I do not hold with institutions in general except in so far as they further their stated goals. Thus, the Litvak yeshiva world does tend to be sitting and learning Torah. But that seems to be evaporating once the great Litvak sages from before WWII are disappearing. The more these great sages like Rav Shach or Rav Israel Kinyevsky disappear, the more the yeshivot become institutions to make money. It might be that nowadays the best one can do is not to depend on anyone else, but to get an Avi Ezri or Chidushei haRambam by Reb Chaim of Brisk and to learn at home, or any corner where one can find a private spot to learn. [There is a problem that comes with trying to mix religion and money. Sincerity goes out the window. Thus learning at home might be the only possibility nowadays.] [My impression is that yeshivot lay out the red carpet for if they think you or your parents have plenty of money, but all that supposed kindness dries up when you are in need. ] 

South Africa, the world leader in genocide

 South Africa has been erasing white people by rape and murder since the 1990's until this very day and they complain about Israel defending it's borders? To me an accusation of genocide coming from South Africa, the world leader in genocide, seems more like a  joke than a serious accusation.

breakdown of American society

 The breakdown of American society, and in particular the breakdown of the relation between the sexes [i.e. the fact that all the women are crazy] is because of the ''meds'' --the medicine that almost all the women are on to supposedly  calm them, but in fact slowly destroys their minds. [The poison of the so called ''mental health'' military complex is at fault. The whole pseudo science of psychology is "Physics Envy".] 

value in the writings of Rabbainu the Ari

 I think that there is value in the writings of Rabbainu the Ari [Izhak Luria], but only if one is prepared by learning and getting through the Talmud twice [the fast way], and also doing a few years in a Litvak yeshiva in order to learn Gemara in depth. Even though there is a lot one can learn by doing it all on one's own, still it is hard to get the idea of understanding the Gemara in depth (''how to learn'') without hearing classes from a Litvak Rosh Yeshiva.  [ Without this preparation, learning Kabalah causes the ''breaking of the vessels'', destroying one's mind.] [Rav Nahman of Breslov pointed this out in the Le.M II, where he explains that the corrections of Rosh Hashanah one also gets by being in a Litvak Yeshiva (being with a rosh yeshiva with his students). Also, he brings the Midrash that we lost ''we will do'',-- so now let us hold on to ''we will listen''. That means learning by yourself is on the level of doing, [''We will do'']. But because of the sin of the Golden Calf, we lost that. I.e., it does not work anymore. The only way learning really gets absorbed is by listening. ]

Without a Litvak yeshiva is is easy to get ide tracked. And every discipline in fact has that danger. In general one needs to learn from an expert in that discipline. However when there is no choice one has to do as well as one can on one' own. Abraham Lincoln was self taught. He probably would have learned more thoroughly if he had had a good teacher, but he did the best that he could.   

 The three morons [presidents] of the ivy league universities in the that did not see any problem with antisemitism crashed and burned-while the morons in charge of the universities in Israel that have ignored the students that support Hamas and welcomed them in are still at their jobs along with the anti-Semitic students --i.e., Betzalel [THE TOP ISRAELI ART SCHOOL], Hebrew university and other supposedly top notch schools. Why is it that the universities in Israel have let back in the students that support Hamas?[you did not hear about it because at first they were expelled in oct, when the universities were not in session but let back in immediately a few days ago when the academic school year began.]

midot tovot good character

 The Chazon Ish pointed out in his small Musar book the importance of being strict in halacha. But what happens when there are conflicts in how to keep the strict law? Then you need an awareness of the order of importance of the laws. In this  learned from Musar books the importance of midot  tovot.in particular the Duties of the Hearts is found help to see what aspects of Torah to emphasize.

Without Musar it is very easy to lose sight of what is important in Torah law. So the aspects of Torah that i think are the most important are monotheism and good midot--''to be a mensch''

[This came up yesterday when I heard one girl is disparaging fanaticism. I did not interject my own two cents at the time, but afterward I mentioned that you have to be fanatic about being in the middle--to seek the middle ground between faith and reason. And in terms of Torah law that means not to add nor subtract. כל המוסיף גורע --ALL that add, end up subtracting.]

 There was tremendous pressure on Israel to leave the Sinai desert from the 1950's until 1967 from both the USA the Soviet Union. [that had been the source of constant raids on Israel until it was taken. ] Israel lost nothing by sticking up for itself. The courts of the Hague which are backed by the U.N. should better investigate the constant calls of the enemies of Israel for final solution of the Jewish problem.

As concerning the general situation in Israel, take the advice of my learning partner-[David Bronson from Uman]-people are just born one side of the issue or the other, and all the arguing in the world will not change anyone's mind. I have a lot of respect for that advice and for him. It is kind of like when you were in your high school algebra class, and the teacher asked  a question that you were sure of the answer. But before you could answer, the smart kid in the class was called on and gave a different answer. How confident are you now about your answer? Not very much. YOU go back and check it again and again before you feel prepared to answer,--or by that time you have discovered your miscalculation. That is the same way people ought to check and recheck their ''facts'' before having an opinion about what they really know next to nothing about. 

 

All Torah institutions should be dropped except Litvak yeshivot that follow the Gra , Reb Israel Salanter and Rav Shach.

 I can understand the  great LITVAK YESHIVOT who just want to sit and learn Torah, but I can't understand the religious world  that makes Torah into a shovel to dig their means of making a living. The whole religious world looks  like a private club that uses the money of secular Jews to make it run. The whole enterprise seems like fraud. They want to be an exclusive private club? Then let them pay for it themselves. To me it seems that anyone wants to support a worthy cause, they ought to volunteer for IDF or the friends of IDF. 

All Torah institutions should be dropped except Litvak yeshivot that follow the Gra , Reb Israel Salanter and Rav Shach. All the rest are pure garbage. 

[The yeshivot that I think are worthy are Ponovitch, Mir, Shar Yashuv,] 

reform in Israel

 My opinion about the the attempt at reform in Israel is mainly based on my little knowledge about the Constitution of the USA  in which James Madison and the other founding fathers made sure that no branch of government would be totally independent of the people.  So judges could not appoint themselves;--they needed to go through people that had been elected by the people. That is why in the  US, there is no such thing as a judge appointing his underlings. So I think judicial reform was quite in order in  Israel. Judges appointing themselves  to me seems like straight tyranny. And all the more so that now that same Israeli Supreme Court has voted itself the right to annul any law they do not like [for not being constitutional when there is no constitution!], and to also remove any member of parliament that they do not like,-- including the prime minister.  Even in Rome where the Senate and most public positions could be held only by the Patrician class, still no public office (including judges) could be held without a vote from the people of Rome. [I mean physical voting in Rome itself.] [Thus the signature  of Rome was SQPR. The Senate and the People of Rome.] There is a lesson from this that extends beyond just the confines of Rome or the USA.

 Politics I think got mixed up with philosophy in a way that tends to blur the lines. I feel that here is a great insight of the Chatam Sopher [Sorry that I forgot his name. That is the name of his book.] He felt that in learning he made sure to make a clear divide between each discipline.  When it comes to politics I think John Locke provides the greatest insights, but I would not say as much when it comes to his philosophy. And even though Kant and Leonard Nelson provide the greatest insights in philosophy, I think their ideas in politics are way too high in the clouds. [THE mix-up between philosophy and politics began with Plato. The road to clarity IN POLITICS began  when Rome by force of necessity [not from philosophy] made a compromise between the plebeians (--the people), and the SENATE. --The story was that the plebeians ran away and the patricians in instead of war offered them the office of the tribune and equal representation and authority for their  elected bodies of the commons [one for each tribe.]] I would be amiss if I did not mention Marx. The flaw that I have held about any system of government from my early youth is the principle that no matter how logical system is , if when put to empirical testing, it does not hold up, then it is wrong. Marxism predicts material abundance way beyond anything that the free market can provide. It does not pass its own test.

