what motivates Muslims

I wanted to say that people that have  a secular orientation have no basis to comprehend what motivates Muslims. If they are economists they try to frame the problem in terms of economic relationships. If they are politicians they try to frame the problem in terms of political elements. The only people that can comprehend what motivates Muslims are religious people. And in a secular society religious people are ignored--even though they are the only ones that actually realize what is going on.
Muslims are motivated by Islam.  And Islam is big problem. Not that I like to knock other people, but I think the Rambam was wrong in this case. He saw the Islam of Ibn Rushd and the people that rationalized it.  I suggest starting with a thesis that Islam is evil and working back from that. That is we might very well find good people that are good in spite of being Muslim. That is they simply do not take their religion seriously.

Two complaints about Christianity

Two complaints about Christianity that Saadia Gaon and the Rambam had. 1. nullification of the commandments.  2. Divine simplicity.



[I have a drop more to say about this whole subject, but all I would be doing would be repeating the opinion of a Medieval mystic Rav Avraham Abulafia.  Professor Moshe Idel at Hebrew University has already written his PhD thesis and many more books on the subject of  A. Abulafia so I have nothing more I could possibly add to the discussion.] [However it is of interest to note that the person that actually printed up all of  Abulfia's books was a fellow from Geulah or Mea Shearim. For some odd reason with all the research they were doing at HU no one thought to actually come out with an academic version of Rav Abulfia's books. I find that odd.] 

I had been out of the States for a few years and when I returned it had deteriorated. I was alarmed and dismayed but did not wait around to see if things could get worst. From what I could tell on later visits, it had become so bad that wholesome normal people are under siege. But I still have confidence in the USA Constitution, and that things can get back on track.

Concerning the steady decline.  I have confidence the trend can be reversed. In fact, you could look on the last 8 years as being a lesson. Many good hearted people did not realize to where the democrats could lead to.  Now I think many people have seen the evidence and realize the problems.

When a certain tzadik comes into the world  and has joined with a certain divine trait completely then it is impossible to get to that same divine trait except through that tzadik.I think this explains why it is only in Lithuanian yeshivas that you can find Torah. Once the Gra came into the world I think one can come to Torah only through the path that he opened.

I know it is good business to pretend to know Torah and make what looks like a yeshiva. Sadly there are too many frauds and charlatans. Instead of naming names I stick with one simple truth: if you want to learn and understand and keep Torah you need to get to a Litvak Yeshiva. You don't need to be in it all day. Part of the day you might work or go to university or go to the beach. I am not talking about how much time you spend. I mean that simply to comprehend what Torah is about seems to me to be impossible without that proper context.

I think my parents got a hold of the "good parents" archetype. Though I forgot most of it, growing up with them was an amazing experience. There was just some numinous aspect of their lives and their relationships that just shone out with the light of a thousand suns. There was just some kind of wholesomeness and amazing love that it was all about. 

Talmud Bava Metzia Shavuot

I wanted to suggest that there needs to be some work to iron out the two subjects in Bava Metzia page 104a and in Shavuot 44a.
I am not saying these two Gemaras agree. But we need to find out if they do and if they don't then in what exact areas do they disagree?

This essay would be valid if we go like the Maharshal who considered Tosphot to continue in his normal vein that דורשין לשון הדיוט means we considered it written even if it is not written. But I think we have to drop this assumption.





I mean in Shavuot the Gemara says Shmuel only said his law in a case where he stated explicitly that the pledge is for the whole loan. [To the girsa (version) of Rabbainu Tam and Rabainu Chananel which Tosphot defends.] [We could switch this around but I am not sure this would help us.] In Bava Metzia the Gemara says one can't take a pledge more than the amount of the loan because דורשין לשון הדיוט that whether he says so or not the pledge is owned even if it is more than the loan. [That is a small pledge will still be taken as the equivalent of a large loan.] [That is we do not have a contradiction. All Shmuel says is a small pledge is equal to a large loan and all the Gemara says in Bava Metzia is the whole pledge is owed even if it is more than the loan.]

There are still many details to work out. But even before I can get to the details, I need to get the idea. Is what we are saying is the pledge is owned completely even if more than the loan and that even if it is small it is equal to the whole loan. If so these two concepts do seem contradictory prima facie.

Then the Gemara concludes not like Shmuel in Shavuot. In Shavuot the Gemara says the pledge is only equal to its own monetary value and that is the amount that it is considered to be against the loan. That is the conclusion of the Gemara--whether he says so explicitly or not  and whether the pledge was taken at the time of the loan or not. [See the Rif.] So this Gemara in Shavuot seems not like the one in Bava Metzia.

