [The Yerushalmi says when the commandment can not be done by another, one should interrupt one' learning. however there is also a principle one involved in a mitzvah doe not have to interrupt to do another. This is the case with the penny of Rav Josef. That is since one is guarding a lost object, he doe not have to give a penny to a pauper.  ]

What counts as Torah? See the letter to Yemen of the Rambam: "Just as there is no adding nor subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law."

That means that just as one can not add to the books of the prophets from Moses until the last prophets of the First Temple period, so one can not add the the Oral Law as redacted by the Tenaim of the Mishna and Amoraim of the two Talmuds. The Gemara also mentions this: "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of rendering a halachic decision."  רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה

        I would like to add here that there are two ways of learning Torah. One is that of Reb Chaim of Brisk which is global or you might say a hawk eyes approach that learns the whole Shas [Talmud] by learning one page. The other is that of Rav Naftali Yeager of Shar Yashuv and David Bronson which is an electron microscope approach. You can least see the Reb Chaim approach in his writings and the other great sages of the Litvak world. The other I think is not so available. I myself could get to this approximately by learning one Tosphot for about a month and then I could start to see the infinite depth of Tosphot. .  

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[The difference between Fries and Hegel

 Hegel is considered to be defending  law and order,  and that everyone has their place in society and  their obligation is to fulfill the duties and obligations that are naturally part of that place. Kant was quite opposite to this. Individual autonomy was the rule. So you might sum-up the argument thus: Hegel saw the disaster of the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution and sought a principle by which freedom can be preserved without disintegrating into chaos. Kant had developed his system before the French revolution, and had a portrait of Rousseau [the ideal of the French  revolutionaries] in his room.

In my view, both are a necessary advancement in philosophy, and reflect the ancient tension between individual and the group, and I do not think that anyone has come up with an answer to this tension. I am mainly on the side of the modified approach to Kant of the Kant-Friesian school  that Kelley Ross so ably defends in his web site, but I can not share the distain that most Kantians feel towards Hegel.[I admit I might be wrong. After all, see the book by Hobhouse, The Metaphysical State. And I do see that communism took a certain degree of Hegel, and yet I do not agree with communism. I hold with John Locke and the Two Treaties.  ]

[BUT I admit my regard for Hegel is probably because I read his Logic ( part of his Encyclopedia) rather than the Phenomenology that everyone else reads--or is assigned to read for their homework. Plus I think the best book on Hegel is McTaggart's.  I also like Cunningham ]   

At any rate, I would like here to recommend the founders of the second Friesian school, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross who provide a necessary amendment to Kant, since I do not think that the B deduction of Kant stands very well on its own, and anyway there is absolutely not the slightest bit of agreement about what Kant actually says there in the first place. [Modern scholars do not agree on the argument of Kant and some of the ambiguity revolves around the question why should things be amenable to be unified into the mind of one subject even before we get to the categories? ] I can see how wonderful it is that Kant is being reintroduced in some universities, still  I  can't see why people do not adopt the modification of Leonard Nelson. [Even though Nelson was just a continuation of Fries in his own mind, I see a lot more rigorous logic in Nelson. But you do not have to take my word for it. Take a look yourself, and I think you will  see what I mean.  ]

[The difference between Fries and Hegel is that the connection between sensory perception and the intellectual categories or why, where, when and what are through non intuitive immediate knowledge in the Friesian approach because Kant did not explain any better way that concepts and senses can exist. To Hegel, even sense objects are manifestations of the Logos of Plato-so there is no place where the intellect can't penetrate. ]

Maybe there is disagreement between them, but I see both as modifications of Plotinus and his Neoplatonist approach

i would like here to suggest looking at the phd thesis of kelley ross where he explains the problems of the b deduction and where he whole issue of ''who is the user?''' is explained. i mean that dr ross shows that kant doe not explain well how synthesis of perceptions or consciousness itself comes about and hegel never asks this question and it is only in the leonard nelson approach that this question gets a good answer.

