za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format

misuse of a philosophy

if every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently and held that one need to learn the organum of Aristotle known by the name of the seven wisdoms.It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam afre ignored.

the first mishna in Bava Batra המשנה הראשונה בבבא בתרא

Tosphot holds in first mishna in Bava Batra the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of derara demomona. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “We both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the gemara says openly that that is not a case of derara demomona. Now the case of derara demomona, Tosphot often says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their pleas, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the gemara in Bava Batra (page 35 side B) holds` derara demomona is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the gemara in Bava Metzia (page 3) says derara demomona is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in Bava Batra where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of derara demomona to be when they object could belong to both. later note: Rav shach brings Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 97b and the beginning of perek 10 that derara demomona is that each is considered to be holding the object. The Rabbainu Yona (bava batra page four and page 35) (who is brought by Rav Isar Meltzer) holds derara demomona is that the object is tied or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the rashbam and Tur as brought by Rav Nachum of the Mir ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of derara demomona in Bava Batra 35a that it means both might own the object. But if you hold derara demomona is like the gemara in Bava Mezia page 3a that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the ketzot HaChoshen that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two gemaras differ about derara demomona is possible to see in the language in Bava Batra 35 "it [the field that each claim that it belong to him] cannot be derara demomona because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so derara demomona means it can belong to both. In Bava Metzia page 3a it says "THE garment that both are holding cannot be derara demomona because it might belong to both" Thus if it can belong to both together then it cannot be derara demomona I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________ תוספות holds in first משנה in בבבא בתרא the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of דררא דממונא. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “we both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the גמרא says openly that that is not a case of דררא דממונא.. Now, the case of דררא דממונא, often תוספות says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their טענות, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the גמרא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) holds דררא דממונא is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the גמרא in בבא מציעא (page ג') says דררא דממונא is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in בבא בתרא where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of דררא דממונא to be when the object could belong to both. note: רב שך brings תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב and the beginning of פרק י' הבית והעליה that דררא דממונא is that each is considered to be holding the object. The רבינו יומה (who is brought by רב איסר מלצר) holds דררא דממונא is that the object is שייך or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the רשב''ם and טור as brought by רב נחום of the מיר ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of דררא דממונא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) that it means both might own the object. But if you hold דררא דממונא like the גמרא in בבא מציעא page ג' ע''א that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the קצות החושן that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two גמרות differ about דררא דממונא is possible to see in the language in בבא בתרא ל''ה "it cannot be דררא דממונא because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so דררא דממונא mean it can belong to both. In בבא מציעא ג' ע''א it says it cannot be דררא דממונא because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be דררא דממונא I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תוספות אוחז במשנה ראשונה בבבא בתרא דין חומה בחצר בין שני שותפים מתחלק שווה בשווה כיון שהוא דין דררא דממונא. אבל אם היו מחלקים כי שניהם נחשבים כמחזיקים בחומה, אז אם אחד אומר "בניתי את כל החומה", והשני אומר "שנינו בנינו", אז יצטרכו לחלק אותו שלושה רבעים, ורביעית, כמו במקרה של שניים אוחזים בבגד ששם מחלקים שלוש רביעיות ורביעית (כשאחד אומר "הכל שייך לי" והשני אומר "שנינו הבעלים שלו"). (ושם עם שניים אוחזים בבגד, הגמרא אומר בגלוי שזה לא דין דררא דממונא.) עכשיו, במקרה של דררא דממונא, פעמים רבות תוספות אומרים שזה מקרה שלבית הדין יש ספק גם בלי ההסבר שלהם, ולכן שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה בלי בהתייחס לטענות שלהם. כעת הגמרא בבבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''ב מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא כאשר החפץ שהם מתווכחים עליו יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, ואילו הגמרא בבא מציעא (דף ג') אומר דררא דממונא הוא רק כאשר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אלא צריך להיות שייך רק לאחד או לשני, לא לשניהם. לכן, אני חושב שהחוק בבא בתרא שבו הם מחלקים את הקיר באופן שווה חייב לקבוע שההבנה של דררא דממונא היא כשהחפץ יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. הערה: רב שך מביא תוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב ותחילת פרק י' הבית והעליה שדררא דממונא הוא שכל אחד נחשב מחזיק את החפץ. רבינו יונה (בבא בתרא דף ד' ול''ה) (שהביאו רב איסר מלצר) מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא שהחפץ הוא שייך או קשור לכל אדם.(זו גם גישתם של הרשב''ם וטור כפי שהביאו רב נחום מהמיר) אבל, בכל אופן, אני חושב שדין חלוקת החומה הולך בבירור עם הרעיון של דררא דממונא בבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''א) שפירושו של שניהם יכולים להיות בעל החפץ. אבל אם תחזיק דררא דממונא כמו הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ג' ע''א שזה אומר שהחפץ לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אז דין חלוקת הכותל צריך להיות כמו קצות החושן כלומר משום שכל אחד מהם נחשב כמחזיק את הקיר אציין כאן שזה ששני הגמרות נבדלים לגבי דררא דממונא אפשר לראות בלשון בבא בתרא ל''ה "לא יכול להיות זה דררא דממונא כי אם זה שייך לאחד זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשני ואם זה שייך להאחר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לראשון". אז דררא דממונא מתכוון שזה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. בבבא מציעא ג' ע''א כתוב "שזה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא כי זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם" לכן אם זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם יחד אז זה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא אני רוצה להוסיף כאן נקודה שהיא כנראה פשוטה, אבל אני עדיין לא יודע את התשובה. מה אם בחצר אין מספיק מקום שיש חוק שבו אחד יכול להכריח את השני לחלק? {כלומר, אין לו ארבע אמות לכל אחד.} אז אם בכל זאת ישים חומה, האם אתה מחלק את האבנים אם החומה נופלת ולמי שהעמיד את החומה אין הוכחה שהוא עשה את העבודה לבד

