Metaphysics

 One finds in some rishonim the importance of Metaphysics. Mainly that would be Ibn Pakuda [author of the Obligations of the Hearts], Binyamin the doctor [author of Maalot HaMidot], Rambam and others. [They do not see this as bitul Torah [waste of time that should be used for learning Torah].] So while clearly they are referring to the discipline, still I would say the main reference is the Book Metaphysics by Aristotle.

So what does that mean for today? My impression is that this discipline has developed in three different directions. Kant (along the lines of Leonard Nelson); Hegel; G.E. Moore. That is I would not venture to say which of these is right because each school seems to have very great and important points. But not the whole picture. 

[The Kant Friesian school tends towards reason in areas of physical reality. It is in spiritual reality it tends towards a sort of fifth sense [non intuitive immediate perception. While Hegel agrees totally with these realms of spiritual reality, he holds that reason can penetrate even there.  The G.E. Moore School simply holds that that way that Hume limited the range of reason is just not so. So he is like Hegel.]

[So in philosophy it seems you have the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson. Then Hegel and then G.E. Moore. It is hard to know which one is correct, but all have something to add to understanding.

 There is an aspect of Hegel that is similar to the Kantian School of Fries and Leonard Nelson. That is in the self contradictions in every thought and every aspect of being things. 

So it seems to me that these two traditions are not as contrary as one might think at first.

In the Leonard Nelson approach this beyond logic and reason occurs in the dinge an sich, the areas beyond possibilities of experience. In Hegel the contradictions are in every stage of being and are resolved only in the Absolute [God]. So to me, it seems these are not all that different. 

[I mean in terms of metaphysical reality. But as for how we know stuff, there is a difference.]

 I was at the Na Nach place today and there came up an interesting discussion about important it is to marry only a woman who does not listen to religious authorities. The reason being that marriage is a union of minds and when someone else is in your wife's mind, that is not a real marriage.

It occurred to me then that in the LeM of Rav Nahman that this same idea came up in the LeM vol I:61 where it says not to give religious authority to people that are not fit for it since by that is cause that Israel goes into exile. And the language Rav Nahman uses is על ידי זה מגרשים ישראל ממקומם which is the same language used to causing of divorce between couples.

The path of the Torah.

There are things that the Tora is strict about. This can not be derided as "religious fanaticism." And example is idolatry. So what makes the world of the religious problematic is not whether to be strict of not. It is what to be strict about. If only the things that the Torah actually cares about were the top of the list of importance, then everything would be alright. That is why the path of the Gra is so important. Not because of the Gra as much as it accurately defines what Torah is about.  

 Kant actually never shows how mind and body are connected. Rather he shows that they must be connected-but does not show how. [That is not my new idea here. This has been noticed even from the very first review of the Critique by Shultz.] 

So to me it seems that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right in the claim that there is a deeper source of knowledge, non intuitive immediate knowledge, that empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge are just secondary manifestations of. But how do they combine? I think that Hegel was right in this that the way these two origins of knowledge combine together is by a give and take process where each modifies the other --what he terms ''dialectics.'' [Hegel actually also never shows how they are connected. But he does come onto this dialectical process to show how the kind of knowledge that is a part of intuition and the kind of knowledge that is independent of intuition work together.--basing himself on Socrates.]

[And this fact was noticed by Michael Huemer in one of his essays where he shows that there is no such thing as empirical knowledge without some a priori assumptions built into it. [See his list of essays.]

So what you have is the primary source of knowledge that Fries and Nelson call immediate non intuitive. Them the two parts split off into empirical and a priori parts. Then they recombine to create actual knowledge. 

 The importance of learning Torah and the basic message of Musar which is Fear of God and good character traits you really only get with the path of the Gra. The path of Rav Nahman does not really have "hatmada" to be learning Torah constantly as an essential part of it, not the sort of basis of Musar. You get other great things in the advice of Rav Nahman but not those few points which really relate to the Gra. 

And I see these points of the Gra as being the essence of Torah. Diligence in learning Torah, Musar and fear of God in the way described in the books of Musar and not to speak lashon hara [slander]. To me it seems that without these points that nothing else can even begin. Sine que non. But if you have the Gra, then there is tremendous benefit in the advice and ideas of Rav Nahman.

[And I admit that my idea of expanding the idea of learning Torah to include Physics is not really part of the path of the Gra though it is hinted at in other rishonim. Still it seems to me that everything has to start with the Gra. The Gra is sine que non.

 The idea of the natives that Columbus encountered were peace loving is somewhat inconsistent with the facts. Columbus encountered the Caribs when he returned on the second trip. The Caribs controlled three islands. They used to make raids on other islands to eat the men and enslave the women. The other islanders were terrified of the Caribs. They had nothing of the noble savage myth. [On the first trip, the other  natives had begged Columbus to protect them from the Caribs]

balance between iyun and bekiut [in depth learning and fast learning.]

 One of the really great things I learned in Shar Yashuv of Rav Freifeld was the idea of review. I had learned the Musar book Ways of the Righteous and also had see the a book bringing the path of learning of Rav Nahman which was to say the words and go on. So the fact that Motti Freifeld [Rav Freifeld's son] kept on telling me about the importance of Iyun [in depth learning] and review gave me a sort of balance. [In fact, it was the conflict between these two extremes that gave me the idea of doing every paragraph of the Gemara with Rashi twice in Hebrew and once in English, and then going on.] So nowadays, I still try to find a sort of balance between these two approaches-- whether in the Gemara, Tosphot and/or the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach or in Mathematics and Physics.   

I once mentioned to my learning partner in Uman, David Bronson that it seems to me that without the emphasis on learning in depth that I got in Shar Yashuv in my beginning of learning, that I never would have gotten the idea at all.  For I noticed that unless one gets the idea of learning in depth at the very start of one's learning, then no matter how much "bekiut" fast learning he does later, he never gets the idea of the in depth sort. [They just tend to skip over Tosphot as if the details are irrelevant. Therefore even with much learning, they never get the essence of Torah.] 

הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב

נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.

I should add that after I thought of this I saw that Rav Shach intended the same question and answer in the Avi Ezri. But he did write this openly. Only after I thought of this question and answer I saw that Rav Shach really intended to to say the same thing.