Bava Mezia 93b. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep and one fell into the river. Raba said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. Abayee asked on this from a braita a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. Abayee suggested that the break was a normal kind and yet he is still liable and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident]and so the shepherd is liable. Raba answered, no. rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. abaye asked if the case is he took an unusual break then it it is a case of the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident is liable. Tosphot learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident.

The Ramban brings the gemara in Bava Kama 45a to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for Abayee. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the unpaid guard pay kofer a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the unpaid guard is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression (for all guards). My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding? [I noticed later that the Ramban, in fact, only meant his argument to apply to the unpaid guard.]

I might mention that Rav Shach and Rav Meltzer had an argument about this Ramban. Rav Meltzer claimed the argument of the Ramban only worked if the obligation of the guard is towards the owner of the animal, while Rav Shach showed that the Ramban's argument works even if the guard is obligated toone whom gets injured by an animal he was guarding.

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בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep, and one fell into the river. רבה said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. אביי asked on this from a ברייתא a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. אביי suggested that the break was a normal kind, and yet he is still liable; and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident] and so the shepherd is liable. רבה answered, no. Rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident, but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. אביי asked if the case is he took an unusual break, then it it is a case of "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in אונס is liable." תוספות learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in accident."

The רמב''ן brings the גמרא in בבא קמא מ''ה ע''א to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for אביי. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the שומר חינם pay כופר a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the שומר חינם is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression. My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding?

בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. היה רועה צאן ואחד נפל לנהר. רבה אמר שהרועה אינו אחראי. מה הוא היה יכול לעשות? כלומר הוא ראה בזה מקרה של תאונה בלתי נמנעת (גדולה) ששומר בתשלום לא משלם עליה. אביי שאל על כך מברייתא רועה צאן שומר כבשיו ונכנס לעיר להפסקה קצרה, ובא אריה ולקח את אחת הכבשים. אם הוא היה יכול להציל את הכבשה לו היה שם הוא אחראי. אביי הציע שההפסקה היא רגילה, ובכל זאת הוא עדיין אחראי; ולכן אנו רואים שזה נחשב למקרה של תאונה נמנעת [תאונה קטנה] ולכן הרועה אחראי. רבה ענה לא. אלא מדובר בהפסקה חריגה, ולכן היא נחשבת לתאונה שאפשר להיות נמנעת, אך בגין תאונה בלתי נמנעת הוא לא יהיה אחראי. אביי שאל אם במקרה הוא לקח הפסקה חריגה, אז זה מקרה של "ההתחלה בפשיעה והסוף באונס שהוא אחראי". תוספות לומדת מכאן שכמות מינימלית של שמירה אינה נחשבת "התחלה בפשיעה וסוף בתאונה.

הרמב''ן מביא את הגמרא בבבא קמא מ''ה ע''א להראות שאותו עיקרון מקובל בכל העולם, לא רק על אביי. שם ההוראה היא שארבעה סוגי שומרים תופסים את מקומו של הבעלים. אם הם שומרים על שור מסוכן (שראו אותו הורג בשלוש הזדמנויות אחרות) שהשתחרר והרג מישהו. השור נהרג, והשומרים חוץ מהשומר חינם משלמים כופר (קנס) ומשלמים על אובדן השור לבעלים. אז אנו רואים בעובדה שהשומר חינם אינו אחראי שכמות השמירה המינימלית אינה נחשבת לעבירה. שאלתי כאן היא שאולי כמות שמירה מינימלית אינה נחשבת עבירה לשומר ללא שכר, אבל אולי היא נחשבת עבירה לשומר בתשלום שכן הוא חייב ברמת שמירה גבוהה יותר?