za57 E minor midi<za57 E minor nwc format

za56 E Flat Major midi za56 nwc

Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot. I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam

There was a great scholar in the Mir who I have just discovered, a Rav Nachum. I  can see great importance in learning his ideas and I might mention here that while Rav shach and Rav Isar Zalman Meltzer generally concentrated their efforts in understanding the Rambam, Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot as was my learning partner, David Bronson in Uman, and also Rav Naftali Yegger in the yeshiva shar Yashuv in New York.  I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David bronson took a definite I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David Bronson took a definite stand that, "Tosfot is always right." Period. But I think that I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam. I think that both Rambam and Tosphot are important. I would like to take use this internet platform to suggest to learn Rav shach and Rav Nachum in each subject, and I also believe that there is a connection between their approaches. however i recommend the approach of balance with a combination of learning in depth along with quike learning--doing the review many time.

za555 midi in A Minor za55 in nwc

za54 midi same file in nwc

to combine tea and coffee

It is obvious` that the rise of the ancient Chinese empire was due to tea. and it was` that same thing that gave rise to the British empire. however, it was coffee that was the direct cause of the rise of Germany in the 1700's and 1800' because obviously coffee is better than tea in giving that first punch. However, I believe that we all should learn from the English custom of having a set tea time every day and in fact having a "nice tea often." The first thing the English did on D-day when they were part of the advance on Nazi Germany was to boil a pot of tea until their commanding officer told them first to fight the Nazis, and then have tea. But, I think the best idea is to combine tea and coffee in the same cup since each one gives a specific and different kind of energy. However, I must also add that immediately after having tea with any kind of sugar, one must brush his or her teeth since bacteria in the mouth love sugar.

Without a doubt Nietzsche is the most powerful prose writer in the German language, and possibility in any language [much beyond any writer that I have seen]. However powerful and convincing he is, every jot and tittle of his writing` is philosophy for angry adolescents, not a word of truth. Instead, I recommend reading Chesterton, the Anti-Nietzschean. [Convincing and powerful does not equal True--as any lawyer or politician can tell you.] ll

Where is Marxism? Argentina was plunged into a devastating economic crisis in December 2001/January 2002, from communist policies that led to a collapse in output, high levels of unemployment, and political and social turmoil? In the cannibalism Venezuela? In the millions of murdered people under Stalin and Meo Zedong? Or is in books?? Of course, if you ask a Marxist, they will tell you true communism has never been tried. However, if you compare anything in this world to paradise, and claim that true paradise is what Marxism promises, well then, Marxism will win. But, if you compare anything in the world to paradise, then nothing will win