Anyway there is a lot more to go into this sugia but I was not prepared to write all my thoughts so I just wrote this short piece. In the meantime for those interested the best thing is to look at Rav Shach in Law of Idolatry. 

It seems to me that the Gemara in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him.

Could this Gemara be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the presents truma, tithes etc. Or that it is obligated? (That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the gentile, he would himself have to take the truma and tithes and give them to a priest and a Levi.) 

It seems that Gemara in Avoda Zara can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about truma and maasar but both agree that a gentile can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the Gemara even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden!

Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.

__________________________________________________________________________

It seems to me that the גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him. Could this גמרא be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the תרומה ומעשרות. Or that it is obligated? That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the עכו''ם, he would himself have to take the תרומה and tithes and give them to a כהן and a Levi. It seems that גמרא in עבודה זרה can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about תרומה and מעשר, but both agree that a עכו''ם can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the גמרא even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden! Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham, but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land, then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.

נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ענראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.

 Some of the major points of Rav Nahman are the Tikun Chazot, Hitbodadut, Seder HaLimud, Not to be stubborn about anything, to be joyful always. Tikun haKlali(1) The Tikun Chazot thing he saw as the main job of every Israeli. That is the midnight prayer for the rebuilding of the Temple. [That does not have to include the "piyutim" [added songs]. It just is a short Tikun Rachel and a somewhat longer Tikun Leah. []I actually have not been able to fulfill this for  long time but I still see the hours after midnight as a very important time to learn and pray.(2) Hitbodadut is thought to be his major point. It is talking with God as one talks with your parents or a close friend in your own language. This was so important to him that he would spend whole days on this and he said that if one really wants to serve God properly he ought to spend the whole day on this every day. [I actually did try to do that for awhile when I first got to Safed in the forests surrounding that city.][3] Seder HaLimud is also fairly well known but not as much as the Hitbodadut idea. It is to learn by saying the words and going on. It is how he advice one disciple Rav Nathan to go through the entire Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries [Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc.] in one year. As I have mentioned before I found this very helpful for me when I majored in Physics at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. [And in, fact that is how I think Physics ought to be learnt. You do not have to be a genius to learn Physics. If a block of wood would learn in this way, it would also become a physicist in time.[4] To not be stubborn about anything is something that I have also found helpful. Not to force any issues. When the waves of life come along, to lower my head and let the wave pass over me.[5] To be joyful Rav Nahman saw as the very essence of Torah. Joy he said is the very essence of holiness.[6] Tikun haKlali. To say ten psalms the day one has sinned any kind of sexual sin. [16, 32, 41, 42, 59, 77, 90,105, 137, 150.]

Rav Nahman that see the Will [Ratzon] as the great and highest of all things.

 One thing David Bronson pointed out to me in the LeM of Rav Nahman. That one word religious authorities love is "No." They see one's "Ratzon" [Desire, Will.] as an evil thing.  It is only Rav Nahman that see the Ratzon  [Will] as the great and highest of all things. Just that one needs to raise his desires towards God. That is what you see in the LeM chap.13 about how the tzadik helps to raise the desires of people towards God. 

[This reminds me of Schopenhauer who also saw the root of everything as being the Will. Logos to him is a secondary derivative.] 

"Not to be stubborn about anything."

There is a whole section of the Hayee Moharan about the idea "לא להתעקש על שום דבר" ("not to be stubborn about anything.") I noticed that one of the examples he brings there is about sleep. That is by trying to force oneself to go to sleep, that is exactly what causes sleep to evade him. And there are other examples there. 

But that is not to say that there are not some things that one needs to be ("makpid") stubborn about. But that one ought to choose one's battles wisely.

[You could apply this to learning also. By being overly stubborn about getting the details perfectly, one can lose the big picture. I mean to refer here to the Conversations of Rav Nahman Conversation 76 where he discusses the importance of learning fast--saying the word and going on until the end of the book and only then to review. It is implicit in this that he is suggesting not to insist on understanding all the details. And in fact I found this method helpful in my Physics courses at NYU.] 

Chaiye Moharan [the life of Rav Nahman]

 The book Chaiye Moharan [the life of Rav Nahman] was not edited. You can see this in a few places. One that come to mind is the statement that Columbus died in chains. This is brought as a proof that who so ever brings some great thing into the world suffers for it. While there are plenty of proofs plus the verse "one who increases knowledge increases pain], still Columbus did not die in chains. He was put into chain in the New World by a favorite of the court, and sent back to Spain in chains. They were removed by Isabella and Ferdinand immediately when he arrived. As far as we know they were buried with him when he died as  he cherished them as a symbol of his loyalty to his monarchs. 

But it also should be noted that he was extremely dishonored and died poor. [But he still had credit he could draw on to pay his rent at an inn.]

There are five major books from Rav Nahman. The most well edited are LeM, Midot, and Stories. The Conversations and Life of Rav Nahman were put together from the writings of Rav Natan. But the publishing took on a series of sad events. It was not edited by Rav Natan, and tons were left out. Later, Rav Shmuel Horwitz's "Left out Parts" helped make up some of the lack.

[But of all the books of Rav Nahman, the Conversations and the Life are the most instructive for me. I mean the path of learning in Conversation 76 you see only in the Conversations and only slight hints of that in the LeM itself.

 x99 G major mp3 file [x99 midi]  [x99 nwc]

x98 B minor mp3 file

x98 midi

[x98 nwc]

x100 D minor  x100 midi  [x100 nwc]

The idea of idolatry is the worship of anything that is not just simply the First Cause who has no form nor image. So worship of pictures of tzadikim or their graves ought to be considered idolatry as much as worship of stars. So the term עובד כוכבים עכו''ם a worshiper of stars [or worshippers of stars and constellations] does not refer to ethnic group or nationality. It is not a synonym of "gentile".

[And since this kind of worship pervades the religious world from top to bottom, I tend to avoid all of them. If there was a Litvak yeshiva in my area, I might go into that, but even then I would be uncomfortable because of the pervasiveness of idolatry anywhere and everywhere in the religious world. Certainly the Gra and Rav Shach were "מוחה" [objected], but their objections went largely unheeded.

