i  find it instructive that the only people that have opened their hearts and homes to the many several hundred thousands of Jews that had to escape from the areas in the south of Israel have been the kibbutzim. i was at first unaware of this until i saw an article about a nearby kibbutz givat chaviva that opened all its facilities to thousands of Jews that had to escape--and till cant go back to their homes. now i have become aware that the only places that have been helping the Jews that have had to escape have been the kibbutzim  

 The Russian revolution is for me a case where it is hard to take sides. given what Nicholas II saw what had happened to all the previous tsars when they tried to be soft [they were murdered], it is hard to imagine what else he could have done. On the other hand, the misery of the Russian people was already growing in intensity because of the cities and industry growing and with WWI it is hard to see any recourse to any kind of action than to throw out a czar that seemed insensitive to their trouble. It is also hard to see any party taking power except the Bolshevik who controlled the army with Trotsky at it head. It is all very confusing. Then to try to reason through it all seems to make it worse. Marx was the author of a brilliant hypothesis that like all scientific hypotheses needed to make predictions, and then can be tested based on those predictions. All of Marx's prediction turned out to be false. Maybe it all comes down to what Rasputin told the czar, ''If my death will be caused by you or any of your close relatives, then you and your family will not last one year after that.''

 

 I think I ought to make Kant clear. There is knowledge that is known by way of reason, for example things known by definition. And there are things known by the five senses. But can we know things like universals [things that particulars have in common]?-Yes. Things are in the realm of possibility of experience. We can know them by structures in the mind like computer chips. [E.G. the ideas of time space and causality. But outside of the conditions of possible experience we can not know.

There are some attempts to get past this blockage, and one approach is that of Jacob Fries--and that is to say there is knowledge that is known, but not by reason and not by the senses.

[This is different from reason first Kant [the first interpretation] and from sensibility first Kant [Robert Hanna, Sperber].] This Kant-Friesian approach says neither reason nor sense perception is first. See Kelley Ross's web site To get an idea about this Kant-Friesian approach I think the best idea is to learn the books of Leonard Nelson who is a lot more clear than Fries himself, even though I think most are still in  German.  

When Robert Hanna and Kelley Ross argue for the Kantian position they do not usually bring evidence from physics. [Dr Ross is mainly interested in expanding the position of Kant and Fries--to develop a much wider world view than you could see in either. Dr Hanna is mainly interested   in showing the flaws in those Analytic thinkers that attacked Kant. ] But one little piece of evidence has convinced me for years about the truth of Kant from Physics. The humble little unremarkable electron. As it reacts or is part of the equations that deal with its kinetic and potential energy, it is fine. But if you try to calculate its mass as independent of all interaction [including its own field], its mass comes out to be infinite. 

the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites

I To the Rambam [Maimonidess], the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites. To the Ramban/Nahmanidess the command is to live in Israel. However the Rambam agrees that one should live in Israel. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the Rambam. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer Israel and the move somewhere else? But where does one go to get clarity about the Rambam except to Reb Chaim of Brisk and that whole school of thought that started with him up until Rav Shach. And so far I have not seen anything that could bring me clarity about the Rambam.   

[And where is Israel? The boundaries are stated in Torah. And yet right then and there, the children of Gad and Reuben decided to live outside of those borders--and Moses agreed with them!! I imagine that this must be the reason for the Rambam. If it would be a command of the Torah to live in Israel, why did Moses not tell them to do so. Why did Moses agree that after they would help to conquer Israel, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay.--but you could  answer this that the borders of Israel  promised to Abraham extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. 

______________________________________________________________________________

 To the רמב''ם, the command of the תורה is to conquer the land of ישראל from the Canaanites. To the רמב''ן the command is to live in ישראל. However the רמב''ם agrees that one should live in ישראל. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the רמב''ם. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer ישראל and the move somewhere else? 

And where is ישראל? The boundaries are stated in תורה. And yet right then and there, the בני גד ובני ראובן decided to live outside of those borders, and משה agreed with them.  This must be the reason for the רמב''ם. If it would be a command of the תורה to live in ישראל, why did משה not  tell them to do so. Why did משה agree that after they would help to conquer ישראל, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay. But you could  answer this that the borders of ישראל  promised to אברהם extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. however the borders of ancient israel did not extend that far. 

לרמב''ם, מצוות התורה היא לכבוש את ארץ ישראל מידי הכנענים. לרמב''ן הציווי הוא לגור בישראל. אולם הרמב''ם מסכים שצריך לגור בישראל. אני מודה שמעולם לא הצלחתי להבין את גישתו של הרמב''ם. איך זה יכול להיות הגיוני לכבוש את ישראל ואז ללכת למקום אחר? ויש לתרץ את זאת. איפה ישראל? הגבולות מצוינים בתורה. ובכל זאת, באותו רגע, החליטו בני גד ובני ראובן לחיות מחוץ לגבולות אלה, ומשה הסכים איתם. זו חייבת להיות הסיבה לרמב''ם. אם זו תהיה פקודה של התורה לחיות בישראל, מדוע משה לא אמר להם לעשות זאת. למה משה הסכים שאחרי שהם יעזרו לכבוש את ארץ כנען, אז הם יוכלו לחיות בצד השני של נהר הירדן? כנראה שזה היה בסדר. אבל אתה יכול לענות על זה שגבולות ישראל שהובטחו לאברהם משתרעים מהנילוס ועד נהר הפרת

 In Torah it is important to have an idea about what is the main thing and what are  the side issues. Thus monotheism and good midot [to be a mensch] ought to be the foremost in everyone' mind. Monotheism is certainly the command to worship and serve God alone. But it also means to understand that God is completely ''other''.  HE is not  a close relative of people. He does not share any characteristics of people,  for all characteristics He created. He has nothing in common with any physical objects- no form nor substance. He is not composed of ingredients. He is not a composite.  

Jay shuts down Islam's Origins in ONE HOUR at "Calvary Chapel Chino Hills"!

 

 I have not discussed the State of Israel much, but I ought to make it clear that I feel it is important. --That is mainly because of the Ramban  [Nachmanidess] in his commentary of the Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam [Maimonidess]. That is where the Ramban [Nachmanidess/Moshe ben Nahman] states his view that living in Israel is one of the commandments of the Torah. But further more I think the State of Israel is also important because of the opinion of Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that held that for Israel the same law applies that applies to any legitimate government, ''The law of the land is the law''[bava batra 35]--[ but of course not when it contradicts  the law of the Torah.]

 Even though it is best to learn Torah in a Litvak yeshiva where one can hear a Gemara lesson from an authentic Talmid Chacham [rosh yeshiva], if one is lacking that, I suggest getting the basic set of books that go into the depths of the Talmud. They are the Chidushei Harambam by Rav Chaim of Brisk,  the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and the several others that are well known. [However it occurs to me that not everyone is familiar with the whole set so I might mention the others--they are the two disciples of Reb Chaim the Birchat Shmuel and the Shaarei Yosher and Even Haazel by I think the father in law of Rav Shach. ]

[However I should admit that when I was in the Mir in NY,  my main efforts were in the earlier commentaries --Pnei Yehoshua, Maharsha, Aruch Laner]-but in terms of hearing classes in Gemara I mainly heard from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum

So one should learn the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov, but only in conjunction with the regular Musar books of the Rishonim and in the context of a Litvak yeshiva.