 According to the Talmud there is a point in learning fast even if one understands not a single word. it says ''forever a person should be ''gores'' (which means saying the words in order and going on" even though he forgets and even though he does not even know what he is saying.'' And in fact it seems impossible to get through the  Oral Law without doing this. The Oral Law  refers to the parts of the law which were no written until the Mishna and Talmud. [It means the two Talmuds and the midrashei halacha and midrashei agada] It does not refer to any commentaries that were written after the completion of the Talmud. but the many commentaries come under the category of learning the Oral Law. [In depth learning also is important. SO one needs both a fast session and a fast session.]

Some Rishonim that hold learning Physics and Metaphysics are also included in the mitzvah of learning the Oral Law as the Rambam says in the third chapter of Laws of Talmud Torah that ''the things called     Pardes are in the category of Gemara'' and he [the Rambam] defined those things called Pardes in the first four chapters of the Yad haHazaka, and at the end of those four chapters writes ''the subjects explained in these four chapters are what the sages called Pardes. 

 Rav Kook  held with nationalism while the Rav of Satmer [Reb Yoel] did not. and neither held from radical nationalism. To me, nationalism has always seemed to be weak.  It had a slow start.  Somewhere in English history there came an idea- ''England for the English''. Much later, under Louis IVX, it became much stronger. But for most of history, whatever area was ruled by a king--that was the nation. The king mattered, not the area, nor language, nor any sense of identity what so ever. 

[To me personally, keeping Torah is what mattered and matters. I have never been able to see any case for nationalism. Berkley came up with an idea that makes a lot of sense to me-- a nation is not a good in itself. It has a purpose: creating conditions that make human flourishing possible. Thus when it does not serve that purpose, it ha no legitimacy.][This I noticed in Danny Frederick [a libertarian critic of Michael Huemer  who believes in anarchy]. ]

Hegel is known for his defense of the metaphysical state. Hobhouse wrote a critique on that.--

Hegel [and Howard Bloom] are advocates for the collective while Kant is an advocate for the individual. 

Bava Batra page 22 בבא בתרא כ''ב

On the way back from the sea today, there occurred to me a way to explain the Rishonim on Bava Batra page 22. Thus: the law is like Rava except in yal keyam. Also the law is like the later authority which clearly Ravina is. The Gemara says "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of horah"--the ability to make a peak din. If you put these two facts together you are forced into some compromise, some middle position that can contain both. [Otherwise they directly contradict each other.] The Gemara Bava Batra page 22 says Rava says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and Abyee says he can. The Gemara asks on Rava from the Mishna מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח  But almost all Rishonim say the law is not like Rava except for digging a pit alone because a pit is like shooting arrows. Still once there is something the neighbor has put there that can be damaged, he has to take away what can cause damage.  The Rambam holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. Most other rishonim hold he does not have to take away  his object if he came first.

Thus the main idea of the Rishonim is that Ravina means the person that can be damaged he himself has to keep away (because the law is like R. Yose)  unless the thing that can cause damage causes damage immediately.   Thus that is the case of Rava. Other than that there is a right of who came first can stay. the argument then is how long can he stay? Forever?, or until the neighbor puts something that can be damaged there?

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On the way back from the sea today, there occurred to me a way to explain the ראשונים on בבא בתרא כ''ב ע''ב. Thus: the law is like רבא except in יעל כגם. Also the law is like the later authority which clearly רבינא is. The גמרא says "רבינא and רב אשי are the סוף הוראה"--the ability to make a פסק דין. If you put these two facts together you are forced into some compromise, some middle position that can contain both . [Otherwise they directly contradict each other. ]  רבא says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and אביי says he can. The גמרא asks on רבא from   מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח  But almost all ראשונים say the law is not like רבא except for digging a בור alone because a בור is like shooting arrows גיריה דיליה. Still once there is something the neighbor has put there that can be damaged, he has to take away what can cause damage.  The רמב''ם holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. Most other ראשונים hold he does not have to take away  his object if he came first. Thus the main idea of the ראשונים is that רבינא means the person that can be damaged he himself has to keep away unless the thing that can cause damage causes damage immediately. Thus that is the case of רבא. Other than that, there is a right of who came first can stay. The argument then is how long can he stay? Forever? or until the neighbor puts something that can be damaged? there._____________________________________________________________________________

כדי להסביר את הראשונים על בבא בתרא כ''ב ע''ב. הלכך: הדין כרבא אלא ביע''ל קג''ם. גם הדין הוא כמו הסמכות המאוחרת שברור שרבינא היא. הגמרא אומרת "רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה"--היכולת לעשות פסק דין. אם אתה מחבר את שתי העובדות האלה יחד אתה נאלץ לבצע איזושהי פשרה, איזו עמדה אמצעית שיכולה להכיל את שניהם. רבא אומר שאי אפשר לחפור בור ליד הגבול ואבי אומר שהוא יכול. הגמרא שואלת על רבא מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח אבל כמעט כל הראשונים אומרים שהחוק אינו כמו רבא חוץ מחפירת בור לבד כי בור הוא כמו ירי חיצים (גיריה דיליה). ובכל זאת ברגע שיש משהו שהשכן שם שם שיכול להינזק, הוא צריך לקחת מה שיכול לגרום לנזק. הרמב''ם אוחז אם יש משהו שעלול לגרום נזק לשכן בגבול שבינו לבין שכנו, אבל אין שם כלום כרגע, הוא צריך לקחת אותו אם השכן שם משהו שעלול להינזק. רוב ראשונים אחרים טוענים שהוא לא צריך לקחת את החפץ אם הוא הגיע ראשון. לפיכך הרעיון המרכזי של הראשונים הוא שרבינא פירושו של האדם שיכול להינזק שהוא עצמו צריך להרחיק (כי הדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי) אלא אם הדבר שיכול לגרום נזק גורם נזק מיד. אז זה המקרה של רבא. מלבד זאת, יש זכות מי בא ראשון יכול להישאר. הטענה אם כן היא כמה זמן הוא יכול להישאר? לָנֶצַח? או עד שהשכן שם משהו שיכול להינזק?

 Rav Nahman of Breslov warned to stay away from doctors [Sichot HaRan. Conversations of the Rav Nahman]. That was at a time 200 years ago when medicine was still based on the four elements. However this advice is still highly relevant. THERE are procedures and medicines that have been around for 50 years and are well established and are okay. But less than that 50 year period  one ought to avoid.

 Michael Huemer says that Bayesian probability can solve the problem of induction. But is that all that different from justified opinion? That last being the flimsy definition of knowledge. Dr. Huemer' opinion is surely better than that, but still does not bridge the gap.  A priori is different in essence from empirical knowledge as Leonard Nelson pointed out.

 The Rambam holds  if you have something that could cause damage to one's neighbor on the boundary between oneself and his neighbor, but there is nothing there right now, he has to take it away if the neighbor puts something there that could be damaged. This is based on the Gemara Bava Batra page 22. Rava says one can't dig a hole next to the borderline and Abyee says he can. The Gemara asks on Rava from the Mishna מרחיקין את המשרה מן הירק  והחרדל מן הדבורים רבי יוסי אומר עד שאתה אומר הרחק חרדלך מדבוראי הרחק דבוריך מן חרדלי שבאות ואוכלות לגלוגי חרדלי ואי לא סמיך היכא  משכחת לה רב פפא אמר בלוקח from this it is clear that even to have anything by the boundary in the first place is forbidden--since the law is always like Rava except for yal kegam. But almost all Rishonim say the law is not like Rava except for digging a pit alone. still once there is something the neighbor has put there, he has to take what can cause damage away. 

