Reason with Faith

The approach of the rishonim to combine faith with reason. It was pointed out to me that that is not necessarily the approach of the prophets. It does seem clear that the prophets wanted to be understood on their own terms.

My own approach is that I have seen a bit too much of religious fanaticism to think that faith without reason leads to much good. Reason without a priori assumptions also is empty.
So to me it seems the approach of Reason with Faith is the best. But then what is the right kind of synthesis? Immediate non intuitive knowledge. as brought in Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross makes the most sense to me.

Talmud Babylonian Bava Mezia page 43a Tospfot.

Tosphot asks a question on Rav Huna. The Maharam Shif makes note that the same question could apply to Rav Nahman. Besides that I also have a question on the answer of Tospfot to that question.

The Mishna says when one gives to a money changer money to guard that was not wrapped up, the money changer can use the money and so if it is lost then he has to pay it back. Rav Huna said not just if it was lost in a small accident but also in a big accident. That is he is a borrower since he can use it. Rav Nahman says only in a small accident but in a big accident then he does not have to pay it back. Tosphot asks on Rav Huna whether a seller can use the money he receives before the buyer has picked up the fruit that he is buying. [That is before the actual deal is done]. If he can  use it then there is a question from the barber. [If one pays a barber with money (bedek habait) that one dedicated for use in the Temple. then he is not transgressing the prohibition of meila until the haircut begins.] If he can not use it then why can he not say "your money was burned up in the attic before you picked up the fruit and since I did not own the money at that time then the deal is off."
So the Maharam Shif asks why not ask the same thing on Rav Nahman. Normally you would respond well the question does not apply to Rav Nahman because to him the money changer is only a paid guard who can not use what he guards. But here we have a case where the paid guard can use what is is guarding.

במשנה יש דין הנותן כסף לשולחני לשמור אם הכסף אינו חתום אז השולחני יכול להשתמש עם הכסף ולכן אם הכסף נאבד השולחני חייב. לדעת רב הונא הוא חייב גם אם הכסף נאנס באונס גדול כמו גזלן עם נשק. היינו יש לו דין כמו שואל. רב נחמן אמר רק אם נאבד אבל אונס גדול פטור כמו הדין של שומר שכר. תוספות שואלים מן המשנה נתן לו מעות ולא משך ממנו פירות יכול לחזור בו היינו בקניין רגיל אין חלות של קניין עד שהלוקח מושך את הפירות. זה שמשך המוכר את הכסף אינו מעלה ואינו מוריד. אז תוספות שואלים ממה נפשך לדעת רב הונא. אם המוכר יכול להשתמש עם הכסף אז למה זה שנתן לספר אינו חייב במעילה מיד? היינו שיש לנו את הדין גזבר או מי שיש לו כסף של בדק הבית שנתן את הכסף לבלן ה גזבר חייב במעילה אבל אם נתן את הכסף לספר לא. החילוק הוא שמיד שנתן כסף לבלן הוא יכול לרחוץ מיד אבל בספר אין קניין עד שמתחיל את התספורת. אז אם מוכר יכול להשתמש עם הכסף עד שלא נגמר את הקניין למה מי שנתן לספר אינו חייב מיד. מצד שני אם המור אינו יכול להשתמש עם הכסף אז למה המוכר אינו יכול להגיד ללוקח נשרפו מעותיך בעלייה? היינו עד שלא נגמר את הקניין נשרפו הכסף. אז אם אין אחריות למוכר הוא יכול לומר נשרפו מעותיך בעלייה.
המהר''ם שיף שואל למה לא לשאול אותו דבר על רב נחמן? לרב נחמן השולחני יכול להשתמש עם הכסף הגם שהוא שומר שכר ולכן יש לשאול המוכר יכול להשתמש עם הכסף אבל אינו חייב באונסים. תוספות עונים בתירוץ הראשון אין שמירה לכסף אלא בקרקע. אבל אני שואל שזה היה צריך להיות גם בשולחני עם מעות צרורות! והוא אינו חייב!

[So just to be clear--I think what the Litvak Torah world does in trying to keep out evil people is a great thing. The problem is that they usually do not pick the right ones to throw out.]

I noticed that in the two great Litvak yeshivas that I was in there was a kind of exclusivity. --that is a kind of attitude that only we have the truth. And to some degree they are correct. When you look at the general religious world it is hard not to notice that the ones that have really\ quality are the Litvak yeshivas.  But I try to hold more from a kind path that you see in some Rishonim [medieval authorities] where there is also an emphasis on Metaphysics and Physics.

And I did anyway have troubles in the Litvak world. So even though I recognize their point about the importance of Gemara Rashi and Tosphot in depth and still wish that I would be able to sit and learn Torah all day like they do, I have found that it does not work so well for me. And after that I anyway started paying attention to the Rambam and the חובות הלבבות about the importance of learning Aristotle and Physics.

The thing about the Litvak world was that as long as I was a part of it, things were great. That is in Shar Yashuv and in the Mir Yeshiva in NY. But once I came to Safed I kind of dropped out of it and then found that I was no longer welcome when I wanted to get back in.
 There is some effort to keep out evil influences and I guess that is what they thought of me. But they are for some reason not really all that successful in keeping out evil influences. For example they ignore the two important warnings of Rav Shach and the Gaon of Villna--the Gra. So as David Bronson noticed--they do try to keep out people that are connected with the Dark Side--but they usually mix up who in fact really is a problem.

[The problem with the Sitra Achra in the Torah world I admit is hard to discern. You really need "faith in the wise" to believe that the Gra was right and Rav Shach also. It is not visible on the surface. And also in terms of the writings of the Ari it is not obvious at first glance why the Gra was right. It takes a certain degree of discernment to see the problems.[I should add that however this problem is not limited to the Dark Side in the world of Torah. Because in fact in every area of value there is an equal and opposite area of value that pretends and poses as if it is the real thing.]

c

Spinoza. A few critiques.

 A few critiques.

When in high school I used to try to learn Spinoza. I was never on the intellectual level to even begin to criticize him. But eventually I began to notice a few things. One is that all the rishonim [medieval authorities] hold that God created the world something from nothing. Not from himself. [I mean to say that in Torah thought, God is simple. He has no substance, nor form. So the world is not made of his substance. He has no substance. I also noticed at some point that Leibniz has an extended critique on the proofs of Spinoza. I also saw at some point in a footnote on a book on Aristotle by an Israeli professor that Aristotle puts on substance lesser restrictions than Spinoza does. That is to say the function of substance in Aristotle is the sub layer that modes are applied to. Hot cold etc.But Spinoza has substance occupying a much more difficult position. That is to Spinoza substance can not be effected by anything else.

Last but not least I noticed that Hegel has a few points that I had not thought of:the fact that Spinoza does not get from substance what he wants. He does have "nature naturing" [as Dr. Kelley Ross points out.] But that does not come out of substance. It is added in. [To Spinoza substance does have infinite modes but that still does not get to nature naturing.] So at some point I decided to go with the basic idea of Torah that God created the world something from nothing. Not from Himself.

I also at that time took note that the Ari himself states this very thing a few times in the beginning of the Eitz Haim.

The idea of Emanation of the Ari does not contradict creation from nothing as you can see right in the start of the Eitz Haim.

I might add that the Rambam makes a point in the beginning of Mishne Torah that the verse Know that the Lord is God, There are none else besides Him" means simply that there are no gods besides God but in a deeper way also that nothing has independent existence besides God

learn at a fast rate

I was on the street and saw a woman selling the pamphlets of Rav Shick about learning fast--which comes from Rav Nahman of Breslov. I mentioned to her that I saw the Rosh Yeshiva of the Mir in NY Rav Shmuel Berenbaum in the afternoon learn at a fast rate. I walked by his place in the start of the afternoon session and towards the end the the afternoon I saw he had progressed more than ten pages.
[And in terms of Gemara learning -that is a lot].