 The Gemara in BM says we consider what has been out of the document of the loan as if it was written. [That is how Tosphot explains the sugia there.] (So the Gemara there certainly makes no difference if something was written and explained openly or not. This is already entirely against the Gemara in Shavuot where the Gemara resolves the contradiction between the Mishna and Shmuel  by says one is where it was said openly the pledge is against the loan and the other is where this was not stated. And the Gemara never goes against this there. It just says no one holds from Shmuel but they do not ever modify the opinion of Shmuel. Tosphot however says if fact the law is like Shmuel but this would not make any difference in our sugia because our sugia is just the opposite case of Shmuel. If Shmuel is when he explained his meaning openly then our sugia is when he did not]


What I am thinking of doing is to say the pledge is owned even more than the loan and when the loan is payed back the amount the pledge is more than the loan has to be paid for by the borrower if he wants his pledge back. And I suggest this is what the Gemara means in BM when it  says "אלא לגירעון."  And that I think we have to say this Gemara in BM does hold by Shmuel. Furthermore the Gemara in BM is only saying this is the opinion of R Yehoshua Ben Karcha.

It is also possible that Shmuel means the pledge is considered equal to the loan even when the monetary value of the pledge is more than the loan, [not just when it is less]. In fact this might be best because then the two Gemaras might be  holding that we do not hold by Shmuel in this case and that we always look only at the monetary value of the pledge.



Appendix: That is about as far as I can think right now. The problems never seems to let up on me for me to be able to concentrate anymore. But just for the convenience of the reader I will just say over quickly the Gemara in Shavuot. The Mishna says the pledge is against the loan only according to its own monetary worth. The Gemara asks this seems not like Shmuel who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole loan. The Gemara answers  Shmuel is when he said so explicitly and the mishna is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of Shmuel is the subject of an argument between two Tenaim. R Eliezer says if the lender lost the pledge he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole loan. R Akiva says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a pledge in the first place but to be for the loan? You lost the pledge, you lost the loan.'"
The Gemara says that neither R Eliezer nor R Akiva hold from Shmuel and rather they disagree about the law of R. Isaac. R. Isaac said the lender owns the pledge. Then the Gemara pushes that off and says R Isaac was talking about a case when the pledge was taken not at the time of the loan and in that case everyone agrees with R Isaac. Rather their argument is when the pledge was taken at the time of the loan and it is parallel to the argument between Raba and Rav Joseph. Raba said a the finder of a lost object has the category of a unpaid guard. Rav Joseph said a paid guard. The gemara says even then if the lender does not need the pledge there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the lender needs to use the pledge.

The gemara in Bava Metzia says R. Yehoshua Ben Karcha  דורש לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the pledge is considered to be for the whole loan even if the pledge is not worth much. The Gemara asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole pledge? But that contradicts Rabbi Yochanan who said the lender can take the whole pledge from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather yehoshua Ben Karcha meant that if the pledge goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on then we go after other property in order that teh whole loan should be paid back.




In any case one difficulty i forgot to mention is the basic contradiction: In Shavuot the whole difference between Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Elizer is whether he explained openly that the pledge is considered equal to the loan or not. And in Bava Metzia this difference is completely erased by the idea we considered it written even if it has not been written. The answer might be that explaining the difference is not the same as writing a document. And in fact the Gemara says in Shavuot that there is no argument between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer when he has written a document. That means Rabbi Eliezer then agrees with Rabbi Akiva but not Shmuel. So we still seem to have  a problem.

________________________________________________________________________




I wanted to suggest that there needs to be some work to iron out the two subjects in בבא מציעא page ק''ד ע''א and in שבועות מ''ד ע''א
I am not saying these two גמרות agree. But we need to find out if they do and if they don't then in what exact areas do they disagree?







I mean in שבועות the גמרא says שמואל only said his law in a case where he stated explicitly that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה. To the גרסה of רבינו תם  and רבינו חננאל which תוספות defends. We could switch this around but I am not sure this would help us. In בבא מציעא the גמרא says one can't take a משכון more than the amount of the הלוואה because דורשין לשון הדיוט that whether he says so or not the משכון is owned even if it is more than the הלוואה. That is a small משכון will still be taken as the equivalent of a large הלוואה. That is,  we do not have a contradiction. All שמואל says is a small משכון is equal to a large הלוואה and all the גמרא says in בבא מציעא is the whole משכון is owned even if it is more than the הלוואה.

There are still many details to work out. But even before I can get to the details, I need to get the idea. Is what we are saying is the משכון is owned completely even if more than the הלוואה and that even if it is small it is equal to the whole הלוואה. If so these two concepts do seem contradictory prima facie.

Then the גמרא concludes not like שמואל in שבועות.  However תוספות says the law is like  שמואל. In שבועות the גמרא says the משכון is only equal to its own monetary value and that is the amount that it is considered to be against the הלוואה. That is the conclusion of the גמרא, whether he says so explicitly or not,  and whether the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה or not. See the רי''ף. So this גמרא in שבועות seems not like the one in בבא מציעא.

 The גמרא in בבא מציעא says we consider what has been out of the document of the הלוואה as if it was written. That is how תוספות explains the סוגיא there. So the גמרא there certainly makes no difference if something was written and explained openly or not. This is already entirely against the גמרא in Shavuot where the גמרא resolves the contradiction between the משנה and שמואל  by says one is where it was said openly the משכון is against the loan and the other is where this was not stated. And the גמרא never goes against this there. It just says no one holds from שמואל but they do not ever modify the opinion of שמואל.  In fact, תוספות however says in fact the law is like שמואל but this would not make any difference in our סוגיא because our סוגיא is just the opposite case of שמואל. If שמואל is when he explained his meaning openly then our סוגיא is when he did not.
The מהרש''א answers this question because he explains this סוגיא in בבא מציעא to mean that it in fact has to be written.