Bava Kama page 6a

In the Rambam laws of damages 13:19 there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In Bava Kama page 6a  Abyee says we learn from the Mishna in the beginning of Bava Kama "the common denominator" comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The Rif and  Rambam leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. Rav Shach writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  a question is that Abyee derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while Ravina derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The Rif and Rambam do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  another question is if the Rif and Rambam do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between Abyee,  Rava, Rav Ada bar Ahava and Ravina,  and we do not go with Abyee against Rava except in 6 specified cases. [Yal Kegam]. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 

Also I would like to mention that the Rosh learns from Tosphot that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the Rif and Rambam hold the same way.   

I would like to add here for clarification the  Gemara on page 6a of Bava Kama. The Gemara asks what is the "common denominator" of the Mishna coming to add? Abyee says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. Rava said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. Rav Ada Bar Ahava said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. Ravina said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To Tosphot any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to Rav Isar Melzter damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell. However the answer to this is one learns from an ox that one is obligated in damage even if the thing that causes damage was not dangerous from its inception. But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact Rav Isar Melzar suggested that this is the reason Tosphot holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire     

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In the רמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון  פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In בבא קמא ו' ע''א says we learn from the משנה in the beginning of בבא קמא "the common denominator" צד השווה comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The רי''ף and  רמב''ם leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. רב שך writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  A question is that אביי derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while רבינא derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The רי''ף and רמב''ם do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  Another question is if the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה and רבינא,  and we do not go with אביי against רבא except in 6 specified cases. יע''ל כג''ם.. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 

Also I would like to mention that the רא''ש learns from תוספות that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the רי''ף and רמב''ם hold the same way.   

I would like to add here for clarification the  גמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א  . The גמרא asks what is the "common denominator" of the משנה coming to add? אביי says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. רבא said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. רב אדא בר אהבה said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. רבינא said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To תוספות any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to רב איסר מלצר damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell.

But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact, רב איסר מלצר suggested that this is the reason תוספות holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire. This is in spite of the fact that תוספות holds that having another power mixed with it would be more of  a reason to acquit from responsibility.

ברמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט יש דין שאם עץ או חומה נופלים וגורמים נזק אין אחריות אלא אם לא היו יציבים והזהירו הבית הדין להוריד אותם. ואז הוא מחויב. בבבא קמא ו' ע''א אומר למדים מהמשנה בתחילת בבא קמא "המכנה המשותף" צד השווה בא לכלול את אבן, סכינו או חבילה שהשאיר על גג ונפלו בגלל רוח מצויה שגם לאחר שנפלו הוא אחראי. הרי''ף ורמב''ם משאירים בחוץ את הדין על סכין אבן או משא. רב שך כותב שאפשר ללמוד את זה ממקרה הקיר. שאלה היא שאבי שואב את האבן מבור ברשות הרבים ואש, ואילו רבינא לומד את העץ והקיר מבור ושור. לכן לא נוכל ללמוד את האבן והסכין מהקיר כי ייתכן שהסכין לא חייבת כיון שכוח אחר מעורב בנפילתם. חשבתי על התשובה לשאלה האחרונה הזו. הרי''ף והרמב''ם אכן מביאים מקרים אחרים שאנו נובעים מבור ואש, וכך נוכל להפיק את האבן והסכין מאותם מקרים. שאלה נוספת היא אם הרי''ף והרמב''ם אינם מביאים דין האבן והסכין על הגג, אולי אינם מחזיקים ממנו כלל. הרי הדין הזה הוא מאבי, וייתכן שיגידו שכל הנושא הזה הוא ויכוח בין אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה ורבינא, ואין אנו הולכים עם אביי נגד רבא אלא בשש מקרים מוגדרים, יע''ל כג''ם.. אבל השאלה האחרונה הזו לא נראית סבירה מאוד שכן המקרה של האבן והסכין נראים חמורים יותר מהעץ מאז שהניח אותם על הגג שם היה מודע לכך שרוח רגילה עלולה לדפוק הם למטה

כמו כן אני רוצה להזכיר שהרא''ש לומד מתוספות שלכל המקרים האלה יש דין של בור ברשות הרבים, וצריך ללמוד אותם מהמכנה המשותף רק כדי להראות שהם חייבים, אבל החוק העיקרי הוא של בור. סביר להניח שהרי''ף והרמב''ם מחזיקים באותו אופן.

אני רוצה להוסיף כאן לבירור את הגמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א . הגמרא שואלת מהו "המכנה המשותף" של המשנה שבא להוסיף? אביי אומר כי סכין האבן או החבילה שלו שהשאיר על גג והם נפלו ברוח מצויה וגרמו נזק לאחר שכבר היו על הקרקע. זה נגזר מבור ואש. אמר רבא בור שדוחפים אותו ברשות הרבים מבור ואש. רב אדא בר אהבה אמר פתיחת צינורות הניקוז וכי הניקוז גורם נזק מבור ואש. רבינא אמר חומה ועץ שנפלו מבור ושור

 

   לתוספות כל נזק שיגרמו הכותל או עץ בשעת נפילה אינו אחראי כי הבעלים נחשבים חף מפשע. אבל לרב איסר מלצר נזק שעושים בשעת נפילה חייב משום שהם כאש הפוגעת תוך כדי תנועה. אבל הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא אש וסכין שנפלו מגג אחראים כי הייתה עבירה מלכתחילה כשהניח אותם שם, אבל לא הייתה עבירה בנטיעת העץ ובבניית החומה שנפלו

אולם התשובה לכך היא לומדים משור שחייב בנזק, גם אם הדבר הגורם נזק לא היה מסוכן מראשיתו

אבל יתרה מכך, עם אש יש גם את העובדה שכוח אחר כלומר רוח מתערבב בו והופכת אותו למסוכן יותר. למעשה, רב איסר מלצר הציע שזו הסיבה שתוספות מחזיקים את שהקיר והעץ אינם חייבים בגלל שריפה. זאת, וזה למרות שתוספות גורסת כי כשמעורבת בה כוח אחר תהיה סיבה יותר לזכות מאחריות

learning Torah is important.

 I would like to recommend learning the book Nefesh haChaim by Reb Chaim of Voloshin [a disciple of the Gra] in in particular the fourth volume.    This is a part of book that explains why learning Torah is important. A large part of my own approach to the world is to a large extent based on this idea, even though I got the idea originally by being in two great Litvak yeshivot, Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. The actually reading of the Nefesh HaChaim came after I had already been in the Mir for a few years. It just confirmed what I already felt intuitively.  Nowadays I think that it is hard for most people to get the idea of the importance of learning Torah without that book. [I might mention here that the best way to learn Torah is to hear classes from an authentic Litvak rosh yeshiva. Happily I had the opportunity to hear such classes myself from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. However the important thing is that they should be in fact expert. That can be found mainly in people that have learned in Ponovitch, Brisk, Mir or the other great Litvak yeshivot.]

I would also like to mention I define "learning Torah" in a rather limited way. That is the Old Testament, the two Talmuds. the Midrashei Halacha  and Midrashei Agada. So anything written after the finishing of the Talmud does not count except as commentary. [I do think that here it is important to mention the opinion of some early authorities like ibn Pakuda and the Rambam who held learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning Talmud as you can see in Mishna Torah laws of Learning Torah in the law about dividing ones time into thirds: one third for Talmud, and in that category comes the subjects dealt with in the first four chapters of Mishna Torah. And if that is not clear enough, the Rambam makes sure that you get the point in the Guide.] Metaphysics in the early authorities means Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus.  Physics in the Rambam  includes Chemistry.

Torah is the Law of Moses.  The point of the Gemara is to understand how to apply it. Not to change it or to add or subtract. Thus I see that what the world needs is the Law of Moses.  

The problem in dealing with the Law of Moses is not to add and not to subtract and not to change it or change its meaning. And to accomplish this is very much an individual endeavor.   It is impossible to keep the Law of Moses except as an individual and ignore all groups.