Bava Batra page 3a. Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 10

I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of Rav Isar Meltzer about the Rosh [rav ]. The Rosh holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners) they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the Rosh entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the Rosh. The question then what is the reason for the Rambam? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both Rav shach and Rav Isar meltzer explain the reason is that to the Rambam this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of Rav Isar Meltzer that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of רב איסר מלצר about the רא''ש. The רא''ש holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners), they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the רא''ש entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the רא''ש. The question then what is the reason for the רמב''ם? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both רב שך and רב איסר מלצר explain the reason is that to the רמב''ם this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” הטעם הוא Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of רב איסר מלצר that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” הברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול לגבי גישתו של רב איסר מלצר לגבי הרא''ש. הרא''ש מחזיק בחצר זו (שאין בה ארבע אמות לכל אחד מהשותפים), הם מסכימים לחלוקה לפי החלפה (קנין חליפין). זה כשלעצמו מסביר את הרא''ש לגמרי. עם החלפה, אף אחד לא צריך להגיד "לך ותרכוש" (לך חזק וקני) ואתה צריך רק אחד שילך ויאחז בחצי שלו. כך שאין אי בהירות לגבי הרא''ש. השאלה אם כן מה הסיבה לרמב''ם? למה שניהם צריכים להשתלט, אבל אף אחד לא צריך להגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש?" לשם כך מסבירים גם רב שך וגם רב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שלרמב''ם זו לא רכישה על ידי החלפה, אלא חלוקה של מה שכבר יש לשניהם. לכן, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש", אולם שניהם צריכים להשתלט על המחצית שלהם. עכשיו אתה יכול לשאול מדוע הם לא צריכים לומר, "לך לרכוש?" הטעם הוא כי אתה צריך את זה רק כאשר אחד מוכר נכס לשני, והשני משתלט לא מול המוכר. זה הולך לפי הרעיון של רב איסר מלצר שלומר "לך ורכש" פירושו פקודה ישירה שנצטרך במקרה של רכישה. אבל גם בלי הפקודה הזו, עדיין יש הסכמה מרומזת לרכישה. אבל אם במילים האלה יש רק משמעות של הסכם לרכוש, אז גם עם חלוקת רכוש נצטרך שאחד יגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש

page 3a of Bava Batra

There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page 3a of Bava Batra. Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief, or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the Rosh, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the Rosh this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the Rambam both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “Go and make an acquisition.” To Rav Isar Meltzer, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “Go and acquire”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “Go and acquire” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to Rav Shach the reason of the Rosh is that the Rosh considers this a case of acquisition by exchange where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “Go and acquire.” But Rav Shach and Rav Isar Meltzer agree that the reason for the Rambam is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “go and acquire,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what Rav Isar Meltzer holds here about the opinion of the Rosh, it is from exchange or from agreement?" Rav Shach mentions that the law is that even in dividing, you only need one to take his share. He however does mention that that might be only in a case when the courtyard is big enough for four cubits to come to each one. But from this we can understand the Rosh, who says even if just one divides that is enough. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________]_________________________ There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page דף ג' ע''א of בבא בתרא Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief (סודר), or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the רא''ש, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the רא''ש this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the רמב''ם both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “לך חזק וקני.” To רב איסר מלצר, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “לך חזק וקני.”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “לך חזק וקני” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to רב שך the reason of the רא''ש is that the רא''ש considers this a case of acquisition חליפין where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “לך חזק וקני.” But רב שך and רב איסק מלצר agree that the reason for the רמב''ם is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “לך חזק וקני,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what רב איסר מלצר holds here about the opinion of the רא''ש, it is from exchange or from agreemenT? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ יש נושא שארצה להציג בדף דף ג' ע''א בבא בתרא. שני אנשים מחזיקים יחד חצר ורוצים לחלק אותה, למרות שהיא קטנה. למעשה, הוא כל כך קטן שארבע אמות לא ילכו לשניהם. ולמעשה, במקרה זה, הם לא יכולים להכריח זה את זה להתחלק. אבל הם רוצים להתחלק בכל זאת. הם יכולים לעשות רכישה על ידי מטפחת (סודר), או אפילו בלי רכישה במטפחת על ידי שכל אחד יכניס לחלק שהוא רוצה ולעשות שם רכישה על ידי עשיית גדר או נעילה או פירוק גדר. לרא''ש רק אחד צריך לעשות רכישה. הסיבה היא שמכיוון ששניהם מחזיקים בו במשותף, לאחר שאחד לוקח חלק אחד, השני מקבל את החלק השני באופן אוטומטי. לרא''ש זה דומה או אולי זהה לרכישה בהחלפה (חליפין). לרמב''ם שניהם צריכים לעשות רכישה. אבל לשניהם אין צורך לומר לשני "לך חזק וקני". לרב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שבמקרים כלליים של רכישת קרקע צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כאן אין מדובר ברכישה רגילה, אלא בחלוקת מה שכבר מחזיקים במשותף. ובביטוי "לך חזק וקני" יש במרומז את המשמעות של נתינת חזקה ישירות, לא רק הסכמה לתת לאחר לרכוש. (ובענייננו, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש" כיון ששניהם מחזיקים בו, אבל צריך להיות הסכם לתת לשני לרכוש.) אולם לרב שך טעם הרא''ש הוא שהרא''ש רואה בזה מקרה של רכישה על ידי חליפין כאשר וכאשר שותף אחד רוכש, השני רוכש אוטומטית מבלי לומר "לך חזק וקני". אבל רב שך ורב איסר מלצר מסכימים שהסיבה לרמב''ם היא שזה חלוקת מה שכבר יש להם, ולכן לא צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כל אחד צריך להחזיק בחציו כפי שאתה יכול לדעת, אני לא בטוח מה רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כאן לגבי דעת הרא"ש, זה מחילופין או מהסכמה רב שך מזכיר שהדין הוא שגם בחלוקה צריך רק אחד שייקח את חלקו. עם זאת, הוא מזכיר שזה יכול להיות רק במקרה שבו החצר גדולה מספיק כדי שארבע אמות יגיעו לכל שותף. אבל מכאן אפשר להבין את הרא''ש, שאומר גם אם רק אחד מחלק די בכך.