It is also possible that שמואל means the משכון is considered equal to the loan even when the monetary value of the משכון is more than the הלוואה, not just when it is less. In fact this might be best because then the two גמרות might be  holding that we do not hold by שמואל in this case and that we always look only at the monetary value of the משכון.

Another answer might be that that law is like שמואל and that שמואל said his law only when פרושי מפרש. Then these two גמרות in שבועות and בבא מציעא would come out equal. that is like תוספות in fact says in שבועות and this would be if we go like the גרסה of רבינו חננאל and we understand the גמרא in בבא מציעא like the מהרש''א.





Appendix: The גמרא in שבועות. The משנה says the משכון is against the הלוואה only according to its own monetary worth. The גמרא asks this seems not like שמואל who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole הלוואה. The גמרא answers  שמואל is when he said so explicitly and the משנה is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of שמואל is the subject of an argument between two תנאים.  The ברייתא  says רבי אליעזר says if the lender lost the pledge he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole הלוואה. Then רבי עקיבא says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a משכון in the first place but to be for the הלוואה? You lost the משכון, you lost the הלוואה.'"
The גמרא says that neither רבי אליעזר nor רבי עקיבא hold from שמואל and rather they disagree about the law of רבי יצחק. The גמרא says רבי יצחק said the מלווה owns the משכון. Then the גמרא pushes that off and says רבי יצחק was talking about a case when the משכון was taken not at the time of the הלוואה and in that case everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. Rather their argument is when the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה and it is parallel to the argument between רבה and רב יוסף. The argument is this. רבה said a the finder of a אבידה has the category of a שומר חינם. Then רב יוסף said a שומר שכר. The גמרא says even then if the מלווה does not need the משכון there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the מלווה needs to use the משכון.

The גמרא in בבא מציעא says רבי יהושע בן קרחה holds  דורשין לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the משכון is considered to be for the whole הלוואה even if the משכון is not worth much. The גמרא asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole משכון? But that contradicts רבי יוחנן who said the מלווה can take the whole משכון from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather רבי יהושע בן קרחה meant that if the משכון goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on, then we go after other property in order that the whole הלוואה should be paid back.




In any case one difficulty I forgot to mention is the basic contradiction: In שבועות the whole difference between שמואל and רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר is whether he explained openly that the pledge is considered equal to the loan or not. And in בבא מציעא this difference is completely erased by the idea we considered it written even if it has not been written. The answer might be that explaining the difference is not the same as writing a document. And in fact the Gemara says in Shavuot that there is no argument between רבי עקיבא and Rabbi Eliezer when he has written a document. That means רבי אליעזר then agrees with רבי עקיבא but not שמואל. So we still seem to have  a problem. This question in fact answered by the Maharsha who says that for our סוגיא in בבא מציעא תוספות is understanding דורש לשון הדיוט differently than he did before hand. In the סוגיא of רבי יהושע בן קרחה he explains it to mean we are exacting in saying the words mean exactly what their simple explanation is an if it is not written then we say it is not written.

I wanted to suggest the importance of learning in a Lithuanian kind of yeshiva. The main reason is that Torah is something that one needs to learn from people that know it well. It is kind of like in Middle Ages when you had apprentices  that needed to learn the ins and outs of some kind of skill over a very long period before they could be accepted as members of the guild or "Masters."  Torah is very much like that. The difference is it has its own kind of rules. Just like in the Middle Ages the rules of one guild did not apply to another. So in Torah there is no reason for the arena to be a free for all in which anyone who puts on the right kind of clothing is considered learned. My suggestion is to accept at legitimate only those who have put in the work; and the frauds that present themselves as experts to dispose of.

I think there are a few good yeshivas around especially in NY. Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, Mir. In Israel it is harder to spot a real yeshiva and tell the difference between it and the phonies. The reason is money got mixed into the system. No you can't tell in Israel who is learning because they love Torah and who is doing it because it is good business. It is not just hard to tell. It is nearly impossible.
The ones that you can be sure of are Ponovitch, and Brisk.

Songs to the God of Israel in mp3 and midi.

n30 [n30 in midi] k16 [k16 in midi] n31  [n31 in midi] n33 [n33 in midi] n35  [n35 in midi] n36 [n36 in midi]  n38  [n38 in midi] n39 [n39 in midi] n40 [n40 in midi] n41 [n41 in midi] [I think n31 and n33 are different even though they start with the same theme] n44 [n44 in midi] n47 [n47 in midi] n5 [n5 in midi] n51[n51 in midi] n52 [n52 in midi] n53 [edited][n53 in midi]  g2 [g2 in midi] q91 [q91in midi] p129 [p129 in midi]  p120 in mp3[p120 in midi]

People that are called tzadikim have powers from the Sitra Achra

The tzadik (righteous person) is a theme that is mentioned by the Gra  on the verse "and a river came out of Eden [Genesis 2] and was divided into four main rivers" the Gra says just two words '' זו הצדיק'' ''this is the tzadik'' The the Gra is simply drawing on the Ari. The basic idea is what we normally call the sepherah of foundation he is calling the tzadik since it is the sepherah that Joseph ben Yaakov became connected with.