The Rishonim are depending on Ravina who is coming to answer either for Rava or Rav Papa and says על המזיק להרחיק את עצמו How this answers any of the above questions is unclear.     But it is the statement of Ravina that makes room for all the opinions that allow one to put something there. and in fact most rihonim hold that it can stay there even after the neighbor has put something there that could be damaged because at that point, the neighbor had to have put his thing farther away. 

Athens and Jerusalem

Athens and Jerusalem -faith and reason. in the middle ages that meant Plato and neo-platonic thought as we see in Duties of the Hearts. But at some point the emphasis got put on Aristotle. But I believe that the problems presented by the Mind- Body problem cannot be ignored, and thus you need some sort of answer. In my opinion, that is best found in Kant and the modified Kantian approach of Leonard Nelson. [And politics is downstream from philosophy, so this Kantian approach is really a much bigger deal than it seems to be on the surface. More over, this approach in itself needs clarification  for it starts with Beneke and Jacob Fries, but this was a sort of neo Kant approach that no one took seriously until nelson.  ]        

 The Obligations of the Hearts [Chovot Levavot] and all Rishonim take the view of faith with reason. in modern language that translates into the approach of a denial of absolute religious fundamentalisms and a denial of radical secularism. That means that  fundamentalism of Torah is in itself  a path of balance. You can see this in every chapter of the Chovot Levavot where for every good character trait he brings proof from the written Torah, the oral Torah and from reason [which to him means Aristotle, Plato, or Plotinus]

The marriage strike. MGTOW. Men going their own way.

 I think it is time to change secular laws about men. There is no reason why a wife can pick up a phone and send her husband to jail and prison, take away his children and money and reputation.  You can understand the MGTOW movement--men going their own way and refusing to get married or anything that can be considered marriage by the state. For once the state is involved, it is there forever.  

However, I can still see getting married as long as the wife learns the laws about lashon hara [slander] every day. [These laws are in the book Gates of.Repentance ] For people with values and that admit when they are wrong or have done wrong are still people that one can have a forever relationship with.

It is hard to know the laws of lashon hara without Gates of Repentance although they are in the gemara [Talmud]. Still to know them from the Talmud is hard, because they are spread out all over the place.  

[The main place in the Torah where the actual law  of lashon hara is stated is in Leviticus לא תלך רכיל בעמיך "Do not go as a tale bearer among your people." ] 

The best way to deal with a situation in which a wife is making her powerplay is to have values that you will not break under any circumstances.  Show her the door. 

Some of the basic problems with false allegations are the lashon hara problem;-- that is saying even what is true in order to cause damage.  There are, of course, many prohibitions that are involved in false allegations, but the lashon hara one is the most severe.

The general rules are that you need several conditions in order to say anything negative about someone: truth, rebuke, first hand evidence, not hearsay, intent to benefit someone, not cause harm that would not come according to din law of the Torah, not exaggerate. With issues between man and God the conditions seem to be less strict in that they do not seem to require all these conditions and there is some doubt about which ones apply--and it looks that a simple fact about someone' reputation is enough. that is that if it is common knowledge. 

Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron concerning the State of Israel.

I believe that the people of Israel ought to return to Israel mainly because of the opinion of the Ramban [Nachmanidess] who holds it is a positive command. But also i think one ought to support the State of Israel because it was made in order to facilitate the possibility of fulfilling this command. I was not always aware of the importance of the State of Israel until I noticed the opinion of both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the state is the law [Bava Batra 35].That statement of the Talmud is well known but Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron both said that that applies also to the State of Israel. What makes this especially relevant nowadays is that girls in the USA tend to be JAP's [Jewish American Princess's] and thus not marriageable material. They have an attitude problem.   And even if they did not, the laws are made in such  way to put a loaded gun into the hands of any wife. She can, with one phone call, put a man into prison, take away his children and money and reputation any time she feels like it. What kind of trusting relationship can anyone have with a partner that has a loaded gun pointed at their head?

The Ramban you can find in his commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam. Reb Aaron's approach I found in a book of musar that he wrote. Reb Moshe --I forget where I found his opinion, but I think it is well known in the circles that knew Reb Moshe. But those were not my circles. I was at the Mir in N.Y. and really had no idea of the opinion of these two great sages. I had heard of the Rav of Satmer, Reb Yoel who disagreed, but that just makes the issue an argument among the authorities. And even though I really am no where near the greatness of these sages, still I think the law is like Reb Moshe, and besides that, you see that Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron.     

Sharira Gaon on Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] [The statement of Sharira Gaon is brought in the Itur]

 The nice thing I thought about  Sharira Gaon is that to him Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] come out parallel. Even though to the Rishonim, there are ways of explaining things, still  the approach of Rav Sharira Gaon makes a great deal of sense, For to Rava one can not dig a hole right next to the border of his neighbor. And to Sharira Gaon R Yose agrees with the sages that it is incumbent one one who might cause damage to move away some distance between himself and his neighbor. Otherwise it is hard to understand how R. Yose who holds it is upon the one that might be damaged to distance himself and Rava could agree.   [Sharira Gaon says R. Yose agrees with the decision of the sages, but not their reasoning- but also that the law is like Rava only in the case of a pit where just by digging he causes the ground on the other side of the border to be weakened. Thus to Rav Sharira Gaon, the the law is to bring close to the border anything besides a pit is ok-- as long as there is nothing there at the time that can be damaged. 

The Rishonim explain this differently (1) Rava is saying his law only in the case of a pit [hole in the ground because that is directly damaging the field of his neighbor; i.e. "his arrows". (2) The Rif and Tosphot say who comes first to the border can stay, and the neighbor who wants to put something on his side of the border can do so if he does not mind. But the first one can stay. (3) Rambam says the first neighbor can put  something there, but then if the neighbor puts something that can be damaged next to the border, then the first one then has to move away.]  (4) Some say the only permission is if the neighbor is new and bought that property after there is already something at the border that can damage. 

The Reasoning of Sharira Gaon is that one statement of the Gemara is that R. Yose is saying his law in answer to the sages in one case but really he disagrees with them in all cases. The another statement  is that he agrees with them. So Sharira is deciding with the later statement.

I can imagine that Harvard takes smart people from the pool of applicants, but from the long gone years of some good teachers, it seems to be in rapid decline. The physics that has come out of Harvard has been the result of no name people. [The greats are at Cal Tech, Stanford and Princeton. No where near Harvard.]The philosophy that came from there has been sloppy .

The Transcendental Deduction of Kant never really worked.

  Mainly, I believe that the Leonard Nelson approach makes the most sense because the transcendental deduction of Kant never really worked to be able to combine reason and perception. As Kelley Ross put it,-- both must  have a deeper source.  That is non-intuitive immediate knowledge. But as Michael Huemer pointed out, that there is no reason to believe implanted knowledge has any relation to reality.  Therefore, immediate non-intuitive knowledge (-the axioms by which knowledge starts) must be open to correction. It is not infallible. And if one asks-- that empirical facts ought not to be able to correct a priori knowledge, -that is where Hegel comes in handy. [Hegel would not have wanted empirical facts to correct an a priori, but even so even in Hegel, logic and reason flow through everything. Every fact is partly a priori.] There is a point where knowledge itself gets to a plateau, and gets above it by contrasting two points where separate series of reasoning led to and end up in a contradiction by which one starts the whole process again. Something like Electromagnetism and Newton that contradicted until you got Special Relativity,-- and Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradicted until you got Quantum Field Theory; and to sew up gravity, you get String Theory. [In STRING THEORY, I think there is a way forward with Hashimoto Flow in differential geometry, i.e. to see how the closed strings develop in time.]