za53 B minor in midi za53 in nwc

za52 in C minor

za52 midi za52 nwc

Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76. Also see the teaching: "All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of flesh and blood are removed from him."

I have a few approaches to learning that I would like to recommend. sometimes one approach seems best and other times another. One way I mentioned in the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76 to say the words and go on. Even if one does not understand immediately he will eventually understand when he goes on to the end of the book and then reviews it many times. This I found helpful not just in Gemara but also in some of the important commentaries on the Talmud, like Rav Shach' Avi Ezri and Rav Isar Meltzer; Even Haazel. I also have used this method in math and physics. another method was low methodical saying the words of every page or even every sentence forwards and backwards and in fact that method helped me get though my course at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. Another method is what is in fact practiced in the secular world of listening to lectures by experts in the subject. That one is probably the best since it really was the reason for any success at Polytechnic and also at the Mir in NY where I heard classes and lectures by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. I highly doubt if I had been able to get anywhere in these subjects without listening to the experts. Study alone at home was helpful in getting ready to absorb the message, but the real quality learning was from listening to lectures. Can you imagine if I had been able to play the violin by learning books? Obviously not. It had to be by learning from the best. on. Even though this approach to learning is effective in Torah, Math and Physics, still i would like to place a special emphasis on the Mishna: All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of people are removed from him. My learning partner (David Bronson mentioned to me the importance of this teaching.)

Bava Metzia page 2a, 3a, 37b. Rambam Laws of two people arguing in court ch 9, law 7. Laws of Robery ch four, law 10.