Closeness to a true tzadik is important. The problem is this gets mixed up with the point of the Torah which is to serve God.

There is positive benefit one can gain by being connected with a true tzadik.
The opposite side of this is the damage one can incur by being close to a phony tzadik or one who seems to be righteous, but gets his powers from the sitra achra (the dark side).


 The two major problems with the concept of the tzadik is when people have a true tzadik, they can go overboard and cross the line into making him an object of worship. The other problem is when people have imagined they have found the real thing, but are not aware they have found a person who knows how to play the part.
The problems are so great in this area that I recommend not going to people that are called tzadikim. They have powers from the Sitra Achra {the Dark Side}. The Gra certainly saw this. 

The world of strict Judaism seems to have a problem with false messiahs. The way this works is they use consciousness traps.

The world of strict Judaism seems to have a problem with false messiahs. Sometimes they admit to following some false messiah and sometimes they do not admit that that is what they believe. This started mainly at the time of the Shatz (Shabatai Tzvi).  After he converted to Islam  his followers continued believing in him but they would deny this publicly. They would even print books against the Shatz and in private be holding meetings in his name.. This goes on today also except the name of the false messiah is changed.  This usually goes way beyond believing in some false messiah. It is almost always a form of worship towards that false messiah. And it would not be so bad except that the there is usually some kind of deeper hidden uncleanliness inside these false messiahs. This is frustrating for me to see this and be powerless to stop it. Rav Shach tried and failed. The Gra tried and failed.  What can I do?

My basic approach to this is simply to try to learn and keep Torah, but when I see this evil spreading rapidly throughout Judaism I am getting worried.

The way this works is they use consciousness traps. That it they have nice slogans and present some kind of polished public picture that makes one think they are all about good and worthy goals. Or the false messiah is given miracles from the Dark Side so he seems to be from the side of holiness. He gives good advice a few times. And  once one has decided  follow this powerful figure, then he is given some kind of directive that he ought to know is from the Dark Side. He still has free will but he chooses the darkness because of the miracles he has already seen from the false messiah.


The best way I think to avoid these problems is by avoiding cults around false messiahs. I may not be the one to organize this, but it would be  a good idea to start an anti false messiah movement.

An idea in Quantum Field Theory

It is probably just a ridiculous suggestion but here goes anyway. I am wondering if we start with Emmy Noether's theorem and put groups of fractional symmetry in the Lagrangian of QFT (Quantum Field Theory). I mean to say I have been fascinated by the idea of fractional derivatives and higher order symmetries for  awhile. So we have from Noether that for every symmetry you can put into the Lagrangian a conservation law why not just postulate symmetries and thus higher conservation laws up to any order?  What I am thinking of is not the same as translational symmetry or fractional charges like quarks.

This might sound like a ridiculous suggestion but sometimes this kind of idea gives results. Originally it was Leibniz himself who thought of fractional derivatives but he did not think the results would interesting so he did not pursue the idea. It turned out there are some interesting results. The same goes for higher orders of acceleration. The third order came up in [I forget where maybe Lorenz Abraham's theorem. I can't recall off hand.]

Further I would like to suggest the order of symmetry will have some proportionality constant  with the number of dimensions.


I really would not say anything but it is that sometimes some idea pops into my head that even to me sounds silly and then after a few years I find out that it really was a good idea.

Dr. Warren Siegel answered this:

"I'm not sure what symmetries you're thinking of, but in general if you impose too much symmetry you find that only a free theory can satisfy it."

And as for the fractional derivative he answered this:

"If by fractional derivative you mean some arbitrary noninteger power of the differential operator, the result is nonlocal (does not depend on just infinitesimally nearby points).  Locality is a basic physical property that field theory requires.  It follows from special relativity & causality."


What I am thinking is that according to the number of dimensions you have got, you have the same number of conservation laws. So for our little world we have conservation of energy and mass, electric charge, etc. In string theory we get some crumbled up dimensions for the normal 26. So what I would like to find are groups to put into the Lagrangian that will correspond to each conservation law for a different quantity. I still need to think about what kinds of groups I am looking for. But the most obvious would be those 26 simple groups I was reading about when I was studying group theory, [i.e., sporadic groups].

Dr Siegel answered to me:

"If you compactify some dimensions into a symmetric space, you'll get the symmetry of that space.

E.g., if you compactify some extra N dimensions into a submicroscopic sphere, you'll get the rotational group for those N dimensions, i.e., the orthogonal group O(N+1).

It will appear as an "internal" symmetry with respect to the uncompactified dimensions (i.e., not affecting them directly)."

So clearly I need to do some more learning and thinking. What Dr Siegel was saying I think was that all I had gotten to was the regular Orthogonal groups.

[What I am trying to do here is to put any (or all) of the sporadic groups into the Lagrangian. That is all. Nothing more. But by doing so I am hoping to get a new conservation law for each group. Then I am hoping that each law will show up in one of the crunched up dimensions of String Theory.]

Dr Siegel is in at SUNY (State University of NY) at Stony Brook,  and at the time  I wrote this I was trying to learn his book Fields.

Terrorism is in general a method of political control. It started with the Reign of Terror in France. It was used by the Bolsheviks  as a means to establish their authority. The basic idea was explained by Trotsky: if there is a reason for the arrests in the middle of the night and the sending of millions to die in the Gulags, then it is not terror. No one is scared if there are reasons. Thus we have Stalin using this idea to control the USSR. He would send orders to many cities in the USSR ordering the local KGB to arrest a certain number of people, to execute another number of people, to jail such and such a number and to send to the Gulag such and such a sum. So there was no reason for the arrests except simply to fill a quota.
Another example is in Israel where Muslims are blowing up shooting and murdering Jews pretty much on a random basis. There is never any particular reason for it except as a means of political protest. I used walk down Jaffa street every day to go the the Western Wall and one day I changed by usually routine  and it just so happened that the day I changed my route and the very time I usually was on Jaffa some Arab had gotten hold of  a sub-machine Gun and mowed down the Jews walking on the opposite side-of the street.[That was the right hand side of the street when you are walking to the Western Wall.]

That is different than taking over an empty Federal building until some grievances are solved.

Talking with God as one talks with his or her's closest friend

Talking with God as one talks with his or her's closest friend. I am sure a lot of people do this without being told. Once they hear from their parents about God being the creator of everything and that he is compassionate and he desires our being moral human beings it seems natural to automatically go to him directly to ask for guidance and help.

the best time I found for this is before going to sleep at night. but there were people that emphasized doing this more often.  We see King David clearly did this when he was in trouble and also he spent time thanking God. There was a Brother Lawrence in France who did this and wrote a bit about it also in a book called The Presence of God.

The best  idea is to go on a hike for an entire day and spend the whole day talking with God. This idea got to me and I tried doing this for some time when I first got to Israel. But sadly I did not keep up the practice. Still it seems like  a great idea and when on occasion I do this I feel I get answers.

When I was growing up in Beverly Hills we lived on the north side and there was a kind of forest in the area. And I used to do this kind of thing from time to time. There was a kind of  opening in a small groups of trees right near the main street that went up Coldwater Canyon where we lived and I used to go there and say prayers from the Jewish Prayer book and also talk to God in my own way. It is hard to do this in a big city but even at the Mir in NY I managed to find a spot where I could go and say prayers privately to God.  It is best to find a authentic Litvak Yeshiva like Ponovitch or Brisk. Private prayer should be private.

Idea in Talmud concerning the sugia in bava metzia page 104

 In בבא מציעא דף ק''ד we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The גמרא there understands this to mean we can't take a  משכון that has a larger value than the הלוואה itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the משכון out of the category of being a משכון to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the גמרא in שבועות in which the משכון if taken not at the time of הלוואה is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה that רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבא disagree about and we go by רבי עקיבא that he is considered a שומר שכר. And the רי''ף says in all cases he is a שומר שכר. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the הלוואה taken at the time of the הלוואה and consider it owned and not just as a משכון. I mean that even רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the לווה pays back the חוב. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal משכון which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a משכון that the מלווה is just a שומר שכר for. This last way  fits the רי''ף in שבועות. But it does not fit the גמרא in בבא מציעא

oregon You can read this whole article to get the whole picture, but as far as I can see there is nothing the federal government in Washington DC touches that it does not ruin. I am 100% behind the ranchers.

The terrible ways the government has treated the ranchers is not news to me. I am all too well familiar with the corrupt hevy hand of government agencies.

There are plenty of abuses of power to see here. You can see that federal government had no problem taking over private land by destroying it by criminal actions against the bill of rights. And of course the attorney general's office will nor prosecute  the  FWS because it is  just as much a criminal organization.

I have zero sympathy for the Federal government in this case. They are point blank wrong about sentencing men to prison for a grass fire, for their criminal takeover of ranchers property against the Bill of Rights. Half of Oregon was taken over by the Fedral government by "Zakaz communist decree" methods. They simply declared that "we own it." and what every ranchers did not want to sell the government redirected rivers to flood the property of the ranchers.

Ideas in Bava Metzia

Ideas in Talmud Updated  Ideas in Bava Metzia Updated

I added some ideas in the first one and changed some things in the second.

I wish I could learn Torah but these two little booklets are about the best I can come up with. I hope you enjoy them. If you can you should find Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which is the best book on Talmud to be published in last hundred years. It is easy to understand and has amazing depth and has a tremendous feeling to it.

The area  I tried to deal with anew is in Bava Metzia page 104 and in Shavuot 44.


I updated the Ideas in Bava Metzia for  a spelling error: I hate to admit it but I wrote שני פעמים which needed to be changed to פעמיים.

Shavuot

In the Talmud in Shavuot [page 44a]

 The question is that the Gemara concludes like Rav  Joseph and that is how the Rambam decides. The question is what does the Rambam do with the Gemara in Bava Metzia in which Rav Nachman says about a משכון [collateral for  a loan] that even though one can use it he is not liable in אונסים [armed robbers].

I also wanted to point out why the Rif in our Gemara in Shavuot says the law straightforwards that the lender that loses the pledge is like a שומר שכר paid guard, and in a case of armed robbers, he loses only the amount of the collateral not the whole loan. The reason is quite elegant. It comes out of the steady progression of the Gemara itself to reach that point.
The Mishna says in an argument about a case when the pledge was lost  that the lender loses only the amount the pledge was worth. Shmuel said he loses the whole loan. [he was talking about when the borrower said so openly.] R Eliezer says the lender does not lose anything and R Akiva says he loses the loan. If the pledge is worth the entire amount then why would R Eliezer disagree? So everyone disagrees with Shmuel. Their argument is about R. Isaac that the lender owns the pledge. But if it was taken not at the time of the loan everyone agrees with R Isaac. So it is at the time of the loan and the disagreement is if a guard of a lost object is considered to be paid or not. But that is only if he needs to pledge. If you follow the logic of the Gemara here you can see why the Rif (Isaac Alfasi) says that nothing matters the lender that loses the pledge loses only the amount it was worth. I can't go into it this minute but by following the logic of the Talmud you can see how he was led to this conclusion step by step.

The key is to remember that if we don't hold by Shmuel then it does not matter if the borrower said it is against the  loan or not. And if it is at the time of the loan of not also makes no difference since we go by R Akiva against R Eliezer. And even if the lender needs the pledge we still consider he is doing a mitzvah and so gets the coin of Rav Joseph and so is  a שומר שכר

There is one question I have even though I have not even gotten to learn Tosphot properly yet. The Rif does as I say take all the divisions and throws them out, and most of this you can see in the Gemara itself. The last division though I find difficult. If they all hold by R. Isaac that the pledge is owned when it was taken not at the time of the loan, and their argument is at the time of the loan and it goes by the debate between Raba and Rav Joseph, then there is a difference! A pledge taken not at the time of the loan  is owned, and for a pledge taken at the time of the loan, the lender is only a שומר שכר [paid guard]. So why does the Rif say for a pledge taken even not at the time of the loan he is a שומר שכר. He should say if taken not at time of loan he owns it and if taken at time of loan he is a paid guard.

From what I can tell Rashi answers this question in Bava Metzia. [That is he explains the Gemara there in a way that can help us understand the Rif in Shavuot--that is we can say perhaps the Rif was learning like Rashi.] He says on pg 84 that the pledge is owned completely only until the loan is paid. He says openly that what Rabbi Isaac means is that the lender is not a paid nor unpaid guard. He is an owner. But the ownership only exists until the second the borrower comes to pay back the loan. So this is not what I wrote in my ideas in Bava Metzia and I am sad to say I have to go back and correct my mistake. I was thinking around page that the lender owns the object completely.

Does this help us? Maybe. But still it looks like we still end up that for the pledge taken not at the time of the loan he is more than a paid guard--he owns it and thus is liable even in a case it was stolen by force. That is  a case the paid guard would not have to  pay for. So we still are in a mess concerning the Rif.

 That is to him when the pledge was taken not at the time of the loan the lender is a paid guard. This seems not like Rabbi Isaac. The only thing I can think might help is the Gemara in Bava Metzia 104 about דורשין לשון הדיוט that is he would own it but the language of the document brings him down one notch.  Because in Shavuot 43b the whole argument of R Akiva and R Eliezer does not apply to when there is a document. That is because everyone agrees then he is a paid guard.
_________________________________________________________________________________
 שבועות מ''ד ע''א
 The question is that the גמרא concludes like רב יוסף and that is how the רמב''ם decides. The question is what does the רמב''ם do with the גמרא in בבא מציעא in which רב נחמן says about a משכון  that even though one can use it he is not liable in אונסים.

I also wanted to point out why the רי''ף in our גמרא in שבועות says the law that the lender that loses the משכון is like a שומר שכר paid guard, and in a case of armed robbers, he loses only the amount of the משכון, not the whole loan. The reason is quite elegant. It comes out of the steady progression of the גמרא itself to reach that point.

The משנה says in an argument about a case when the משכון was lost  that the מלווה loses only the amount the משכון was worth. שמואל said he loses the whole loan. He was talking about when the לווה said so openly. רבי אליעזר says the מלווה does not lose anything and רבי עקיבא says he loses the loan. If the משכון is worth the entire amount, then why would רבי אליעזר disagree? So everyone disagrees with שמואל. Their argument is about רבי יצחק that the מלווה owns the משכון. But if it was taken not at the time of the loan everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. So it is at the time of the loan and the disagreement is if a שומר of a lost object is considered to be paid or not. But that is only if he needs to משכון. If you follow the logic of the גמרא here you can see why the רי''ף  says that nothing matters the מלווה that loses the משכון loses only the amount it was worth.
The key is to remember that if we don't hold by שמואל then it does not matter if the borrower פירש  it is against the  הלוואה or not. And if it is at the time of the הלוואה or not also makes no difference since we go by רבי עקיבא against רבי אליעזר. And even if the מלווה needs the pledge we still consider he is doing a מצווה and so gets the פרוטה of רב יוסף and so is  a שומר שכר


 The רי''ף does as I say take all the divisions and throws them out, and most of this you can see in the גמרא itself. The last division though I find difficult. If they all hold by רבי יצחק that the משכון is owned when it was taken not at the time of the הלוואה, and their argument is at the time of the loan and it goes by the debate between רבה and רב יוסף, then there is a difference! A משכון taken not at the time of the loan  is owned, and for a משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה, the מלווה is only a שומר שכר . So why does the רי''ף say for a משכון taken even not at the time of the loan he is a שומר שכר. He should say if taken not at time of הלוואה he owns it, and if taken at time of loan he is a שומר שכר.

Maybe רש''י answers this question in בבא מציעא. That is he explains the גמרא there in a way that can help us understand the רי''ף in שבועות. That is we can say perhaps the רי''ף was learning like רש''י. He says on דף 84 that the משכון is owned completely only until the הלוואה is paid. He says openly that what רבי יצחק means is that the מלווה is not a שומר שכר nor שומר חינם. He is an owner. But the ownership only exists until the second the לווה comes to pay back the הלוואה.


Does this help us? Maybe. But still it looks like we still end up that for the משכון taken not at the time of the loan he is more than a שומר שכר. He owns it and thus is liable even in a case it was stolen by force. That is  a case the שומר שכר would not have to  pay for. So we still are in a mess concerning the רי''ף.



 That is to him when the משכון was taken not at the time of the loan the lender is a paid guard. This seems not like רבי יצחק. The only thing I can think might help is the גמרא in בבא מציעא  ק''ד about דורשין לשון הדיוט that is he would own it but the language of the document brings him down one notch.  Because in שבועות מג ע''ב the whole argument of רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר does not apply to when there is a document. That is because everyone agrees then he is a paid guard.
_________________________________________

שבועות מ''ד ע''א השאלה היא שהגמרא מסכמת כמו רב יוסף וכך הרמב''ם מחליט. השאלה היא מה עושה הרמב''ם עם הגמרא בבא מציעא שרב נחמן אומר על משכון כי למרות שניתן להשתמש בו הוא אינו אחראי באונסים. אני גם רוצה לציין מדוע הרי''ף   על הגמרא בשבועות אומר החוק כי המלווה שמאבד משכון הוא כמו שומר שכר, ובמקרה של שודדים חמושים, הוא מאבד רק את הסכום של המשכון, לא כל ההלוואה. הסיבה לכך היא די אלגנטית. הוא יוצא מההתקדמות יציבה של הגמרא עצמה.  המשנה אומרת בויכוח על מקרה שבו המשכון אבד והמלווה מאבד רק את הסכום שהמשכון היה שווה. שמואל אמר שהוא מאבד את כל ההלוואה. הוא מדבר  כשהלווה אמר זאת בגלוי. רבי אליעזר אומר מלווה לא מאבד שום דבר. ורבי עקיבא אומר שהוא מאבד את ההלוואה. אם המשכון שווה את כל הסכום, אז למה רבי אליעזר אינו מסכים? אז כולם מסכים עם שמואל. הטענות שלהם הן  בדיון של רבי יצחק שלמלווה יש בעלות מלאה במשכון. אבל אם המשכון לא נלקח בזמן ההלוואה כולם מסכים עם רבי יצחק. אז זה בזמן ההלוואה והמחלוקת היא אם שומר על אבידה שאיבד אותה נחשב שומר חנם או שומר שכר. אבל זה רק אם הוא צריך את המשכון.  כאן אתה יכול לראות למה הרי''ף אומר  שמלווה שמאבד את המשכון מאבד רק את הסכום שזה היה שווה. המפתח הוא לזכור שאם אנחנו לא מחזיקים עם שמואל, אז זה לא משנה אם הלווה פרש שזה נגד ההלוואה או לא. ואם זה בעת ההלוואה או לא גם לא משנה מאחר שאנחנו הולכים על לפי רבי עקיבא נגד רבי אליעזר. וגם אם מלווה צריך המשכון אנחנו עדיין רואים שהוא עושה מצווה וכך מקבל פרוטה של רב יוסף וכך הוא שומר שכר.  רי''ף עושה מה שאני אומר לקחת את כל חילוקים וזורק אותם, וזה אתה יכול לראות בגמרא עצמה. אבל את החלוקה האחרונה אני מוצא קשה. אם כל מה שהם מחזיקים ברבי יצחק שהמשכון נמצא בבעלות כאשר הוא נלקח לא בזמן ההלוואה, והטענה שלהם היא שמצב שהמשכון נלקח בעת ההלוואה וזה תלוי בוויכוח בין רבה ורב יוסף, אז יש הֶבדֵל! משכון שנלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה הינו בבעלות המלווה, ומשכון שנלקח בזמן של ההלוואה, המלווה הוא רק שומר שכר. אז למה הרי''ף אומר משכון שנלקח אפילו לא בזמן של ההלוואה הוא שומר שכר. הוא צריך לומר אם נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה הוא בבעלותו של המלווה, ואם נלקח בזמן של הלוואה הוא שומר שכר. אולי רש''י עוזר על שאלה זו בבא מציעא.  הוא מסביר גמרא שם באופן שיכול לעזור לנו להבין את רי''ף בשבועות.  אולי הרי''ף למד כמו רש''י. לדבריו, בדף פ''ד המשכון נמצא בבעלות המלווה לחלוטין רק עד ההלוואה משולמת. הוא אומר בגלוי כי מה שרבי יצחק פירש שהמלווה אינו שומר שכר ולא שומר חינם, הוא בעל. אבל הבעלות קיימת רק עד השניה שהלווה מגיע כדי להחזיר את ההלוואה. האם זה יעזור לנו? אולי. אבל עדיין זה נראה קשה  שעדיין בסופו של דבר המשכון נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה והמלווה יותר משומר שכר. הוא מחזיק אותה ובכך עלול גם במקרה שזה נגנב בכוח. זה מקרה ששומר שכר לא יצטרך לשלם עבור זה. אז אנחנו עדיין נמצאים צריך עיון בנוגע לרי''ף.


 כלומר להרי''ף כאשר המשכון נלקח לא בזמן של ההלוואה המלווה הוא שומר שכר. זה נראה לא כמו רבי יצחק. הדבר היחיד שאני יכול לחשוב עשוי לעזור הוא הגמרא בבא מציעא ק''ד על דורשין לשון ההדיוט שהוא היה בבעלותו, אבל השפה של המסמך מורידה אותו החריץ אחד. כי בשבועות מ''ג ע''ב כל הטיעון של הרבי עקיבא ורבי אליעזר אינו חל על כאשר יש מסמך. זאת משום שכולם מסכים שאז הוא שומר שכר.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
English




What I wanted to add is this. In Bava Metzia page 104 we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The Gemara there understands this to mean we can't take a pledge that has a larger value than the loan itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the pledge out of the category of being a pledge to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the Gemara in Shavuot in which the pledge if taken not at the time of loan is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the pledge taken at the time of the loan that Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree about and we go by Rabbi Akiva that he is considered a paid guard. And the Rif says in all cases he is a paid guard. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the loan taken at the time of the loan and consider it owned and not just as a pledge. I mean that even Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the lender pays back the loan. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal pledge which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a pledge that the lender is just a paid guard for. This last way  fits the Rif in Shavuot. But it does not fit the Gemara in Bava Metzia

English and Hebrew

......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
What I wanted to add is this. In בבא מציעא דף ק''ד we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The גמרא there understands this to mean we can't take a  משכון that has a larger value than the הלוואה itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the משכון out of the category of being a משכון to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the גמרא in שבועות in which the משכון if taken not at the time of הלוואה is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה that רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבא disagree about and we go by רבי עקיבא that he is considered a שומר שכר. And the רי''ף says in all cases he is a שומר שכר. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the הלוואה taken at the time of the הלוואה and consider it owned and not just as a משכון. I mean that even רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the לווה pays back the חוב. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal משכון which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a משכון that the מלווה is just a שומר שכר for. This last way  fits the רי''ף in שבועות. But it does not fit the גמרא in בבא מציעא

If Germany does not want more jihad, it should probably not invite jihadists in.

jihad in Germany  Germany is simple. People get into certain habits of thought and then continue with them even after it becomes clear that they have crossed some line. It is the way people are. Germany has wanted to be the good Samaritan for decades by letting in people in times of need. And that is praiseworthy. But at what point does this become imprudent?

If Germany does not want more jihad, it should probably not invite jihadists in.  I admit however that I do not understand why they let it so many jihadists already. There must be something I am not seeing here.

How to form a government has been a question for a long time. People did not always live in dictatorships. The founding fathers of the USA were aware of the problems of democracy. Their way of solving the problems of democracy was by setting the powers of government one against the other. This had been in Europe during the Middle Ages the way society was operating with  the Secular power opposite the power of the church. This had been a effective method for Jewish people also.  There was even in the Talmud, a secular head and a religious leader.[ריש גלותא the head of the exiles was the secular leader in Babylonia.] This aspect of balance of powers is not effective in the USA today when all government powers are have joined with the  executive branch to effectively subjugate and silence the American people.

Herodotus brings down that Darius [the king that caused the Second Temple to be built] argued against democracy because the wicked form alliances while the good hard working people remain unconnected  individuals. This critique is certainly true in the USA. The Left wing anti God Democrats are organized and dynamic. All their energy and religious fervor goes into trying to destroy God. No wonder they love Islam and its anti God (Allah).

The right wing that is for Judeo-Christian values is not just disorganized, but there is no fervor or emotional commitment towards politics.

Dihydrogen Monoxide can cause severe burns and even death. Should it be banned? [This was an  question in a survey. 30% of those asked answered yes. ]  [Water can be heated and cause severe burns. People can drown in it also.] People can be dumb. So rule of the people has limitations. Democracy has limitations, and that is the reason the Constitution was made--to guard against these kinds of problems. So the best solution is to keep and safeguard the Constitution of the USA.