 There are  great ideas of Rav Nahman of Breslov. However there is the importance of learning Torah that is lacking in that system. This was not because Rav Nahman himself did not know about it, but rather he was concentrating in his teachings on how to encourage and help people that were not yet able to learn in depth.  There is also in the teachings of Rav Nahman a lot of disparaging of science and philosophy and doctors. A lot of what he says is quite true seeing how much the social studies departments of universities have become saturated with pseudo science. Still, I think it is best not to throw out the baby with the bath water. Among the important ideas of Rav Nahman are hitbodadut--to speak with God as one speaks with a good friend. This is the real authentic meaning of prayer; not prayer from  prayer books, but prayer from the heart. BUT this great and important idea does work best only when one is grounded in a Litvak yeshiva where Torah is learned for its own sake. 

So one should learn the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov, but only in conjunction with the regular Musar books of the Rishonim and in the context of a Litvak yeshiva.

 I have been thinking that the after blessing after pizza and all kinds of cake if one has eaten more that the volume of three or four eggs is birchat hamazon which is for after bread. The reason is it is either פת הבאה בכיסנין [bread that comes in pockets] or just plain bread. And even if it is  פת הבאה בכיסנין, after an amount the equals three or four eggs, it is birchat hamazon anyway. Three or four eggs volume is the amount of a full meal.--as we see in the laws of tithes where the amount of a full meal makes the obligation of taking the tithe to come into force. [If three or four eggs is an argument between Rashi and the Rambam.]]

 I have not any success in convincing anyone at all about my approach to learning. however based on the off chance that anyone will listen I would like to suggest first of all learning Torah-in the narrow definition of the Rambam in his letter to Yemen. And I quote, ''Just like there is no adding or subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law.'' So you do not add prophets to the Old Testament. Even if Joe Shmoo down the street claims to be a prophet of God, and even if you believe it, still you do not add a new book to the Old Testament containing The Visions and Revelations of Joe Shmoo. So you do add nor subtract any books to the Oral Law--the tradition that was handed down by the sages of the Talmud and Mishna [i.e.,  the two Talmuds and the midrashim.][You can add explanations that make the intension clear but they are not The Oral Law" except in a second hand kind of way.]

There is an argument to support the Raavad in his argument against the Rambam in laws of marriage 12 law 9.     The argument is that the way the Rambam himself understands the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka  Bava Batra pg 130 is that it refers only to someone close to death. Also one can argue that the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife.

Here is the Rambam, if a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the Sages still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the Torah.  conditions about inheritance are not valid.

The Raavad writes there is no need for the Sages to make their law like the law of the Torah because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. 

Rav Shach tries to bring support to the Rambam from the law of R Yohanan ben Broka that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. he can say this son alone will inherit me. 

But the Rambam himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [laws of inheritance 6 law 2]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her since when she is married, only one person inherits her, and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the Rambam. After all, you do see with R Yohanan ben Broka that there can be a condition that applies to inheritance. So the sages wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the Torah, ]

___________________________________________________________________________________

There is an argument to support the proof for the ראב''ד his argument against the רמב''ם in הלכות אישות  פרק י''ב הלכה ט.     The argument is that the way the רמב''ם himself understands the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא  בבא בתרא דף ק''ל is that it refers only to someone close to death (שכיב מרע). Also one can argue that the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife. Here is the רמב''ם, If a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property, that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the חכמים still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the תורה.  Conditions about inheritance are not valid. The ראב''ד writes there is no need for the חכמים to make their law like the law of the תורה because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. רב שך tries to bring support to the רמב''ם from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. He can say, "This son alone will inherit me." But the רמב''ם himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her, since when she is married, only one person inherits her and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the רמב''ם. After all, you do see with ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that there can be a תנאי that applies to inheritance. So the חכמים wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the תורה, 

יש הוכחה לטענתו של הראב''ד נגד הרמב''ם בהלכות אישות פרק י''ב הלכה ט. הטענה היא שהדרך בה הרמב''ם עצמו מבין את דינו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא בבא בתרא דף ק''ל היא שהכוונה היא רק למישהו הקרוב למוות (שכיב מרע). כמו כן, ניתן לטעון שלדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא אין כל יישום במציאות עם הירושה שהבעל יורש מאשתו. הנה הרמב''ם, אם הבעל הסכים עם אשתו שלא יירש את רכושה, אין תוקף לתנאי זה. אף על פי שירושת בעל היא מדברי החכמים עדיין כאן עשו את הדין הזה שבעל יורש כחוק התורה. תנאים לגבי ירושה אינם תקפים. הראב''ד כותב שאין צורך שהחכמים יעשו את דינם כדין התורה כי ממילא אדם לא יכול להתנות לא להחזיק או לרשת משהו שעדיין לא בא לעולם. רב שך מנסה להביא תמיכה לרמב''ם מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שאפשר לבחור באחד מיורשיו לבדו לרשת אותו. הוא יכול לומר: "הבן הזה לבדו יירש אותי". אבל הרמב''ם עצמו כותב שדין זה חל רק על אדם הקרוב למוות [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. כמו כן, לא יכול להיות מקרה ממשי שבו אישה יכולה לומר שרק מישהו יירש אותה מבין כמה אנשים שיכולים לרשת אותה, שכן כשהיא נשואה, רק אדם אחד יורש אותה וזה בעלה.

איני אומר שאין הגנה לרמב''ם. הרי אתה כן רואה אצל ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שיכול להיות תנאי שיחול על ירושה. אז החכמים רצו לבטל את האפשרות הזאת על ידי שחיזקו את גזירתם כמו חוק התורה,

The approach of the Litvak Yeshiva World based on the Gra is this: to will sincerely believe in the Torah [the Tenach and the Two Talmuds and Midrash], to critically evaluate these teachings, and to attempt seriously to model their lives on its tenets. 

The approach of Rav Nahman of Breslov is: to adhere to the the Torah out of sincere conviction, but to disagree with important tenets; to attempt to recast the Torah in more personally palatable terms, and to work to redirect the Torah itself into more agreeable lines. The changes are real reforms, and sometimes redefinition into something more palatable.

This is honest and sincere but this still is not the same thing as straight unadulterated TORAH. And in spite of this the teachings of Rav Nahman are valuable and important --as long as one is aware that there can be slight or major deviations from straight Torah  

The problem I see in some Israeli cities is that there are no Litvak Yeshivot. Nor even kollels. Why specifically the Litvak brand? That is because [a a rule] that is where Torah is learned for its own sake, not for money,  nor for any agenda at all except to learn and keep Torah.

the problem with being too smart

 The Midrash says that the mother of Samuel the Prophet prayed that her son should not be too smart, nor dumb. You can see the problem with being too smart in a lot of intellectuals when their over extended minds mislead them. This is a point that Rav Nahman made in the Lekutai Moharan [The Le.M for short]. In particular you can see this in collage campuses where Harvard and Yale students and professors are cheering for Hamas. 

In philosophy however there was one philosopher who noticed the limits of reason and in fact that is the name of his book--The Critique of Pure Reason. The answer to the question "What is the limit of reason?" is the possibility of experience. i mean to say [from Kant] that outside of that realm of possible experience, reason collapses and starts to come up with self contradictions. --iI am not saying that is the end of the story. Rather there was the Friesian approach to Kant which to me makes the most sense. See the web site of Kelley Ross who shows some of the wider aspects of that approach in how it applies to faith. That aspect of the Kant Fries approach was first noticed by Otto.