The issue here are the two points of Jacob Fries: empirical facts can not tell us anything about  how to make logical deductions. And logical deductions can't tell us if there is a continent between Europe and Asia.  

[There is no problem here from General Relativity because to Kant, space is a formal intuition.--Not a priori.]

There is another problem in Kant's transcendental deduction. That deduction says that the knowledge of transcendental subject depends on the knowledge of the transcendental object;-  and knowledge of the transcendental object depends on knowledge of the unity of the transcendental subject. The circularity here does not bother me, even though it probably should. What bothers me is that how can knowledge of object A be dependent on knowledge of object B? Or more precisely: Why is it that Kant says I can not know that I exist unless I know that something else exists?  I assume people in Europe knew that Europe existed before they knew that America existed. Therefore I think that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right that there has to be a deeper source of knowledge: immediate non intuitive knowledge.

I realize that there is a certain amount of stretching things to combine Fries and Hegel in the way that I am doing it here. But what I am doing here I think is somewhat like Plotinus when he combined Plato and Aristotle.] 

I might mention here that I have thought a lot about the Fries-Leonard Nelson approach for years and how it compares with the Hegel- McTaggart approach. [Though there are other approaches to Kant and Hegel but these seem the best of both. But in the long run I think I have to go with the Leonard Nelson non intuitive immediate knowledge idea.] 

the age of prophecy is over.

In Zachariah 13 verse 3 it says that if one will prophesize his parents will tell him''you deserve to die because  you have spoken falsely in the name of the Lord' and then will stab him to death. Then a bit later    Zachariah continues that people  will ask one, ''Are you a prophet?" He will say, "I am just a working guy." And they will ask, "Then what then are those bruises on your hands?" And he will say, "I was at my girl friend's house, and they beat me up." So the idea is that the age of prophecy is over. That is after all the context of those verses--that God will get rid of the spirit of evil from the land. 

 During the era of Victorian England, people were  over much thinking and talking about death. People would spend vast fortunes on their future grave monuments,-- but sex was never discussed, and thought to be in extremely terrible taste to even mention it. Nowadays, people are thinking and talking all the time about sex, while death is a forbidden subject. But things are again changing into obsession's with power.--the attempt to take power from anyone who has had it, and give it to the least powerful--the race and competition to be the best victim. This age is reducing all relations to power relations.--Love is non-existant.  

 Both learning in depth with lots of review and learning by just saying the words and going on are mentioned in the gemara.''לעולם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג לא ידע מאי קאמר'' ''Always one should learn fast  by just saying the words even though he forgets and even though he does not even know what he is saying.'' And there is the event where one teacher was teaching each his lesson to his student 400 times until he understood. Then one day the student was not paying attention, so the teacher taught the same lesson another 400 times. Then in that merit, he was granted 400 years of life and that all the people of his generation would merit to the world to come.

So you need both. my suggestion is to do the in-depth learning in math, physics and gemara [talmud] in the morning and the fast type in the afternoon and evening as is the regular order in most Litvak yeshivot. [However, I do not think that Shar Yashuv had any set time for fast learning,-- as all the learning there was in depth.]   [My son, Isaac, told me many times that the main thing is in depth learning, and that fast learning (saying the words in order and going on) should only be after one has completed his in-depth learning sessions.] 

בבא בתרא כ''ב Bava Batra page 22 and In Laws of Neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam.

In laws of neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam, we have the law that one can put the leftovers of the olive press or other forms of garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The Gra explains  this in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:8) it is because the oven is a doubt, and in case of doubt in prohibitions the law is to be strict, and in money the law is to be lenient. So before the attic is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the attic was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the Avi Ezri the notebook on laws of damages paragraph 2 and the Avi Ezri on that law in the Rambam.] I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the ""chezkat mamon" possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built the garbage has little right to remain while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

      

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In הלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג in the רמב''ם we have the law that one can put the גפת leftovers of the olive press or  garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if  an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs right underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The גר''א explains this in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח'  it is because the oven is a doubt. In case of doubt in prohibitions, the law is to be strict.  In doubt of  money, the law is to be lenient. So before the upper floor is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the upper floor was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the רב שך אבי עזרי the notebook on קונטרס הרחקת נזקים paragraph ב and the אבי עזרי on that law in the רמב''ם. ]      

I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the חזקת ממון possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built, the garbage has little right to remain, while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

בהלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג ברמב''ם יש את הדין שאפשר לשים את שאריות הגפת של בית בד או אשפה ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים חומה שם. אז הוא חייב לקחת את האשפה כדי שלא יפגע בקיר הזה. אבל אם השכן מלמעלה מתכנן להפוך את הקומה העליונה למקום אחסון לפירות, אז הוא יכול להתנגד אם השכן מלמטה רוצה להכין תנור למטה ממש מתחת. אבל אם התנור הונח שם בכל זאת, הוא יכול להישאר. מה מחמיר את התנור משאריות בית הבד לפני הפיכת עליית הגג לחלל אחסון, ופחות מחמיר לאחר מכן? הגר''א מסביר זאת בשלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח' זה משום שהתנור ספק. במקרה של ספק באיסורים, יש להחמיר את הדין. בספק כסף, החוק צריך להיות מקל. אז לפני שהקומה העליונה נעשית לאחסון, השאלה היא של איסור גרימת נזק, ולכן אנחנו מחמירים. לאחר שהקומה העליונה נעשתה לאחסון, השאלה היא של כסף, ולכן אנו מקלים. השאלה שלי כאן היא שגם לאחר שהוכנס התנור למטה ועליית הגג משמשת לאחסון, עדיין נראה שהשאלה היא של גרימת נזק לפרי. [ראה רב שך אבי עזרי קונטרס הרחקת נזקים פסקה ב', ובאבי עזרי על הדין ההוא ברמב''ם. ]

אני רוצה להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו. זה שהחזקת ממון של אשפה חלשה יותר מהחזקה של תנור. אז בעוד שלאחר בניית הקיר, לאשפה אין זכות להישאר, בעוד שלתנור יש יותר זכות להישאר

wisdom of the Greeks

 Even though the wisdom of the Greeks is frowned upon in the Gemara, many Rishonim (note 1) did not think that applied to Plato or Aristotle but to the other schools of Greek philosophy. [There were four such schools altogether including Epicurus ]. It seems likely that the Rishonim understood the objection of the sages was directed against  Epicurus. otherwise it is hard to understand why the Rambam would have written that מעשה מרכבה ומעשה בראשית the Divine Chariot and the Work of Creation mentioned in the Mishna and Gemara refer to what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Metaphysics   

(note 1)   [FIRST AUTHORITIES from the  Rif [Isaac ALFASSI ] up until the Beit Joseph [JOSEPH KARO-author of the SHULCHAN ARUCH]--not including the Beit Joseph]

My opinion is that the prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].

 The major point of the Book of Maccabees is against worship of idols. The miracle of the oil and the menorah are not even mentioned. The only thing that comes up is that the king of Syria put up an idol and demanded that people worship it and when someone went over to bow down to that idol, Matisyahu killed him, and started the rebellion against Syrian rule.   [My opinion is that this prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].]