[I ought to add that there is an obligation to be  "מוחה" [object], even if you know your objection will not be heeded as we see in the event of the concubine of Givat Binyamin in the book of Judges and the event of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in tractate Gitin. ] 

[In fact I was hoping to study the connection between hametz and idolatry in terms of the ashes after they are burnt. But so far I have not gotten to that.]  

One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph I would repeat twice and then go on forward.

 One way of learning I think helped me a lot was that every paragraph  I would repeat twice and then go on forward. To my mind this combined what I saw in the books of Rav Nahman about learning fast (that is to say the words in order and then to go on) and the way of learning in Litvak yeshivas which was to stress in depth learning with review. In this way of repeating each paragraph twice I felt I was making progress and also doing review. This seemed to help a lot when it came to learning Gemara and later I used this same method for Mathematics and Physics.

[The thing is that in Shar Yashuv there was an emphasis on in depth learning that almost seemed to negate the value of "bekius" fast learning. And in the book of Rav Nahman [Conversations of Rav Nahman 76] the emphasis is the exact opposite. So this sort of compromise was the only way I could make sense of this. And this method definitely helped  me.]

[That was for Gemara and Tosphot. But when it came to the Pnei Yehoshua I used to repeat very paragraph more than 10 times--or at least that much. That was based on Rav Freifel's emphasis on repeating every chapter of Gemara 10 times.]](Rav Freifeld was the rosh yeshiva of Shar Yashuv)

גמרא פסחים דף צ''ה

 

רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם מחזיק כמו החכמים נגד ר' יהודה בכך שהוא מחזיק שאפשר להיפטר מחמץ  בכל אופן, לא רק על ידי שריפה. והוא מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אז הוא חייב לקבוע שגמרא פסחים דף צ''ה לא מתנהל לפי הדרך בה החוק הוחלט כחכמים אלא לר' יהודה. שגמרא שם אומרת שהבעלות על חמץ בפסח היא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית. זה אומר שהוא חייב לחשוב שלר' יהודה האיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית. אם הפקודה החיובית תבוא לפני הפקודה הנגדית, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה. כך שהסיבה שמישהו יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ תהיה משום שלפי החכמים, הפקודה החיובית להיפטר מהחמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בה. רמב''ם זה שונה אם כן מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בעמוד צ''ה יהיה כמו החכמים שהאיסור והפקודה החיובית מגיעים בו זמנית ורק לר' יהודה מצווה התשביתו (לבטל את החמץ באמצעות שריפה) מחויב לקרות לפני הזמן של האיסור. לתוספות שניהם מגיעים בו זמנית. מה אני תוהה לגבי זה: יכול להיות הבדל בין להחזיק חמץ לרכוש חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא בדף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך בה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה  של איסור שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית (לאו הניתק לעשה) הוא כאשר שניהם פעולות. לפיכך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה פירושה שהמצב הפסיבי של בעלות על חמץ הוא איסור לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן באמצעות פקודה חיובית מכיוון שביטול  של חמץ אינו מעשה. זה יכול להיות על ידי הפיכתו לרכוש נטוש "הפקר". אך לא ניתן לבטל פעולה חיובית של קניית חמץ על ידי מצב פסיבי של אמירתו שהיא הפקר בלבד. רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את הרמב''ם הזה אחרת. לדבריו, חובתו של חמץ היא גם פקודה שלילית וגם חיובית, אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה ולכן הוא גם יצטרך לומר כי הגמרא הולכת כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא שהבעלות על חמץ תהיה רק איסור

Here is a link to the small booklet I wrote on different areas in Shas where I included this idea 

חידושי הש''ס

Also I should mention that I should run this idea by David Bronson  to get some feedback or criticism.  But since that does not seem possible right now, I will have to think about this a little more. I am mean, after all what is the category of "spread to the winds" of the sages? Probably not the same as bitul as the Ran [in the beginning of Pesachim goes into]. Still it seems worthwhile at least writing this idea down for future reference and to see if this is perhaps what the Rambam was getting at. [That is besides the obvious question that there ought to be some proof of this hiluk. ]

Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim] Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11]

Rav Shach explains that the Rambam [laws of hametz 3:11] holds like the sages against R. Yehuda [tractate Pesachim 23] in that the Rambam holds getting rid of hametz [leavened bread] is by any means, not just by burning (like the law is according to the sages). And he holds that one who buys hametz on Passover gets lashes. So, the Rambam must hold that the Gemara on page 95 [Pesachim] is not going according as the sages, but rather like R Yehuda. That Gemara says owning hametz on Pesach is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command. That must mean that the Rambam must be thinking that to R. Yehuda, the prohibition and the positive command come simultaneously. [If the positive command would come before the negative command, it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה].So the reason one would get lashes for buying hametz would be because to the sages, the positive command to get rid of hametz comes before the prohibition of owning it. [This Rambam is thus different than Rashi or Tosphot. To Rashi that Gemara on pg 95 would be like the sages that the prohibition and positive command come simultaneously and only to R. Yehuda does the command תשביתו [to make the hametz rest by means of burning happen before the time of the prohibition. To Tosphot both come simultaneously. What I am wondering about is this: could there be a difference between owning hametz and buying hametz? If there was such a difference, perhaps the Rambam could say that Gemara on page 95 could be to the sages also. The way this could work would be that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command is when both are actions. Thus, the gemara on pg 95 would mean the passive state of owning hametz is a לאו הניתק לעשה prohibition that can be corrected by a positive command because the "bitul" nullification of the hametz is not any act. It could be just by making it "hefker" abandoned property. But a positive act of buying hametz could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is hefker. [But if I was in Uman, I would have to run this by my learning partner David Bronson to see if there are counter examples. ][Rav Haim of Brisk explains this Rambam differently. He says owing hametz is both a negative and positive command but then that would not be like the gemara on page 95 so he also would have to say that that gemara is going like R. Yehuda. and to that gemara owning hametz would only be a prohibition.]

______________________________________________________________________________רב שךרב שך explains that the רמב’’ם [laws of חמץ פרק ג' הלכה י''א] holds like the sages against ר' יהודה [פסחים כ''ג] in that the רמב’’ם holds ביטול חמץ is by any means, not just by burning. (THAT IS the law is according to the sages. אבל לר' יהודה ביטול חמץ הוא רק על ידי שריפה). And הרמב''ם holds that one who buys חמץ on פסח gets lashes. So, the רמב’’ם must hold that the גמרא on דף צ''ה פסחים is not going according as the חכמים, but rather like ר’ יהודה. That גמרא says owning חמץ on פסח is a לאו הניתק לעשה that can be over written by a מצוות עשה. That must mean that the רמב’’ם must be thinking that to ר' יהודה, the לא תעשה and the מצוות עשה come simultaneously. [If the מצוות עשה would come before the לא תעשה בזמן, it could not be a לאו הניתק לעשה]. רק אם העשה והלא תעשה הם חלים באותו זמן העשה דוחה את הלא תעשהSo, the reason one would get lashes for buying חמץ would be because to the חכמים, the מצוות עשה to get rid of חמץ comes before the prohibition of owning it. [This רמב’’ם is thus different than רש''י or תוספות. To רש''י that גמרא on דף צ''ה would be like the sages that the prohibition and מצוות עשה come simultaneously and only to ר' יהודה does the command תשביתו To תוספות both come simultaneously. What I am wondering about is this: could there be a difference between owning חמץ and buying חמץ? If there was such a difference, perhaps the רמב’’ם could say that גמרא on צ''ה דף could be to the חכמים also. The way this could work would be that a regular case of a prohibition that can be corrected by a מצוות עשה is when both are actions. Thus, the גמרא on דף צ''ה would mean the passive state of owning חמץ is a לאו הניתק לעשה that can be corrected by a מצוות עשה because the ביטול חמץ is not any act. It could be just by making it הפקר abandoned property. But a positive act of buying חמץ could not be nullified by a passive state of just saying that it is הפקר. [רב חיים מבריסק explains this רמב’’ם differently. He says owing חמץ is both a לא תעשה and מצוות עשה but then that would not be like the גמרא on דף צ''ה so he also would have to say that that גמרא is going like ר' יהודהand to that גמרא owning חמץ would only be a לא תעשה.]רב שך מסביר שהרמב''ם [הלכות חמץ פרק ג' הלכה י''א] מחזיק כמו חכמים כנגד ר' יהודה [פסחים כ''ג] בכך שהרמב''ם מחזיק ביטול חמץ הוא בכל דרך, לא רק בשריפה. (זה הדין הוא לפי חכמים. אבל לר' יהודה ביטול חמץ הוא רק על ידי שריפה). והרמב''ם מחזיק שמי שקונה חמץ בפסח מקבל מלקות. אם כן, על הרמב''ם לקבוע שהגמרא בדף צ''ה פסחים אינו הולך כחכמים, אלא כר' יהודה. שהגמרא אומר לבעלות על חמץ בפסח זה לאו הניתק לעשה שיכול להיות נדחה על ידי מצוות עשה. זאת אומרת שהרמב''ם בטח חושב שלר' יהודה, הלא תעשה והמצוות עשה באים בו זמנית. [אם המצוות עשה הייתה באה לפני לא התעשה בזמן, זה לא יכול להיות לאו הניתק לעשה]. אז הסיבה שאדם יקבל מלקות על קניית חמץ היא בגלל שלחכמים, המצוות עשה של ביטול חמץ באה לפני האיסור להחזיק בו. [רמב''ם זה שונה אפוא מרש''י או תוספות. לרש''י שגמרא בדף צ''ה יהיו כחכמים שהאיסור והמצוות עשה באים בו זמנית ורק לר' יהודה מצוות תשביתו לתוספות באות שתיהן בו זמנית. מה שאני תוהה לגבי זה: האם יכול להיות הבדל בין בעלות על חמץ לבין קניית חמץ? אם היה הבדל כזה, אולי הרמב''ם יכול לומר שגמרא על דף צ''ה יכול להיות גם לחכמים. הדרך שבה זה יכול לעבוד תהיה שמקרה רגיל של איסור שניתן לתקן על ידי מצוות עשה הוא כאשר שתיהן פעולות, הביטול הוא פעולה והקניין הוא פעולה. או להפך, הגמרא בדף צ''ה משמע שהמצב הפאסיבי של בעלות חמץ הוא לאו הניתק לעשה שניתן לתקן במצוות עשה כי ביטול חמץ אינו כל מעשה. זה יכול להיות רק על ידי הפיכתו של הפקר לנכס נטוש. אבל מעשה חיובי של קניית חמץ לא יכול להתבטל על ידי מצב פסיבי של רק לומר שזה הפקר. [רב חיים מבריסק מסביר את רמב''ם זה אחרת. הוא אומר שחייבים חמץ זה גם לא תעשה וגם מצות עשה אבל אז זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא בדף צ''ה אז הוא גם יצטרך להגיד שאותו גמרא הולך כמו ר' יהודה ולגמרא הבעלים של חמץ זה יהיה רק לא תעשה

Jesus is a sore topic

 The subject of Jesus is a sore topic. Especially when combined with the history of the church.  The opinions vary. On one hand, you have the Rambam who thought that Christianity is idolatry. And Rav Abulafia does not seem to disagree with that at all. But the opinion of Rav Avraham Abulafia is that Jesus was the messiah son of Joseph,  --even though his opinion about the church was highly negative.

[The issue of  Christianity however is approached differently in Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara. By sitting and trying to learn that Tosphot with my learning partner, helped me see that Tosphot seems to have several different approaches.] My own opinion is that I go with Rav Abulafia.

Messiah son of Joseph is brought in the end of tractate Suka and in the Zohar and the Kol HaTor of the Gra and the Tikunim Hadashim of the Ramchal. What it means is simple. It refers to a preliminary stage before messiah son of David. [Rav Nahman also refers to this . Just today I was in the Na Nach place and opened up the LeM of Rav Nahman and saw that sometimes the same tzadik can contain both aspects in himself.]

I should add that there are souls of the world of Emanation in the Ari [The Arizal, Rav Isaac Luria]. These are souls that are Divine, in that they receive the light of God without any division in between God and them. Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Aaron Joseph, David. So when it comes to the subject of the messiah son of Joseph or son of David, we are talking about a spark of the soul of David or Joseph.

[I might add here that I think the idea of Emanation is the approach that Hegel took to this same issue--that is how I tend to read Hegel. [See the debates about Hegel between McTaggart and Cunningham (Logos is everything or penetrates everything?). At any rate, this idea of over flowing or Emanation seems to me to be what Hegel was saying concerning Logos and Jesus. And we know that Hegel was aware of the Ari and borrows from him concerning Adam Kadmon. So it is not to far to imagine that Hegel was thinking along these lines concerning more central issues in his system. So I am not claiming that this answers all the issues in Hegel. Certainly McTaggart and Cunningham would argue that the idea of overflow along with condensation might not answer the issues they were raising. Still this seems to me to be what Hegel was saying.]

[So what would McTaggart say? He would answer that my arguing that condensation of the light or flow of Logos does not answer the issues --because of the same problem--it is the same or it is not.[The law of the excluded middle.] So I am not saying I could answer this question. But rather that I think that this is what Hegel was saying.

So the question would be can incremental change cause a complete change in essence or some other variable.\This is answered in Chaos Theory and in fact is a suggestion of Kelley Ross on how evolution happens.

[Just to make myself clear I want to mention that I can see important points in Kant, Leonard Nelson Kelley Ross, Huemer and Hegel.  ]

it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot"

 Rav Nahman wrote in the LeM that when one needs compassion from Heaven the way thing to do is to have compassion on others. the difficulty of course is that it is not always so clear how to have compassion on others. But it is clear that when someone asks for help, it ought to be offered as the law is on Purim, "One must give to whom so ever asks."

My approach to having compassion is to try to give to whom so ever asks, but not to seek things to do. The disciple of the Gra, Rav Chaim of Voloshin said it is better to sit in one's room and twiddle your thumbs that go around looking for "mizvot". As Rav Nahman said "the evil inclination is dressed in mizvot."

A certain amount of the extra added restrictions that often one finds people doing for Passover seem to me to be not all that necessary. After all what is matza? Just flour and water. Heat it up and eat it within 18 minutes and it can not be leavened, bread. The only way something an be leavened bread is by sitting. In any case, the restrictions I think are a power grab by religious authorities to make people think that we need their great wisdom.

Personally, I think the whole religious world has an aspect of being a cult. I would not go anywhere near them --with two exceptions. One would be  straight Litvak yeshiva. There the Torah is learned for its own sake. Another exception would be a Na Nach group of Breslov. Though these are very different kinds of groups, still they both seem fine to me. 

The best way to keep Passover is to do the seder at home.to make ones' own maza by making a thick batter of dough and to either put it into an oven or in a frying pan [or empty can of fish. if one does not have a frying pan.] with just enough oil so as to not stick. [a thin batter would be mezonot--cake and not considered as bread. even though one can eat it, it still is not maza.]

See the LeM of Rav Nahman volume II, chapter 44   not to add extra restrictions to the commandments of the Torah. Just to keep it plain and simple.

[I got the idea of not adding extra restrictions from the LeM of Rav Nahman. Since then I have tried to stick to what the Torah says: "Do not add nor subtract from the mizvot that I have commanded." However the religious thrive on adding restrictions. So I recommend staying away from them.]

 I think human affairs often go as a pendulum. You see the situation in Russia under the czars and it was quite natural that people would be upset and see the monarchy as a problem. [Especially you can imagine that when the monarch got a little too out of touch with the people, that would have exasperated the situation. Like going into WWI.] So then you get the Bolsheviks going in the opposite direction. And that that turns out to be not all that better.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach

Hametz of a gentile who uses force that a Israeli has to guard or pay for. To the Rambam one is required to get rid of it. To the Raavad he does not. \

Rav Shach ties this with a different argument. That is the issue of Haametz of a regular gentile that a Israeli has accepted to guard. There he certainly does need to get rid of it. But the question is how much responsibility does he accept for the Hametz? Like a paid guard or a guard that guards for nothing.

I was thinking about this argument of Rav Shach before I went to sleep last night. And it occurred to me that you could argue one way of the other. On one hand the Raavad is only saying that a case where the Israeli accepts no responsibility at all that he does not trespass the prohibition of "בל יראה ובל ימצא"  ["Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary."] That is unlike an unpaid guard. However what in fact is the unpaid guard obligated in? Only willful neglect. That would be as if one was walking alone the street in Yerushalaim and saw Arabs selling leaven bread on Passover and overturned their stand. Certainly he has to pay for the damage, but would not transgress the prohibition of "Hametz (leaven bread or yeast) should not be found in your home nor your boundary,"--even though he is incurring a financial obligation to pay for hametz on Passover.  

So you can see this argument of Rav Shach as possibly holding.

Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able.

What is considered a part of "learning Torah" is extremely important because of the sin of "bitul Torah".[Bitul Torah means the very severe sin of not learning Torah when one is able. ]

So when some rishonim [mediaeval authorities]like Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam include Physics and Metaphysics in the category of learning Torah, the significance is great. What I mean is that one is obligated to learn Torah all the time. And if Physics was not a part of Torah, then it would be possibly bitul Torah. [Unless one was doing it for the sake of making a living.] 

The significance of the concept of bitul Torah is not just to make one guilty if e is not learning when he could. Rather it is to point out the awesome sweetness of Torah that one would not give up after having tasted it even once. The only thing is thatt I am saying that to some rishonim, math and physics come under the heading of "Learning Torah"

To so degree you can see this in Psalms 77, 105 and other places where it says to speak of God's wisdom in his creations.

picture of my Dad with the U-2 camera.

 

That was after he invented the Infra-red telescope. Then he was offered a job to make a camera to put on the U-2 airplane to see if the Soviets were about to launch a military strike against the USA. [That is, to see if there was any indication anywhere inside the U.S.S.R. if they were planning on a strike of any sort against the USA. No one in the USA had any info, and President Eisenhauer had been advised to launch a preemptive strike against the U.S.S.R.. Instead, he exercised caution, and decided to create the U-2 project. 

[In fact, the U-2 camera showed that the USSR was not planning any sort of attack on the USA. So the U-2 had the great merit of avoiding WWIII.]

 One is not allowed to mention the name of an idol and certainly not to swear an oath by an idol. Now for a regular prohibition of the Torah one gets lashes. [That is the punishment unless something else is stated openly.] But here things are a little different. One who swears by an idol has not done an act. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 63 side A says the opinion that one gets lashes for swearing by an idol is coming like R Yehuda who holds one can get lashes even for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

The Rambam brings that one does get lashes for this and the Raavad asks that that is only like R. Yehuda. But the law is not like R. Yehuda but rather R Yose who held one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act. 

Rav Shach answers that Rabin who stated the original version of the law before the Gemara made its corrections to his statement said simply one does not get lashes for a prohibition that does not have an act except swearing and vowing. [And that original statement was said according to the law which is like R Yose. And the way that original statement was said involved not just swearing a false oath but also swearing in the name of an idol.]

I am trying to figure out what possible reason the Rambam would have had to ignore the correction of the Gemara.

x97 music file

 x97mp3 D minor  x97 midi   x97 nwc

 "The evil inclination is dressed in mitzvot". [This is from the LeM of R.Nahman of Breslov. vol I. perek 1. ] The Satan never comes to  a person and says come and do a sin. Rather it is always "come and do a mitzvah." But hidden in the mitzvah is some poison that is unseen. You you this same idea in the commentary of the Gra on Mishlei in the beginning where the evil inclination comes and says: "Come and bring peace offerings."

So my approach is to avoid anything and everything that has any connection with the religious world unless it is straight from the Gra  according to the approach of Rav Shach and Rav Kinyesvsky. [The trouble is the aspect of the trojan horse that has seeped and infiltrated everything in the religious world] 

Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone

 I see sometimes in the books of Rav Nahman statements that need to be taken with a grain of salt. His approach is basically to get to the core essence of Torah. But that is not to say that his approach is the whole shebang. Without the Litvak approach based on the Gra, one lacks the backbone [the structure]. It would be like a a person with no bones. 

the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach.

 Rav Nahman has in one Torah lesson the idea that when one finds that he learns but does not understand the advice is to shout  the words. On occasion I have tried that myself and it works, but it seems to be advice for occasions that present the opportunity to do so. Because in general, I find it simpler to take the basic path of learning of Rav Nahman of just saying the words and going on more practical.

Also Rav Nahman did bring the idea of review both in the LeM and Sefer HaMidot. But clearly according to the Conversations of Rav Nahman 76, that is only a part time affair. Still I want to bring one way of review that I have tried and seems to work for me. As I progress through a book, I go one page forward and then keep my place and then review all the way back to the beginning. Then I go one more page forward and then from that new place also review back to the beginning. 

[But I should add that there were different ideas of how to learn in depth in Shar Yashuv in NY and the Mir in NY. But in any case, the emphasis of the Litvak world was to learn in depth along the lines of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach. [That is a more global approach than the previous achronim later authorities [like the Pnei Yehoshua and Maharsha] that concentrate more on local issues.]

Slander [lashon hara]

Slander [lashon hara] is causing damage. That is the main issue. This fact can get obscured within all the details you find in the Hafez Haim. In lesser degrees of severity comes the points of the Hafez Haim that speaking even truth  that results in damage that would not happen if judged in court is lashon hara pliss all the other conditions. [There are 7 condition altogether to be able to say something negative about someone else. In issues of between man and his fellow man. In issues of between man and God the conditions are not the same but seem to be related.]

Rehilut is different. That is causing hatred between people. That is not the same thing as lashon hara.

In any case, the point of the Hafez Haim that lashon hara is dived into between man and fellow man and man and God does not come out of this principle-of causing damage. [Causing damage to one's reputation is also causing damage.]

[There however is a sort of balance in that to warn others of to stay away from evil people is a positive command. And the prohibition of lashon hara does not forbid that. Thus the letter of excommunication of the Gra is important to abide with since it in fact warns us of danger that we would not know otherwise. In fact it would be hard to know without the warning of the Gra and Rav Shach.]

When at the Mir there was a sort of emphasis on not speaking lashon hara [slander]. I noticed this in a few ways. One was that right after the morning prayers there were people that had a small session in learning two laws per day in the book about the laws of slander [Hafez Haim]. Also I noticed a general emphasis on this particular law in the daily conduct of most people pus the roshei yeshiva. 

There was another specific emphasis on laws about monetary matters.

And these two points were in addition to the general atmosphere of emphasis on learning Torah.

So looking back on that period I think it is clear why I and so many others look back on our time at the Mir as a golden age.

Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

 Rav Shach brings two arguments of Rav Akiva Eiger and and asks on both arguments. This is in the  Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

[The issue is also brought in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in the commentaries].

The case is this. Hamez [yeast or leavened bread]  belongs to a gentile that is in the domain of a Israeli, and the Israeli has accepted responsibility and an obligation to pay for it if it is lost or stolen. He can not keep it on Passover. But let's say he did not get rid of it and kept it on Passover. After Passover is it allowed or not to derive benefit from it?

The Yerushalmi [The Jerusalem Talmud] brings two opinions about this. One forbids and the other allows.

The Rambam states the law as the opinion that it is forbidden. Why? It is a law of the sages and any law of the sages we always go by the lenient opinion. Rav Akiva Eiger wants to answer this.

One answer if based on the Mishna:  One stole hamez and it was still in his possession on Passover. After Passover he wants to return it to the owner. He can say (הרי שלך לפניך) "What you own, you can now take."

One way to explain this is that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from the hamez. [The reason is on whom would the law of the sages apply to? Not the person that was the victim of the theft. But not the thief either since even if it would be forbidden he could still say "what you onw now you can take."]

So the law that hamez that Passover has passed over on is forbidden would not apply. This explanation of the Mishna would be like the opinion in the Yerushalmi that hamez of a gentile in the domain of a Israeli is permitted after Passover. But since we see that our Gemara [Pesachim 105] holds the explanation of the Mishna is that even though the hamez is forbidden in use so we do not go with the lenient opinion of the Yerushalmi.

One question I have on Rav Akiva Eigger. is the very idea in itself { even if it would be forbidden the thief could still say "what you onw now you can take."] This is sort of hard to see since the whole question in the first place is is it forbidden?  Presumably this opinion would hold that if teh hamez is forbidden in use then the thief could not say this. 

But that is not the question of Rav Shach. Rav Shach simply brings two Gemaras in Pesachim that show that the explanation of the Mishna is not in question. The hamez is forbidden.

 x96   x96 in midi

Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon.

 Since the conjunction of sun and moon was on the 13th I think Passover comes out on the 27 of March. That is Friday night, the night of the 26. That would be like R. Elazar in Sanhedrin page 10 that the new moon does not depend on the court on earth. Rather if the court on earth sanctifies the  new moon at the right time then fine,-but if not, then the heavenly court does so anyway.

Everyone seems to think that the new moon depends on the lower court according to all opinions, but you certainly do not see that in Sanhedrin. Just the opposite. The later opinions of Rav Ashi and Rava go with the idea of R. Elazar. And even if the new moon would depend on the lower court, there has not been a lower court to sanctify it since the middle of the Talmudic period when the authentic semicha died out.

And the idea of Hillel II sanctifying the later new moons is a myth never mentioned anywhere in the Gemara.

Since semicha disappeared during the time of the amoraim [Talmudic sages] the dates were in doubt. Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon. During the time of the geonim at some point they accepted the calendar of Meton. But there is no indication that Hillel II sanctified it. 

letters from the early geonim have the dates of their writing to not be in accord with the present calendar, but sometime around the time of saadia gaon you see the present day calendar being accepted. but at least we knw the present day calendar is not from the talmud. 

at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics).

I wanted to mention that at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics). Or at least that was one thing that attracted me to the place. Even though Shar Yashuv is also a very great yeshiva, still the lack of Musar left me feeling somewhat empty. Although I am looking at this from hindsight which can be faulty, still it is clear to me that this small drop of Musar made a world of difference for me. So I would like to suggest in fact the idea of having two Musar sessions per day just like at the Mir. 

Musar has three separate aspects. The books of the rishonim [mediaeval]. Books of the achronim which are also thought to be part of the Musar movement.  Then the books of the actual disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Obligations of the Hearts of Ibn Pakuda is the best of the books of the Rishonim. As for the later authors, the books of Rav Isaac Blazer are the best. The main one, Or Israel is known. The other was a collection of his writings and only printed once. I saw it in Netivot. But I should mention that the books of all the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter are great in terms of getting an idea of Musar is all about.]

"with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

 

That is based on the statement of Rav Nahman that "with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is  a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

And Rav Natan takes this idea  a bit further and claims that as much as one forgets his past, all the better.

You see this also in the LeM about starting new every day.

This shows the deep insight of Rav Nahman into human nature. It is a profound insight how important forgetting all ones' past is.

maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context.

 maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context. The idea comes from the Gemara that dough that is made for dogs is Ok for Passover even to fulfill the obligation of eating maza the first night of Passover if the shepherds eat also from it . that is called "shumra" {guarded}.

You can not imagine they guarded the dough so that the dogs could fulfill the mitzvah!

This all comes down to an important idea of Rav Nahman: not to add extra restrictions.

[I thought to add here that all the restrictions about maza are sometimes exaggerated. All maza is is flour and water baked or fried before 18 minutes is up from the time the flour touched the water and put into  a frying pan with oil at the bottom so it doesn't stick. [not any more oil than that.] The thing is that you have to remember is the it should be בלילה עבה thick dough, not easily poured like you would be making a pancake. Of course the pancake is also ok in terms except that to be "bread" (Hamotzie) the dough has to be thick. A think dough is "mezonot".

The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari.

 The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari. [That Tosphot is fairly well known because it is the source of the idea that gentiles are not commanded on the prohibition of "shituf". ["joining"]. However I forgot the page  number. But it should be easy to find for anyone who is interested. You just look up the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in laws of oaths and the Beer HaGola will bring the page number of that Tosphot.]

Rav Saadia Gaon brings two problems. That of identifying God and Jesus. Plus nullification of the commandments.  Both of these points are correct.

Rav Avraham Abulafia has a very positive opinion about Jesus, but a highly negative opinion about the Catholic Church. That is more of less the same as Rav Yaakov Emden. The Ari has the same opinion as Rav Abulafia as you can see in the writings of the Ari on the end of Genesis, concerning the burial of Joseph in Egypt.   [That is the idea of the Ari is identical to that of Rav Avraham Abulafia.]

[My own opinion is that I have no opinion except what these sages say. However there are some other opinions that disagree with the above, and when there is a difference of opinion among the rishonim I say אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים אבל הלכה  כהרוב These and those are the words of the Living God, but the law goes by these that I have quoted since they are the majority.]

x94 music files

 x94 C minor mp3

x94 midi file

x94 nwc file

If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

 The point of Rav Nahman that Satan is dressed in mitzvot [as it says in the first Torah lesson in the LeM] is this: The mitzvot are not goals in themselves. They are to bring to natural law. Laws that are recognized by means of Reason. This is the opinion of all rishonim. This is also  clear in the Gemara itself. In the Gemara we find [Bava metziah page 119 side a] the sages do not disagree with R Shimon ben Yochai about the fact that the mitzvot were given with certain goals as their purpose and these goals are known. That is not the disagreement. Rather-the disagreement is if there is conflict between the reason for the law or the letter of the law,-- which one do you go by? But we do know the reason for the law according to both opinions. But almost no where in the mishna or Gemara are the reasons stated. That is left to the rishonim [mediaeval authorities].

So now we can see how the evil inclination can be disguised in mitzvot. For sometimes keeping a mitzvah results in the opposite of the intension of the law.   [reasons: (1) to gain good character traits, compassion, mercy, kindness, honesty, not to slander; honor of one's parents (2) peace of the state; (3) to avoid idolatry.] [And for the religious, the result of the façade of keeping mitzvot usually results in the exact opposite of the actual reasons for them. However this ought to be qualified a bit. After all the Litvak world that follows the Gra is actually pretty close to keeping the Torah and the reasons for the commandments as well as possible. If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

Placebo Religion and Philosophy

 The ... problem with placebo religion is this: imagine a patient with a serious illness is given a placebo pill as treatment. Since there is no substantive therapeutic medication in it, the patient will continue to suffer from the illness and perhaps even die. The same danger exists in placebo religion: it has no real substance other than the placebo effect. The believer will continue to be vulnerable to the ill effects of everyday life while he is convinced his belief in the placebo religion is having a positive effect on a negative reality.

http://philosophos.sdf.org/feature_articles/philosophy_article_161.html

[See the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov. This problem is discussed in a somewhat different kind of way in his discussions of Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chaps 12 and 28. Even the very first lesson in the LeM discusses the fact that the evil inclination [Satan] disguises himself in mitzvot.]

 x93 mp3 D minor

x93 midi  x93 nwc

Musar --the learning of the books of the rishonim [mediaeval authors] that deal with ethical issues is helpful in terms of orientation. It gives an idea of the big picture of Torah. But the idea that learning lots of Musar in order to correct character traits, seems a bit far fetched. That is why I think almost all Litvak yeshivas based in the Gra limited the amount of time of learning Musar to only 20 minutes before mincha and 15 min. before maariv. But I am not sure if there really is any  formulas that can help one come to good character. So learning Musar certainly seems like the best approach in that there simply does not seem to be any other approach at all.

 I can see that without Musar people tend to understand Torah in ways that are idolatry in the guise of Torah. 

So for those with resources, the best idea is that original idea of Rav Israel Salanter to spend a lot of one's spare time in learning Musar.

Rav Nahman also noticed the issue that people can get the wrong idea easily about what really constitutes a "mitzvah". The is the very first Torah lesson in his LeM that היצר הרע מתלבש במצוות the evil inclinations disguises itself in mitzvot -

There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82

 There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82. However I thought to at least jot down the basic issues.

The Mishna there says one can make a eruv for boundaries the day before Shabat and the person has to accept it while still day. The Gemara asks that that sounds like there is "no choice that works in reverse", for if there would be choice, then one could make the eruv in the day and at night the person that it is made for can accept it and it would be known in reverse that it was ok with him even during the day. Rav Ashi answers and says really there is choice and here we are talking about when they let the person know  that the eruv is being made but he did not accept it until night.

The problem is that אין חבין לאדם שלא מדעתו. One can not make an acquisition for another that causes him harm unless it is with his knowledge. [And an eruv is in that category since he loses the right to walk on Shabat in all directions except 2000 amot from the eruv.]

Now since from the Torah there is "no choice in reverse", the answer of Rav Ashi is only going according to the opinion "there is choice". The issue is not if there is choice when it comes to a eruv. Rather the question is can it be revealed after the fact that the direction chosen to place the eruv was good for the person--i.e. the direction he wanted to walk it on Shabat. It is not a question if the eruv is valid in one direction or another Rather if this direction is a good thing for that person.

Thus the Rif and Rosh both leave out the answer of Rav Ashi. That is how Rav Shach explains the Raavad over in laws of eruv. [chapter 6:23]

The  question in Eruvin 82  is about if that direction is good. That is different than  the issue of a person that makes his own eruv and says, "If the wise man comes in that direction, then my eruv is in that direction. And if in the other direction, then my eruv is in that other direction." Now in this last case, there is no doubt that one can make his own eruv even in a direction he does not want to go. So the only question is "retrograde choice " in eruv which we know is ok. That is different from one making an eruv for someone else, and that someone else deciding later on shabat that that is the direction he wants to go. 

The Raavad is brought in the Rashba and Ritva on page 82b. The Rambam seems to be going with Rashi. The issue is this: retrograde choice is valid for laws from the sages but not for laws from the Torah. So the way Rashi and the Rambam look at this is that the one for whom the eruv was made can decide later which direction he wants to walk in and that in reverse means that the eruv that was made from him was good. To the Rif, Rosh and Raavad this would only work for the the law of eruv. Not for something which is a liability for which the law of retrograde choice is that it would not work.

In the approach of Rav Natan, the disciple of Rav Nahman there is an emphasis to stay away from all secular learning, I think you can see in the LeM of Rav Nahman itself a somewhat different approach. This you can see in the first Torah lesson to להסתכל בהשכל שיש בכל דבר ולהתקשר להשם  על ידי השכל שיש בכל דבר to look at the wisdom that is in all things and to become attached to God by means of the wisdom that is in all things. But a vast majority of secular learning is pseudo science and so you can see why Rav Natan was taking the approach to avoid all secular learning all together. 

But since the Ran [Rav Nahman] himself had the approach of seeing the wisdom that is in each thing, it seem to me that this corresponds to the rishonim [medieval authorities] that held one ought to learn Physics [which meant at that time the book Physics of Aristotle and the related subject matter]. 

The approach of the rishonim however was not simply that book of Aristotle, but rather the subject matter. Even during the middle ages the subject was developing.

The switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people

 There is a sort of switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people in the religious world. And this is to be expected since the nature of the evil inclination changes according to the times. Even in ancient Greece the nature of the different gods of Olympus changed in time. [Especially Hera.] Drastically. So idolatry is definitely not stationary. Just that the religious world ought to be more careful about this issue than is found currently. In the case of a עיר הנידחת [a city that has gone after idolatry] there is no need to see if every person is guilty of worshipping an idol. All you need is a majority of the people. That is enough to determine that the whole city must be destroyed. Thus with the religious world that worships dead people. You do no need to weigh the beliefs of every person. It is enough to see that "if it looks like a duck, and wobbles like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is  a duck." That means in a practical sense that one ought to stay away from the religious world, least he or she be caught up in the punishment that will eventually follow them. [As the Gemara says about those people in the city that has gone after idolatry.]

 The Gra  signed the letter of excommunication and was ignored and so this problem has just grown larger and larger over time. Maybe it is time to stop all the pictures of so called tzadikim. It it had merely been a matter of  a few pictures of the Gra or Rav Shach to remind one to learn Torah. But once you let pictures of true tzadikim like the Gra then that makes room for all the frauds. But now the worship of dead people has gotten way out of hand. Maybe it is time to get back to straight monotheism. Worship of God alone. And the problem is exasperated by the fact that is it is the people that wear of the religious clothes that are supposed to make us think that they are learning and keeping Torah. They are the ones worshipping dead people. 

What I think is that getting back to straight worship of God alone.

[However I should make clear that Rav Nahman's teachings I find invaluable and important and this critique on the religious world is not meant to be extended to Rav Nahman.]

music files x92

x92 D major mp3 file

 x92 D major midi

x91 music

 x91 G major mp3  x91 in midi format  x91 nwc format