There is a Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b.

There is a a law in the Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b. The Gemara brings a case where a cow was exchanged with an ass, and the cow was present, but the ass was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.   Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shumel, the owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Mari bar Yechezkeil said ''Pay no attention to what Yehuda said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The Rambam writes in laws of sales 20 law  14 in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an ass. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.  The owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the Rambam brings the statement of Mari who disagrees with Rav Yehuda and right away the statement of Rav Yehuda. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the Rambam is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the ass, still since the ass is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the ass, the previous owner must bring proof.  While Mari is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of Mari is when he says ''domain''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as Rav Yehuda with whom he is disagreeing. 

this is clearly very relevant to bava mezia page 100a but i do not recall that sugia. i recall writing about it in my little booklet on bava metzia chapters 8 and 9 but i have no recollection of what i wrote. while i am at it i might mention that this idea here i jut put into a different book on shas

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 I am confused about a רמב''ם that does not seem to be in accord with the גמרא in כתובות ע''ו ע''ב. The גמרא brings a case where there a cow was exchanged with an חמור, and the cow was present, but the חמור was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.   רב יהודה said in the name of שמואל, the owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. מרי בר יחזקאל said ''Pay no attention to what יהודה אחי said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The רמב''ם writes in בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד   in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an חמור. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.  The owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the רמב''ם brings the statement of מרי who disagrees with רב יהודה and right away the statement of רב יהודה. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the רמב''ם is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the חמור, still since the חמור is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the חמור, the previous owner must bring proof.  While מרי is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of מרי is when he says ''רשות''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as רב יהודה with whom he is disagreeing. 

 הרמב''ם לא נראה כמתאים לגמרא בכתובות ע''ו ע''ב. הגמרא מביאה מקרה שבו הוחלפה פרה עם חמור, והפרה הייתה נוכחת, אבל החמור עדיין היה ברפת של בעליה. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל, בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה חי בזמן ההחלפה. מרי בר יחזקאל אמר ''אל תשים לב למה שאמר יהודה אחי. אלא שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה.'' הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד של מי שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה. למשל פרה הוחלפה עם חמור. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה בחיים בזמן ההחלפה. כאן מביא הרמב''ם את דברי מרי החולק על רב יהודה ומיד את דברי רב יהודה. כדי להבהיר את שאלתי, הרשו לי להבהיר שהרמב"ם אומר אף על פי שבעל הפרה הוא עכשיו בעל החמור, עדיין כיון שהחמור נמצא ברפת של הבעלים [הקודמים] של החמור, הבעלים [הקודמים] חייבים להביא הוכחה. ואילו מרי אומר שבעל הפרה צריך להביא הוכחה. חוץ מזה, הכוונה של מרי היא כשהוא אומר ''רשות'' פירושו בעלות, לא בקרקע של. אחרת הוא היה אומר בדיוק אותו דבר כמו רב יהודה שהוא לא מסכים איתו

I was at the sea shore and on the way back it occurred to me that the law in the Rambam laws of gifts 8 law 6 (if one says if my wife gives birth to a  son he will take 100 zuz and if he gives birth to a daughter she will get 200 zuz.) might refer to a kinyan sudar [handkerchief]. But that is not how the Magid Mishna explains it there [and he says it refers to a person dying] because of the gemara in Gitin page 40 side b that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the Rambam brings that law in laws of gifts chapter 4. The Rashba however brings the Magid Mishna that there might be a difference between a kinyan sudar and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is derabanan [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the Torah explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a kinyan sudar is from the Torah as a valid exchange [halifin]. Thus it makes sense to say that the Rambam is referring to a kinyan sudar which is clearly more powerful than a document.

_________________________________________________________________________________

 The Rambam  writes הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: If one says, "If my wife gives birth to a  son, he will take מנה.  If she gives birth to a daughter, she will get מאתיים. This might refer to a קניין סודר [handkerchief]. But that is not how the מגיד משנה explains it there. [He says it refers to a person dying שכיב מרע]. The reason the מגיד משנה explains this differently is because of the גמרא in גיטין מ' ע''ב that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the רמב''ם brings that law in laws of giftsהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. The רשב''א however brings the מגיד משנה that there might be a difference between a קניין סודר and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is מן הרבנן [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the תורה explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a קניין סודר is from the תורה as a valid exchange [חליפין]. Thus it makes sense to say that the רמב''ם is referring to a קניין סודר which is clearly more powerful than a document.

הרמב"ם כותב הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: אם יאמר "אם אשתי תלד בן, ייקח מנה. אם היא תלד בת, היא תקבל מאתיים. זה יכול להתייחס לקניין סודר [מטפחת]. אבל לא כך מסביר זאת המגיד משנה שם. [הוא אומר שזה מתייחס לשכיב מרע]. הסיבה שהמגיד משנה מסביר זאת אחרת היא בגלל הגמרא בגיטין מ' ע''ב שאם יכתוב אדם במסמך ''אתן כזה וכזה'' שאינו תקף, ואין התחייבות שנגרמה על ידי אותו מסמך. והרמב''ם מביא את הדין הזה בהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. הרשב"א לעומת זאת מביא את המגיד משנה שאולי יש הבדל בין קניין סודר למסמך. עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם בעצמו כותב שתוקף המסמכים הוא מן הרבנן [מהחכמים, לא מהתורה אלא במקום שבו התורה אומרת במפורש שצריך מסמך כמו בגירושין.] ואילו קניין סודר הוא מהתורה כחילופין. לפיכך הגיוני לומר שהרמב''ם מתייחס לקניין סודר שהוא בבירור חזק יותר ממסמך

 In the ketubah there is a clause ''I will work.'' But in any document, if one writes ''I will do such and such a thing'' it is קניין דברים acquisition of words which has no validity.  So why is it in the ketubah-- because of the obligation that exists anyway. Even though the obligation to provide for a wife is an argument if it is from the Torah or the words of the scribes, still there is no doubt that there is such an obligation which amounts to about two kilograms of flour every week. 

there is a lot to go into about all this which i might get to someday. 

 When Christians talk about Bible Studies for Wednesday night [or some other time they get together during the week], they do not ever learn the Old Testament in depth, and most of the time not even the New Testament except for the letters of Paul.  But that just goes to show that Christianity is really based on Paul. But that requires a belief that Paul understood the approach of Jesus better that any of the actual people that heard and saw him, and wrote down his teachings directly from first hand knowledge.  But if they want to learn Paul as an authority on Jesus, well so be it. But then, why is it that the ''Bible Studies''never include the Old Testament.

[One place where you can see the problem of not learning the Old Testament is when Christians try to take a verse from the Old Testament to show something is morally wrong, but ignore other verses. When they take the words of the Old Testament to be authoritative, they are depending on Jesus. When they ignore the Law of Moses, they depend on Paul. But this weakens their position . You can not have it both ways. Either the Law of Moses means what it  says, or it does not. I ask them to make up their minds.]

I might add here that the way I see morality of the Old Testament is that it is based on a synthesis of faith and reason. This is as we see in the Talmud where there is a great deal of discussion about how to understand the verses of the Law of Moses based on reason. Very few times is any discussion based on the idea that someone's opinion is halacha le'Moshe miSinai [a law to Moses from Sinai]. [There are a few places where it is considered that a law is halacha to Moses from Sinai. More often it is just clear that some things are in fact ''from the Torah''; e.g., things like the 39 types of work on the sabbath, or the many laws about the temple or marriage]. Rather all discussions are based on the idea of how can we reconcile seemingly contrary verses or later teachings that themselves were based on verses.

I hope that Christians start to learn the Old Testament in depth, not superficially. In fact, I recall that there was once a long time ago a father who read to his family a few chapters of the Bible at the dinner table every night until the family had finished the Bible several times over.

The issue about the need for knowledge in the writing of  the get [divorce] or kidushin is unclear to me like I wrote a few days ago. The main point of confusion is the Ramban brought by the Ran that for a get one needs both for her sake and the husband should write it. That is how the Ramban gets out of the problem about why he could not say to a messenger [or two] to go and tell so and so to write a get and give it. The answer מילי לא מימסרי לשליח ''words are not given to a messenger'' clearly does not work as the Ramban himself noted. After all you can tell a messenger to take trumah or to write a document of ownership and give it to someone--and lots of things that require intension. But if you need the man to write the get, then that should be that. I noticed that Rav Shach deals with this issue, and I imagine many of the other Achronim also try, but to me the whole issue is unclear. [I might just give up. Or i might wait until i can gain clarity by learning further on.]

 I get the impression that most people do not have an idea about  learning Torah. They see it is only applicable to people that want to use it to make money.

And I think that the fact that people in kollel use Torah to make money adds to this misimpression.

 But it should be obvious that learning Torah is incumbent on every person, and that no one should use it to make money. 

But while I am on the subject, I would like to suggest and offer here my approach. That is- I think people should learn in depth in the morning right when they wake up and learn fast in the afternoon when it is harder to concentrate.  So the morning should be like in the great Litvak yeshivot-- with staying on one page of Gemara for a few weeks. That is either in depth with Reb Chaim of Brisk or Rav Shach or the other great sages of the Litvak world [i.e., Birchat Shmuel, Shaari Yosher of R. Shimon Shkopf etc.] The afternoon for getting through Shas with Tosphot and Maharsha. Also there should be a few sessions in Mathematics and Physics-- to get through fast the basic material. [I mean to get through it,-- and then review.]

 Kant's synthesis between empirical knowledge and rational knowledge has been a problem as soon as the ink was dry on the first Critique as was immediately noted by Schulze  and Maimon. The answer to their objections I have thought was best answered by Jacob Fries until I noticed what I think is the similar answer given by Reinhold. [I saw this answer in a paper by   Peter Sperber]. Schulze had objected to a sort of circularity in Kant  [that  sense perception works by way of cause and effect. The object outside of oneself causes the perception. But if causality is the only thing that makes perception possible, then it can't be part of perception.][The problem is that without causality, perception is pure delusion] and Salomon Maimon had objected to any possible contact between a priori concepts and empirical senses. The answer is there are concepts that are known immediately without have to go through  reasoning process--they are the categories of where, when, how, why, etc.

Kidushin page 9

 I have been puzzled about a Rambam that says if one writes a document of marriage and it is given to a messenger of the woman, then it must be written with the agreement of the messenger. The Magid Mishna brings there [Laws of Marriage chapter 3-law 18] that the Ramban disagrees with this and says it has to be written with the knowledge and agreement of the woman. This is just like the fact that  a husband  can not say, ''Tell so and so to write a divorce doc and give it to my wife.'' The Ramban is bringing this from a Gemara in Kidushin page 9 that says a doc of marriage has to be written with the knowledge of the woman. [ That is an argument there, but this is the agreed upon conclusion.] What is the puzzle about this to me is the general law, ''Words are not given over to a messenger.''  That means one can appoint a messenger to do things, but not to say things. And for a divorce doc  to be for a particular woman requires the husband to say so. But this in itself is the source of my confusion. Why is it that a scribe could not write a doc of divorce for a particular man and wife?  If we say a scribe  is ok to write the doc, then why should he have to hear it from the husband. If we say the verse says that the husband himself has to write it, then why should a scribe be ok-- even if the husband tells him to write it?

 The sages of the Gemara [Talmud] said that Gog and Magog [Armageddon] would come three times against Israel and that at the third time they will reach Yerushalaim [Jerusalem]. That is based on Yechezkel [Ezekiel] chapters 38 and 39. Then in the next chapters, Yechezkel [Ezekiel] goes into the dimension and building  of the third temple. Now it is clear that Russia, China and Iran are aligned against Israel. So even if Israel would be able to finish off Hamas, that would do nothing to take care of the larger threats. [That is, even if Israel would have any specific targets inside of Gaza. But there is no such thing. The entire population is determined to destroy Israel. There is no specific target.] So what ought to do is to learn Gemara, Rashi and Tosphot every day as the sages said: ''What should one do to be saved from Armageddon--learn Torah.'' [But to learn Torah as a mitzvah means not to take money for doing so. To get paid for learning negates the value.] [And I might add here my basic approach to learning Torah. It is divided into in depth learning in the morning and includes the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Mathematics, and Physics. The afternoon or evening is for fast learning, I.E., to get through the Talmud with Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, and then the Yerushalmi, plus getting through the basic math and physics, Algebraic Topology, Quantum Field Theory, String Theory. There should also be a few hours for exercise.][string theory is important as the only viable explanation of gravity. To see what i mean, take a look at Feynman's papers on quantum gravity showing that it is not renormalizable.]

[people are too discouraged from the hard subjects because of lack of faith in God. they ought to believe that by saying the words and going on, that they will eventually understand. this is like the same wat trust in god works in other areas where one does a minimum amount of effort and trust God to do the rest.]

 There is a sort of Achilles heel in Breslov in that in spite of the tremendous advice of Rav Nahman, there is a kind of tendency for it to take people away from straight Torah. The advice really works best in a context of a place that is devoted to learning Gemara.--i.e. a regular Litvak yeshiva.  This is hinted at in a letter Rav Nahman wrote to his group in Breslov מאסתי בישיבת ברסלב ''I have become disgusted with Yeshivat Breslov'', -Even though the intension of the letter was to say that he was upset with the town and would no longer dwell there, still there is a hint in that letter.

In the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] Rav Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [There is such a thing a being too smart.]]

Rav Nachman of Breslov said the trait of wisdom spread out [like all the other ten sephirot] until God established a limit for it. You can see this idea in other places in the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] where R' Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [''The main thing is to be simple and straight, for too much smarts tricks a person..]] You can see this same idea in Kant where he wants to expand the role of reason into synthetic a priori [ i.e., what other philosophers call ''universals;;]--but he does place a limit on this role of reason. The limit is that it is applicable only in the realm of possible experience.  [The way to see this is to think of a computer. A bathtub full of computer chips is not a computer. To have knowledge of the real world, one's own computer chips--his way of sensing time space color etc. have to be ordered and structured.[Space and time are the forms of intuition aka sense perception. They are not concepts of reason.] But we do not have sense perception outside of our 3-d world.]

 My basic idea of what to do in these horrific times is to learn Torah. But I should add that I have a very limited idea of what ''Torah'' is--that is only the actual Oral and Written Law. This is like the Rambam wrote, ''Just like one can  not add nor subtract from the Written Law, so one cannot add nor subtract from the Oral Law.''-which is only the actual set of books written down by the Tenaim and Amoraim [Sages of the Talmud and Mishna]. After them, there is no authentic tradition. [The idea here is that just like if one would come along today and claim to prophecy, no one would or should believe him or her because we already have the prophets, and that age is finished. So it is with the Oral Law, that age is finished. So no one could come along after the finishing of the Talmud and claim they found a lost book of the Oral Law, nor make up his own ideas in Torah and call them the Oral Law.]

[Since learning Torah is equal to all the other mitzvot [and out weighs them as shown in Nefesh Hachaim vol 4], thus one ought to take as an obligation on oneself to get through the entire oral and written law, Tenach, the two Talmuds [with Rashi, Tophot and corresponding commentaries], and all the midrashim. Also to have an in depth session in the AVI EZRI of Rav Shach, Mathematics and Physics.] 

the third temple.

 The Third Temple is not well  understood by many people including myself. But today i saw a book by a fellow Izhak Cohen [in a yishuv called Elad] who brings the Rashi and Ramchal on the verses in Ezekiel and does a great job in laying it all out in detail. However to actually build it would require a red cow without which there is no way of getting out of tumat met [uncleanliness that come from touching a dead body.] [But I imagine nowadays that should be fairly easy by genetic modification]

[ii admit to having read Ezekiel and also seeing the Ramchal without having the slighted understanding until this morning when I looked at that book.]

One of the major reasons the third temple is not understood in the Mishna and Gemara talk only about the second temple. The parts of the gemara that are relevant to the third temple are only the parts about sacrifices

for some odd reason the chapters in ezekiel which explain all about the third temple are almost never studied by anyone.

Of course Muslim would nor be pleased with us jews for making a third temple, but we are in any case not winning any popularity contests in the muslim world. our mere exitance is a thorn in their side. Christians also would not be in favor of this because the last chapters of revelations seem to indicate a third temple that would not be for sacrifices. all the more so Paul is down on keeping the commandments of the torah which include building a temple. however paul anyway go into the new testament for reasons that do not seem valid since he had no first hand information about anything that jesus ever said or did.

advice to school

 Get rid of the social studies pseudo science departments. I do not agree with anything of what the teach. I agree however with art and hard sciences. Also the Old Testament. I would agree with philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and Kant.

 There is one way of learning in depth that I have not mentioned. This is to hold your place where you already are in the book and work around that point. That is to review that page. then go back  one page and then go forward a few more pages.  Then go back a few more pages. But I do not mean this in place of a regular in depth session with review back to the very beginning, nor in place of the sort of very fast learning [called ''girsa'']. 

 no one is asking my opinion, but it seems clear to me that Gaza ought to be flattened. i mean, they have had plenty of chances to become peaceful. they were always saying that if they could have their own area then that is all that would be needed for peace..since they got it all the have done is to try to make war against Israel.  fool me once-shame on you. fool me twice shame on me

 Even though the Litvak world is about as close to the Gra as anyone could get, I still find a few things,  amiss. What about the herem of the Gra that is completely ignored? And I find this to be the root of many other things that are amiss. [Nor do I claim to be innocent in this regard. For I do learn the books  of Rav Nahman of Breslov. bBut I do have a reason for that. That is that after looking at a book that contained the original herems including that of the Gra, I noted that Rav Nahman would not be in that category. ]

 I think it is agreed that the Hegelian attempt to replace Aristotelian logic with his own was not successful. Even though there are fuzzy logics,  they have nothing in common with Hegel. The many attempts to discard Kant and the distinction between a priori and empirical truths have also not proven to be valid as Robert Hanna has pointed out. [Michael Huemer however goes along with Prichard and what are called the intuitionists, that school comes from G.E. Moore and to some degree is the beginning of the Analytic School which Robert Hanna has rightfully put into its place. However, I still can not decide the winner. To me it seems like a draw between the Friesian school based on Kant [i.e. Kelley Ross] and Huemer. 

to get through the two Talmuds

Simchat Torah is the best time to make a commitment to get through the two Talmuds with all the commentaries-every day to do a few pages with Rashi, Tosphot and Maharsha.  Beside that to do a few in depth sessions with the Reb Chaim of Brisk [Chidushai Harabam] and Rav Shach's Avi Ezri.

the Talmud asks since only the light of Torah can bring a person to the revival of the dead, [as is mentioned in the verse -טל תורה מחייה אותו that the dew of Torah will ring a person to be revived at the time of the revival of the dead] then how can women merit to a portion in the next world [since women are not obligated in the commandment to learn Torah -    so they get no reward by doing so]. The Gemara answers by bringing up their children to learn Torah and waiting for their husband to return from the study hall.

 I was looking at the Gate of Intentions by Rav Chaim Vital about Sukot, and it mentions there the importance of repentance on the night of Hoshana Raba. [The 7th day of Sukot after midnight] That is when the memo is given to the angels that was sealed on Yom Kipur. There it says there is still hope to repent before the angel of judgment gets the memo. But how to repent or on what to repent is the question. The most obvious answer is to learn Musar [books of ethics].  This is because every person is on their own path and can't know what they are doing wrong except by seeing what others do wrong. כל הפוסל במומו פוסל, all who cancel cancel with their own defect. SO only by seeing what is wrong with others, can one see what is wrong with himself.

 There is a fine line between exploitation and a  legitimate structuring of society. A hierarchy of a group is a natural phenomenon in all mammals and ants and lobsters.   To see all hierarchy as exploitation is a mistake. But there can be exploitation also--and often it is not easy to see the difference. You need a balance as the ancient Romans had figured out when there was a peasant rebellion, and instead of making war against them, someone had the brilliant idea of creating institutions that would insure the lives and liberties of the people while leaving the patricians in power to insure law and order. Thus was created the office of the tribune.

    Everyone has a place and just because one is low in the hierarchy  that does nor mean he or she is exploited. But there is a line that can be crossed. The advantage of  some systems is they give one the chance to excel based on ability and competence--not birth.

 I am not doing much in depth learning nowadays, but just occurred to me at the beach to ask an obvious question. With a gift we say that if the external circumstances show it was given with a mistaken assumption, then the gift is invalid--even though it was signed and sealed in a legitimate court of law according to halacha. To Tosphot [Ketuboth 37] this applies also to sales. But a forced sale is valid. You might answer that in a forced sale, there is no mistake about the circumstances. But even in the first case, it seems that the mistake in circumstance also ''forced'' the sale.

What I mean here you can see in a few examples. Let's say a person has heard that his son died in a faraway country, and then signs away all his property. Then we discover that his son is alive. We say that gift is invalid. 

But if someone ties up a person, and forces him to sign a document of a sale, that sale is valid- since we say because of the circumstances, he really did intend for the sale to be complete and valid. 

     Even though a lot of the woke and gender insanity depends on the Frankfurt School, that does not mean that Kant and Hegel had nothing to say of importance. Rather it is indicative of where philosophy  went wrong after them. And there were a lot of false leads and trails that veered off into lunacy. But it is hard to get to some sort of '''' birur'' [separating the wheat from the chaff].   High I.Q. does not seem to help much, since the philosophy professors in the USA universities are very smart.  [The highest I.Q.s in universities are the physics and math students and teachers, while the lowest are the teachers in the psychology departments.] 

 My son Izhak held with the importance of Rav Nahman of Breslov but in the way that many do so in the Litvak yeshiva world--that is to accept many of his major principles but not to take it all--especially when it seems not to apply to some present situation.  And I would have to agree with this. After all you do not see real Torah learning except in the Litvak Yeshiva World. and there are clearly no real Torah scholars outside of the Litvak world. 

 You can see in some of the books on ethics from the middle ages the synthesis of faith with reason. But this was not universal. The dividing line seems to be the Geonim from Saadia Gaon down through the Obligations of the Hearts until the Rambam. On the other side [against secular studies] are Rav Hai Gaon Tosphot and the Ramban. 

 But even the side that held with the importance of learning physics and metaphysics there are some differences. Ibn Gavirol went with Plato.In fact his book on platonic philosophy was widely used as an introduction to Plato. And even the system of Ibn Pakuda [author of Obligations of the Hearts] was neo platonic. But Rambam clearly thought Aristotle was superior. [I don't mean that Plato and Aristotle are the end. Rather philosophy did make progress in Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson.]

[There is a way for everyone to become an expert in Physics and Mathematics; that is mentioned in the gemara tractate Shabat pg 63--to say the words and go on. This is called ''bekiut'' in Litvak yeshivot, but it is not meant tor replace in depth learning, but as a supplement. Even so when Rav Nahman learned in this fast way, it was I think a major part of his learning. See Conversations of Rav Nachman 76 where it is brought that he said in the few minutes in the morning before the morning prayer, began he would go through four pages of the Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries, i.e., Shach, Taz, Pri Chadash, Beer Hagola etc.

This relates to Bava Batra page 37 where the subject is selling three trees and Arachim page 14

Introduction-Rav Huna said one who sanctifies a field with it's trees redeems each one separately, and  the Gemara says that is going like the opinion that a person that sanctifies does so with a kind eye.  Rav Papa said a statement that the Gemara says means if one sanctifies trees which include the ground, then the redemption is on both together, and as far as one can tell that could be like the opinion that one who sanctifies does o with a selfish eye. The Rambam does bring the part of that statement that one who sanctifies a field brings the trees along with it, but leaves out the part that the redemption is together. 

[i might mention that to sanctify a field means to offer it to the Temple. Then the owner might redeem it by giving its worth to the temple plus a fourth or someone else might redeem it by giving its value to the temple.] 

According to Rav Shach in his explanation of the Rambam laws of Arachim chap 4 halacha 15 if one sanctifies three trees  [and thus along with them comes the ground that is between them and around them by the amount one would plow] when he redeems the field, the trees are redeemed along with the field.  But if instead he would sanctify the field with the trees, then when he redeems the field, the trees come along with it. But this approach of Rav Shach is based on a few missing words in the Rambam where he says, ''If one sanctifies three trees, the field comes along with them'', but he leaves out that each is redeemed separately. Only when the Rambam writes that ''If one sanctifies more or less than three trees in such a field, that the field and trees are redeemed separately.'' However in no place does the Rambam ever mention the idea or case in which one redeem the field and the trees come along with it. One could argue that since Rav Huna [in Arachim 14 side a] holds that one that sanctifies sanctifies with a good kind eye, then in all cases when one redeems a field with trees, they are always redeemed separately,  

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------According to רב שך in his explanation of the רמב''ם laws of ערכים פרק ד' הלכה ט''ו  if one sanctifies three trees  [and thus along with them comes the ground that is between them and around them by the amount one would plow] when he redeems the field, the trees are redeemed along with the field.  But if instead he would sanctify the field with the trees [and thus the trees come along with the field], then when he redeems the field, the trees come along with it. But this approach of רב שך is based on a few missing words in the רמב''ם where he says, ''If one sanctifies three trees, the field comes along with them'', but he leaves out how each is redeemed. Only when the רמב''ם writes that ''If one sanctifies more or less than three trees in such a field, that the field and trees are redeemed separately.'' However in no place does the רמב''ם ever mention the idea or case in which one redeems the field and the trees come along with it. One could argue that since רב הונא [in ערכים י''ד ע''א] holds that one that sanctifies, sanctifies with a good kind eye, then in all cases when one redeems a field with trees, they are always redeemed separately,  

INTRODUCTION        רב הונא  said one who sanctifies a field with trees  must redeems each one separately.  The גמרא says that is going like the opinion that a person that sanctifies does so with a kind eye.  רב פפא said a statement that the גמרא says means if one sanctifies trees (which includes the ground), then the redemption is on both together. and that could be like the opinion that one who sanctifies does so with a selfish eye. The רמב''ם does bring the part of that statement that one who sanctifies a field, sanctifies the trees along with it, but leaves out the part that the redemption is on the field and the trees come along with it.. 

הקדמה. רב הונא אמר המקדש שדה עם עצים חייב לפדות כל אחד בנפרד. הגמרא אומרת שזה הולך כמו הדעה שמקדש עושה זאת בעין טובה. אמר רב פפא אמירה שהגמרא אומר משמע אם מקדשין עצים (שכולל את הקרקע), הרי הפדיון הוא על שניהם יחד. וזה יכול להיות כמו הדעה שמי שמקדש עושה זאת בעין רעה. הרמב''ם אמנם מביא את החלק של אותה אמירה שמי שמקדש שדה, מקדש עמו את העצים, אבל משאיר את החלק שהפדיון על השדה והעצים באים איתו

לפי רב שך בביאורו להלכות הרמב''ם של ערכים פרק ד' הלכה ט''ו אם מקדשים שלשה עצים [וכך יחד איתם באה הקרקע שנמצאת ביניהם וסביבם בכמות שהיה צריך מחרישה] כשהוא פודה את השדה, נגאלים העצים יחד עם השדה. אבל אם במקום זה היה מקדש את השדה עם העצים [וכך באים העצים יחד עם השדה], אז כשהוא פודה את השדה, באים איתו העצים. אבל גישה זו של רב שך מבוססת על כמה מילים חסרות ברמב''ם ששם הוא אומר ''אם מקדש שלשה עצים בא עמם השדה'', אבל הוא משאיר איך כל אחד נגאל. רק כשהרמב''ם כותב ש''אם מקדשים יותר או פחות משלושה עצים בשדה כזה, שהשדה והעצים נגאלים לחוד'' אולם בשום מקום הרמב''ם לא מזכיר את הרעיון או מקרה שבו פודה את השדה והעצים באים אתו. אפשר לטעון שמכיוון שרב הונא [בערכים י''ד ע''א] סובר שמקדש, מקדש בעין טובה, אז בכל המקרים כשפודים שדה עם עצים, תמיד נגאלים בנפרד.

----

 I would like to suggest the best way to learn Talmud is to go through half page per day with  Tosphot and Maharsha. [I mean this as the going fast session, not the in depth session.] If people are just starting out learning, the best way to do this half page is with the English Soncino edition [if possible to find it]. But after the first year, the best way is with one finger on the Gemara and the other on Rashi.

As for in depth learning, the best is the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which goes in the depth of the subject matter. 

Rosh Hashana seems to be a bit ambiguous.

 Rosh Hashana seems to be a bit ambiguous. On one hand, there is the Tosphot in Sanhedrin 10b where the first opinion is the conjunction  [molad] is the day of Rosh Hashanah. But then, most of that Tosphot points out the gemara in tractate Rosh Hashana where you find the time the Sanhedrin would set it was when the new moon was visible which is almost always  a day later. And what makes this confusing is the fact that in Sanhedrin 10b you find that the time of Rosh Chodesh [new moon] depends on heaven. It says, ''If the earthly court sanctifies the new moon on time, then fine. But if not, the the heavenly court sanctifies it anyway''. 

The calendar was adopted from the ancient Greeks. It is the Meton calendar and has little validity except in so far as when Jews were dispersed, no one had a set court that would tell them when the new moon was. At least during the time of the gemara, there was some stability. But at some point there was a revolution in Iraq and the yeshivot were closed for a hundred years. So at some point, Saadia Geon decided to accept the Meton calendar which more or less corresponded to when the Sanhedrin would have decreed Rosh Hashanah. 

[The idea that Hillel the second set the calendar is a fiction. If that had been so, the gemara would have mentioned it.

My opinion is that it is best to go by the molad since there is no Sanhedrin nor any valid semicha. [I mean to say that at least if the was valid ordination, then any court of three judges with valid ordination could sanctify the new moon. But valid ordination disappeared in the beginning of the Talmudic period. [Some of the first Amoraim had ordination like R. Yochanan. But after that, it was lost. Ordination since then has been a fiction. ] [However, the ability to decide halacha was not lost. That ability continued until Ravina and Rav Ashi-as the Gemara says ''רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה.'' [''Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the ability to render a halachic judgment'']. Later, when the Geonim and Rishonim decide a halacha, they are trying to decide what the gemara holds.

Also I have to add here that I think the gemaras in Sanhedrin and in Rosh Hashana are in conflict. While in most cases Tosphot is right to reconcile gemaras that seem to be at odds, but this is one case that I do not think it possible. 

 The רמב''ם writes הלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' that ''If a wife  says, 'My hands are holy to He who made them,' or took a נדר that her husband should not derive any benefit from the work of her hands, her husband is not forbidden in the work of her hands because that work is under obligation to him. ...but he must revoke her נדר because he might divorce her and then be forbidden  to remarry her.'' The ר''ן asks כתובות נ''ט that that should be only in the case she said ''Her hands will be holy to He who made them'' but not when she forbids the work of her hands because that work has not yet come into existence and so the נדר does not apply to them  at all. And the כסף משנה says that the רמב''ם  is going like רב אשי that holiness of body does apply even to things not yet in existence. רב שך uses that same answer for aש similar question. But this answer is contradicted by רמב''ם  הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט''ו והלכה ט''ז . There he writes ''If a man says ''what my animal gives birth to will be holy for the בית המקדש or will be forbidden to me or I will give it to charity,'' even though it does not become holy , still he has to fulfill what he said'' and when he said ''will be forbidden to me'' that is a נדר which is in the category of holiness of body. 

The place where רב שך uses that answer of the כסף משנה is in in רמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט'  .  But that answer is going on רמב''ם הלכות מעשר שני ט' הלכה ז. ''MODEST  PEOPLE would leave money in the year of שמיטה and say 'anything taken from the fruits of the fourth year that holiness is חל on this money'. The question there is the fruits are not in the possession of the owner, but of him who picked them.  

see below where this question is answered by saying the cases where the vow is valid even on something not yet in existence is where he said ''like a sacrifice''. the fact of the matter is that sometimes the rambam leaves out a few details. i noticed in laws of ''zarat'' on houses where you can see yourself that he leaves out important details about the green green or red red. you can ask why he left things out but never the less that is a fact.  here in this place leaving out a detail that can be filled elsewhere does not seem like a important thing. but over there in zarat, i did not see any place else that could have filled in the details.

הרמב''ם כותב הלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' ''אם אומרת אשה 'קדושות ידי למי שעשה אותן' או נדרה שבעלה לא יפיק תועלת ממלאכת ידיה, בעלה אינו אסור במלאכת ידיה כי עבודה זו חייבת לו. ...אבל הוא חייב לבטל את נדריה כי עלול להתגרש ממנה ואז להיאסר להתחתן איתה שנית .הר''ן שאל שזה רק כשאמרה שידיה תהינה קדושות למי שעשה אותן'' אבל לא כשהיא אוסרת את עבודת ידיה כי העבודה ההיא עדיין לא באה לעולם. ולכן הנדר אינו חל עליהם כלל. והכסף משנה אומר שהרמב''ם הולך כמו רב אשי שקדושת הגוף כן חלה גם על דברים שעדיין לא קיימים. רב שך משתמש באותה תשובה לשאלה דומה. אבל תשובה זו בסתירה לרמב''ם הלכות נדרים כ''ב הלכה ט''ו והלכה ט''ז . שם הוא כותב ''אם יאמר אדם 'מה שהבהמה שלי יולדת יהיה קדוש לבית המקדש או יאסור לי או אתן לצדקה' אף על פי שלא נעשה קדוש, בכל זאת יש לו. לקיים מה שאמר'' וכשאמר ''יאסור לי'' זה נדר שהוא בגדר קדושת הגוף.

המקום שבו רב שך משתמש בתשובה זו של הכסף משנה נמצא ברמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט'. אבל התשובה הזאת שייכת לרמב''ם הלכות מעשר שני ט' הלכה ז'. ''אנשים צנועים היו משאירים כסף בשנת שמיטה ואומרים 'כל הנלקח מפירות השנה הרביעית שהקדושה חל על הכסף הזה'. השאלה שם היא שהפירות אינם ברשות הבעלים, אלא של מי שקטף אותם

 נדר בא מהחוק על קורבנות. מי שאומר 'הלחם הזה כמו קרבן לי' אסור לאכול אותו

כדי לענות על שאלה זו על הרמב"ם ועל תשובת הרב ש"ך צריך לעיין ברמב"ם הלכות מעילה ד' הלכה ט' שם הרמב"ם מחזיק חייב בהקרבת קרבן מעילה רק כשאמר, ''חפץ זה יאסור לי כמו קרבן''. אבל אם לא אמר "כמו קרבן", אינו חייב. לפיכך במקרים שלמעלה שבהם הרמב"ם אומר שהנדר או הכסף יכולים להיות '''חל'' אפילו על משהו שעדיין לא קיים שזה חייב להיות במקום שבו אמר ''כמו קרבן''.

 i am not  saying that you can see this idea in the gemara in that being liable a sacrifice for the vow would make it strong enough to settle on something not yet in existence  but it seems to be a possible answer

 The Rambam writes [Laws of Vows 12 law 10] that ''If a wife  says 'my hands are holy to he who made them' or took a vow that her husband should not derive any benefit from the work of her hands her husband is not forbidden in the work of her hands because that work is under obligation to him. ...but he must revoke her vow because he might divorce her and then be forbidden  to remarry her.'' The Ran asks [Ketuboth 59] that that should be only in the case she said ''her hands will be holy to he who made them'' but not when she forbids the work of her hands because that work has not yet come into existence and so the vow does not apply to them  at all. And the Kesef Mishna says that the Rambam is going like Rav Ashi that holiness of body does apply even to things not yet in existence. Rav Shach uses that same answer for a similar question. But this answer is contradicted by Rambam Laws of Buying 22 laws 15 and 16. There he writes ''If a man says ''what my animal gives birth to will be holy for the temple or will be forbidden to me or I will give it to charity,'' even though it does not become holy , still he has to fulfill what he said'' and when he said ''will be forbidden to me'' that is a vow which is in the category of holiness of body. 

The place where Rav Shach uses that answer of the Kesef Mishna is in in Rambam Laws of Sale 22 law 9.  But that answer is going on Rambam Laws of the Second Tithe 9 law 7. ''Modest people  would leave money in the year of shemita and say 'anything taken from the fruits of the fourth year that holiness is settled on this money'. The question there is the fruits are not in the possession of the owner, but of him who picked them.  

 I might mention that a vow comes from the law about sacrifices. One who says 'this bread is like a sacrifice to me' is forbidden to eat it.

To answer this question on the Rambam and the answer of Rav Shach one needs to look at Rambam Laws of Meila 4 halacha 9 where the Rambam holds one is obligated for a sacrifice of meila only when he said this object will be forbidden to me like a sacrifice. But if he did not say ''like a sacrifice'', he is not obligated. Thus in cases up above where the Rambam says the vow or money can be '''chal' even on something not yet in existence that must be where he or she said ''like a sacrifice.''

doing Gemara [learning talmud]

     The way I recommend doing Gemara is to do every day a 1/2 daf [i.e., one whole side of a page] with Rashi, Tosfot, Maharsha and Maharam of Lublin. The way to do the daf itself would be with two fingers--one on the words of the Gemara and the other finger on the Rashi--and thus go through that entire half page with the Gemara and Rashi together and then the Tosphot. If possible to add the Pnei Yehoshua and Aruch Laner.

The main characteristic of Rome is the balance between the patricians and the plebeians, SPQR

 The way that I understand the modern world is a a repeat of the conflict between Athens, Sparta, and Rome. To me the USA always looked like Athens--democracy, individual rights. The USSR always seemed to be some kind of modern version of Sparta--community is everything and warlike. And the analogy can be stretched far. Just like Athens used to push it's weight around to build up an Athenian empire, so does the USA. That was until Sparta knocked it down [with the help of most of Greece, not alone.]. But it did not take long until Sparta itself fell, and both became part of the Roman Empire. [That was not immediate. Sparta was first conquered by Macedon which later was conquered by Rome.] What was unique about Rome? The main characteristic of Rome is the balance between the patricians and the plebeians, SPQR. The senate and the people of Rome.

[Even though the landowning class of the patricians were the only people that could be part of the senate, still they needed to be voted in by vote of the people. No one could hold any public office without being voted in by majority of the people.]

 My son Izhak held with learning in depth but also fast learning,--- that is fast learning in the sense of Rav Nahman of Breslov --to just say the words and go on. Even though I only heard Izhak state the importance of in depth learning--i.e with lots of review and deep understanding, he also held with the general principles of Rav Nahman which certainly includes fast learning. And I do nor mean this to apply to learning gemara only but also to mathematics and physics. [we know that these are also important a stated openly in the Rambam--in the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah] and in his other writings.]  but some will complain that not everyone has the math gene--but so what? We do not say that everyone is talented in understanding the Gemara, and yet everyone is obligated to learn and finish the Oral and Written Torah at least once. Learning Torah is a commandment that applies to everyone as the Rambam  puts it, '' young or old, even until the day of death..'' This mitzvah has nothing to do with how smart one is. So also for math and physics and all the seven wisdoms that the Gra and Rambam and other Rishonim hold are obligatory.

 The ancient Greeks understood that there is a deep connection between truth and beauty.  From that insight one can see that trying towards truth is like a Mozartian symphony where every member of the orchestra plays his or her part. But each one needs to play his part alone --and know his place. The violinist ought not to play the part of the cello or piano. That would be as if in an army, the  person standing watch would desert his post and try to fulfill the part of a general. Even if he might be a good general in other circumstances, but still he has deserted his post [and by that cause the city to fall.]. Even on a religious scale we can see how there should be an awareness of this point. Torah has a good point --monotheism. Christians have a good point about kindness. The Torah is also right about law. Where things go wrong is when the violinist goes over to the French horn section and decides that he can play the French horn better that  those in the wind section. Or things can go wrong when one is not following the score. Or people on the outside imply try to interrupt or play music of the dark side [as most music is nowadays.] 

And in the search for truth enlightenment philosophers also played an important role. While on one hand the middle ages were aware of the need for both reason and faith, still the development of both was needed.  Even though Plato Aristotle and Plotinus had gone far in the realm of reason, still a lot was missed and there needed to be Kant to begin to resolve the mind body problem,

There is a prohibition in the Torah not to add or subtract from the commandments of the Torah. There is a four way argument among the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities ] about what this means.  To the Raavad, it refers only to positive commands. The reason is the courts have permission to add restrictions as a fence around Torah.  However as important this subject is, I wanted to add here the fact that Rav Nahman of Breslov mentions a related issue in the Le.M. II chapter 44 and II chapter 86 and in the Conversations of Rav Nahman 235. There it says that one should not seek extra restrictions.   

Most of what the religious world does is adding extra restrictions. And ''כל המוסיף גורע''. ''Anyone that adds [make believe] restrictions ends up subtracting [transgressing real restrictions].'' [That is a common saying in Israel]. in fact even adding restrictions as a ''fence'' is also problematic as is brought in Avot d'Rav Natan on the first Mishna in Pirkei Avot there it says adding a fence around Torah is exactly what Adam, the first man, did. [And that caused the fall of all mankind.]It say there that was wrong, ''Better ten inches that stands, than 100 yards that falls.''

But for many decrees that are from the scribes, the reason for the decree no longer exists, and thus to the Raavad  they are nullified.  [ But to the Rambam, the decree still stands. that comes from beitza pg 5.  but in the gemara in gitin we see that once the reason for a decree i gone, the decree no longer stands.

The Ramban and Raavad, the Rambam and Tosphot are the main sources to look at. but after all is said and done the point that is most important is Rav Nahman's not to keep on adding restrictions all the time like the insane religious world does. 

I would like to suggest that everything about the prohibition of thou shalt not add revolves around the mishna these are the commandment that have no limit. that is there are commandments that once one has done them they are done and one is not allowed to add. there are other commandments like learning Torah that have no upper limit and so the more one does them the better. But for some reason that is not what תוספות says. They  say one can do again even a mitzvah that one has fulfilled. I do not know why תוספות does not make this simple distinction. Especially after the גמרא itself seems to imply this when they ask in סוכה דף כ''ח why is it that if one sleeps in a סוכה on the eighth day of שמיני עצרת he does not get lashes?

 

 אני רוצה להציע שהכל על איסור "אל תוסיף" סובב סביב המשנה שאלו המצוות שאין להן גבול. יש מצוות שברגע שעשה אותן הן נעשו ואסור להוסיף. יש עוד מצוות כמו לימוד תורה שאין להן גבול עליון ולכן ככל שעושים אותן יותר טוב

 i mean  תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב says one can do a commandment more than once, but i think this must refer to commandments that have no upper bound. 

כלומר תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב אומר שאפשר לעשות מצוות יותר מפעם אחת, אבל אני חושב שזה חייב להתייחס למצוות שאין להן גבול עליון

אבל משום מה זה לא מה שהתוספות אומרים. הם אומרים שאפשר לעשות שוב אפילו מצווה שקיימה. אני לא יודע למה תוספות לא עושות את ההבחנה הפשוטה הזו. בפרט לאחר שהגמרא עצמו נראה רומז לכך כששואלים בסוכה דף כ''ח למה זה שאם ישן בסוכה ביום של שמיני אצרת אינו מקבל מלקות?