[And I believe that herem is still valid and in force, but I do not think it applies to Rav Nahman of Breslov for reason that looking at the actual language of the herem, I noticed it did not seem applicable to him. ]

THE king of Syria, Antiochus is referred to as Greek because he was king of of of the four areas conquered by Alexander of Macedonia which after conquering Greece adopted much of Greek culture. AS a result, ''Greek wisdom'' got a negative review until Rav Saadia Gaon, ibn Pakuda, the Rambam. and the Gra. I myself would have been happy to it a learn Gemara, and ignore all ''outside learning'' until I discovered the opinion of these above mentioned  sages that wrote about the importance of certain aspects of secular learning--but not all. learning.  Physics and Metaphysics, in fact, the Rambam writes are included in the commandments to love and fear God. But most of what today is considered science is pseudo science [e.g., psychology], and would  not be included in these commandments 

'' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one]

 The synthesis faith and reason was the major idea of the Middle Ages. Each by itself can get seriously out of kilter. This is a case where faith in the Bible can correct flaws in reason. '' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one].

Reason by itself does not tell us much. To Hume it is confined to analytic propositions. Kant struggled mightily for ten years to answer this approach of Hume, and came up with his justification of synthetic a priori knowledge-which is that it is justified within the realm of possibility of experience. But this approach in itself has been subject to debate until rejected totally by both continental and Anglo American so called ''Analytic philosophy.'' The approach favored by me is the Kant-Friesian School [Leonard Nelson] which rightly shows that reason itself has to have starting principles-otherwise it can not get off the ground. This is by immediate non-intuitive knowledge.

But this problem has been rejected by Michael Huemer who says reason itself recognizes universals, i.e., a priori knowledge. While what he says is quite true, however it leaves the problem of how does reason recognize what principles are more ''reasonable''. What criteria does one have to judge. He depends on probability [of Bayes], but even there one needs criteria to decide what is more reasonable.  

The main contenders of the Kant Friesian School of Leonard Nelson were the neo- Kantian and Husserl. The Neo-Kantians have gone into oblivion, and Husserl is incoherent. What does he think?--to boil down a person to discover his essence? That is like boiling down a whale into its constituent atoms to find out what is the essence of a  whale.   And  his method of phenomenology  he never got around to defining what exactly it is. No wonder David Hilbert sided with Nelson. And there is a bit of poetic justice in that Husserl was paid back in kind in his efforts to block Nelson from a professorship. [That was when his own student, Heidegger, got Husserl removed from his professorship. Payback is a bitch.   

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a]

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a] says if a wall falls down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The Rashba [[Bava Batra page 4]] asks what if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, ''I built half and my neighbor built half.'' The Rashba answers [according to Rav Shach] since it is derara demomona [relevance of money] still both divide evenly. But what about Tosphot [Bava Metzia page 2a ]? To Tosphot when there is derara demomona that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the Mishna is Sumchos [money in doubt is divided]. And this is not far fetched, since the stam mishnas [anonymous mishnas  ] in the three bavot hold like Sumchos. However, we see the Rambam still decided the halacha like this mishna even though it is like Sumchos. The reason might be that if  the sages would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the Mishna does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

I am aware of the fact that in Bava Metzia pg 100 there is some modification of Sumchos, but I forget what was said there, and it could be it might disprove my suggestion here. If so, I am willing to retract.  All this is just a suggestion that this first mishna in Bava Batra might be Sumchos, and if so, that would help Tosphot.

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The משנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א  says if a wall fall down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The רשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד   asks What if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, 'I built half and my neighbor built half. The רשב''א answers [according to רב שך] since it is דררא  דממונא still both divide evenly. But what about תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? To תוספות when there is דררא דממונא that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the משנה is סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים . And this is not far fetched, since the סתם משנה in the three בבות hold like סומכוס. However, we see the רמב''ם still decided the הלכה like this משנה even though it is מסתבר like סומכוס. The reason might be that if  the חכמים would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the משנה does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

המשנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א אומרת שאם נפל קיר בין שני שכנים, מחלקים את האבנים או הלבנים באופן שווה. הרשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד' שואל מה אם אחד אומר ''בניתי את כל החומה'', והשני אומר ''בניתי חצי ושכני בנה חצי''. עונה הרשב''א [לפי רב שך] כיון שזה דררא דממונא עדיין שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. אבל מה לגבי תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? לתוספות כשיש דררא דממונא שבית הדין אומר אחד נוטל שלש רביעיות והשני רביעית. אני רוצה לענות על השאלה הזו כך. אולי המשנה היא סומכוס, ממון המוטל בספק חולים. וזה לא מופרך, מכיוון שהסתם משנה בשלושת הבבות מחזיקה כמו סומכוס. עם זאת, אנו רואים שהרמב''ם עדיין החליט על ההלכה כמו המשנה הזו למרות שזה מסתבר כמו סומכוס. הסיבה עשויה להיות שאם החכמים יחלקו על כך, מדוע לא אמרו זאת? אז כנראה שהם מסכימים. זה מוביל אותי לתשובה אחרת. אולי אם השכן האחד היה אומר ''בניתי הכל'' והשני היה אומר ''בניתי חצי'', אז נחלק שלוש רביעיות לאחד ורביעית לשנייה. המשנה לא מטפלת במקרה הזה. אולי הם לא אומרים כלום והמקרה הוא שהלבנים נפלו לחצר אחת בלבד

I was thinking about the idea of Rav Shach in the Rambam [laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18.] off and on for a few weeks. I felt there was some sort of question that I should ask, but I could not see it exactly until today on my way to the sea. So here it is: 

 I have a question on the way Rav Shach explains the Rashba in Bava Batra page 4 side a , brought in Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18. . My question is that derara demomona [a relevance of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment, we say they divide equally. Or if one says, ''It is all mine'' and the other says, ''It is half mine,'' then 1/4 goes to the last one, and 1/2 to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is derara demomona. Tosfot Bava Metzia page 2a based on the mishna there and the case of the boat in Bava Batra page 35.  

But in Bava Batra, the first mishna says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The gemara on page 4 asks, "Is that not obvious?" The Rashba there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? Rav Shach explains there that the intension of the Rashba is because each has derara demomona which means there is a doubt to the court even without their claims, and therefore the court ignores their claims and divides the wall equally.

The question on this is that derara demomona in the beginning of Bava Metzia means that the court pays attention to their claims,--as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here Rav Shach is saying derara demomona is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.     

There is an obvious answer, the Rashba is not Tosphot. But my question is based on the idea that the Rashba had a reason for his approach and the Tosphot also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

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 I have a question on the way רב שך explains the רשב''א in בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (This is brought in the רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח.) My question is that דררא דממונא [a שייכות of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment we say they divide equally. Or if one says it is all mine and the other says it is half mine, then a fourth goes to the last one and חצי to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is דררא דממונא. And תוספות בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''א based on the משנה there and the case of the boat in בבא בתרא דף ל''ה. But in בבא בתרא, the first משנה says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The גמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א asks, "Is that not obvious?" The רשב''א there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? רב שך explains there that the intension of the רשב''א is because each has דררא דממונא which means there is a doubt to the בית דין even without their claims, and therefore the בית דין ignores their claims and divides the wall equally. The question on this is that דררא דממונא  in the beginning of בבא מציעא means that the בית דין pays attention to their claims, as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here רב שך is saying דררא דממונא is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.   