I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of rav shach in the rambam. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). [The case of theft is one wants to give back an object that he stole, but does not know from which one of two people he stole it. The case of buying is one sold an object to two people and does not remember to which one of them. The case of holding is two people are holding an object, and each one says, "It belongs to me." In each case you divide the value of the object.] These are the three cases the Rambam says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding an object for two people, and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The Rambam does not make the sort of difference of the Ri Migash. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] The difference according to Rav Shach is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the Gemara and brought in Tosphot that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that certainly can not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when he says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the Rambam and the Gemara. The Rambam says they divide and the Gemara on page 37b says “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer is the case of holding an object for two people. There each is certain, and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that Rav Shmuel Rozovski says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt, and that there comes the laws money that is in doubt stays in its place as the R’’an suggests. But what would be the difference between theft and a deposit if both are certain and neither is holding it and yet the case of theft you divide and the deposit stays put? I can answer somewhat like the gemara says how ca you compare theft with a deposit? the case of theft is such that there is no reason to leave the object in the hands of he who stole it. Even if there is no proof for either side and even if one is lying and even if the division can’t be correct, still you give it to them both a and they divide it between themselves. (That is not the same as when the court itself divides the value in half and gives a half to both parties.) But in the case of a deposit both gave their object to him by their own volition. Now there is no way of knowing to whom belong the part that is argued over, therefore it stays in its place. That is because it is where the actual owner put it. Until proof is brought, that is where it stays. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of רב שך in the רמב''ם. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). These are the three caseS the רמב''ם says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding aפקדון for two people and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The רמב''ם does not make the sort of difference of the ר''י מיגש. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] Even though the רמב''ם does not mention the idea of the גמרא of where there is definitely a liar, nor the idea of the division might be correct it, still he might hold with these ideas as I will mention soon. But the main difference according to רב שך is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the גמרא and brought in תוספות that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that can certainly not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when it says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the רמב''ם and the גמרא. The רמב''ם says they divide and the גמרא on page ל''ז ע''בsays “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer the case of holding an object for two people. there each is certain and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that רב שמואל רוזובסקי says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt and that there comes the law המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיהas the ר''ן suggests. But רב שך can answer that you divide when they are certain and also because the law what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him and like the גמרא says the division might be true and there is not a liar for a certainty. But in the case of holding an object for two people, even though each one is certain, but neither is holding it and there is a liar for sure and the division can not be correct. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ בבא מציעא ב' ע''א ג' ע''א ל''ז ע''ב רמב''ם טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', גזילה פרק ד' חלכה י יש שלושת המקרים שהרמב''ם אומרכל אחד מחלק.[[המקרה של גזלה הוא שרוצה להחזיר חפץ שגנב, אבל לא יודע מאיזה אחד משני אנשים הוא גנב אותו. במקרה של קנייה הוא מכר חפץ לשני אנשים ואינו זוכר למי מהם. המקרה של תופסים הוא שני אנשים מחזיקים חפץ וכל אחד אומר "זה שייך לי". בכל מקרה אתה מחלק את הערך של האובייקט]] המקרה שבו אתה לא אומר זאת הוא במקרה של החזקת פיקדון לשני אנשים ולא ידוע למי שייך. שם אתה אומר שהחלק שמתווכחים עליו צריך להישאר במקומו. הרמב''ם אינו עושה את סוג ההבדל של הר''י מיגש. [אם שניהם מחזיקים בו, מחלקים אותו, אבל אם לא, הוא נשאר במקומו.] אף על פי שהרמב''ם לא מזכיר את רעיון הגמרא איפה בהחלט יש שקרן, וגם לא את רעיון שהחלוקה עשויה להיות נכונה, ובכל זאת הוא עשוי להחזיק ברעיונות האלה כפי שאציין בקרוב. אבל עיקר ההבדל לפי רב שך הוא שכשהם בטוחים מחלקים את החפץ. ותוכל לראות שזה הולך כרעיון הגמרא והביא בתוספות שמה שיש ביד אדם שייך לו. אבל זה בהחלט לא יכול להיות המקרה אם הוא עצמו בספק. אדרבא, מניחים שזה שייך לו כשאומר ''זה שייך לי בוודאות'' ולמעשה, במקרים שכל אחד מחזיק בו ובמקרה של מכירה, הם בטוחים. רק במקרה של גניבה יש לומר שהם מחלקים כשהם בטוחים, וזה נשאר במקומו כשהם בספק. [זה יענה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם לגמרא. הרמב''ם אומר שהם מחלקים והגמרא בדף ל''ז ע''ב אומר "נשאר במקומו".] השאלה שרעיון זה לא יענה במקרה של החזקת חפץ לשני אנשים. שם כל אחד בטוח ואתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו. אני מתאר לעצמי שזאת הסיבה שרב שמואל רוזובסקי אומר את ההיפך כלומר, המקרה שבו אתה מחלק הוא בגלל ספק וששם מגיע החוק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה כמו שהר''ן מציע אני מבין שזה לא בדיוק מה שרב שך אומר, (הוא משווה הרמב''ם עם הר''י מיגש שהעיקר תלוי באוחזים) אבל אני עדיין סומך מ על הרעיון הבסיסי שלו שאתה מחלק כששניהם בטוחים. אבל אני יכול לראות מה קבע הרב שמואל רוזובסקי [שמחלקים כששניהם בספק] כי הוא סומך על הרעיון של רב חיים מבריסק שצריכים לקיים ''החזרת החפץ'', מה שיכול להיות אם שני הצדדים מוטלים בספק, אך לא היכן שאחד משקר

A complaint about Hegel is that he idolizes the state and detracts from the importance and significance of the individual. But this critique seems to me to be unfair because his general approach across the board is that nothing has reality except in so far as it corresponds to its true concept. And so one might ask ''what is the true idea of a state? Hegel sensed this and said that “the USA is the state of the future,” meaning that its principles corresponded most closely with the ideal state. See the essay of Kaufman about Hegel. On the other hand the approach of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross is also important as to answering the problem of how knowledge is possible as different and my point here is that Hegel is better understood as a philosopher, not a political activist. And if he was advocating anything it certainly was not the Prussian state as historical evidence shows but rather the English and later the American model. [see the cambridge book on hegel where different authors explain different aspects of hegel.]

za51 midi same piece in nwc format

the beginning of Bava Metzia [and the answer of Shmuel Rozovski, the rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach.]

I have not been writing about the beginning of Bava Metzia because I see there are a few different approaches to solve the conundrum of why in the begining you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide, while in a case in Bava Metzia 37a you have cases of a deposit and theft where there is one case where you say the object being argued over should be left in neither’s possession, and in another case you say nothing and the parties decide it between themselves. The main approaches to solve this mystery are Rav Shach, Rav Isar Meltzer, Rav Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shmuel Rozovski. Reb Chaim and Rav Shmuel Rozovski are very similar in approach. Rav Shach has radical new approach in which he explains the position of the Rambam as being based on the idea that the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia is they divide because you say that "What is in one's possession is assumed to belong to him," without needing any further proof. Rav Isar Meltzar has a new approach to the idea of "derara demomona" by which he solves these problems. Some of the major problems come from the Rambam, but there are two arguments between Rashi and Tosphot conerning "derara demomona" and the reason in the first mishna you say divide. [I hope that i might gain some clarity into this subject, but for now I am just trying to get some idea of what the problems are and possible solutions] I might mention that I am limited by the fact that is do not have my learning partner, David Bronson, to learn with any more. His razor-sharp computer mind made getting to the depths of any subject highly accessible for me. I have just these great thinkers of the Litvack world, David Bronson was invaluable in his way of electron micro scoping a subject. But since I do not have him with me, I look to the great sages of the Litvak world that have a more global perspective In the meantime, I want to mention here that the answer of rav shmuel rozovski makes a lot of sense to me. he brings from the ran that there is a possibility that the law of the mishna of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from Bava Metzia pg 6 where a braita continues the mishna and says if one grabs the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the mishna would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. but if the law of the mishna came from a doubt then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain.[shmuel rozovski was the rosh yeshiva of ponovitch before rav shach.]But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. it seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the Gemara state openly. thus it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what Rav Shach is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the Rambam why in some cases you say divide and in other cases you say it remains in its place until Eliyahu comes. He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ why in the begining משנה you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide? רב שמואל רוזובסקי brings from the ר''ן that there is a possibility that the law of the משנה of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from בבבא מציעא ף ו' ע''א where a ברייתא continues the משנה and says if one תופס the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the משנה would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both, then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. But if the law of the משנה came from a doubt, then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain. But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. It seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the גמרא states openly. Thus, it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what רב שך is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the רמב''ם why in some cases you say "Divide!" and in other cases you say "It remains in its place until Eliyahu comes." He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. למה במשנה ראשונה בבבא מציעא יש לך שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שאתה מחלק? רב שמואל רוזובסקי מביא מהר''ן שיש אפשרות שדין משנה שהחלוקה היא מחמת ספק. ההוכחה באה מבבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א. שם ברייתא ממשיכה את המשנה, ואומרת אם אחד תופס את הכלי בתוכנו, אנו אומרים שאיננו לוקחים אותו ממנו. לפיכך, אם דין המשנה יהיה בוודאי שהכלי שייך לשניהם, אז למה לא ניקח אותו ממנו לאחר שכבר ידענו והכרענו דין חילוק. אבל אם דין המשנה בא מתוך ספק, אז הגיוני להשאירו ברשות מי שחטף אותו כיון שכעת הוא ברשותו. אבל נראה לי שעדיין יש כאן שאלה חשובה. נראה לי שהסיבה שאתה אומר שהחפץ נשאר בידיו של מי שתפס אותו היא בגלל שהשתיקה היא כמו להודות כפי שהגמרא קובעת בגלוי. לפיכך, זה לא בגלל ספק. ובמקרה הפוך אתה לוקח את זה, זה בגלל שהשתיקה היא לא הודאה, ולכן אנחנו מחזירים את זה להיות מחולק, לא בגלל שהחלוקה היא בגלל ודאות אני יכול להזכיר שזה יכול לראות מה רב שך אומר. הוא מנסה לתת תשובה להסביר את הרמב''ם מדוע במקרים מסוימים אתה אומר "תחלק!" ובמקרים אחרים אתה אומר "זה נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו". הוא אומר שאם אין ספק, אז אתה מחלק כמו במקרה שניהם מחזיקים. במקרה שיש ספק, אתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו