When at the Mir there was a sort of emphasis on not speaking lashon hara [slander]. I noticed this in a few ways. One was that right after the morning prayers there were people that had a small session in learning two laws per day in the book about the laws of slander [Hafez Haim]. Also I noticed a general emphasis on this particular law in the daily conduct of most people pus the roshei yeshiva. 

There was another specific emphasis on laws about monetary matters.

And these two points were in addition to the general atmosphere of emphasis on learning Torah.

So looking back on that period I think it is clear why I and so many others look back on our time at the Mir as a golden age.

Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

 Rav Shach brings two arguments of Rav Akiva Eiger and and asks on both arguments. This is in the  Correspondence of R Akiva Eiger letter 23.

[The issue is also brought in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in the commentaries].

The case is this. Hamez [yeast or leavened bread]  belongs to a gentile that is in the domain of a Israeli, and the Israeli has accepted responsibility and an obligation to pay for it if it is lost or stolen. He can not keep it on Passover. But let's say he did not get rid of it and kept it on Passover. After Passover is it allowed or not to derive benefit from it?

The Yerushalmi [The Jerusalem Talmud] brings two opinions about this. One forbids and the other allows.

The Rambam states the law as the opinion that it is forbidden. Why? It is a law of the sages and any law of the sages we always go by the lenient opinion. Rav Akiva Eiger wants to answer this.

One answer if based on the Mishna:  One stole hamez and it was still in his possession on Passover. After Passover he wants to return it to the owner. He can say (הרי שלך לפניך) "What you own, you can now take."

One way to explain this is that it is not forbidden to derive benefit from the hamez. [The reason is on whom would the law of the sages apply to? Not the person that was the victim of the theft. But not the thief either since even if it would be forbidden he could still say "what you onw now you can take."]

So the law that hamez that Passover has passed over on is forbidden would not apply. This explanation of the Mishna would be like the opinion in the Yerushalmi that hamez of a gentile in the domain of a Israeli is permitted after Passover. But since we see that our Gemara [Pesachim 105] holds the explanation of the Mishna is that even though the hamez is forbidden in use so we do not go with the lenient opinion of the Yerushalmi.

One question I have on Rav Akiva Eigger. is the very idea in itself { even if it would be forbidden the thief could still say "what you onw now you can take."] This is sort of hard to see since the whole question in the first place is is it forbidden?  Presumably this opinion would hold that if teh hamez is forbidden in use then the thief could not say this. 

But that is not the question of Rav Shach. Rav Shach simply brings two Gemaras in Pesachim that show that the explanation of the Mishna is not in question. The hamez is forbidden.

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Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon.

 Since the conjunction of sun and moon was on the 13th I think Passover comes out on the 27 of March. That is Friday night, the night of the 26. That would be like R. Elazar in Sanhedrin page 10 that the new moon does not depend on the court on earth. Rather if the court on earth sanctifies the  new moon at the right time then fine,-but if not, then the heavenly court does so anyway.

Everyone seems to think that the new moon depends on the lower court according to all opinions, but you certainly do not see that in Sanhedrin. Just the opposite. The later opinions of Rav Ashi and Rava go with the idea of R. Elazar. And even if the new moon would depend on the lower court, there has not been a lower court to sanctify it since the middle of the Talmudic period when the authentic semicha died out.

And the idea of Hillel II sanctifying the later new moons is a myth never mentioned anywhere in the Gemara.

Since semicha disappeared during the time of the amoraim [Talmudic sages] the dates were in doubt. Only a court with authentic ordination can sanctify the new moon. During the time of the geonim at some point they accepted the calendar of Meton. But there is no indication that Hillel II sanctified it. 

letters from the early geonim have the dates of their writing to not be in accord with the present calendar, but sometime around the time of saadia gaon you see the present day calendar being accepted. but at least we knw the present day calendar is not from the talmud. 

at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics).

I wanted to mention that at least one major reason I went to the Mir in NY was the Musar aspect (learning ethics). Or at least that was one thing that attracted me to the place. Even though Shar Yashuv is also a very great yeshiva, still the lack of Musar left me feeling somewhat empty. Although I am looking at this from hindsight which can be faulty, still it is clear to me that this small drop of Musar made a world of difference for me. So I would like to suggest in fact the idea of having two Musar sessions per day just like at the Mir. 

Musar has three separate aspects. The books of the rishonim [mediaeval]. Books of the achronim which are also thought to be part of the Musar movement.  Then the books of the actual disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Obligations of the Hearts of Ibn Pakuda is the best of the books of the Rishonim. As for the later authors, the books of Rav Isaac Blazer are the best. The main one, Or Israel is known. The other was a collection of his writings and only printed once. I saw it in Netivot. But I should mention that the books of all the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter are great in terms of getting an idea of Musar is all about.]

"with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

 

That is based on the statement of Rav Nahman that "with most people forgetfulness is a lack. But in my opinion forgetfulness is  a great thing. If one would remember everything that happened to him, he could never start afresh."

And Rav Natan takes this idea  a bit further and claims that as much as one forgets his past, all the better.

You see this also in the LeM about starting new every day.

This shows the deep insight of Rav Nahman into human nature. It is a profound insight how important forgetting all ones' past is.

maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context.

 maza shumra is a sort of concept that got taken out of context. The idea comes from the Gemara that dough that is made for dogs is Ok for Passover even to fulfill the obligation of eating maza the first night of Passover if the shepherds eat also from it . that is called "shumra" {guarded}.

You can not imagine they guarded the dough so that the dogs could fulfill the mitzvah!

This all comes down to an important idea of Rav Nahman: not to add extra restrictions.

[I thought to add here that all the restrictions about maza are sometimes exaggerated. All maza is is flour and water baked or fried before 18 minutes is up from the time the flour touched the water and put into  a frying pan with oil at the bottom so it doesn't stick. [not any more oil than that.] The thing is that you have to remember is the it should be בלילה עבה thick dough, not easily poured like you would be making a pancake. Of course the pancake is also ok in terms except that to be "bread" (Hamotzie) the dough has to be thick. A think dough is "mezonot".

The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari.

 The issue of Christianity comes up in a few places. Saadia Gaon, Rav Avraham Abulafia, Rav Yaakov Emden, the Meiri, and a Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara, and the Ari. [That Tosphot is fairly well known because it is the source of the idea that gentiles are not commanded on the prohibition of "shituf". ["joining"]. However I forgot the page  number. But it should be easy to find for anyone who is interested. You just look up the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo in laws of oaths and the Beer HaGola will bring the page number of that Tosphot.]

Rav Saadia Gaon brings two problems. That of identifying God and Jesus. Plus nullification of the commandments.  Both of these points are correct.

Rav Avraham Abulafia has a very positive opinion about Jesus, but a highly negative opinion about the Catholic Church. That is more of less the same as Rav Yaakov Emden. The Ari has the same opinion as Rav Abulafia as you can see in the writings of the Ari on the end of Genesis, concerning the burial of Joseph in Egypt.   [That is the idea of the Ari is identical to that of Rav Avraham Abulafia.]

[My own opinion is that I have no opinion except what these sages say. However there are some other opinions that disagree with the above, and when there is a difference of opinion among the rishonim I say אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים אבל הלכה  כהרוב These and those are the words of the Living God, but the law goes by these that I have quoted since they are the majority.]

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If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

 The point of Rav Nahman that Satan is dressed in mitzvot [as it says in the first Torah lesson in the LeM] is this: The mitzvot are not goals in themselves. They are to bring to natural law. Laws that are recognized by means of Reason. This is the opinion of all rishonim. This is also  clear in the Gemara itself. In the Gemara we find [Bava metziah page 119 side a] the sages do not disagree with R Shimon ben Yochai about the fact that the mitzvot were given with certain goals as their purpose and these goals are known. That is not the disagreement. Rather-the disagreement is if there is conflict between the reason for the law or the letter of the law,-- which one do you go by? But we do know the reason for the law according to both opinions. But almost no where in the mishna or Gemara are the reasons stated. That is left to the rishonim [mediaeval authorities].

So now we can see how the evil inclination can be disguised in mitzvot. For sometimes keeping a mitzvah results in the opposite of the intension of the law.   [reasons: (1) to gain good character traits, compassion, mercy, kindness, honesty, not to slander; honor of one's parents (2) peace of the state; (3) to avoid idolatry.] [And for the religious, the result of the façade of keeping mitzvot usually results in the exact opposite of the actual reasons for them. However this ought to be qualified a bit. After all the Litvak world that follows the Gra is actually pretty close to keeping the Torah and the reasons for the commandments as well as possible. If everyone would simply be following the path of the Gra and Rav Shach I would have nothing to complain about.'

Placebo Religion and Philosophy

 The ... problem with placebo religion is this: imagine a patient with a serious illness is given a placebo pill as treatment. Since there is no substantive therapeutic medication in it, the patient will continue to suffer from the illness and perhaps even die. The same danger exists in placebo religion: it has no real substance other than the placebo effect. The believer will continue to be vulnerable to the ill effects of everyday life while he is convinced his belief in the placebo religion is having a positive effect on a negative reality.

http://philosophos.sdf.org/feature_articles/philosophy_article_161.html

[See the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov. This problem is discussed in a somewhat different kind of way in his discussions of Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chaps 12 and 28. Even the very first lesson in the LeM discusses the fact that the evil inclination [Satan] disguises himself in mitzvot.]

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Musar --the learning of the books of the rishonim [mediaeval authors] that deal with ethical issues is helpful in terms of orientation. It gives an idea of the big picture of Torah. But the idea that learning lots of Musar in order to correct character traits, seems a bit far fetched. That is why I think almost all Litvak yeshivas based in the Gra limited the amount of time of learning Musar to only 20 minutes before mincha and 15 min. before maariv. But I am not sure if there really is any  formulas that can help one come to good character. So learning Musar certainly seems like the best approach in that there simply does not seem to be any other approach at all.

 I can see that without Musar people tend to understand Torah in ways that are idolatry in the guise of Torah. 

So for those with resources, the best idea is that original idea of Rav Israel Salanter to spend a lot of one's spare time in learning Musar.

Rav Nahman also noticed the issue that people can get the wrong idea easily about what really constitutes a "mitzvah". The is the very first Torah lesson in his LeM that היצר הרע מתלבש במצוות the evil inclinations disguises itself in mitzvot -

There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82

 There are still some things that I am not clear about in Eruvin page 82. However I thought to at least jot down the basic issues.

The Mishna there says one can make a eruv for boundaries the day before Shabat and the person has to accept it while still day. The Gemara asks that that sounds like there is "no choice that works in reverse", for if there would be choice, then one could make the eruv in the day and at night the person that it is made for can accept it and it would be known in reverse that it was ok with him even during the day. Rav Ashi answers and says really there is choice and here we are talking about when they let the person know  that the eruv is being made but he did not accept it until night.

The problem is that אין חבין לאדם שלא מדעתו. One can not make an acquisition for another that causes him harm unless it is with his knowledge. [And an eruv is in that category since he loses the right to walk on Shabat in all directions except 2000 amot from the eruv.]

Now since from the Torah there is "no choice in reverse", the answer of Rav Ashi is only going according to the opinion "there is choice". The issue is not if there is choice when it comes to a eruv. Rather the question is can it be revealed after the fact that the direction chosen to place the eruv was good for the person--i.e. the direction he wanted to walk it on Shabat. It is not a question if the eruv is valid in one direction or another Rather if this direction is a good thing for that person.

Thus the Rif and Rosh both leave out the answer of Rav Ashi. That is how Rav Shach explains the Raavad over in laws of eruv. [chapter 6:23]

The  question in Eruvin 82  is about if that direction is good. That is different than  the issue of a person that makes his own eruv and says, "If the wise man comes in that direction, then my eruv is in that direction. And if in the other direction, then my eruv is in that other direction." Now in this last case, there is no doubt that one can make his own eruv even in a direction he does not want to go. So the only question is "retrograde choice " in eruv which we know is ok. That is different from one making an eruv for someone else, and that someone else deciding later on shabat that that is the direction he wants to go. 

The Raavad is brought in the Rashba and Ritva on page 82b. The Rambam seems to be going with Rashi. The issue is this: retrograde choice is valid for laws from the sages but not for laws from the Torah. So the way Rashi and the Rambam look at this is that the one for whom the eruv was made can decide later which direction he wants to walk in and that in reverse means that the eruv that was made from him was good. To the Rif, Rosh and Raavad this would only work for the the law of eruv. Not for something which is a liability for which the law of retrograde choice is that it would not work.

In the approach of Rav Natan, the disciple of Rav Nahman there is an emphasis to stay away from all secular learning, I think you can see in the LeM of Rav Nahman itself a somewhat different approach. This you can see in the first Torah lesson to להסתכל בהשכל שיש בכל דבר ולהתקשר להשם  על ידי השכל שיש בכל דבר to look at the wisdom that is in all things and to become attached to God by means of the wisdom that is in all things. But a vast majority of secular learning is pseudo science and so you can see why Rav Natan was taking the approach to avoid all secular learning all together. 

But since the Ran [Rav Nahman] himself had the approach of seeing the wisdom that is in each thing, it seem to me that this corresponds to the rishonim [medieval authorities] that held one ought to learn Physics [which meant at that time the book Physics of Aristotle and the related subject matter]. 

The approach of the rishonim however was not simply that book of Aristotle, but rather the subject matter. Even during the middle ages the subject was developing.

The switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people

 There is a sort of switch from worship of gods to worship of dead people in the religious world. And this is to be expected since the nature of the evil inclination changes according to the times. Even in ancient Greece the nature of the different gods of Olympus changed in time. [Especially Hera.] Drastically. So idolatry is definitely not stationary. Just that the religious world ought to be more careful about this issue than is found currently. In the case of a עיר הנידחת [a city that has gone after idolatry] there is no need to see if every person is guilty of worshipping an idol. All you need is a majority of the people. That is enough to determine that the whole city must be destroyed. Thus with the religious world that worships dead people. You do no need to weigh the beliefs of every person. It is enough to see that "if it looks like a duck, and wobbles like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is  a duck." That means in a practical sense that one ought to stay away from the religious world, least he or she be caught up in the punishment that will eventually follow them. [As the Gemara says about those people in the city that has gone after idolatry.]

 The Gra  signed the letter of excommunication and was ignored and so this problem has just grown larger and larger over time. Maybe it is time to stop all the pictures of so called tzadikim. It it had merely been a matter of  a few pictures of the Gra or Rav Shach to remind one to learn Torah. But once you let pictures of true tzadikim like the Gra then that makes room for all the frauds. But now the worship of dead people has gotten way out of hand. Maybe it is time to get back to straight monotheism. Worship of God alone. And the problem is exasperated by the fact that is it is the people that wear of the religious clothes that are supposed to make us think that they are learning and keeping Torah. They are the ones worshipping dead people. 

What I think is that getting back to straight worship of God alone.

[However I should make clear that Rav Nahman's teachings I find invaluable and important and this critique on the religious world is not meant to be extended to Rav Nahman.]

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[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar, ]

Even though I had  a lot of benefit by learning the particular path of Musar (Ethics) of Navardok (which is trust in God), I have to mention that there were  few different schools of thought that came from Rav Israel Salanter like Slobodka (which is about the greatness of Man). Each of his disciples had a different approach. And from what I learned, each has something important to add. [The main ones were Rav Isaac Blazer (fear of God), and Rav Simcha Zisel of Kelm.] There was a different emphasis in each school.  With Isaac Blazer there was the emphasis on Fear of God. Simcha Zisel's emphasis was on order.  But the core and essence of Musar was always good character traits. And the idea there is that good character is the essence and goal of Torah.  And how to define good character is the clarity of the medieval books of Musar. 

What I found most beneficial (for me ) was to go through all the basic books of Musar of the Middle Ages along with the books of the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. 

[Without Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. And even with Musar, it is easy to get side tracked. But to go wrong is easier without Musar. And when I say "side tracked", I mean that as an understatement. For some reason God, blessed me with great parents and teachers, But I realize that not everyone has that, so all the more so is Musar important. [אורחות צדיקים, שערי תשובה, מסילת ישרים ,מעלות המידות, חובות הלבבות]  [Obligations of the Heart. Gates of Repentance, Ways of the Righteous, ...]

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עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א

 חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת את זה רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומרת מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל, ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם, ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. An das for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land.

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of תוספות is that these two גמרות do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It must be ר' אלעזר that an  עכו''ם does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of תרומה and מעשר. That is the only way I can see that the גמרא in  ראש השנה can make sense. But if so then what is the question in  עבודה זרה? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. Just like תוספות answers for the גמרא in  ראש השנה. So you must say instead that תוספות is going like רבה that the עכו''ם has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the גמרא in עבודה זרה. And as for the גמרא in ראש השנה the answer is the  עכו''ם has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of תרומה. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the עכו''ם could own land.

עם זאת אני עדיין תוהה את השאלה הזו. התשובה של תוספות היא ששתי הגמרות הללו אינן חולקות. בסדר. אבל אז לפי איזו דעה התשובה הזו הולכת? זה חייב להיות ר' אלעזר כי לעובד אלילים יש יכולת להחזיק אדמות בישראל  כדי לסלק את חובת תרומה ומעשר. זו הדרך אחת שיכולים לראות שהגמרא בראש השנה יכולה להיות הגיונית. אבל אם כן אז מה השאלה בעבודה זרה? איך הגויים יכולים לגרום לאיסור על העצים בארץ ישראל? התשובה צריכה להיות פשוטה. יש להם רכוש חלקי. בדיוק כמו שתוספות עונה לגמרא בראש השנה. אז אתה חייב לומר במקום זאת שתוספות מתנהלות כמו רבה שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק קרקעות בישראל עד כדי נטילת חובת המעשר. זה עונה לגמרא בעבודה זרה. ובאשר לגמרא בראש השנה התשובה היא שלעכו''ם אין יכולת להחזיק אדמות בכדי להסיר את חובת תרומה. אבל האדמה בזמן כניסתה של ישראל לארץ כנען, הארץ הייתה בבעלות קולקטיבית בלבד, ולא בבעלותו של אדם אחד. ובמקרה זה יכול האכו''ם להחזיק אדמה באופן שמסולק חיוב תרומה ומעשר.

Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a.

 I was thinking about those two Gemaras in Avoda Zara 23b and Rosh Hashanah 13a. While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other Gemara holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly Tosphot [in Rosh Hashana 13a] does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. Raba who holds אין קניין לעבו''ם בארץ ישראל (there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel) holds that only with regard to Truma and Maasar [tithes], not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact Raba holds that  monetary ownership even stronger than Rav Elazar. So the the Gemara in Avoda Zara can not simply be said to be of Raba.

The actual Gemara in Avoda Zara 23 says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to Avraham, and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the Gemara answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden.

Now the way Rav Shach understands the Rambam in laws of idolatry 8:3, that Gemara in fact is like Raba that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to Avraham. But that answer is hard to see since even Raba holds a gentile can have monetary ownership, and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So Tosphot explains that that Gemara is referring to trees that existed already in the time of Avraham, and its question refers to them.

[But I can see the answer to Rav Shach also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as truma and maasar would go.]

[The other Gemara in Rosh Hashana asks how could Israel bring the omer from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the omer from grain that was owned by gentiles.

The contradiction between these two Gemaras is answered by Tosphot thus: The gemara in Rosh Hashana is ok because even though Israel owned the land still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in Avoda Zara is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees]--that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees even those that were around from the time of Avraham

[There is still a lot to think about here --in terms of in fact how these two gemaras relate to the issue between Raba and Rav Elazar. I recall that I wrote something about this in my little booklet on Bava Metzia.] [page 101]

However I still am wondering this question. The answer of Tosphot is that these two gemaras do not disagree. Ok. But then according to which opinion is this answer going like? It seems that it must be R. Elazar that an idolater does have to ability to possess land to take away the obligation of truma and maasar. That is the only way I can see that the Gemara in Rosh Hashana can make sense. But if so then what is the question in Avoda Zara? How can the gentiles cause to be forbidden the trees in the land of Israel? The answer ought to be simple. They have  part possession. [Just like Tosphot answers for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]. And so why does the Gemara there not simply answer the question in that way? So you must say instead that Tosphot is going like Raba that the gentile has no ability to possess land to the degree of taking away the obligation of tithes. That answers the Gemara in Avoda Zara. An das for the Gemara in Rosh Hashana the answer is the gentile has no ability to possess land that can remove the obligation of truma. But the land at the time that Israel came into the land of Canaan, the land was only collectively owned, not owned by any one individual. And in that case the gentile could own land.

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 I was thinking about those two גמרות in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב and ראש השנה י''ג ע''א . While it would be simple to say that one holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel while the other גמרא holds an idolater can possess land in Israel. But clearly תוספות does not make that distinction, and it occurred to me the obvious reason. רבה who holds אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל there is no ability of a idolater to possess land in Israel holds that only with regard to תרומה and מעשר, not when it comes to monetary ownership. And in fact רבה holds that in terms of monetary ownership even stronger than רב אלעזר. So the the גמרא in עבודה זרה  can not simply be said to be of רבה. The actual גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב says why was Israel commanded to burn the idolatrous trees when they entered into Israel? After all Israel was in the possession of Israel since it was promised to אברהם and so the gentiles could not make the trees forbidden. And the גמרא answers  that since Israel worshipped the golden calf, thus idolatry was alright to them, so the gentiles could cause those trees to becomes forbidden. Now the way רב שך understands the רמב''ם in laws of idolatry 8:3 that גמרא in fact is like רבה that the land could not have been owned by the gentiles after it was promised to אברהם. But that answer is hard to see since even רבה holds a gentile can have monetary ownership and that should be enough to make trees that he worships to be forbidden. So תוספות explains that that גמרא is referring to trees that existed already in the time of אברהם and its question refers to them.  But I can see the answer  של רב שך  also to some degree, since the Rambam might have said that to forbid a planted tree the gentile would have to have complete ownership even as far as תרומה and מעשר would go. The other גמרא in ראש השנה asks how could Israel bring the עומר from grain that was in Israel when they entered into the land. Was not the grain owned by gentiles? And one can not bring the עומר from grain that was owned by gentiles. The contradiction between these two גמרות is answered by תוספות thus: The גמרא in ראש השנה י''ג ע''א  is ok because even though Israel owned the land, still the gentiles owned the grain that they grew. And the question in עבודה זרה is ok [how could gentiles cause trees owned by Israel to become idolatrous trees?] that question is  a good question since Israel was commanded to destroy all the idolatrous trees, even those that were around from the time of אברהם.

[I am thinking that that is what Tosphot means over there in Rosh Hashana.]

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חשבתי על שתי הגמרות האלה בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב וראש השנה י''ג ע''א. אמנם יהיה פשוט לומר שאחד מחזיק שאין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל, (אך אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמה בישראל) ואילו הגמרא השנייה מחזיקה שעכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל. אך ברור שתוספות לא מבדילה את ההבחנה הזאת, ונדמה לי שהסיבה ברורה. רבה המחזיק אין קניין לעכו''ם בארץ ישראל אין יכולת של עובד אלילים להחזיק אדמות בישראל גורסת כי רק לגבי תרומה ומעשר, לא כשמדובר בבעלות כספית. ולמעשה רבה גורס כי מבחינת בעלות כספית חזקה עוד יותר מרב אלעזר. אז לא ניתן לומר שהגמרא בעבודה זרה היא רבה. גמרא בפועל בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב אומר מדוע נצטוו ישראל לשרוף את העצים האלילים בעת כניסתם לישראל? אחרי הכל ארץ ישראל הייתה ברשות ישראל מאחר שהובטח לאברהם ולכן הגויים לא יכלו לאסור על העצים. והגמרא עונה שמכיוון שישראל סגדו לעגל הזהב, כך עבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מבחינתם, כך שהגויים יכולים לגרום לאותם עצים להיות אסורים. עכשיו הדרך בה רב שך מבין את הרמב''ם בחוקי עבודת האלילים 8: 3 שלמעשה הגמרא בראש השנה לרבה שהארץ לא הייתה יכולה להיות בבעלות הגויים לאחר שהובטח לאברהם. אבל קשה לראות את התשובה הזו מכיוון שאפילו רבה מחזיק שלגוי יכול להיות בעלות כספית וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך עצים שהוא עובד כדי לאסור. אז תוספות מסביר כי הגמרא מתייחסת לעצים שהיו קיימים כבר בתקופת אברהם ושאלתה מתייחסת אליהם. [אבל אני יכול לראות את התשובה של רב שך גם במידה מסוימת, מכיוון שהרמב"ם אולי היה אומר שכדי לאסור על עץ נטוע, הגוי יצטרך להיות בעלות מוחלטת אפילו עד לתרומה ומעשר.] הגמרא האחרת בראש השנה שואלת כיצד יכול ישראל להביא את העומר מתבואה שהייתה בישראל כשנכנסו לארץ. האם התבואה לא הייתה בבעלות גויים? ואי אפשר להביא את העומר מדגן שהיה בבעלות גויים. את הסתירה בין שתי הגמרות הללו עונה תוספות כך: הגמרא בראש השנה י''ג ע''א היא בסדר מכיוון שלמרות שישראל היו הבעלים של האדמה, עדיין הגויים היו הבעלים של התבואה שהם גידלו. והשאלה בעבודה זרה היא בסדר [איך גויים יגרמו לעצים שבבעלות ישראל להפוך לעצים אלילים] שאלה זו שאלה טובה מאחר שישראל נצטוו להשמיד את כל העצים האלילים, אפילו אלה שהיו בסביבה עוד מימי אברהם.

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 In Breslov today, I was speaking with a fellow that is in the paratroopers units of IDF and the subject the religious world sucking money out of the state ( a well known sore spot) came up. [I suggested that the parliamentary system is at fault.]  At any rate, I think it ought to be clear that people ought to learn Torah; but to use Torah to make money is  different subject. The ideal way of learning Torah is to sit and learn and trust in God for parnasah [making a living]. But the trouble begins when people begin to see Torah as a means of making money. 

There is an argument if it is permitted it accept charity in order to learn Torah, but to use Torah to suck the state is not the same thing. But that is not just in Israel. There is a general problem in the religious world of using Torah for money and power.

See the Guide for the Perplexed: the parable about the king in his country

 In the approach of the Rambam you place Physics and Metaphysics on a higher plane than learning Gemara. You can see this in the Guide where his parable about the king in his country says this openly. [In that parable there are different levels of closeness to the king. Those outside the palace but inside the capitol city are closer than almost everyone else--except for those that are inside the palace. Those outside the palace are the Torah scholars. Those inside the palace are the Physicists. 

[The Rambam is depending on the Gemara about ר' יוחנן בן זכאי שלמד דבר גדול ודבר קטן מאי דבר גדול? מעשה מרכבה. ומאי דבר קטן ? מעשה בראשית]

But even closer to the king are the "philosophers and prophets." OK about the prophets. But philosophers? I have trouble seeing that. Philosophy today is in deep trouble. There seems to be something about philosophy that has a sort of Achilles heel. Physics I think the best way of learning this mainly saying the words and going on. But also some time one should do review.

God is not the same as the world.The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him," means there are no other gods besides Him.

In Torah, God is not thought to be the same as the world. I do not know from where people get the opposite idea from. The meaning of the verse, "You were shown to known that the Lord is God, there is none other besides Him,"  means there are no other gods besides Him. But on a deeper level it means that  everything besides God can not exist without Him. This is clear in all Rishonim when they discuss the basic core beliefs of Torah. You can see this in all Musar books of the Rishonim. In the first seven laws of Mishna Torah you can see this also. There the Rambam explains "there is none besides Him" to mean the existence of everything besides God is dependent on God. 

None of that implies that God is the same as the world.

 In the Musar movement of Rav Israel Salanter, Fear of God was a major goal. I noticed today in the local Breslov shul a Torah lesson of Rav Nahman that echoes that point. He say that by bringing up Fear of God to its roots one merits to the secrets of Torah.  And he explains to bring "fear of God up" to mean not to be afraid of lower things but of God alone. In fact when I was in Uman I noticed a lot of Torah lessons of Rav Nahman revolved on the theme of fear of God  and from that I decided to dig more deeply into Musar. 

I have in my own life seen that fear of God is can be gained and lost and once lost does not come back easily. Even learning Musar does not seems to help a lot. It is as if the hand of the  fates is over one in such a way that regaining lost levels is against the grain.

On one hand learning Musar seems to be the only way to gain any idea of authentic Torah and to gain at first fear of God. But there is a sort of way of falling from that that does not return.

Some Rishonim [medieval authorities] like the Ramban [Nahmanides] would hold that to learn practical professions for the sake of making a living is OK.

Some Rishonim [medieval authorities] like the Ramban [Nahmanides] would hold that to learn practical professions for the sake of making a living is OK.  He himself was a doctor. It was just that this group of rishonim would not hold that learning Physics and Metaphysics are a part of learning Torah.

You only see the opinion that Physics and Metaphysics are are part of Torah in Saadia Gaon, Ibn Pakuda [author of the Hovot Levavot], Binyamin the Doctor, the Rambam.

Words of the Rishonim are thought to be valid even when they argue.אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. But I tend to go with the opinions based on Saadia Gaon. 

But even if you go with Saadia Gaon, still how can one do physics which is hard? My suggestion is the idea of the Gemara לעלם לגרס איניש ואחר כך ליסבר אף על גב דמשכח ואף על גב דלא ידע מאי קאמר

Always one should just say the words in order and go on ["girsa"] and after that to go back and explain, even though he forgets and even though he does not know what he is saying.

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לרב שך על הרמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג'

 ראש השנה דף י''ג ע''א ועבודה זרה דף כ''ג ע''ב. הגמרא בעבודה זרה שואלת מדוע נאסרו אשירות [העצים הנסגדים]? אחרי הכל איש אינו יכול לאסור את השייך למישהו אחר, והארץ הייתה בבעלות ישראל מימי אברהם. תשובה: מכיוון שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב, זה נחשב כאילו הכנענים היו כאילו שליחיהם. הגמרא בראש השנה שואלת, "איך ישראל יכולה הייתה להביא את העומר כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? התבואה הייתה בבעלות גויים והפסוק אומר קצירכם ולא קציר עכו'’ם. לפי תוספות בראש השנה שלמרות שהאדמה שייכת לישראל, עדיין גויים שקונים אדמות בישראל הם הבעלים של תבואת אדמתם. אבל עדיין הגמרא בעבודה זרה היא בסדר לשאול איך גויים יכולים לאסור את מה שלא שייך להם? תירוץ: בגלל העצים שהיו שם מלפני תקופת אברהם. אני חושב שהדרך שבה תוספות מבינה את הסוגיא הזו קשה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה אומרת שהסיבה שהאשירות אסורות בגלל שהכנענים כאילו הם פועלים על דעת ישראל לעשות עבודת אלילים לאחר שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב. הגמרא אינה חוזרת מעמדתה המקורית שלפיה הארץ שייכת לישראל, ולכן כל מה שצומח עליה שייך לישראל. לדעת  של הרמב''ם  שני הגמרות האלה לא מסכימות זו עם זו. זה נקרא שזה נושאים חלוקות בש''ס.  לרב שך (הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה ג'),. הגמרא בעבודה זרה היא פשוטה. העצים אסורים מכיוון שישראל הייתה בסדר עם עבודת אלילים. לא כי לכנענים היה חלק כלשהו בהם. רב שך נותן סיבה קצרה לאמירת הרמב''ם, שהוא לא מזכיר “את קצירכם ולא קציר עכו''ם". אבל אני חושב שרב שך בוודאי חשב גם בקווים האלה. אחרת למה לא לומר כמו תוספות? והגמרא בראש השנה מחזיקה כמו רב אלעזר שיש קניין לעכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות, שלמרות שהארץ ניתנה לאברהם, עדיין גוי יכול להחזיק שם אדמה וכשהוא עושה זאת, התבואה אינה חייבת בתרומה ומעשר, או העומר. והגמרא האחרת בעבודה זרה מחזיקה כמו זה שאין לעכו''ם קניין להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות גם כאשר גוי מחזיק בקרקע בישראל, התבואה עדיין חייבת בתרומות ומעשרות

I wanted to mention here the point of the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam [according to the way that Rav Shach is explaining the Rambam]. There are three points on the stalk that are the issue here. Who  owns the ground. Who owns the stalk. Who finishes the work on the stalk which is smoothing the stake of what. Tosphot sees a difference between the first two. Israel can own the ground  and the gentile the wheat, [as a renter.] To the Rambam (at least in terms of truma) there is no difference. If the gentile owns the ground in terms of truma then he owns the wheat and that is the point of Rav Elazar. He  can possess land such that the wheat is not obligated in trumah. To Raba he can not own the land in such a sense. Even if he owns land in Israel, that is like renting and the wheat is still obligated in truma.  

I recall that this very issue was a point of confusion for me in Bava Metzia chapter 8 where this same argument between R. Elazar and Raba comes up.

Rosh Hashanah pg 13a and Avoda Zara 23b.

 Rosh Hashanah pg 13a and Avoda Zara 23b. 

The Gemara in Avoda Zara asks why were the worshipped trees forbidden? After all, no one can forbid that which belongs to someone else, and the land was owned by Israel from the time of Abraham. Answer: since Israel served the Golden Calf, it is considered as the Canaanites were acting on their behalf. The Gemara in Rosh Hashana asks "How could Israel bring the Omer when they entered into the Land of Canaanan? The grain was owned by gentiles and the verse says your grain, not the grain of gentiles."

Tosphot the Rosh Hashana gemara is saying that even though the land belongs to Israel still gentiles that buy land in Israel own the grain of their land. But still the gemara in Avoda Zara is Ok to ask how can gentiles forbid that which does not belong to them   because of the trees that were there from before the time of Abraham.

So to Rav Shach, the Rambam comes out this way. The gemara in Avoda Zara is straight and simple. The trees are forbidden because Israel was OK with idolatry. Not because the Canaanites had any portion in them. [There were trees the Canaanites had a portion in --that is trees that they planted. But the trees that were growing at the time the land was given to Abraham those trees belong to Israel and the gentiles could not cause them to be forbidden. So then why was Israel commanded to destroy all the Asherot  those the gentiles had no portion in. To that question the Gemara gives an answer.] Rav Shach gives a  reason for saying the Rambam disagrees with Tosphot. The Rambam does not mention קצירכם ולא קציר עכו''ם. 

And the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah holds like R, Elazar that יש קניין לעכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות that even though the land was given to Abraham, still a gentile can own land there and when he does, the produce is not obligated in Truma and Maasar --or as in our case the Omer. [And the other Gemara in Avoda Zara holds like Rabah that אין לעכו''ם קניין להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות Even when a gentile owns land in Israel, the produce is still obligated in Trumah and maasar

 The Ari [Rav Isaac Luria Ashkenazi] says that Emanation is pure Godliness, Briah (Creation) is mostly good, Yezira (Formation) half and half, and the Physical universe is mostly evil.

This explains a lot to me. We find people that start out sincere seekers of God and his will but fall. The reason I think is this. That every area of value has an opposite area of value. But the opposite can be no so much damaging as areas of value with more content. What I mean is that Logic is one area of value that is pure form and no content. The sentences: "A implies B. B implies C. If A is true, then C is true" are an example of the form is true but the content of each A B and C can be anything. zero content. Math has more content and is not just formal as Kurt Godel proved. Then up the scale you get to art and music with more content and less form. And the progression continues until you get to God--all content and no form. לא ראיתם כל תמונה ביום עמדכם בהר סיני "You did not see any form on the day you stood at Mount Sinai."

See this diagram which shows this [By Kelley Ross based on Leonard Nelson]

But every area of value has an opposite area. The Sitra Achra of that area. And since this world is mostly evil is easy to fall from holiness into the opposite area of value.

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 The attack on me by the Arabs last Sunday night was in fact serious. After stealing money they were dragging me away to a hidden to do something else while they were saying they are going to kill as many Jews as they can. So I figured that I was in a serious situation. I really do not know what distracted them for a second that gave me a chance to run away. At any rate, in a nearby parking lot there was a woman who I told what had happened and she suggested that she would call the police. So I was taken to the station to give as many details as I could remember and then to Binyamin near Jerusalem. The police wanted to talk to me about other issues. But God granted me grace in their eyes and let me go. But I had no money to return so they gave me money from a sort of fund box they have there for random purposes, and shared their sort of grilled pizza sandwiches with me. [I can not explain it. It seems to be an Israeli invention. Combination of sandwich and pizza.]  I got back Monday afternoon.

Rav Shach suggest that the Rambam has a different approach to the two gemaras in rosh hashanah 13 and and Avoda Zara 23 .

Rav Shach suggest that the Rambam has a different approach to the two gemaras in Rosh Hashanah 13 and and Avoda Zara 23 . The one in Avoda Zara we know he holds with since that is the source of the idea that if someone sets up a brick to worship and then someone else comes along and worships it then it is forbidden even though a person can not forbid that which belongs to someone else. Still in this case the first person has already revealed his acquiescence.

But the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah, the Rambam simply does not hold with. The reason is this. It says How could Israel bring the Omer after they arrived in the land of Canaan? Did not the grain grow in the possession of gentiles? And the Omer has to be brought from a harvest that belonged to a Israeli.

In fact the Rambam does not bring that law that the Omer has to be brought from a harvest that belonged to a Israeli. Rather he holds like the Gemara in Avoda Zara that the land belonged to Israel from the time of Abraham.

[But Rav Shach is not simply saying that the two gemaras disagree with each other סוגיות חלוקות. Rather that the Gemara is Rosh Hashana 13:a hold with the opinion יש קנין לנכרי בארץ ישראל להפקיע מתרומות ומעשרות and so even though everyone holds that the land of Canaan belongs to Israel from the time of Avraham still they should not have been able to bring the Omer since the grain that grew in the possession of a gentile would anyway not be obligated in tithes. But the law is אין קניין לנכרי להפקיע מידי תרומות ומעשרות and the law does not follow  the Gemara in Rosh Hashana.

The leaders of the religious world tend to come under the category of Torah scholars that are demons that Rav Nahman brings in the LeM in ch 12. [ch.s 28, 61, vol II ch.s 1, 8 and many other places that do not occur to me this minute ] There are exceptions but no fixed rule how to tell. Someone suggested to me that this is the reason so many do not show much interest in keeping the Torah since the Torah scholars that are demons give the Torah a disreputable reputation. 

In the LeM of Rav Nahman you do not really see any clear way of how to avoid the demonic Torah scholars except in the LeM ch 12 where the major difference is the "Shelo Lishma" aspect. [i,e, those that use Torah to gain power and money.]   

In any case you see Rav Nahman was very aware of the problem that the Sitra Achra has taken over much of the religious world. No wonder most people left it when they had the chance. 

So in a practical sense how does one come to learn authentic Torah? To me it seem the answer is clear--to go to any yeshiva based on the Gra. However in that very conversation it came up that many people in Israel have had problems  even in Litvak yeshivas. So while I base my recommendation of Litvak yeshivas based on my experiences in Litvak yeshiva in NY, it could be that in Israel things might be different. So maybe the best thing is to learn at home? 

[The Rambam brings the problem of using Torah to make money in his commentary of Pirkei Avot ch 4 on the Mishna "He that uses the crown passes away". [To find that commentary you have to go to chapter 4, because the same mishna of Hillel occurs in chapter 1 and there the Rambam does not write anything.] ]

 I was thinking about the dialectical approach of Hegel. The idea starts with pure Being which by itself implies Non-Being since Being is without "being things".  And Non-Being implies Being for the reason nothing implies nothing of being things, so there is an implicit recognition that there are being things. The resolution to Hegel is Becoming. But it occurs to me that Becoming requires a third category--time. [Without time there can be no Becoming]. And this model I think provides Hegel with a long series in which every concept implies its opposite, and the solution is by adding a third category. [After all hot and cold are two contradictory things until you add time and/or place.] So Hegel wants to continue this series --adding concept after concept until you get to the Absolute Idea [God] where all contradictions are resolved.[I want to add that Dr Kelley Ross [https://www.friesian.com/origin/chap-4.htm#sect-1][or here https://www.friesian.com/origin/] brings in his PhD thesis that this original idea of Hegel is valid. Just that he disagrees with the long series expansion.

Dr Kelley Ross writes:"The similarity and the connection that Hegel described between Being and Not Being is also very germane, although the motivation and explanation here will be different from his."

 The question that occurred to me at the police station was implicitly asked by Tosphot and answered. Just to give a background let me explain. The Gemara in Avoda Zara [page 23 side b] says when Israel came into the land of Canaan why did they have to burn all the asherot [worshipped trees] of the Canaanites? After all, no one can make forbidden that which belongs to his neighbor, and the land was given to Israel from the time Abraham. So it must be that since Israel worshipped the Golden Calf that makes the worship of the trees [asherot] OK to them, so  the Canaanites were acting as messengers for them.

Now the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah asks. how can it be that Israel brought the Omer [a offering of grain] right away when they came into the land? After all the only produce was grown by the Canaanites, and the verse says to bring the Omer from your produce, not the produce of a gentile.

On this Gemara in Rosh Hashana [page 13], Tosphot asks:  we know from the Gemara in Avoda Zara that the land belongs to Avraham from before Israel came into the land.(So the produce does in fact belong to them) Still the question is valid since the gentiles have ownership in the grain that they grow even if the land belongs to Israel. But if that is so then what is the question in Avoda Zara if after all the land is of Israel then the asherot are forbidden and need to be burnt. But the Gemara's question is from the asherot that were planted before the time of Avraham Avinu [Abraham the Patriarch]] that would be permitted in use by just nullification. [An idol of a gentile becomes permitted by simple nullification, without burning. Only an idol of a Israeli needs to be burnt]

So you see that it is implicit in the answer of Tosphot that trees that were outright owned by the Canaanites would come under the same category that tosphot brings about the trees that were planted before the time of Avraham

 I was in the Breslov place today and they were learning Lesson 52 in the book of Rav Nahman. There is brought the idea that "hitbodadut" [talking with God as one talks with a close friend] helps to correct one's midot [character traits]. But I think that Rav Nahman is depending on a certain amount of knowledge of context. I mean to say that just hitbodadut by itself without knowledge of what is a good character trait and what is not probably can not help much.

How could hitbodadut help one to correct the trait of speaking lashon hara [slander] unless one even knows that lashon hara is wrong, and also knows the specific laws of lashon hara.

Rather my impression is that Rav Nahman's teachings are meant to bring one to a higher level of service of God. But there has to be something to start with. Some basic knowledge of authentic Torah. But authentic Torah nowadays is only found in the Litvak yeshiva world. And the closer to the path of the Gra, the better.

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 I was attacked by Arabs and taken to the local police station to make a statement, and then to the police station in Binyamin for other reasons. Then after the interrogation was over, I was thinking about the Gemara in Avoda Zara page 23 that serves as the source for the previous blog entry [about the Israeli setting up a brick to worship, and then comes a gentile and worships it--in which case the brick is forbidden to be used.]

The Gemara says this: It says in the verse: "their worshipped trees you should burn". [That refers to when the children if Israel entered into the Land of Canaan.] The Gemara asks, 'but a person can not make forbidden that which belongs to another'. The Gemara answers, since Israel served the Golden Calf that shows idolatry is OK to them, so when the Canaanites were worshipping their trees, that is just doing what Israel sent them to do.

My question is this: What about trees they planted in order to be worshiped trees (i.e. tree planted by the Canaanites in order to worship them )? That is the regular case of "ashera" and so when the Torah says to burn those trees, why can it not be talking about the most regular simple case of worshipped trees that in fact belong to the Canaanites? [Not trees that were planted for other reasons or which grow by themselves.]

הגמרא אומרת: הפסוק אומר: "אשירהם תשרפו אש". [הכוונה היא, מתי ישראל נכנס לארץ כנען.] הגמרא שואלת אך אדם אינו יכול לאסור את מה ששייך לאחר. הגמרא עונה מאז שישראל שימשה את עגל הזהב זה מראה שעבודת אלילים זה בסדר מבחינתם, אז כשהכנענים עבדו לעצים שלהם זה מה שישראל שלח להם לעשות

השאלה שלי היא זו: מה עם עצים שהכנענים נטעו על מנת שיעבדו עצים? זהו המקרה הרגיל של "אשרה" ולכן כאשר התורה אומרת לשרוף את העצים האלה מדוע היא לא יכולה לדבר על המקרה הפשוט ביותר של עצים סגודים השייכים למעשה לכנענים? [לא עצים שנשתלו מסיבות אחרות או שגדלים מעצמם

[The police offered to me one of their sandwiches which costs them 26 shekels [around 8 dollars] which was kind of like a combination of pizza doubled over with vegetables and coffee.  I had no money to return home, so the police gave me money from a sort of general purpose collection box they keep there in the station. I still could not get home, until some soldier bought me a ticket to the central bus station in Jerusalem. There is a lot more interesting stuff but that is enough of my personal affairs for now. 

I was attacked by Arabs and then the police were informed that the police at Binyamin wanted me under arrest. I was very afraid this was going to be a many year prison sentence, and prayed hard the whole way, But God turned the heart of the police officer towards me and let me go. 

 In terms of my previous blog entry I just wanted to add that if the gentile would bow down to the brick without the Israeli having set it up to be served, the brick would not be forbidden to derive benefit from (since the gentile does not own the brick). So it is just the setting it up by the Israeli which makes it prepared to receive idolatrous worship which makes it forbidden after the worship was done. So when the Rambam says "the setting it up is an act" he means it causes a "halut" [state of being]. There is no question about what the law is, but rather what does the  Rambam mean by words "setting up the brick is an act''.

[The brick is just an example. Worship of any physical object would be the same thing. And worship means bowing, burning incense, bringing close to an altar, slaughter of an animal before it, or doing a kind of service that is specified for that idol. And example would be throwing a stone at Markulit which is its service. And the physical object does not have to be a statue. It would be anything except for the One First Cause. This I hope might bring clarity to why I say that the religious world is really doing idolatry, and why the Gra signed the letter of excommunication.] [The reason for the Gra might not have been clear at the time, but nowadays it is crystal clear]

I want to mention that Rav Shach answers the obvious question n the Rambam by putting setting up the object is an act by the egg.

רמב''ם בהלכות עבודת כוכבים פרק 8. חוק 1 Rambam Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1

רב שך שואל על חוק מסוים ברמב''ם. אחד שם לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה ואז מגיע עכו''ם שסוגד לו, אסור להפיק ממנו תועלת מכיוון שההקמה שלו היא מעשה. יש לו תשובה מסוימת לכך, אבל עלתה לי תשובה אחרת. הרמב''ם קובע על פי חוק רב הונא כי לא ניתן להפוך לאובייקט של מישהו אחר אסור. אתה רואה זאת בחוק, אם אחד שוחט חיה של מישהו אחר לאלילים, מותר להרוויח שימוש ממנה. עכשיו יש את העובדה שפעולה על האובייקט עושה שהדבר אסור. אבל זה לא המקרה כאן. הגוי השתחווה לחפץ של מישהו אחר. והקמת האובייקט כשלעצמה אינה הופכת אותו לאסור. זה פשוט גורם להיות מוכן להיות סוגדים. כך שזה שיחד אותה עם מעשה הגוי הופך את זה לאסור וזה מה שהרמב"ם מתכוון להקמתו הוא מעשה. זו הקמתו יחד עם פולחן העכו''ם שהופך אותו לאסור. כלומר, שזה מעשה שלם. הרעיון כאן הוא שאופן השימוש במילה "מעשה" שונה מהרעיון הפשוט של פולחן. לדוגמא בהלכות עבודת כוכבים פרק 8. חוק 1 אנו רואים שאפילו פולחן על בעל חי אינו גורם לכך שאסור להשתמש בו. רק "מעשה" כמו שחיטת הבעל חי לאליל או החלפתו לאליל הופך אותו לאסור. זה לא אותו דבר כמו מה שגורם לאסור להביא חיה כקרבן במקדש, ובמקרה זה די בפולחן פשוט כדי לאסור את החיה. בכל מקרה אנו רואים את אופן השימוש במילת "מעשה" בהקשר זה הוא מאוד ספציפי. וככה הרמב"ם משתמש במילה בפרק ח' הלכה ג' שם הוא כותב, "אחד שם לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה ואז בא עכו''ם שסוגד לו, אסור להפיק ממנו תועלת כי הקמתו הוא 'מעשה'". אז הוא לא יכול להתכוון למעשה כאן אומר שהחפץ אסור. במקום זאת הפעולה של הקמתה בקשר עם מישהו אחר שמגיע ומתפלל ללבנה היא זו שהופכת אותה לאסורה. אז מה קורה אם מקימים לבנה כדי לעבוד אותה אך עדיין לא סגדו לה? זה מה שהרמב''ם מתכוון אליו כאן. אנו יודעים שאם אחד סוגד לבעל חי, אפילו אם הוא סוגד לחיה שלו, לא נעשה איסור להשתמש בבעל החי מכיוון שזה לא מעשה ידי אדם. אבל מה עם לבנה? נראה שזה המקרה שהרמב''ם מתכוון אליו. העובדה שאם ההקמה לא הייתה הופכת אותה לאסורה. אבל אם מישהו אחר בא סוגד אליה, בקשר להקמתו זה יהפוך את זו לאסורה. כל זה בא מגמרא בה נשאלת השאלה אם מקימים ביצה לסגוד לה ואז סוגדים לה אם אסור להשתמש בלבנה זו [ע''ז דף מ''ו ע''א] [חזקיה שאל אם זקיפתה היא מעשה]. ואז הגמרא מציינת שהתשובה ברורה מאליה, אלא שהשאלה הייתה אם הוא פשוט הקים את הלבנה ומישהו אחר סגד לה. האופן שבו הרמב''ם מסתכל על השאלה נראה קשור לוויכוח אחר אם שוחטים חיה של מישהו אחר לאליל אם אסור להשתמש בחיה זו. שם הרמב''ם סבור כדעה שאינה אסורה להפיק תועלת. אלא הנה העובדה שהלבנה היא מעשה האדם עשתה השינוי.

 רב שך asks about a certain law in the רמב''ם. One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an act. He has a certain answer for this, but it occurred to me a different answer. The רמב''ם holds by the law of רב הונא that one can not make an object of someone else forbidden. You see this in the law, if one slaughters an animal  of someone else to idols, the animal is not forbidden to gain use from. Now there is the fact that an act on one's an object that is man made makes it forbidden. But that is not the case here. The gentile bowed to an object of someone else. And the setting up of the object in itself does not make it forbidden. It just makes to prepared to be worshiped. So that together with the act of the gentile makes it forbidden and that is what the Rambam means the setting it up is an מעשה. That is the setting it up along with the worship of the gentile makes it forbidden. That is, that that is a whole act. The idea here is that the way the word "act" is used is different from the simple idea of worship. For example in Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1, we see that even worship of an animal does not make it forbidden to be used. Only an "act" like slaughtering it for an idol or exchanging it for an idol makes it forbidden. This is not the same thing as what makes an animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the temple in which case simple worship --bowing down--is enough to make the animal forbidden. At any rate we see the way act is used in this context is very specific. And that is the way the Rambam uses the word in chapter 8 law 3 where he writes, "One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an 'act'". So he can not mean the act here means the object is forbidden. Rather the act of setting it up in connection with someone else coming and worshipping the brick is what makes it forbidden.]

So what happens if one sets up a brick to worship it but has not yet worshipped it? That is what i think is what the Rambam is addressing here. We know that even one does that with an animal or even if he worships his own animal that animal does not become forbidden to be used since it is not man made. But what about a brick? This seems to be the case the רמב''ם is addressing. The fact if setting it up would not make it forbidden. But if someone else comes and bows down to it, that in connection with his setting it up would make it forbidden. This all come from a גמרא where the question is asked if one sets up a brick to worship and then worships it if that brick is forbidden to be used. Then the גמרא points out that the answer is obvious, but rather the question was if he just set up the brick and someone else worshipped it. The way the רמב''ם looks at the question seems related to a different argument if one slaughters an animal of someone else to an idol if that animal is forbidden to be used. There the רמב''ם holds like the opinion it is not forbidden to derive benefit from. So here the fact that the brick is man made changes that.

 

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Rav Shach asks about a certain law in the Rambam. [Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 3] "One puts up a brick to worship it, and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an "act".

He has a certain answer for this but it occurred to me a different answer. The Rambam holds by the law of Rav Huna that one can not make an object of someone else forbidden. [You see this in the law, if one slaughters an animal  of someone else to idols, the animal is not forbidden to gain use from.]

Now there is the fact that an act on one's an object that is man made makes it forbidden. But that is not the case here. The gentile bowed to an object of someone else. And the setting up of the object in itself does not make it forbidden. It just makes to prepared to be worshiped. So that together with the act of the gentile makes it forbidden and that is what the Rambam means the setting it up is an "act". That is the setting it up along with the worship of the gentile makes it forbidden. That is, that that is a whole act.

[The idea here is that the way the word "act" is used is different from the simple idea of worship. For example in Laws of Idolatry chapter 8. law 1, we see that even worship of an animal does not make it forbidden to be used. Only an "act" like slaughtering it for an idol or exchanging it for an idol makes it forbidden. This is not the same thing as what makes an animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the temple in which case simple worship is enough to make the animal forbidden. At any rate we see the way act is used in this context is very specific. And that is the way the Rambam uses the word in chapter 8 law 3 where he writes, "One puts up a brick to worship it and then comes a gentile who worships it, it is forbidden to derive benefit from it because the setting it up is  an 'act'". So he can not mean the act here means the object is forbidden. Rather the act of setting it up in connection with someone else coming and worshipping the brick is what makes it forbidden.]

So what happens if one sets up a brick to worship it but has not yet worshipped it? That is what i think is what the Rambam is addressing here. We know that even one does that with an animal or even if he worships his own animal that animal does not become forbidden to be used since it is not man made. But what about a brick? This seems to be the case the Rambam is addressing. The fact if setting it up would not make it forbidden. But if someone else comes and bows down to it, that in connection with his setting it up would make it forbidden.

[This all come from a Gemara where the question is asked if one sets up a brick to worship and then worships it if that brick is forbidden to be used. Then the Gemara points out that the answer is obvious, but rather the question was if he just set up teh brink and someone else worshipped it. The way the Rambam looks at the question seems related to a different argument if one slaughters an animal of someone else to an idol if that animal is forbidden to be used. There the Rambam holds like the opinion it is not forbidden to derive benefit from. So here the fact that the brick is man made changes that.]

The great thing about Litvak yeshivas is that they learn and teach authentic Torah.

 I have thought about an idea of making a Litvak yeshiva in every city. A yeshiva in the path of the Gra and Rav Shach would give people  a great idea of the essence of Torah. However the difficulty is that not every Litvak yeshiva is Ponovitch or the Mir. Some are good and some not so good.

A different idea occurred to me about the ancient custom to learn Mishna between the afternoon prayer an the evening prayer. This in fact seems like a great idea.

The great thing about Litvak yeshivas is that they learn and teach authentic Torah. 

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 I wanted to mention that even though you have the space foam [little black holes] which are sort of like the Dirac sea of negative particles that fill space, still space is not quantized. There can not be any sudden jumps because of Max Born's four postulates. It has to be that way because otherwise there would be infinite momentum at the jump-off point. [However I am wondering if perhaps a Lipschitz function might fill the needs of the Max Born postulates. It would have a limited derivative even though space would not be continuous. And that might be helpful for the space foam which  seem to mean that space would not be continuous, [even if they are connected by worm holes as mentioned by Alsaleh]] [The original idea of worm holes connecting the quantum foam came from a paper  by Robert Penna]

I also wanted to mention something that was noted by Kelley Ross. That the uncertainty principle does not just mean a limit on what one can know. It requires that things do not have both classical values of position and momentum at the same time because otherwise the electrons would fall into the nucleus. And there are lots of hydrogen atoms in the universe that are not observed.[So it is not just Bell's inequality which shows that things do not have classical values until they interact with something big. Even the very existence of hydrogen atoms shows that.]

Things sacrificed to idolatry

Things sacrificed to idolatry are forbidden to be used. Rav Huna in the Gemara holds of one does an act on an animal that even someone else owns, the animal is still forbidden to derive benefit from. And that is the way the Raavad decided the law. But Rav Nahman, R.Amram, and Rav Isaac decided the law is that when one does an act on an animal that he does not own, then the animal is permitted. And that is how the Rambam decided the law. But when they say an "act" they mean slaughter, not just bowing down.

So that is what makes it a bit confusing when it comes to a different kind of prohibition that when an animal is worshipped even one that belongs to someone else, that animal forbidden to be brought as a sacrifice in the Temple. And there the Rambam holds that is even any kind of worship. But the Raavad holds there too there needs to be a physical act on the animal to make it forbidden.

Rav Shach has an explanation for the Rambam in this case. He brings that the prohibition of bringing a worshiped animal to the Temple is learned in two different ways. One way is from the beginning of Leviticus. "Bring from the sheep". That verse is extra since we already know you can only bring sheep or goats or cows as a sacrifice. So the Gemara learns that the verse is coming to exclude something. That is a worshipped animal. But there is a different teaching that that same prohibition comes from "their destruction is in the their defect is in them". Rav Shach shows that the Rambam holds from the second teaching and then that implies that any kind of act in which the animal is worshipped makes it forbidden to bring to the altar. 

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