There is an obvious answer, the רשב''א is not תוספות. But my question is based on the idea that the רשב''א had a reason for his approach and the תוספות also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

יש לי שאלה בדרך רב שך מבאר את הרשב''א בבבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (זה מובא בהלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח) השאלה שלי היא שדררא דממונא הולך ככה. אם יש ויכוח בין שני אנשים לגבי מי הבעלים של ספינה או סירה ואין הוכחה לכאן או לכאן, אנו אומרים שמי שחוטף אותה קודם מקבל אותה. אבל לשני אנשים שמחזיקים בגד אנחנו אומרים שהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. או אם אחד אומר שהכל שלי והשני אומר  חצי שלי, אז רביעי הולך לאחרון וחצי לראשון. ההבדל הוא שעם הבגד יש דררא דממונא. (תוספות בבא מציעא דף בע''א לפי המשנה שם ומקרה הסירה בבבא בתרא דף ל''ה.) אבל בבבא בתרא, המשנה הראשונה אומרת ששני שכנים חייבים לבנות חומה בין הנכסים שלהם. לכן אם היא נופלת, האבנים או הלבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. שואל הגמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א "האם זה לא מובן מאליו?" הרשב''א שם שואל: "למה זה ברור? מה אם הראשון יגיד: בניתי את כל החומה", והשני טוען שכל אחד בנה חצי חומה? רב ש"ך מבאר שם שכוונת הרשב"א היא משום שיש לכל אחד דררא דממונא, כלומר יש ספק לבית דין גם בלי טענותיהם, ולכן בית הדין דין מתעלם מטענותיהם ומחלק את החומה שווה בשווה. השאלה על כך היא שדררא דממונא בראשית בבא מציעא משמע שבית דין שם לב לטענותיהם, לעומת התעלמות מטענותיהם, ולתת להם להסדיר את העניין בעצמם. אבל כאן רב שך אומר דררא דממונא סיבה להתעלם מטענותיהם, ופשוט לחלק את הכותל שווה בשווה   

יש תשובה ברורה, הרשב''א אינו תוספות. אבל שאלתי מבוססת על הרעיון שלרשב''א הייתה סיבה לגישתו וגם התוספות. לכן השאלה מבוססת על הנושאים, לא על מי אמר מה

Philosophy is still the servant of religion, but now that religion is the new secular religion of wokism.

Philosophy used to be thought of as being in the service of religion and Kant did not like that and tried to emancipate philosophy from religion.  After Kant  there was still a lot of optimism that philosophy would make some progress. Eventually all that optimism dissipated when philosophy could not show a single positive result. Zilch. So it became the handmaid of science. But even in that, it could not show anything deep nor profound or even relevant. So in her desperation, she became anti-science [with the no truth doctrine] and became the servant of wokism and political correctness. Philosophy is still the servant of religion, but now that religion is the new secular religion of wokism. Analytic philosophy is good for people that would like to be mathematicians, but do not have talent. It gives them something to do, and keeps them out of the way from people with real talent. Continental philosophy is good for people that would like to be authors, but do not have talent. Psychology is good for people that would like to be con-men, but do not have talent.

I think one ought to have a goal of getting through the whole oral and written law, plus basic physics and mathematics. --at least once. You can see in the writings  of the Gra the importance of getting through the whole oral and written law plus the seven wisdoms. 

But how can one accomplish this?--that is by the way of learning called ''girsa'' i.e., just saying the words and going on. That is, to have one session in Gemara i.e.,  to make a place marker and  go through one side of a page of Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot with the Maharsha and Maharam printed in the back of the Gemara. Put the place marker in, and the next day to go on to the next page. Do the same with the Yerushalmi and Midrash. Plus go through daily a few pages of Physics and Mathematics. But all of this is what is known as ''bekiut''. Besides this, one should have a few in depth sessions with the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach or the Chidushei HaRambam by Reb Chaim of Brisk.     [ Mathematics in depth is not all that different from the fast learning called ''girsa''. The difference is for every chapter you go forward, you go back to all the previous chapters.]

Another aspect of learning in depth I heard from my son Izhak--that of doing lots of review. [The gemara mentions review forty times.But that should be done separately from the fast kind of learning i have mentioned up above. ] 

 To Rav Avraham Abulafia, Jesus was a very great tzadik. But that does not say anything at all about Christianity. Rav Abulafia quite definitely considered the Catholic Church to be straight idolatry. and in that he was going with the opinion of the Rambam. However Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara considers Christianity to be ''shituf'' (joining anything with God's name ).[Actually in that one short Tosphot there are a few opinions, but the general gist of his argument is that it is shituf.] [Shituf is joining another with God. In the Gemara itself over there, it is talking about the prohibition of joining anything with God's name in an oath--for example when Gideon shouted ''A sword to the Lord and to Gideon'' to arose his men before battle.

Rav Avraham Abulafia lived near the time of the Rambam. The Rambam died in 1204 and Rav Abulafia was born around 1240.

Learning fast--just saying the words in order and going on --is a great piece of advice about learning which really comes straight from the Talmud itself. לעולם לגרוס איניש אע''ג ששוכח ואף על גב שאינו יודע מה שהוא אומר .  and one of the major books of Musar the  אורחות צדיקים brings this path of learning in Shar Hatorah. But they are usually understood to mean learning gemara in this way. However at some point  a few years ago I became aware that learning math and physics is considered as part of the mitzvah to learn Torah and so I applied this path of learning to my studies in Physics at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU.  

So now I try to have both in depth learning sessions with lots of review of every chapter and also fast learning sessions.  [this is very well known in litvak yeshivot where the accepted approach to learning is to do in depth learning in the morning and fast learning in the afternoon.] [however the fast learning is much slower than the approachof just saying the words and going on]

  I might make clear a few categories. ''Zona'' [זונה] is a woman who has had sex with someone forbidden to her by a prohibition, not an isur ase איסור עשה. A zona is forbidden to a kohen. The Rambam expands the definition to include the common usage of the word to mean a prostitute. That is a woman who is willing to have sex with more than one partner. [It does not mean sex for money--because if it did, then all married women would be in the category of prostitutes.] The actual word for prostitute is kedeisha קדישה. Niuf adultery ניאוף is sex with a married woman. It is not sex outside of marriage, [as many Christians mistakenly believe.]

NOW that I am at it, I might expand this to clarify some more issues. ''Mezonot'' support in what is called alimony is none existent in Torah. But from derabanan [words of the scribes] a widow gets mezonot until she remarries. A divorced woman gets only the ketubah,-- $500 nowadays. There is a ketubah of $1000 for a virgin, but of course there is almost no such thing as a virgin anymore. Any woman getting married nowadays is almost never a virgin.  And there is almost no such thing as a ''good woman''. Almost any woman at 18 years old will be influenced by society and become a fat bitch after about 10 years. 

Even though to some people marriage is thought to be the only legal connection between man and woman -I do not see it that way . To most medieval authorities, a girl friend [concubine ]- is permitted. That includes the Rosh, Raavad, Ramban/Nahmanidess and others that I have forgotten off hand. Even to the Rambam/Maimonides there is no prohibition involved except for lack of doing kidushin [marriage]. That is,- he sees the kidushin as an obligation, but lack of it is not a prohibition in itself. And not all versions of the Rambam have that either. [''Rambam'' is said with emphasis on the first syllable. ''Ramban'' with emphasis on the last syllable ]

Besides that, a girl friend relationship is well established  even after the giving on Mount Sinai of the Torah as we see in Chronicles I chapter 2 verse 46 concerning the concubines of Caleb ben Yefuna. [That is the same Caleb who was a friend of Joshua. See whole incident in the Book of Numbers. Joshua and Caleb were among the 12 spies that Moses sent into the Land of Canaan [Israel] and they brought back a good report as opposed to the other ten spies]

[And even if you find a good woman, she can leave any time she gets tired of you and your beer cans on the couch, and take the kids and half of anything you own, and she will get paid by the government to do so.  Who needs it? ]

the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored.