I think it is  a good idea to apply this method of learning to Mathematics and Physics. That is to have a few fast sessions in which one just says the words and goes on until he finishes the book--and then starts over again. But also to have a few sessions of learning in depth with immediate review. That is how Litvak yeshivas anyway learn. The morning for deep learning and the afternoon for fast learning.

[The reason to apply this to math is more or less along the lines of the rishonim that held that physics and metaphysics are important to learn besides the regular session in Gemara.

[I might add that in Shar Yashuv and with my learning partner David Bronson, I noticed that to get inside of Tosphot it is needed to spend a great deal of time on even just one page of Gemara. But that woulkd have to come under the category of in depth learning. That does not take away the need to do all of Shas as the Gra and Rav Nahman pointed out.]

bullying

Some girls asked me about bullying--that is what were my experiences [in school]? My answer was that I never experienced anything like that at all. The reason is that when I was in school this was simply a different day and age. That is I was in Newport Beach CA in Mariners elementary school and then later in Hawthorn elemntry school [BH] and then Beverly Hills High School. Clearly something terrible was happening in the world in the 1960's in such a way that a new world appeared in the 1970's in which the world became a crazy place. The 1960's was a transition from the world of the 1950's and the 1970's. The world became a madhouse. But I was mainly guarded from the problems since I was in the Mir in NY [after high school] and then later in Safed in Israel . So I was more or less unaware of how drastically the world had changed. What does it all mean? I am not sure.
[I might add that the reason I was accepted in the Mir in NY was that I already knew some Hebrew since I learned Torah in Temple Israel in Hollywood and after that in Far Rockaway in Shar Yashuv. I have to add that in some ways I think Shar Yasuv was superior to the Mir in terms of their analysis of Tospfot. But the Mir was more into the path of Rav Haim from Brisk.]
Since most of the time in the 1970's and 1980's I was involved in the Torah I did not see what was going on around me. Only when I emerged from my shell I saw the religious world in itself had become a hell hole. The explanation of this I found in Rav Nahman's idea of Torah scholars that are demons.יש תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאיים כמובא בזוהר פרשת פנחס/
That is to say that the Dark Side has penetrated the religious world and taken it over.

The solution to this problem seems to me to be more or less to go to a Litvak Yeshiva that follows the path of the Gra and Rav Shach as far as possible. [I assume there must be places like that even though I do not have the merit to be anywhere near one/ My impression is that I myself would not have had such terrible problems if I had simply stuck with the straight Torah path of the Gra and the Litvak world. It was the fact that I more or less left that path and then my attempts to get back in ended in failure.]

Bava Mezia page 43a. First Tosphot on the page. The question of Tosphot

  Bava Mezia it seems to me the question of Tosphot is thus. [And I should add that clearly Tosphot thinks he is asking on Rav Huna even though it can be expanded to Rav Nahman also. This you can see in the language of Tosphot where he clearly points his question towards Rav Huna. but the fact that Tosphot is on the question of RavNahman we can see he is also asking on Rav Nahman.]
  The question is this:There is no משיכה for money. I mean to say this. If the money given to the money changer would be a loan then fine. We can see that the money changer would be obligated as a person that took a loan. But he is not a borrower. he simply has permission to use the money. That does not make him a borrower. It would make him someone that borrowed an object like an ax. But money is not an ax. There is no קניין on the money as if it would be an ax.
  [The unstated problem I am trying to adress here is that the question of Tosphot seems to be more appilicable to Rav Nahman than to Rav Huna-because to R yohanan the whole reason that money does not acquire is so the seller can not say to the buyer your wheat was burned up in the barn before you took it home. This does not seem to apply to Rav Hiuna who holds the seller in that case would be liable.]
  I was not able to learn this Gemara for a few days sadly enough. But today I went to the mikveh in the sea and on the way to the library the intenion of Tospfot became clear to me.
I am still looking for a place I can sit and learn Torah but without any success.
  Anyway after writing the above paragraphs I want to just add a little bit of background as far as I can remember the gemara itself.  In the Mishna we have the law that if you give to a money changer money to guard --but the money is not sealed, the money changer can use it. But if he loses it he must pay it back. The mishna says "if he looses it:" but Rav Huna said also if he looses it by means of a accident that was not his fault he still has to pay it back. Rav nachman said only if he loses it but if it a big accident then he does not have to pay it back. Rav Nahman asks on Rav Huna from a teaching that says if a person that has in his possession an object of "bedek habait" gives it to a to a money changer to guard and the moeny changer uses the moeny, then the first person is liable for meila.
Tosphot asks from the mishna נתן לו מעות ולא משך ממנו פרות יכול לחזור בו.
בבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א. שאלת תוספות היא כך .אין משיכה לגבי מעות. דהיינו אם המצב היה שהשולחני קיבל מעות בתור הלוואה הכל היה בסדר. אבל הוא אינו לווה. הוא פשוט קיבל כסף לשמור הגם שיש לו רשות להשתמש עם הכסף. וזה אינו גורם לו להיות לווה. אבל הוא גם אינו שואל בגלל שכסף אינו חפץ. אובייקט.
השאלה שאני משתדל לענות עליה היא ששאלת תוספות נראית יותר להיות שייכת לרב נחמן. היינו שהסיבה שאין משיכה במעות היא בגלל החשש שהמוכר יגיד ללוקח חיטיך נשרפו בעליה. וזה שייך רק לרב נחמן אבל לרב הונא הנפקד הוא שואל ולכן חייב באונסים. אבל עכשיו רוצה לומר שהשאלה שייכת  במיוחד לרב הונא בגלל שאין משיכה במעות אלא אם כן הוא לווה. ובמצב שלנו הוא אינו לווה וגם אינו שואל. הרקע כאן הוא זה. החוק במשנה הוא המפקיד מעות פתוחות לשלחני ונאבדו השולחני חייב בגלל שהייתה לו רשות להשתמש בהן .רב הונא אמר אפילו אם נאנסו. ורב נחמן אמר רק אם נאבדו. ורב נחמן שאל מחוק שגזבר שהפקיד ליד שולחני מעות פתוחות והוא השתמש אתם הגזבר חייב במעילה. השאלה היא שרק אם הוא השתמש, לא אם רק נמסרו לו. תוספות שואלים מן הדין נתן לו מעות ולא משך ממנו פרות יכול לחזור בו.

I was asked a few weeks ago about Leibniz and other pre-Kantian philosophers.

I was asked a few weeks ago about Leibniz and other pre-Kantian philosophers. I do not recall how it came up. I simply walked into the Na Nach Breslov beit midrash and someone asked me about this. My short answer to them was "They are not relevant". My main point was that pre_Kantian thinkers got to a certain point in the conflict between Mind and Body and it needed Kant and Hegel to come up with a kind of synthesis.

On a larger scale, my idea is this. Philosophy before Plato  was leading up to Plato and then everything after that was picking up  the pieces. (The question the pre Plato people had was "How is change possible?")
This question went up until Plotinus. Then a new problem arose: Faith and Reason. [And that in itself had a subset of a different problem free will as opposed to Divine knowledge. That went up until Aquinas.

 Then a whole new question came up with Descartes; the mind body problem. Then that went on back and forth between the people like John Locke and Spinoza and Leibniz until Kant. Since then everything has been getting trying to get a handle on Kant and Hegel.

And the relevance of all this is great as politics is downstream from Philosophy. What kind of idea people have about what is truth and justice will determine what kind of society they will live in.


[And you do not really get to skip this process by assuming you know the whole truth because of some religious text you read. The problem with that is that truth is not determined by "identity philosophy." That is to choose who has the truth based on what religious group or ethnic group they belong to. If that would be valid, then why did the Rambam make such a big deal out of the importance of Aristotle? You have to say that he did not think in terms of identity politics.]

I ought to add that in terms of the post Kantian debate I think that Leonard Nelson is unjustly ignored. To me his system [the Kant Fries School] seems important. And just to add weight that that it is a fact that Karl Gauss saw the book of Fries and praised it and David Hilbert clearly held that Leonard Nelson was on the right track. But I also do not think that this takes away from the importance of Hegel. But after Nelson I think 20th century philosophy really took a nose dive into the mud.

Kelley Ross does use the Nelson Kant approach for knowledge and Shopenhaur for Metaphysics but I am thinking that Hegel's Metaphysics might be better.

Kant and Hegel

I find the argument between Kant and Hegel to be along the lines of מחלוקת בין הצדיקים argument between the righteous/ That is I see both as being as important to figuring out what "It is all about" as Plato and Aristotle. [The idea of argument between the righteous comes from Rav Nahman and it refers to the fact that even great people seem to not be on the same page about what is important to emphasize. However there is still the problem of figuring out who is  a zakik in the first place. The problem in that is that there is a lot of sitra achra [the dark side] around that copies true tzadikim. Especially in Israel there is a lot of this problem- Rav Shach and the Gra warned about it but they seem to be universally ignored. Or perhaps it is just in the supposedly religious world that they are ignored.]

And in fact I owe a debt of gratitude to a certain school of thought of Kant based on Leonard Nelson. [That is the Kant-Fries School].

That is to say I found some of the problems in Torah thought to be almost insolvable because of two reasons. One was in understanding the basic meaning and the other problem is in practical experience.
So when I found on the Internet the school of thought of Kant Fries--that basically answered almost my questions.[That is the web site of Dr Kelley Ross from California.] However it helped also to see the essays of Dr Michael Huemer.]


There is an argument between Hegel and Kant about the dinge an sich [the thing in itself with no properties] if reason has access to it. In one way it seems that Kant has the advantage here since in his view there are two levels of reality --one in which reason can penetrate and the other in which it can not. This certainly helps when it comes to question in faith.

However the advantage of Hegel is that universals are at least accessible to reason by a process of dialectics. But when it comes to a political system I think the founding fathers of the USA were more on track.

a way to dispose of corrupt religious leaders.

Sometimes it is useful to have a way to dispose of corrupt religious leaders.

Rav Nahman of Breslov has quite a few chapters of his book [LeM] on the difficulties that stem from Torah Scholars that are demons.

The trouble with the idea of having a way of disposing of them is that thy have no authority in the first place. Once ordination was continued from Moses at Mount Sinai until about the middle of the time of the amoraim (Talmudic period). But once that authentic ordination was lost then authority reverts back to the Gemara [Talmud].
" Just like you can not add or subtract from the written Torah so you can not add or subtract from the Oral Law." Rambam in his letter to Yemen.

So anyone that claims ordination is a fraud in the first place. Much less to make money out of Torah makes it worse. So to dispose of these frauds really requires nothing more than simple awareness of the facts.

The phony kinds of ordination that is claimed nowadays started during the Middle Ages, but it has no legal validity. It is just a way to use Torah to make money--thus piling one lie on top of the other.

Question: Remember the thing about the earth being created from snow?  Fasten your seatbelt: Iyyov 37:6. (The Book of Job)

I just found it brought as a proof in the Midrash Rut from the Zohar Chadash 93:a. If the Rambam accepted the tradition that Iyyov was written by Moshe then it’s a pretty, uh, shtarke qasha. Moshe is as authoritative as it’s possible to get on the question.


My Answer: That midrash refers to the Big Bang. Not the actual earth. The idea is that snow contains structure a hexagon that you do not see in water or other things. That is why snow is used as the analogy. In Greek thought before R Eliezer there was an argument of what the world is made of. Water or fire etc or all four. So R Eliezer did not want to say all four but not one or the other either. Rather he found snow as being some combination of Solid Liquid Gas and Energy in a way that combined all four but in some way that was not any of the four.

But I imagine you are referring to the fact that the Rambam thought that Midrash is ridiculous. The Rambam can be wrong as I might have mentioned before. For some reason the great sages like Rav Shach and others made it an important part of learning to answer questions in the Rambam--and that is a worthy cause. Still with all that we see Rav Nahman ignored him in his list of things that one ought to learn every day.

 I was impressed with Tosphot when i first got to Far Rockaway and later learning sessions  simply reinforced that impression. Still the Rambam is a worthy Rishon but not one to put above any of the other great rishonim.

On the other hand the idea of the Rambam of a synthesis between Reason and Faith is a worthy idea and found in other Rishonim and Geonim. 
Pirkei Avot --I forget where is one place where the Rambam misunderstood the meaning of an Aramaic word. The commentaries over there mention this and they are right. Another place I mentioned is the Spheres and the Rings. The whole reason the Rings were introduced was because the Spheres did not explain the fact that Venus gets darker and lighter. So just in the course of one generation after Plato then spheres were abandoned and the Rings put in there place. yet the Rambam says the reason the Rings were introduced was because of the darkening and lightening of Venus.


I might add that the way of the Litvak yeshivas since Rav Haim of Brisk is great on the side that they dig in to find some way of reconciling the Rambam with the Talmud which is usually hard if not impossible. Yet they all do an amazing job. Rav Shach, Rav Haim, my own teachers at the Mir Rav Shmuel Berenbaum etc. Yet too much in Tosphot is forgotten about. people get to the point of almost just skimming over Tosphot without getting the ideas except for how the conclusion may of may not disagree with the Rambam. They ignore the whole reasoning.

Dr Kelley Ross and Dr Michael Huemer are coming from very different kinds of approaches. Dr Ross from German Idealism especially of Leonard Nelson and Fries. Dr Huemer from the intuitionist school {Prichard]. Still both very much against communism. And while I agree totally that communism is not very good-I also got to see  the Ukraine and started realizing things are not so simple. To me it looks like politics depends on DNA to a large degree. Capitalism just does not work automatically. But DNA is the one area that philosophy just can not deal with. that is the fact that people are different. not just individual people but also whole groups.

Sorry I can not go on but the library is closing and I do not have my own computer.

Talmud Bava Mezia 43

In the Talmud Bava Mezia there is a mishna that says that one who gives over money that is not sealed to a money changer--if the money changer loses it he is liable [The money changer is liable]. the reason is it was open so he was allowed to use it. To Rav Huna that means even if it was unavoidable accident. Rav Nahman askes on him from a braita [A kind of teaching that is from the time of the mishna but not included in the mishna]. It says if a gizbar [one appointed over Temple funds] gives over to a money changer money to guard--if he uses the money he [the gizbar] is liable the sin of trespassing meila.[The idea is the if the permission to use the moeny is what counts then here also the permission to use the funds ought to make the gizbar right away liable]
Tosphot asks on this question from the Mishna that one who sells some product and has received the money but the buyer has not yet picked up the product the seller can change his mind and renege on the deal.

Rav Shach and the Maharam [under the Maharsha] and the Maharam Shif all go into this subject.
But what I wanted to say here is that the question of Tosfot is thus: It does not seem to be any question on Rav Huna since in a case of meila or just regular buying and selling the permission to use the money does not exist. Only actual using the money counts. So also in our case of just giving over money to guard what ought to count is to make one a borrower is actual using. And permission to  use should only count as far as being considered a paid guard.

בבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א. משנה המפקיד מעות אצל שולחני אם היו פתוחים ונאבדו הוא חייב לשלם. לפי רב הונא השולחני הוא נחשב שואל ומחויב גם באונסים אבל לרב נחמן הוא רק שומר שכר. רב נחמן שואל שגזבר שמפקיד מעות אצל שולחנית אם השולחני השתמש אתם הגזבר חייב במעילה. היתר תשמיש אינו מועיל לעשותו שואל אלא שומר שכר. תוספות שאול  שבמכירה המוכר שמקבל מעות אינו יכול להשתמש אתם עד שהלוקח מושך את החפץ. היינו שבמכירה זה שנמצא הכסף ביד המוכר אינו נותן לו רשות להשתמש אתו. ולכן במעילה הדין דומה שאין היתר השתמשות--ולכן מה הקושיה על רב הונא?

Rav Nahman mentions the importance of being attached to a true tzadik a few times in the LeM [ליקוטי מוהר''ן]. The trouble is well known that it is hard to know who is a true tzadik and who is a fake tzadik.
Rav Nahman himself mentions this problem in the part of the Lem about saying over stories from true tzadik. He says there that only one who can tell the difference between day and night can say over stories of true tzadikim.

This came up today because I was in the synagogue of Breslov of the Na Nach group and they were learning that particular Torah lesson in the Lem. Vol I, chapter 8 I think]..

[I ought to mention here that Rav Nahman does not contradict Rav haim fgrom Voloshin in this idea of attachment to a true tzadik. The reason is that Rav Nahman does not say the intention of one's serve is to be attached to a true tzadik (as that would constitute idolatry according to Rav Haim from Voloshin] Rather--the idea of Rav Nahman is to serve God in connection with a true tzadik.

So what is a true tzadik. To answer this I think it helps to see the idea of מחלוקת בין הצדיקים argument between tzadikim [in the Lem vol 1. chapter 5 I think].


That is there can be vast differences between what kind of service the true saints did in order to serve God. It all comes down to the question of Socrates, "What is virtue (arete)?" That is to say--even though there are difference between great people--but what is the one thread that unites them? One is the one thing in each that makes them great?

[I found the idea of Aurobindo about the danger of the intermediate zone to be helpful in this regard. Too many people think they can tell who is a tzadik by their dress or other external signs.They are not aware of the danger of the intermediate zone that can give evil people the ability to preform miracles that seem to be from the realm of holiness.]

Bava Mezia 43a. The Mishna says that the fact that one gives over some money to guard to a money changer that is not wrapped up, that means the money changer is already responsible. To Rav Huna he is a borrower. To Rav Nahman he is a paid guard.

Later Rav Nahman asks on Rav Huna from a braita that says if gizbar [one appointed over Temple funds] gives over money to a money changer, the money changer trespasses the prohibition of {Meila} using unauthorized temple funds] if he uses the money.

The question I have at this point even before getting into the Tosphot on the page is how this relates to what Tosphot says later on on page 99a. There Rav Ami said if one gives over some object [bedek habait] to another person--as soon as he gives it over, he trespasses the prohibition. even before the other person uses it.

This relates to an essay in Rav Shach's Avi Ezri conserning Meila.

The Sitra Achra [Dark Side] seems to be part and parcel of the religious world.  The reason I think is some idea that Rav Nahman brings סביב רשעים יתהלכון [psalms 77]"The wicked go round about". That is,--where ever there is holines the Dark Side tries to get in. This makes it hard for me to find anywhere I can sit and learn. To some degree I feel that if people had listened to the Gra and Rav Shach this problem would not be here. But also I realize that people will often choose evil even when great tzadikim like the Gra warn correctly.

Wyat Earp and the OK Coral. I think the Clantons were trying to draw the Earps into a trap.

There are probably experts out there that know better than I. But I want to suggest that there is some aspect of the shootout at the OK Coral that I find hard to understand.
Was it so hard to find the Earps? What in the world were the Clantons and McLaurys doing around Fremont Street? They certainly were not looking for the Earps. Rather, what seems to me is that they were trying to draw the Earps into a trap. That is why one fellow came up to them while there were at Allen Street and 4th and told them the Clantons were at the OK Coral. They were hoping the Earps and Doc Holiday would walk straight to the OK Coral from where they stood,  and when their back were turned to start shooting. But in an unexpected way, the Earps instead turned up to Fremont and 4th Street and started walking down Fremont beyond the back entrance of the OK Coral, and then  they saw the Clantons standing around that empty lot besides the photography studio. [They were obviously waiting for the Earps. They certainly were not going around looking for anyone!]

This is also I think the cause of Behan to try and stop them thinking that the Clantons plans had gone haywire.

One point I would like to bring out is that the Earps were not hard to find. Vigil was the Sheriff, and his two brothers were his deputies.

[It seems clear to me that Wyat Earp suspected a trap, and thus walked up the opposite way.]

way of learning of Rav Nahman

The way of learning of Rav Nahman was to say the words and to go on. And not to do any review until one has finished the book one is learning until he or she has finished it. Then to review again and again. This comes up in the Conversations of Rav Nahman 76. But it is also brought in his Magnum Opus {the LeM}.
I suggest applying this to things that are beyond the general accepted Torah sessions. --To include Physics and Mathematics. The reason I say this is more or less based on the Musar book The Obligations of the Heart and the Rambam. These Rishonim saw in natural science and Metaphysics an imperative. To the Rambam, Physics and Metaphysics are included in the commandments to love and fear God.
However, it is true that most people that are good in these subjects have IQs that are way beyond us regular people. So my point here is not that everyone can be a genius at these subjects-- which I realize are difficult. It is rather that everyone has access to these subjects --even though they might think that they do not. And these access is through this path of learning fast--saying the words in order as fast as possible and going on to the end of the book--and then tart again.     

[In Far Rockaway, Rav Freifeld emphasized review of every chapter 10 times,- but I found that did not work very well for me. I whittled it down to review twice of every paragraph. But when it came to math and Physics, I found the only thing that seems to work for me is this path of learning of Rav Nahman.]
[However, even with Rav Nahman, there is a place for deeper learning [as he also mentions in Conversation #76] [And the Le.M VOLUME I chapter 74]. So when I try to learn Gemara, I do try to spend a little more effort into the deeper aspects. But when it comes to Physics, I find that efforts on depth tend to take away the time I need to get the big picture. So there I tend to concentrate more of Rav Nahman's path of just saying the words and going on.]

Just for a reminder "outside wisdoms" are not books on natural science, but as the Rif [Rav Isaac Ilfasi ] and Rosh [Rabbainu Asher] explain they are books that explain the Torah in other ways besides the Sages of the Gemara.[You can find this idea of the Rif in the first mishna in chapter Helek in Sanhedrin]

It is well known that the way of counting the days of nida (woman that sees blood) for the Rambam is different than all other rishonim. The basic place that I recall shows the way of the Rishonim to be correct is Arakim 20.
The Mishna says אין פתח בטועה פחות משבעה ולא יותר מי''ז. [A woman that forgets the days of her period is not less than 7 and not more than 17]. And the Gemara goes on to explain it. The basic idea is lets says she see blood for a day. So you say that is the beginning of nida and you wait 17 more days. but even if she sees three days in a row that could be all zava or the last one could be the beginning of nida. In any case you never have more than 17. But the number goes down after 3. So each day after that she needs to count one day less. But To the Rambam this can not work. To his way the last day can always be the beginning of nida and she would need a whole 17 days.
[1-17;2-17;3-17;4-16;5-15;6-14;7-13;8-12;9-11;10-10;11-9;12-8;13-7]
The only thing I can imagine here is perhaps the Rambam simply found a different Gemara someone that to him implies that his way is correct.

The basic way of the Rishonim is that a woman that is once a zava never goes back to count nid until she has counted seven clean days This seems crytal clear in that Gemara in Arakim.
To see that the Rambam can not fit with the Gemara in Arakim take for example a woman that sees 13 days. With the Rambam the last day might be the beginning of nida. But that Gemara says she only needs then 7 clean days and then starts to count nida again. So the Rambam must have found someother place which he thought shows his way is correct.]




[The way of the Rishonim is seven days is nida [even if she sees only one day] and then mikve at the night of the start of the eight day. But if after that she sees for three straight days she is a zava and needs seven clean days. And she does not go back to nida until she has counted 7 clean days.
To the Rambam the cycle is always 7-11-7-11-7... unless she gives birth. 

I recall vaguely that the popes at the time of Joan of Arc were in a kind of precarious position. The one right before she was burned at the stake had a high ranking bishop accuse him of calumny or something like that. I forget the whole story. But in any case, the popes back then were not considered sacrosanct like a Roman tribune.

[What I mean is that, (from what I recall), a tribune could not be hurt in any kind of way. If a person even just laid a hand on a tribune, he could be killed on sight by any plebian at any time without trial. But popes apparently were not like that.]

The point is that the position of any pope was precarious unless he agreed with what the bureaucracy wanted to hear. That has been suggested as a reason that even if the popes at the time had wanted to interceded for Joan, they would not have been listened to. Popes have gained undreamed of power that they originally never had.

There is a notion of Hegel that form [essence] shines forth, not matter. The idea I realized is based on Kant that the thing in itself is not known. It is only the attributes that are known. So Hegel expands on this to mean that the reason we know forms is that they allow themselves to be known. They shine forth. But then Hegel goes on to say the form also in reflected into the thing in itself. He means to say there is a connection between the form that goes beyond their just being attached to an object.

the work my Dad did on the infrared satellite systems

I wanted to mention the work my Dad did on the infrared satellite systems that were made at TRW and the launched in 1970. The basic story was that he created the infrared camera in the 1950's. Then
he went into private business with another invention [the Copy Mate x-ray machine]. So when the USA government wanted to create a early warning satellite system using infra red the logical place to go was to the actual inventor of the system that is Phil Rosenblum [Rosten]. Then after that system was created he went on to create laser communication also at TRW for SDI. But that system was not launched until many years later since in the meantime there was a spy for the KGB at TRW, so the whole space program was closed down for some years until it reopened in the 1990's. [That whole sad incident was made into a movie with Steven McQueen called The Falcon and the Snowman named after the two traitors that gave American secrets  including my dad's work to the KGB.]]

[My dad was considered very highly even before that. During WWII he was responsible for the smooth running of six B-29's.]






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תוספות בבא מציעא צט ע''א וקידושין נ''ה ע''א

The משנה says מועל with בדק הבית goes out to חולין. That is אין מועל אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. The תוספתא פרק ב says יש cases when בדק הבית also stays הקדש. This is the question of תוספות in קידושין נ''ה ע''א. The answer  looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to ר' מאיר  that מזיד it goes out to חולין. This seems to be open and plain in the words of תוספות even though he does not mention ר' מאיר. The second answer looks to be straight like ר' יהודה that only if he שוגג that it goes out to חולין. The actual division that תוספות says there is whether he thinks it is his or not. And besides that I think this is possible to be what תוספות means in Bava Mezia page 99a also. However the משנה למלך on רמב''ם laws of 'מעילה פרק ו' הלכות ד' וה says the difference is whether he gives the ax to another person or not. It looks like the מהרש''א understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek. However the Maharshal divides the answers of Tosphot into two parts. So to me it looks like the marshal understands Tosphot as I said.


במשנה כתוב אין מעול אחר מועל אלא בבהמה וכלי שרת. היינו שמעילה בבדק הבית יוצאת לחולין. אבל בתוספתא כתוב מצבים שיש מועל אחר מועל בבדק הבית. זו שאלת התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א. נראה לי שתירוץ התוספות הוא שזה תלוי רק באם הוא חושב שכלי שלו. אם הוא חושב שהוא שלו אז לר' מאיר הוא יוצא לחולון  ולר' יהודה רק אם הוא יושב שהכלי של אחר.
אבל לפי המשנה למלך התירוץ של תוספות הוא שהכל תלוי באם הוא נתן את הכלי למי שהוא אחר או אם הוא משתמש בו בעצמו. הדבר שקשה להבין במשנה למלך הוא שאם הוא נותן את החפצא שמי שהוא אחר הוא יוצא לחולין בהכרח אז מה אפשר לעשות עם המחלוקת בין ר' מאיר לר' יהודה

the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55

If you have some object that you want to give to the Temple in Jerusalem and you say something that indicates this, then the object becomes sanctified. If it is one of those things that can be offered on the altar that is one kind of holiness. If not then it is just given to the Temple for its money value. In the meantime if someone uses it before it gets to the Temple and is redeemed then that person has to pay the amount he causes the vessel to lose value. If he just gives the object to someone then this is an argument between R Meir and R Yehuda. To R Meir if he knew it is holy then it became unconsecrated when it changed hands.But if he did not know then not.  To R Yehuda it is just the opposite.



The Mishna says moel [one who uses] with bedek habait [something consecrated for the Temple] goes out to hulin [to be not any more consecrated]. The Tosefta says There are cases when bedek habait [consecrated ]also stays holy [kodesh]. This is the question of Tosphot in Kidushin 55. The answer there looks to me to be straightforward. The first answer is to R. Meier that on purpose it goes out to hulin [secular]. [That is: R M says if one uses a sanctified object to marry a woman if he knew it is consecrated then she is married. If he did not know then she is not. The idea here is that one usually marries a woman by means of giving her some object that is worth some amount of money. But here the object does not belong to him. But still when he gives it to her it becomes not consecrated and she can use it].This seems to be open and plain in the words of Tosphot even though he does not mention R Meier. The second answer looks to be straight like R Yehuda that only if he thinks it is his that it goes out to hulin [secular].  The actual division that Tosfot says there is whether he thinks it is his or not.
And besides that I think this is possible to be what Tosphot means in Bava Mezia page 99a also.
However the Mishna Lamelek on Rambam laws of Meila perek 6 halachas 4 to 5 says the difference is whether he gives the ax [which was consecrated towards use in the Temple] to another person or not.
I learned this subject in Uman with David Bronson and for some reason I do not recall that we discussed this problem.
I have been troubled by the Mishna LaMelek for over a week and am also upset that I do not have my old learning partner to straighten out this issue for me. I mean the basic issues look clear--even if I do not understand the Mishna Lamelek. But where David Bronson excels is in deciphering the actual words of Tosphot when Tosphot is unclear and to me the words of Tospfot in Kidushin do look unclear.

And in partcular I have to admit that it looks like the Maharsha understands Tosphot like the Mishna Lamelek


The problem that has bothered me with the Mishna laMelek is if you say that when he gives the object to his friend it goes out to hulin then what do you do with the argument between R Mei and R yehuda [in kidushin page 52b]?

Gender wage gap

Thousands of cases were brought and the number keeps rising. But less than one percent of the cases are won. [Actually less than one percent but I forget the exact number.] Just because you can accuse someone of something does not mean they did anything wrong. The wag gap is like that. I am sitting in a library where girls are writing a paper that assumes the wag gap is true and suggest solutions. But why bring solutions to a problem before you know there is a problem.

I was in Netivot with the same problem. They assumed in the public schools that global warming is a fact without verifying the facts.





Thomas Sowell makes this point :

If the 77 percent statistic was for real, employers would be paying 30 percent more than they had to, every time they hired a man to do a job that a woman could do just as well. Would employers be such fools with their own money? If you think employers don't care about paying 30 percent more than they have to, just go ask your boss for a 30 percent raise!

Rambam nedarim has one law that comes from the Mishna: "'Not Hulin I will eat of yours,' is forbidden."The reason is that it means, "a karban I will eat of yours."  That is like R. Yehuda that from a "no" we can understand a "yes." Then in two laws later he says, "'hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."  That is like R Meir that we do not know a "yes" from a "no." Because if we would learn from the implication of "no" to "yes" it would mean, "Hulin I will not eat of yours, but a karban |I will eat of yours."

The Raavad asks this question. The Raavad asks this question on the Rambam. The Radvaz says the Rambam in  fact holds like R Yehuda and so the only question is the later law. The Radvaz points out that Rav Ashi makes a difference between To hulin and to not Hulin. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. Hulin I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the Radvaz means in that in the later law the no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler.
So in the first law of the Ramabm we know that there is only one thing that is not hulin. It is  a karban. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any hulin of yours does not mean I will eat a pkarban of yours. I might not eat not hulin nor a karban.

________________________________________________________________________________


רמב''ם נדרים has one law that comes from the משנה. This is it. "Not חולין I will eat of yours is forbidden." The reason is that it means a קרבן I will eat of yours.  That is like ר' יהודה that from a no we can understand a yes. Then in two laws later he says חולין i will not eat of yours is מותר.  That is like ר' מאיר that we do not know a yes from a no. Because if we would learn from the implication of no to yes it would mean חולין I will not eat of yours but a קרבן |I will eat of yours.

The ראב''ד asks this question.  The רדב''ז says the רמב''ם in  fact holds like ר' יהודה and so the only question is the later law. The רדב''ז points out that רב אשי makes a difference between  לחולין and to  לא חולין. How does that answer the question? For in the later law we also have a no. היינו שלא אוכל לך חולין I will not eat of yours. Clearly what the רדב''ז means in that in the later law. The no comes in front of the verb, not the noun. But why would that makes the difference? The answer is that from a no you can learn a yes can only be the case if there is a one to one correspondence between the cause and effect. But if that is not the case then we do not know a yes from a no. For example. We know if it is raining then it is wet outside. But if it wet outside we do not know that it is raining. Someone might have turned on the sprinkler. So in the first law of the רמב''ם we know that there is only one thing that is not חולין. It is  a קרבן. But in the second law the fact that I will not eat any חולין of yours does not mean I will eat a קרבן of yours. I might not eat not חולין nor a קרבן.

ברמב''ם הלכות נדרים יש הלכה. האומר לא חולין שאני אוכל לך אסור. כלומר שזה דומה שמי שאומר קרבן שאני אוכל לך. זו דעת ר' יהודה שמכלל לאו אתה יכול להבין כן. אבל אחר כך הרמב''ם פסק  חולין שלא אוכל לך מותר. זו שאלת הראב''ד. הרדב''ז עונה ממה שהגמרא מביא רב אשי שיש חילוק בין לחולין ללא חולין. אבל בחוק השני יש גם לא. היינו חולין שלא אוכל לך. תירוץ. אם יש התכתבות אחת לאחת בין סיבה למסובב אז מכלל לאו אתה יודע כן. אבל אם אין התכתבות כזה אז לא. למשל אם יש גשם אנחנו יודעים שבחוץ הוא רטוב. אבל אם הוא רטוב בחוץ אין אנו יודעים שהוא יבש בחוץ בגלל שיכול להיות שמי שהוא פתח את הממטרה שלו. לכל בעניין שלנו לא חולין יש לו רק פירוד אחד היינו קרבן. לכן לא חולין שאוכל לך פירודו קרבן שאוכל לך. אבל זה שלא אוכל לך חולין אין מזה מובן שכן אוכל לך קרבן אלא שיכול שלהיות שלא אוכל לך לא חולין ולא קרבן.

The religious in general give me the creeps.

I think the best approach to passover is to stay home and do as much as one can do without going to any religious people. I think people make too much of a problem out of Passover in such a way that people get the idea the can not stay home and do it themselves. I think in general is the best to not go to any religious place except if you have a Reform or Conservative place nearby. The religious in general give me the creeps. [However I do like the Breslov Na Nach Groups and also I like the Litvaks [i.e., Lithuanian yeshiva type people.]  
I should add that not just Breslov but some other groups I think are OK like Vishnitz and Ger.] 

It occurs to me that you only find strong old trees where the wind and rain blow hard. In the sunny valleys where a tree encounters little resistance, it does not grow strong.
So it is in life that the problems are often opportunities for growth and to learn from one's mistakes.

When sailing also it is a rule that you do not want the wind right behind you. That causes one to lose control of the boat. You want to go to the side of the wind where it is coming at an angle--for the same reason as ditto. You need a bit of resistance.

Musar movement of R. Salanter

It is possible that the Musar movement of R. Salanter and his ideas do not work as well as one would hope. But when I was in the Yeshiva world I found that combination of intense learning of Gemara and Musar [Ethics] [the ethical works of the rishonim [medieval authors]] to be a potent combination that works for self improvement. And from what I can see -it does work to a high degree.. [The only thing is that I felt I needed the imput of idea from Rav Nahman also.]

I mean to say that the way of the Litvak yeshivot is good in which the morning is devoted to in depth Gemara learning and fast in the afternoon, while Musar is only given a short amount of time. Still the Musar periods I think should be expanded. 

Shaari Teshuva by R. Yona

Why it is important to remember the past is to learn lessons for the present.The idea here is what it says the the Gemara in Shabat אין יסורים בלי עוון  "There are no problems without sin." That is all problems that one has are either directly from some sin or indirectly. [The Gemara over there had a question about death also, but it concludes that death can come without sin- but not other kinds of problems.]

The idea is furthermore that Repentance involves remembering what one has done wrong in the past and trying to change for the better.

In any case the book Shaari Teshuva by R. Yona is one of the canonical books of Musar which are a core part of the Musar Movement. And I definitely was into that book when I was at the Mir.

I also can not see how it is possible to improve oneself without learning from the past. Maybe in theory it is possible to simply find the right path--the truth- and stick with it. But in fact unless one is a god-and has infallible knowledge--then it always makes sense to recheck your homework.

In fact from what I recall String Theory started out by the fact that one of its founders went back to recheck his work and by that discovered one of the first equations of String Theory.

I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge.

I was in the Breslov Beit Midrash today [the Na Nach group] and listened a few minutes to a book written by Rav Natan [a disciple of Rav Nahman]. [I mean to say that the general approach is to read of books of Rav Nahman and Rav Natan aloud--and I listened a few minutes.
The statement of Rav Natan was basically about "חכמות חיצוניות" [secular wisdom].
 This seems to be an argument between rishonim. There are those that go along the lines of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam that see certain secular subjects as important. There are others that say no.

I am not really sure how to deal with this issue. To me the whole emphasis on not learning secular wisdom seems to be with intention to create a kind of alternative society. --The idea is to create a kind of insulation from the outside world.
 The same thing seems to be the emphasis on dress and the skull cap and women's dress. It all seems to be geared towards creating a separate society where the religious are in charge.

I can not think of a worse nightmare than imagining the religious to be in charge. Enough said for the wise.

On the other hand I can how a great deal of secular subjects are rotten--like anything that has the word "studies".

My own approach is more or less based on the Rambam in Mishne Torah in the part that deal with learning Torah and the part in particular that says to divide one's time into three parts. There the Ramabm says one part goes for the written law. Another third for the Oral Law. And the third for Gemara. Then the Rambam adds, "The subjects discussed in the first four chapter of Mishna Torah which are called Pardes are in the category of the Gemara."
Those subjects are what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Meta-physics. [The Ramabm repeats this in the Guide.] You can see this in the Hovot Levavot also[Obligations of the Heart by Ibn Pakuda].

I can see how the world changed from when I was growing up. The world I grew up in was optimistic and open. Southern California. Things were a little different in the two yeshivas I went to  in NY Shar Yashuv and the Mir but the same atmosphere or classic American optimism was there. Then I kind of wne into a period of hibernation. I was in the Vishniz community in Meor Haim in Safed for a few years and totally lost contact with the outside world. I spent most of my time in the basic path path of Rav Nahman from Breslov of Hitbodadut.[[Talking with God in the forest]. And there was a kind of Divine light that filled the atmosphere in those days. Then it all fell through. So when I awoke the world had changed drastically. I think a lot had to do with crimes that had changed people's perspective. The world was filled with suspicion one for the other. Maybe it is justified suspicion. But it seems to me it is usually misplaced. There are lots of deviants and sadistic monstors. But they are never the people that are usually suspected.

As Rav Nahman himself made a point of this in his critique of Torah Scholars that are demons.

Today I would probably have taken Rav Nahman's teachings in a more balanced way. My center of gravity would be along the lines of the Gra and Rav Shach, while at the same time I would try to follow what is valuable and important in Rav Nahman's teachings.

Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.

I have a question in the Rambam in laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 19.
The question that I have is one that it looks like Rav Joseph Karo and the Radvaz answer but their answers look to me to be hard to understand.


The basic issue is this. There is a teaching in the Gemara that says hulin the hulin like hulin whether \I will eat of yours or will not is permitted. "'Hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden. 'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is permitted."

The Rambam says, "'Not hulin I will not eat of yours' is forbidden." [Nedarim 1:19]

Now with the Radvaz, the Rambam holds like R Yehuda that from a negative we can understand what would result in a positive. So it makes sense why the Rambam would disagree with the end of that teaching. However the question I have is that, "How does it make sense?" Should not two negatives result in a positive?

Rav Joseph Karo holds the Rambam holds like R Meir that from a negative one can not derive a positive. So I am not sure how to deal with this issue. I saw a few days ago that Rav Shach has some ideas on this subject but I still have not gotten a chance to get over to the Litvak Beit Midrash where the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach is located to study carefully what he says.

I just wanted to give a short idea of who I am for those that are wondering. I was born into an amazing family. My parents loved each other and us [their children very much]. I went to public school until it became time to choose a university and instead i decided to go to Shar Yashuv [a Litvak Yeshiva in NY] and then the Mir in NY. And then to Israel.
The experience I had in the Mir was formative of my attitudes about the importance of learning Torah and trust in God.
I have not been able to continue on that path very well and so I also went to Polytechnic Institute of NYU for Physics.

the existence of time

McTaggart argues against the existence of time. I forget the argument. I was not like Kant's. But locality is well established. as in Special Relativity. Which means cause and effect have to be close to each other and in sequence. The only way I can see Kant's point is if time is circular like Godel wanted to show.


The way you can see that causality [or locality is correct is by GPS [Global Positioning System]. Both Special Relativity and General Relativity have to be right for the system to work at all.
However there is a  set up that Einstein Podolsky Rosen thought up that Bell showed that Quantum Mechanics is  right. So you can  show from the inequality of Bell that either locality is not right or that particles do not have classical values until measured. So since we know locality is right therefore we have to take the second choice. Particles do not have classical values until measured.

I one time wrote to Dr Kelley Ross asking about this result which looks a  lot like Kant. I asked him that de-coherence is well known phenomenon. That means the wave function of particles collapses even just because a particle interacts with another particle. That is what makes Quantum computing hard to set up. He answered that some people argue that if your look at the big picture in which the lab itself is a part of the system we still have the result that things do not have classical values until measured.

Just to be a little more clear about the issues I raised in my blog from yesterday I want to explain a little as best I can.

The idea of R.   Meier is this. You can not derive a plus from a minus, a yes from a no. That means let us says you have a sentence, "If it is raining it must be wet outside." To R. Meier you can not derive "If it is not raining it is dry outside." And this came up in one of my little books on Shas. But I had forgotten this whole issue about R Meir.

This comes up in the Talumd tractate "Nedarim" page 11 side A. and in the book of Rav Shach on the Rambam laws of nedarim vows chapter 1 law 18 [actually 18 through 20].

The problem in the Rambam is in law 18 he says, '"That which I will eat of yours is not secular" and then he is forbidden to eat of anything that belongs to the other person.' That is like the Sages against R Meir.. Then in law 20 he says, "That which I will eat of yours is secular or that which I will not eat of yours is secular and that is allowed to eat from the other fellow,' and that is like R Meir. So everyone wants to answer how can the Rambam decide the law in two contradictory ways? The Radvaz [Rav David ben Zimrah], the Migdal Oz [Rav Shem Tov from Spain], and Rav Elazar Shach  and Rav Yoseph Karo each try to answer this question.


I have nothing new to add here except that I can see that I really must have been a real ignoramus (am haaretz) when I was at the Mir, because this exact chapter in Nedarim is what the whole yeshiva was learning in my first six months there and I can see now that I was completely unaware of the issues that ought to be obvious to anyone learning Nedarim--but I missed all these issues.

daughter of an"am Haaretz" -ignoramus

I was surprised to see in the commentary of the Rambam on the Mishna  that one is not allowed to marry the daughter of an"am haaretz"[that is a ignoramus]. That is it is not just good advice but actual a law. Then I noticed the same thing in Mishne Torah of the Rambam. This goes to show what they used to say in the Mir Yeshiva [during the short period I was there] concerning the choice of whom to marry: "If your wife wants you to learn Torah,- you will. If she does not want it,- then you won't."

This is an important point to consider when thinking about marriage.
 When at the Mir, I was hoping for this kind of shiduch. In the meantime, the girl [whom I knew from high school] who had been writing and calling me for years to get me, just seemed to not want to give up. I tried to explain to her nicely, and not nicely, that I was not interested in her. Yet, she just did not  give up. So one day, on the phone trying to find a place for her for the Sabbath meals, I was on the phone with Arye Kaplan. He asked why I did not marry her? I said, I wished for a daughter of a person that was into learning Torah{as in the path of the Mir}. His reaction to that was that it was not possible that I would be offered anyone else in the religious world except for a baalat mum [a person with a hidden defect]. [That is to say, I should marry her since she is a good girl that I know very well. That is preferable to someone I do not know, and would find later problems with.] So I talked afterwards to Rav Getz, a good Torah scholar who learned at the Mir. He also suggested that I marry her.[I did. Soon after we went on the normal 6 dates--every motzai Shabat. And for a while I stayed at the Mir [I forget how long. Maybe two years I think. Then Israel. So for a good long time se stuck with me as I was learning Torah and she deserves credit for that,]  


I ought to add that these issues are not all that clear, since it is possible to have a girl that wants you to learn Torah even though her background might be not religious at all. And on the opposite side of things you might have  a girl from a religious background that wants one to work. But in any case, I suggest that if one is into learning Torah in the way of the Gra and the Litvak Yeshiva World. I suggest  that this issue ought to be  a first priority. For it is hard for most people to realize what the issue is all about. It is not that it is "good idea" to learn Torah. It is more or less that learning Torah is the purpose of life and of the creation of the universe. It is the first priority beyond anything else imaginable. It is hard to see this. For I myself having fallen from this ideal find it hard to describe. But in fact there is a profound truth in this that is more or less impossible to communicate to anyone who does not already feel it deep inside of him or her.
[In later times I got involved in Physics and Mathematics, yet I feel that even though these are also important, still I wish I had been able to contunue in Torah.] The thing is --it is hard to find the right balance.

Talmud Nedarim page 11

From "no" you hear "yes". That is the sages. However R. Meier hold not. This comes up in the Talmud Nedarim page 11 and in Rav Shach's Avi Ezriin laws of Nedarim chapter 1 law 18.

I had forgotten this whole issue and because of this I would like to add a comment on my little books on Bava Mezia and Shas. But I can not because the police have my computer.
There are probably tons of things going on in this chapter in the Avi Ezri -- but the first thing that occurs to me is how this relates to a comment made my my learning partner David Bronson a few years ago.

The basic idea is this.Rashi in Bava Mezia had some comment If A then B therefore if not A then not B. I objected to this because of Aristotelian logic Even if it is true that it is raining it is wet outside but there might be other reasons for it to be wet. Therefore if it is wet that does not mean it is raining. Someone might have turned on their sprinklers.
Then David noticed in laws of sacrifices this same argument came up between Rava and the gemara.

This I wrote down in my notes. But at the time I was not aware of this disagreement between the sages and R Meier. So now it looks like Rava was going like the sages and the Gemara was going like R. Meier.
And from what I can tell that is how Rav Joseph Karo answers the problem in the Rambam himself who on the surface looks like he contradicts himself between law 18 and law 20 in laws of Nedarim chapter 1.
But I was in a Lithuanian Beit Midrash today where they have a copy of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and from my brief glance I could see that he has a different way of answering for the Rambam.
He makes a distinction beween "hatfasa" התפסה and prohibition. But I still have not had a chance to learn what Rav Shach says thoroughly.

In any case the basic idea is this לא חולין שאוכל לך אסור כחכמים. הלכה י''ח. חולין שאוכל לך מותר כר' מאיר. הלכה כ

There is something in laws of Truma of the Rambam [chapter  1] that I have a hard time with. It comes from a well known statement of Reish Lakish that if one takes the first tithe before he takes truma from sheaves of wheat that have not yet been separated and grounded then the Levi does not have to take truma but only maasar. In that the Rambam is going like the Babylonian Talmud [Abyee], not like the Jerusalem Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud holds that the Levi gives truma only if the tithe was taken after the crops became obligated. The thing that I find confusing is that in the first case the crops are tevel [obligated after the grinding] and the maasar is not even maasar. So why would the maasar be anything but a present/gift? The tithe was given before the crops even became obligated, so the maasar is not even maasar. In the case of the Jerusalem Talmud, the crops are actual tevel and still there is no obligation to give truma.

These are not really hard questions once you have verses which state that that is just the way it is. But what is odd is the Rambam says the reason in the first case is that the crops have not yet been obligated in truma. How is that a reason? In both cases you have real tevel that is not going to have truma taken from it. So on either Gemara I really have no question. It is rather the reason the Rambam gives that I find hard to understand.

The new idolatry is worship of religious leaders. Israel is so full of this that it is almost impossible to go anywhere without encountering it. This was one of the major reasons I did not want to return to Israel. As you can see in tractate Avoda Zara to go anywhere where there is avoda zara [idolatry] is a problem.
I knew there might be  probvlem but I was not aware of how extensive it is. If only Rav Shach and the Gra had been listened to, this would nopt be an issue. But for some reason even in the Litvak wolrd they are ignored for the most part.

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors

The lowest I.Q. among all university majors is the people that go into social work. And they are the people that decide whether you can keep your children? And interview children to see if they have been hurt by an adult? As in "did so and so hurt you".[That is they ask leading questions to get the children to say what they want to hear.] You must be kidding. social workers ought to be put away in some insane asylum so they can stop hurting people themselves. Asking a social worker to interview kids is like asking a monkey to do the same.
Psychologists are almost as stupid as social workers--but not quite. But they certainly think they are superior beings.

The Hegelian State is not so absurd in my eyes. I think Communism is in its very core based on serious mistake like the Labor Theory of Value--even thought that was accepted as fact in the time of Marx--still it is not true that they value of any thing depends on how much labor went into making it. Rather it depends on how much people want to buy it.

And Hegel's model was in any case meant to help avoid the insane chaos that was the French Revolution.
And what then is up with China?
Dr Michael Huemer and Kelley Ross are against Communism in any and all forms for very good reasons and yet how else can one take control of chaos before it gets out of hand? Anyone who has been to Ukraine knows there is some kind of elements in the population that are simply crimnal and there is  alarge percent. They are not WASPS [White Anglo Saxon Protestants]. And then good elemenst are either in fact Russian DNA or Russia leaning.

In the Talmud in Nazir you have a case around page 32 or so where two people see someone coming. One thinks it is George and the other says it is Simon. The one that said it is George says "if it is Simon I will be a nazirite." The one that says it is Simon says "if it is George I will be  a Nazirite" If it is Simon the first one who thought it is George is a nazirite.

Why is this any different from nidrei zeruzim of other kinds of vow where one really does not intend the vow to actually become obligated?

I always had a kind of conflict between learning fast as I wanted to do{as I saw in a few books] in Shar Yashuv and the fact that Rav Friefeld and his son Moti were always recommending review.

So what I did was this kind of compromise that I would do the actual paragraph of the gemara twice with Rashi and also one time the English translation in the Soncino.

The idea of a sort of minimal review seemed to help me then and later on also when I was in university learning Physics I also had this kind of minimal review approach. That is one time to review the page or paragraph and go on.

This is not exactly the way of Rav Nahman that was to read the words i.e. say them in a whisper or out loud, and go on without review until you reach the end of the book and then review. But neither was it was Rav Freifeld was.


In Shar Yashuv [a Litvak yeshiva that went more or less along the path of the Gra.] They were doing Gemara in a deep way that was different from the Mir where I went later on. In Shar Yashuv the way was kind of what is called in Israel" To calculate the sugia" that is intense analysis ofg the actual words of the Gemara and Tosphot. Later in the Mir and especially with Rav Shmuel Berenbaum I saw a different approach that was based on Rav Haim Soloveichik which was global--and not concentrated on that one page in front of you. I benefited from both approaches but again as I mentioned up above when it came to personal; learning I found this kind of method of review of the paragraph twice and going on to be the thing that worked for me best. 

The basic background in Bava Mezia 101a as far as I can recall is this:
The Mishna brings the law that a renter of a field in Israel from an non Jew, takes maasar (tithe) and then pays the non Jew (probably Arab). The reason is that you can not pay your debts with tevel (produce that has not had tithes taken from it). R. Yehuda adds "also a sharecropper must take tithes and then pay." The Gemara says at first it looks like a gentile has no possesion in such a way that the crops are not obligated in tithe and a sharecropper is like a renter.

Then the Gemara brings a braita that says that R Yehuda said his law only in the case of a gentile that took the ground without paying for it. That is he stole it.  So the Gemara concludes that there is possesion and a sharecropper is not like a renter.


Sharecropping is when the worker shares some percent of the crops like Frank Hamer used to do before he became a Texas Ranger and brought down Bonnie and Clyde. 

Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

__________________________________________________________________________________




The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

I think that Rav Nahman was not in the category of the excommunication of the Gra however I do think the excommunication was valid.
The reason is something I saw in a commentary of the Rambam Mishna LaMeleh in the beginning of laws of vows [Nedarim] where he brings the Beit Yoseph who brings the Tashbaz that a herem has a category of both a vow and an oath. There the ML himself disagrees and says it only has the category of a vow. Still the point is it is valid.
That is just like one can forbid the use of a loaf of bread on another by saying this loaf of bread is a korban [sanctified for the altar] to you"--so a herem excommunication also has that same kind of validity.

The reason this is relevant to me even though others ignore this issue is that I am horrified by how the Dark Side has taken over the religious world in Israel. I wish that the Gra and Rav Shach would have been listened to. 

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of being more strict than the letter of the law.

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of "Chumrot" which is to say being more strict than the letter of the law. I was in the same Na Nach Breslov place and they were learning the beginning of Rav Nahman's book the LM vol 1:8. He does not mention this idea there but he does go into the idea that is related. The actual place is in LM vol 2 around chapter 44 I think and also around 82.
There Rav Nahman does bring up the problem of religious authorities that are demonic for the first time -and that is a recurring theme in the LM.
I was reminded of this by reading the Commentary of Rav Joseph Karo on the Rambam where he brings the case of Shmuel the amora telling one person that he must use the oil of gentiles or he would declare him a zaken mamre rebellious elder.