I am very sad because I feel that the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored. but i also feel that I am not one who can help recover from this loss. [Tosphot is the commentary on the Talmud on the opposite ide from Rashi.] the only two people i ever knew that could see this depth were naftali yeager [the rosh yeshiva in Shar Yashuv and David Bronson my learning partner in Uman [by the ziun of Rav Nahman]. ] My feeling is that to see this requires a combination of high IQ and talent.

Now I do not mean to belittle the great efforts of that whole school of thought that revolved on Reb Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shach that digs into the Rambam. But I miss the people that could see what is really going on in Tosphot. Believe me,-- I looked . All my years in the Mir Yeshiva in New York I learned every achron [later commentary] I could get my hands on, but never saw this. They certainly have important points -especially the Maharsha. Still my impression is that they are all revolving on the outside of Tosphot--never the inside. 

[i tried to capture a little of this in my little booklet on bava metzia to which i provide a link here.]

but you will see what i mean here only in the parts that i bring the questions and issues brought up by david bronson and my tentative answers. that is from bava mezia pgs 97b to 104b. the rest i wa doing without his insights    

Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks

  When the Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks  --that took a certain amount of courage. Even though this was an ancient approach that began with Saadia Gaon and the Obligations of the Hearts still it does not sound like how the sages of the Talmud think of the ancient Greeks. [Most of the time in the Talmud you get the idea that they did not like the ancient Greeks very much..And the few places where the Work of Creation and the Divine Chariot are mentioned, the Talmud does not describe them as being what in Attic Greece were the subjects of Physics and Metaphysics. Still I eventually had to depend on this opinion of the Rambam. [but no before i saw this same approach brought in the obligations of the hearts. ] [For some reason I have not been able to understand, I never ''made it'' in the Litvak yeshiva world which I really loved--but they did not love me. So from lack of choices, I went to university to major in Physics]

When the Rambam mentions Physics, he includes Chemistry as you can see in the first four chapters of the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah.] When he mentions metaphysics, he is mainly referring to the set of books of Aristotle by that name;- but not that alo ne. He clearly includes Plotinus--as has been noted before that he is not solely going with Aristotle, but rather the synthesis the Plotinus created between Aristotle and Plato. [Nowadays I would include Kant and Leonard Nelson's approach to Kant. see the web site of Kelley Ross]. That is  not the only approach to Kant but it makes a lot more sense to me than the other one's of sensibility first or reason first. See Robert Hanna and Sperber. [I mean that there were critiques on Kant by Schulze, and Maimon and some others. Because of that set of questions, there arose three approaches to Kant --1. reason first, 2. sensibility first, and 3. neither of the above but rather a kind of knowledge that precedes both reason and sensibility--nonintuitive immediate knowledge  ]

בבא בתרא י''ג ורמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכה ב'

 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the Rambam and the approach of Rav Shach. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the Gemara in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So Rava would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the Rambam who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard.

However you might ask if that is so that Rava agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the first born son and the second born? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So Rava would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''  

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 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the רמב''ם and the approach of רב שך. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the גמרא in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' (גוד או אגוד) is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So רבא would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the רמב''ם who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard. 

However you might ask if that is so that רבא agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the בכור and the פשוט? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So רבא would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''

הייתי בחוף הים ועלה בדעתי לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול על הרמב''ם וגישתו של רב שך. כלומר כך. אנחנו לא עושים חוק כדי להכריח מישהו לקנות משהו שהוא לא רוצה, וגם לא למכור משהו שהוא צריך. אז כל העניין של הגמרא באומרו אם החצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה, אז אפשר לומר לשותף השני ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' (גוד או אגוד) הוא רק הצעה, לא דרישה. אז המקרה של החצר וחצי העבד זהה לגבי הרעיון של ''אתה קונה חצי או אני אקנה חצי'' זה לא יכול להיות חוק. אז רבא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן תהיה גישה תקפה מכיוון שאיננו יכולים להכריח אף אחד מהצדדים לקנות או למכור את חלקו. אז עכשיו אנחנו מבינים שהרמב''ם שאכן מחזיק שהחלוקה בזמן היא גישה תקפה עם חצר קטנה

עם זאת אתה יכול לשאול אם זה כך שרבא מסכים לחלוקה בזמן כאשר ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' אינו אפשרי, אז למה הוא לא אמר זאת במקרה הראשון של בכור והפשוט? אני חושב שהסיבה היא שירושה זה לא אותו סוג של קנייה ומכירה או שותפות רגילה. בירושה, הרעיון הוא לחלק. אז רבא למעשה יסכים לחלק בזמן רק אם הם יסרבו ל''אני אקנה את שני השלישים שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את השליש שלי

בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א Bava Batra page 13 a

Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 1 halacha  2. The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide the other must divide if it is 8 yards by 4 yards. If the courtyard is less, then one can not force the other, but rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' The Rambam says if both refuse that arrangement then they divide in time. That is one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this.

The Raavad disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the Raavad is clear in the Gemara itself and it is hard to see how the Rambam would have understood that Gemara. 

The Gemara is Bava Batra 13 side a. Rava asked Rav Nahman,'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a braita, where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. Rava answered in that case there is not choice. In our case it is clear that Rava does not hold with dividing in time. Rav Shach says the case of a court yard that has less than  4 yards for each one is different and Rava would agree that dividing in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full slave. So Rava would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half, or I will buy your half.'' So the Raavad is right that Rava does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

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 The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide, the other must divide if it is ח אמות על ד אמות. But if the courtyard has less area than that, then one can not force the other.  Rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' [ גד או אגוד ] The רמב''ם in  הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב says if both refuse that arrangement, then they divide in time. That is, one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this. The ראב''ד disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the ראב''ד is clear in the גמרא itself and it is hard to see how the רמב''ם would have understood that. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א)'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a ברייתא. where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. רבא answered in that case there is not choice. In our case, it is clear that רבא does not hold with dividing in time. רב שך says the case of a court yard that has less than ארבע אמות for each one is different, and רבא would agree that diving in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full Slave. So רבא would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' So the ראב''ד  is right that רבא does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

הדין לחצר שבבעלות שני אנשים הוא שאם אחד רוצה לחלק, השני חייב לחלק אם זה ח' אמות על ד' אמות. אבל אם בחצר יש פחות שטח מזה, אז אי אפשר להכריח את השני. במקום זאת אחד יכול לומר לשני ''קנה את החצי שלי או שאני אקנה את החצי שלך'' [גד או אגוד] הרמב''ם בהלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב', אומר אם שניהם מסרבים להסדר הזה, אז הם מחלקים בזמן. כלומר, אחד גר בו שנה ואחר כך השני, והם ממשיכים ככה. הראב''ד חולק על חלוקה בזמן. דעת הראב"ד ברורה בגמרא עצמו וקשה לראות כיצד היה מבין זאת הרמב"ם. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א) ''אתה לא מסכים עם ההלכה שאחד אומר לשני 'אתה קונה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך'. אז מה יעשה בכור ובן שני עם עבד?'' הוא ענה, ''הוא עובד יומיים בשביל הבכור על כל יום שהוא עובד לבן השני'' מביאים הוכחה מברייתא שבו עבד הופך חופשי בחצי. (היו לו שני בעלים, ואחד שחרר אותו.) הוא עובד יום אחד עבור אדונו, ויום אחד עבור עצמו. רבא ענה במקרה כזה אין ברירה. בענייננו ברור שרבא אינו מחזיק בחלוקה בזמן. רב שך אומר שהמקרה של חצר שיש בה פחות מארבע אמות לכל אחת שונה ורבא יסכים שגם חלוקה בזמן הגיונית כי אין ברירה. אבל סירוב להקשיב להצעה לקנות את החצי השני או למכור את החצי שלך, אינו אותו מקרה של חצי עבד שאינו יכול להפוך לעבד מלא. אז רבא לא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן היא תחליף תקף להצעה של ''קנה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך''. אז צודק הראב''ד שרבא לא מסכים לחלק בזמן אלא אם כן יש אין אלטרנטיבה אחרת

 

 i  find it instructive that the only people that have opened their hearts and homes to the many several hundred thousands of Jews that had to escape from the areas in the south of Israel have been the kibbutzim. i was at first unaware of this until i saw an article about a nearby kibbutz givat chaviva that opened all its facilities to thousands of Jews that had to escape--and till cant go back to their homes. now i have become aware that the only places that have been helping the Jews that have had to escape have been the kibbutzim  

 The Russian revolution is for me a case where it is hard to take sides. given what Nicholas II saw what had happened to all the previous tsars when they tried to be soft [they were murdered], it is hard to imagine what else he could have done. On the other hand, the misery of the Russian people was already growing in intensity because of the cities and industry growing and with WWI it is hard to see any recourse to any kind of action than to throw out a czar that seemed insensitive to their trouble. It is also hard to see any party taking power except the Bolshevik who controlled the army with Trotsky at it head. It is all very confusing. Then to try to reason through it all seems to make it worse. Marx was the author of a brilliant hypothesis that like all scientific hypotheses needed to make predictions, and then can be tested based on those predictions. All of Marx's prediction turned out to be false. Maybe it all comes down to what Rasputin told the czar, ''If my death will be caused by you or any of your close relatives, then you and your family will not last one year after that.''

 

 I think I ought to make Kant clear. There is knowledge that is known by way of reason, for example things known by definition. And there are things known by the five senses. But can we know things like universals [things that particulars have in common]?-Yes. Things are in the realm of possibility of experience. We can know them by structures in the mind like computer chips. [E.G. the ideas of time space and causality. But outside of the conditions of possible experience we can not know.

There are some attempts to get past this blockage, and one approach is that of Jacob Fries--and that is to say there is knowledge that is known, but not by reason and not by the senses.

[This is different from reason first Kant [the first interpretation] and from sensibility first Kant [Robert Hanna, Sperber].] This Kant-Friesian approach says neither reason nor sense perception is first. See Kelley Ross's web site To get an idea about this Kant-Friesian approach I think the best idea is to learn the books of Leonard Nelson who is a lot more clear than Fries himself, even though I think most are still in  German.  

When Robert Hanna and Kelley Ross argue for the Kantian position they do not usually bring evidence from physics. [Dr Ross is mainly interested in expanding the position of Kant and Fries--to develop a much wider world view than you could see in either. Dr Hanna is mainly interested   in showing the flaws in those Analytic thinkers that attacked Kant. ] But one little piece of evidence has convinced me for years about the truth of Kant from Physics. The humble little unremarkable electron. As it reacts or is part of the equations that deal with its kinetic and potential energy, it is fine. But if you try to calculate its mass as independent of all interaction [including its own field], its mass comes out to be infinite. 

the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites

I To the Rambam [Maimonidess], the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites. To the Ramban/Nahmanidess the command is to live in Israel. However the Rambam agrees that one should live in Israel. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the Rambam. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer Israel and the move somewhere else? But where does one go to get clarity about the Rambam except to Reb Chaim of Brisk and that whole school of thought that started with him up until Rav Shach. And so far I have not seen anything that could bring me clarity about the Rambam.   

[And where is Israel? The boundaries are stated in Torah. And yet right then and there, the children of Gad and Reuben decided to live outside of those borders--and Moses agreed with them!! I imagine that this must be the reason for the Rambam. If it would be a command of the Torah to live in Israel, why did Moses not tell them to do so. Why did Moses agree that after they would help to conquer Israel, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay.--but you could  answer this that the borders of Israel  promised to Abraham extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. 

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 To the רמב''ם, the command of the תורה is to conquer the land of ישראל from the Canaanites. To the רמב''ן the command is to live in ישראל. However the רמב''ם agrees that one should live in ישראל. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the רמב''ם. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer ישראל and the move somewhere else? 

And where is ישראל? The boundaries are stated in תורה. And yet right then and there, the בני גד ובני ראובן decided to live outside of those borders, and משה agreed with them.  This must be the reason for the רמב''ם. If it would be a command of the תורה to live in ישראל, why did משה not  tell them to do so. Why did משה agree that after they would help to conquer ישראל, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay. But you could  answer this that the borders of ישראל  promised to אברהם extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. however the borders of ancient israel did not extend that far. 

לרמב''ם, מצוות התורה היא לכבוש את ארץ ישראל מידי הכנענים. לרמב''ן הציווי הוא לגור בישראל. אולם הרמב''ם מסכים שצריך לגור בישראל. אני מודה שמעולם לא הצלחתי להבין את גישתו של הרמב''ם. איך זה יכול להיות הגיוני לכבוש את ישראל ואז ללכת למקום אחר? ויש לתרץ את זאת. איפה ישראל? הגבולות מצוינים בתורה. ובכל זאת, באותו רגע, החליטו בני גד ובני ראובן לחיות מחוץ לגבולות אלה, ומשה הסכים איתם. זו חייבת להיות הסיבה לרמב''ם. אם זו תהיה פקודה של התורה לחיות בישראל, מדוע משה לא אמר להם לעשות זאת. למה משה הסכים שאחרי שהם יעזרו לכבוש את ארץ כנען, אז הם יוכלו לחיות בצד השני של נהר הירדן? כנראה שזה היה בסדר. אבל אתה יכול לענות על זה שגבולות ישראל שהובטחו לאברהם משתרעים מהנילוס ועד נהר הפרת

 In Torah it is important to have an idea about what is the main thing and what are  the side issues. Thus monotheism and good midot [to be a mensch] ought to be the foremost in everyone' mind. Monotheism is certainly the command to worship and serve God alone. But it also means to understand that God is completely ''other''.  HE is not  a close relative of people. He does not share any characteristics of people,  for all characteristics He created. He has nothing in common with any physical objects- no form nor substance. He is not composed of ingredients. He is not a composite.  

Jay shuts down Islam's Origins in ONE HOUR at "Calvary Chapel Chino Hills"!

 

 I have not discussed the State of Israel much, but I ought to make it clear that I feel it is important. --That is mainly because of the Ramban  [Nachmanidess] in his commentary of the Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam [Maimonidess]. That is where the Ramban [Nachmanidess/Moshe ben Nahman] states his view that living in Israel is one of the commandments of the Torah. But further more I think the State of Israel is also important because of the opinion of Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that held that for Israel the same law applies that applies to any legitimate government, ''The law of the land is the law''[bava batra 35]--[ but of course not when it contradicts  the law of the Torah.]

 Even though it is best to learn Torah in a Litvak yeshiva where one can hear a Gemara lesson from an authentic Talmid Chacham [rosh yeshiva], if one is lacking that, I suggest getting the basic set of books that go into the depths of the Talmud. They are the Chidushei Harambam by Rav Chaim of Brisk,  the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and the several others that are well known. [However it occurs to me that not everyone is familiar with the whole set so I might mention the others--they are the two disciples of Reb Chaim the Birchat Shmuel and the Shaarei Yosher and Even Haazel by I think the father in law of Rav Shach. ]

[However I should admit that when I was in the Mir in NY,  my main efforts were in the earlier commentaries --Pnei Yehoshua, Maharsha, Aruch Laner]-but in terms of hearing classes in Gemara I mainly heard from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum