בבא קמא בדף כ"ג. הרמב''ם לפי הגר''א

כשחזרתי מהים עלה בדעתי מדוע הרמב''ם (לפי הגר''א) קבע שר' יוחנן שינה את דעתו, וקובע שנזק על ידי שריפה חייב בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו, לא נזק על ידי גופו. הסיבה היא השקלא וטריא של הגמרא בבא קמא בדף כ"ג. רבא שאל, אם צודק ר' יוחנן שנזק על ידי אש הוא בגלל "חיציו" {נזק ישיר על ידי גופו}, אז למה נזק לטמון (דברים נסתרים) לא יהיה אחראי? עונה הגמרא, היה שם חומה, והיא נפלה (לא בגלל האש), ולא הספיק לתקן אותו לפני שפרצה השריפה. אז זה מקרה של אי יכולת לעשות שום דבר כדי לעצור את הנזק הזה (אונס) . [למרות שבדרך כלל אנו אומרים שאדם תמיד עלול לגרום נזק, עדיין נזק באמצעות רכושו (או אפילו בשריפה שהיא חמורה יותר), העובדה שהמצב אינו בשליטתו גורמת לו שהוא ללא אחריות. לאחר מכן הגמרא שואלת, אם כן, אז גם על דברים גלויים אינו צריך להיות אחראי. הגמרא עונה ר' יוחנן מחזיק נזק מאש נחשב חיציו וגם רכושו; ועניינו שהוא חייב בדברים פתוחים, אבל לא חייב בדברים נסתרים הוא במקום שהייתה התרשלות. זה יהיה דומה למה שיהיה אם הוא שכח לנעול את השור שלו בלילה, והוא יצא וגרם נזק.] אני חושב שהגמרא רואה בחומה מקרה של אי יכולת לשנות כלום (אונס) . אבל בלי חומה בינו לבין שכנו, אם זה יהיה "החצים שלו", אז הוא יהיה אחראי גם לדבר גלוי וגם נסתר. [כדי לגרום לו לא להיות אחראי לדברים נסתרים, הגמרא צריכה להמציא תרחיש שבו היה קיר. אחרי הכל, חיצים עוברים הרבה מעבר לחומות. ולכן הרמב''ם קבע שאין אנו חושבים עוד שר' יוחנן מחזיק ב"חיציו" אלא כדי להטיל עליו אחריות בכל חמשת מיני הנזק שחייב אדם בהם במקרה של נזק מגופו. מלבד זאת, הוא אחראי רק לנזק שנגרם על ידי רכושו.רק תחשוב. הגמרא אמרה כשהייתה חומה, "נגמרו החצים שלו". לכן, כדי למצוא דרך שחיציו לא יגמרו, היה על הגמרא לחלץ את החומה, ולהכניס עצלות והזנחה פשוטה. בשלב זה, מדוע שחצים יסתיימו? ברור שלא

the Gemara on page 23 in Bava Kama. Rambam according to the Gra.

As I was walking back from the sea it occurred to me why the Rambam held that R Yochanan changed his mind, and holds that damage by fire is obligated because of damage by his property, not damage by his body. The reason is in the questions and answers of the Gemara on page 23 in Bava Kama. Rava asked, if R Yochanan is right that damage by fire is because of “his arrows” {direct damage by his body}, then why would damage to hidden things not be liable? The Gemara answers, there was a wall there, and it fell (not from the fire), and he did not have time to repair it before the fire broke out. So it is a case of not being able to do anything to stop that damage. [Even though we normally say a person is always liable to do damage, still damage by means of his property or (or even with fire which is more serious), the fact of the situation being totally out of one’s control makes him not liable. The Gemara then asks, if so, then even for open things he should be not liable. The Gemara answers R Yochanan holds damage by fire is considered “his arrows” and also his property; and our case where he liable for open things but not liable for hidden things is where there was neglect similar to what would be the case if he forgot to lock his ox up at night, and it went out and cause damage.] I think that the gemara considers a wall to be a case of not being able to change anything. but with no wall between him and his neighbor, if it would be “his arrows” then he would be liable for both open and hidden thing. [To get him to not be liable for hidden things the gemara has to come up with scenario where there was a wall. After all, arrows go far beyond walls. so the Rambam held that we no longer think that R Yochanan holds with “his arrows” except to make him liable in all the five kinds of damage that one is liable for in a case of damage by his body. Besides that, he is liable only for damage by his property. Just think. the Gemara said when there was a wall "his arrows were finished". So, to find a way that his arrows would not be finished, the Gemara had to extract the wall, and put in simple laziness and neglect. At that point, why would arrows be finished? Clearly not. ------------------------------------- As I was walking back from the sea it occurred to me why the רמב''ם held that ר’ יוחנן changed his mind, and holds that damage by fire is obligated because of damage by his property, not damage by his body. The reason is in the questions and answers of the גמרא בבא קמא on page 23. רבא asked, if ר’ יוחנן is right that damage by fire is because of “his arrows” {direct damage by his body}, then why would damage to טמון hidden things not be liable? The גמרא answers, there was a wall there, and it fell (not from the fire), and he did not have time to repair it before the fire broke out. So, it is a case of not being able to do anything to stop that damage(אונס) . [Even though we normally say a person is always liable to do damage, still damage by means of his property or (or even with fire which is more serious), the fact of the situation being totally out of one’s control makes him not liable. The גמרא then asks, if so, then even for open things he should be not liable. The גמרא answers ר’ יוחנן holds damage by fire is considered “his arrows” and also his property; and our case where he liable for open things, but not liable for hidden things is where there was neglect. THAT WOULD BE similar to what would be the case if he forgot to lock his ox up at night, and it went out and caused damage.] I think that the גמרא considers a wall to be a case of not being able to change anything(אונס) . But with no wall between him and his neighbor, if it would be “his arrows”, then he would be liable for both open and hidden thing. [To get him to not be liable for hidden things the גמרא has to come up with scenario where there was a wall. After all, arrows go far beyond walls. so the רמב''ם held that we no longer think that ר’ יוחנן holds with “his arrows” except to make him liable in all the five kinds of damage that one is liable for in a case of damage by his body. Besides that, he is liable only for damage by his property. Just think. the גמרא said when there was a wall "his arrows were finished". So, to find a way that his arrows would not be finished, the גמרא had to extract the wall, and put in simple laziness and neglect. At that point, why would arrows be finished? Clearly not.

בבא קמא כ''ב וכ''ג

הייתי בחוף הים וחושב שאפילו אם נלך עם הגר"א שכתב שהרמב"ם סבור שר' יוחנן שינה את דעתו, והוא הולך עם הרעיון של ריש לקיש שחובת תשלום נזק באש היא בגלל נזק של רכושו (לא חיצים שלו) שעדיין זה לא מספר לנו כלום על המשנה עם הכלב והפחם. אתה בכל מקרה צריך לומר את הסיבה לריש לקיש שעל שאר הערימה לא חייב כי זה כוחו של כוחו. אבל זה רק זורק את השאלה צעד אחד אחורה. נניח שהכלב זרק את הפחם על הערימה. האם אין אנו אומרים שאנו הולכים בהתחלה של נזק? וכך בעצם הכריע הרמב''ם בהלכה. {זה כמו רבה שאם זורק כלי ולפני שהוא מגיע לארץ ונשבר, מישהו אחר שובר אותו בעודו באוויר. הראשון הוא חייב, לא השני.} עם זאת, אולי זה כל העניין של ריש לקיש? שנלך על תחילת הנזק, ולכן גרירת הפחם או השלכתו על הערימה תהיה אחראית כי זה הכוח הראשון. ואז שאר הערימה הוא כוח הכוח שלו. אז זה יסביר את הרמב''ם. זה גם עוזר לר' יוחנן שאמר שהוא אחראי לכל הערימה שהכלב צריך להניח עליה את הפחם. יכול להיות שהוא מסכים שאם הכלב יגרור אותו לאורך הערימה או יזרוק אותו על הערימה זה יהיה כמו ריש לקיש שהאזור הזה חייב בחצי נזק, (אבל לא נזק מלא כי זה לא דרכו הרגילה של כלב לזרוק גחלים. אבל אדם שזורק כלי יהיה אחראי מלוא נזק שלם.) אבל ר' יוחנן מחפש דרך לקבל חוק המשנה שאת החובה של חצי הערימה כולה תהיה חצי נזק. בסיכום, החליט הרמב''ם שהחוק כמו ריש לקיש. בעל הכלב חייב על הלחם נזק מלא, ועל מקום גרירת הפחם הוא חייב חצי נזק כי אנו הולכים עם תחילת הגורם נזק כמו רבה; ועל שאר הערימה, הוא אינו חייב כי זה כוחו של כוחו

Bava Kama page 22 and page 23.

I have been at the sea shore and thinking that even if we go with the Gra who wrote that the Rambam holds that R Yochanan changed his mind, and he goes with the idea of Reish Lakish that the obligation of paying for damage by fire is because of damage by his property (not his arrows) that still does not tell us about the Mishna with the dog and coal. You anyway have to say the reason for Reish Lakish that the rest of the stack is not liable because it is force of his force. but that just throws the question one step back. Let’s say the dog threw the coal on the stack. Don’t we say that an animal that steps on a vessel and it rolls away and get broken, that we go by the beginning? And that is in fact how the Rambam decided the law. {Thi I lie Raba that if one throws a vessel and before it reaches the ground and is broken, someone else breaks it while it is still in the air. The first one is obligated, not the second one.} However, maybe that is the whole point of Reish Lakish? that we go by the beginning of the damage and o dragging the coal or throwing it on the stack would be liable because of that is the first force. then the remainder of the stack is force of his force. so that would explain the Rambam. This also helps R Yochanan who said to be liable for the whole stack the dog needs to place the coal on it. It might be that he agrees that if the dog dragged it along the stack or threw it on the stack that would be like Reish Lakish that that area is liable half damage. But R Yochanan is looking for a way to get the obligation of half damage to be applied to the whole stack, not just the place the coal landed. In summery the Rambam decided the law like Reish Lakish. The owner of the dog is liable for the bread full damage, and for the place where the coal was dragged, he is liable half damage because we go by the beginning of the cause of damage like Raba; and for the rest of the stack, he is not liable because that is force of his force. I am thinking that this explains Reish Lakish and the Rambam, but the sugia on page 23 is still blurry to me. The nice thing about this approach is that it uses the insight of the Gra to explain the Rambam, and also the inight of the Tosphot that we still need the idea of force of his force. _____________________________________________________________________________ I have been at the sea shore and thinking that even if we go with the גר''א who wrote that the רמב’’ם holds that ר’ יוחנן changed his mind, and he goes with the idea of ריש לקיש that the obligation of paying for damage by fire is because of damage by his property (not his arrows) that still does not tell us about the משנה with the dog and coal. You anyway have to say the reason for ריש לקיש that the rest of the stack is not liable because it is force of his force. but that just throws the question one step back. Let’s say the dog threw the coal on the stack. Don’t we say that an animal that steps on a vessel and it rolls away and get broken, that we go by the beginning? And that is in fact how the רמב’’ם decided the law. {This is like רבה that if one throws a vessel and before it reaches the ground and is broken, someone else breaks it while it is still in the air. The first one is obligated, not the second one.} However, maybe that is the whole point of ריש לקיש? that we go by the beginning of the damage and so dragging the coal or throwing it on the stack would be liable because of that is the first force. Then the remainder of the stack is force of his force. so that would explain the רמב’’ם. This also helps ר’ יוחנן who said to be liable for the whole stack the dog needs to place the coal on it. It might be that he agrees that if the dog dragged it along the stack or threw it on the stack that would be like ריש לקיש that that area is liable half damage, (but not full damage because it is not the normal way of a dog to throw coals. A person throwing a vessel however would be liable full damage.) But ר’ יוחנן is looking for a way to get the obligation of half damage to be applied to the whole stack, not just the place the coal landed. In summery the רמב’’ם decided the law like ריש לקיש. The owner of the dog is liable for the bread full damage, and for the place where the coal was dragged, he is liable half damage because we go by the beginning of the cause of damage like רבה; and for the rest of the stack, he is not liable because that is force of his force.

Mathematics was for me a big challenge. It took for me a long detour to get a grip on Math and Physics. I had to go the rout of the approach in the Gemara Tractate Avoda Zara page 19 which says that the main thing in learning is to say the words in order from the start of the book until the end and then review. I found that this helped me to get started with math and physics. And from my own experience I try to recommend this approach to others who like me may not be particularly talented in these areas and yet still realize their importance. But Isaac Rosten told me that an essential part of this approach is the review part. After you finish the book or chapter, then you need to review four times. This approach does not work without the review part.

בבא קמא כ''ב וכ''ג ותירוץ יותר טוב לרמב''ם

כתב הגר''א בדף כ''ג בבבא קמא ובשלחן ערוך פרק 418 הערה 33 שהרי''ף ורמב''ם גורסים שהגמרא שינה דעתו לגבי גישתו של ר' יוחנן בגלל שאלת רבא, אם האש חייבת בגלל חיציו, אז למה טמון (נסתר) לא חייב? (כלומר שאם היו דברים חבויים בערימה, אין הוא חייב בהם.) אלא ר' יוחנן מחזיק לגמרי כדעת ריש לקיש וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא ארבעת הדברים הנוספים שחייבים עליהם כשאדם עושה נזק בגופו ולא על ידי רכושו (כשורו). ההוכחה לכך ברורה. זה בגלל שהרי''ף והרמב''ם משאירים שניהם את התשובה הראשונה של הגמרא שהתכוונה לענות על שאלת רבא, (שבגלל שהיה חומה, נגמרו החצים שלו). הגמרא דחק את התשובה ההיא כי אם גמרו חיציו, אז גמרו לגבי נכסים שאינם נסתרים. אני כותב את זה כי ברור לי שהסיבה שהרמב''ם כתב שכאשר כלב לוקח לחם עם פחם לערימה והערימה נשרפת שהמקרה הוא שהכלב נשא אותו מעל הערימה, אבל לעולם לא הניח אותו ולכן החיוב הוא חצי נזק לכל מקום שדרכו של הפחם היה, ואין חובה על שאר הערימה. הסיבה היא שהרמב''ם פשוט הכריע כרישלקיש. הגר''א כתב שהרי''ף ורמב''ם הסבירן את הגמרא בדף כ''ג שר' יוחנן מחזיק למעשה כמו ריש לקיש, והמקרה הקודם שבו הכלב שם את הפחם על הערימה יהיה נזק מלא לכל הערימה. עם זאת, אני יכול להזכיר שהגישה הקודמת שלי להסבר הרמב"ם הייתה שהוא מחזיק שכוח כוחו אינו חייב (כמו שתוספות אמרו) הייתה תשובה ברת קיימא אלא שיותר הגיוני ששאר הערימה היה אחראי על רביעית מהנזק כפי שהרב"ד למעשה ששאל. עכשיו ההסברשל המשנה ופסק הרמב''ם לא כח כוחו, אלא שאש חייבת בגלל רכושו כמו השור שלו כמו שאמר ריש לקיש והנושא הפחם על הערימה זה צרורות או קרן של שור תם. בלילה הזה ראיתי שהרדב"ז כתב את תשובתי המקורית לרמב"ם שהמקרה הוא כח כוחו. ובהמשך הערב גיליתי את הערת הגר"א. אני חושב שגישת הגר"א יותר מדויקת________ קצת רקע לנושא הזה. אמר ר' יוחנן שהנזק של אש הוא בגלל חיציו וריש לקיש אמר שזה בגלל נזק מרכושו, למשל, השור שלו. שאלה הגמרא על ר' יוחנן שאם החבות תהיה בגלל נזק ישיר מפעולה אחת, אז למה טמון יהיה פטור? כלומר, אם שרף מישהו את ערימת החטים של מישהו אחר, ובתוכו הוחבא חפץ כלשהו, חובת התשלום היא רק על ערימת חיטים. התשובה שהגמרא נותנת לר' יוחנן היא שהייתה שם חומה שנפלה, ולפני שהייתה לאדם הזדמנות לתקן אותה, פרצה השריפה והלכה לנכס של השכן. אחר כך התנגד הגמרא לתשובה זו, ואמר באותו מקרה אז גם לדברים הפתוחים כמו הערימה עצמה, אין לחייבו. אז הגמרא אמר שלמעשה ר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש, וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא בארבעת סוגי הנזק הנוספים שאדם אחראי להם כאשר הוא עושה נזק מפעולתו ולא מרכושו

bava kama pg 22 and 23. A better answer for the Rambam than the one I gave previously

The Gra wrote on page 23 in Bava Kama and in the Shulchan Aruch chapter 418 paragraph 33 that the Rif and Rambam hold that the Gemara changed its mind about the approach of R Yochanan because of the question of Rava, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather R Yochanan holds completely with the opinion of Reish Lakish and the only difference between them is the four extra thing that one is obligated for when one doe damage by his own body rather than by one property like hi ox. the proof of this is clear. It is because the Rif and Rambam both leave out the first answer of the Gemara that intended to answer the question of Rava, that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The Gemara pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the Rambam wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the Rambam simply decided the law like Reish Lakish because that is how he and the Rif explain the Gemara on page 23 that R Yochanan in fact hold like Reish Lakish and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the Rambam was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like Tosphot said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the Raavad in fact ask.[and in fact the Rambam does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like Reish Lakish said and carrying it over the stack is pebbles or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the Rambam that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the Gra. I think the approach of the Gra is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. R Yochanan said that damage by fire is because of his arrows and Reish Lakish said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The Gemara asked on R Yochanan that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the Gemara gives for R Yochanan is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the Gemara objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So then the Gemara said that in fact R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property _____________________________________________________________ The גר’’א wrote on page כ''ג in בבא קמא and in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט פרק תי''ח הערה ל''ג that theרי’’ףand רמב’’ם hold that the גמרא changed its mind about the approach of ר’ יוחנן because of the question of רבא, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden טמון not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather ר’ יוחנן holds completely with the opinion of ריש לקיש and the only difference between them is the four extra things that one is obligated for when one does damage by his own body rather than by one's property like his ox. The proof of this is clear. It is because the רי’’ף and רמב’’ם both leave out the first answer of the גמרא that intended to answer the question ofרבא , that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The גמרא pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the רמב’’ם wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the רמב’’ם simply decided the law like ריש לקיש because that is how he and the רי’’ף explain the גמראon page כ''ג that ר’ יוחנן in fact hold like ריש לקיש and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the רמב’’ם was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like תוספות said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the ראב''ד in fact ask.[and in fact the רמב’’ם does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like ריש לקיש said and carrying it over the stack is צרורות or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the רמב’’ם that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the גר’’א. I think the approach of the גר’’א is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. ר’ יוחנן said that damage by אש is because of his arrows and ריש לקיש said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The גמרא asked on ר’ יוחנן that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing טמון be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the גמרא gives for ר’ יוחנן is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the גמרא objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So, then the גמרא said that in fact ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property

I think that how religious a girl makes no difference. What matters is how devoted to Torah she is. The idea of the sages of marrying a daughter of a Torah scholar to me means to marry a girl who is devoted to the idea that her husband and children should learn Torah at all cost. Religiosity has nothing to do with this. I can see that there are plenty of girls who are religious, but are not interested in her husband learning Torah. That does not count as a daughter of a true Torah scholar. [Sadly Torah has become a easy way to make a living. Girls with sense (but no fear of God) will marry these kinds of hypocrites. What really matters is the people who will stick with Torah at the cost of having no money

בבא קמא דף כ''ב ע''א . עלו לי שלוש שאלות. אחת על ריש לקיש. אחת על איך רש''י מסביר ריש לקיש, ואחרת על איך ר' חננאל מסביר ריש לקיש. הסוגיא הבסיסית היא זו. ריש לקיש אמר ששריפה חייבת בנזק מלא בגלל נזק שנגרם לרכוש. בעוד ר' יוחנן אוחז שאש חייבת כי זו כמו חיצים. לרי''ף ורש''י, הרעיון של ר' יוחנן הוא שהאש חייבת כאילו אחד בעצמו גרם נזק, לא רכושו) כפי שהיה קורה אם השור שלו גרם נזק. (הגמרא שואל שאלה על ריש לקיש מהמשנה. לכלב יש כיכר עם פחם בתוכו והולך וגורם לערימה להישרף. את תשלום של הלחם הוא נזק שלם, ובגלל הערימה חצי נזק. השאלה מהמשנה הזו על ריש לקיש היא שהפחם לא שייך לבעלים של הכלב. ריש לקיש עונה שהמקרה של המשנה הוא שהכלב זרק את הלחם עם הפחם בתוכו על הערימה, ומחויב או בגלל שזהו שינוי מהדרך הרגילה ובכך אחראי בחצי נזק כמו קרן התם או בגלל צרורות. (אם הכלב היה מניח אותו על הערימה, הבעלים של הכלב היה אחראי במלוא הנזק.) השאלה שיש לי כאן היא שהשאלה והתשובה אינן מתאימות זו לזו. השאלה הייתה מדוע הבעלים של הכלב צריך להיות אחראי בכלל? אחרי הכל, זה לא הפחם שלו. תשובה: בעל הכלב אחראי בגלל שינוי או צרורות? איך זה עונה על השאלה? הפחם עדיין לא שייך לו. תשובה לכך יכולה להיות שהגמרא בשלב זה חושב שבעל הפחם יישא באחריות אם לא ישמור על גחלתו. אבל כדי למצוא כיצד הבעלים של הכלב עלול להיות אחראי גם, ריש לקיש מוצא את התרחיש הזה שבו הכלב זרק אותו. כך אפשר להסביר את המשנה שהתשלום הוא חצי נזק. (מאוחר יותר, הגמרא למעשה, גורסת שבעל הפחם אכן שמר על הפחם שלו.) עכשיו, רבינו חננאל אמר שהתשובה של ריש לקיש היא שהכלב זרק את הפחם, ואז הפחם לא עזב את תחום בעל הפחם. זה בהתייחסות למסכת שבת שבה (אני חושב שאני זוכר אולי) יש דעה שנחיתה לא אותו דבר כמו להרים ולהניח. בדרך כלל צריך להרים ולהניח ארבע אמות, או מתחום אחד לשני, אבל איך זה עונה על השאלה על ריש לקיש? למה בעלים של הכלב חייב?ויש לשאול שאלה נוספת. ר' יוחנן אמר שהחובה לאש היא בגלל חיציו, וריש לקיש לא הסכים לזה כי חיציו נעים מכוח האדם, ואילו האש נעה מעצמה. מכיוון שכך, אני שואל לפי ריש לקיש מדוע הבעלים של הכלב לא יצטרך לשלם עבור כל הערימה? הרי לריש לקיש אין צורך שחובת האש תהיה נעה רק מכוחו הישיר של האדם שהדליק. מספיק שהוא הדליק אותו, והוא נע ברוח רגילה

i was at a litvak beit midrash which is different than a yeshiva. A yeshiva is built for a certain age group 18-24; while a beit midrash is for all ages -who ever wants to come and learn Torah. so I my area there is such a place and I was there thinking about Reish Lakish in Bava Kama page 22a and three questions occurred to me. One on reish lakish. one on how Rashi explains Reish Lakish, and another on how Rabbainu Chananel explains Reish Lakish, but later on the way to the seashore an answer for Rashi occurred to me. the basic idea is this Reish Lakish said that fire is obligated in full damage because of nizkei mamon damage due to one’s property. While R Yochanan holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the Rif and Rashi, the idea of R Yochanan is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not hi property a would be the case if hi ox caused damage. The gemara asks a question on Reish Lakish the from the mishna. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. the damage for the loaf i full damage and payment for the stack is half damage. the question from this mishna on reish lakish is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. Reish Lakish answers the case of the mishna is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. Rashi explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it i a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a tame animal or because of pebbles. If he would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. the question I have here is that the question and answer to not fit together. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or pebbles? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the gemara at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable Reish Lakish find this scenario i where the dog threw it. In that way it is possible to explain the mishna that the payment is half damage. Later the gemara in fact holds that the owner of the coal did in fact guard his coal. Now Rabbainu Chananel said the answer of Reish Lakish is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to Tracate shabat where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on shabat one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. how ever how does this answer the question on Reish Lakish? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. R Yochanan said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. Reish Lakih disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to Reish Lakish why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to Reish Lakis there is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lite it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind. ___________________________________________________________________ קמא page כ''ב ע''א . three questions occurred to me. One on ריש לקיש. one on how רש''י explains ריש לקיש, and another on how ר' חננאל explains ריש לקיש _______ the basic סוגיא is this. ריש לקיש said that fire is obligated in full damage because of damage due to one’s property. While ר’ יוחנן holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the רי''ף and רש''י, the idea of ר’ יוחנן is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not his property) as would be the case if his ox caused damage (. The גמרא asks a question on ריש לקיש the from the משנה. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. The damage for the loaf is full damage, and payment for the stack is half damage. The question from this משנה on ריש לקיש is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. ריש לקיש answers the case of the משנה is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. רש''י explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it is a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a קרן התם or because of צרורות. If הכלב would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. The question I have here is that the question and answer Do not fit together WELL. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or צרורות? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the גמרא at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable ריש לקיש finds this scenario where the dog threw it. In that way, it is possible to explain the משנה that the payment is half damage. )Later the גמרא, in fact, holds that the owner of the coal did, in fact, guard his coal.( Now, רבינו חננאלsaid the answer of ריש לקיש is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to מסכת שבת where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on שבת one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away, or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. However how does this answer the question on ריש לקיש? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything? and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. ר’ יוחנן said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. ריש לקיש disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person, while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to ריש לקיש why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to ריש לקישthere is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lit it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind.

Kant, and Leonard Nelson

I have a natural inclination toward philosophy and thus it is a bias that I see it as important. But even if I am biased towards it, in Middle Ages it was also considered important in the important formulation of the Middle Ages, faith and reason. But in the period from the fall of Rome until about the time of the Rambam, it was Plato who was foremost. Then slowly, the emphasis changed toward Aristotle. That started with the fact that the Muslim world had always been more interested in Aristotle than Plato. But with the Rambam, that changed toward Aristotle and the with Aquinas that set the stage even for Europe. That of course puttered out with Bacon. Philosophy in itself began to deal with a new set of problems; the Mind body problem, and politics; until a kind of synthesis came about in Kant, and Leonard Nelson. so now, I think that if we would go with the Medieval authorities that saw philosophy as important like The Rambam, then we ought to study Kant. But clearly there are plenty of people who reject any learning of philosophy at all. still, I tend not to agree with that. evil.

za71 B Flat minor midiza71 nwc

בבא קמא דף כ'''ב הגמרא אומרת שהכלב עם הלחם והפחם גורם לשריפה של ערימה שזה "חיצי הכלב", ולכן חייב רק בחצי נזק. אבל באותו עמוד מובא מקרה אחר שבו נכנס גמל עמוס בפשתן לחנות והיה נר דולק בתוך החנות. הפשתן עלה באש, והחנות נשרפה. הגמרא קובע שחייבים בנזק מלא, אף על פי שהם גם "חיצי הגמל". מה ההבדל בין חיצי הכלב שעליהם משלם הבעלים חצי נזק, לבין חיצי הגמל שעליהם הוא משלם נזק מלא

Bava Kama pg 22

In Bava Kama pg 22 I am wondering why when the we say the dog with the loaf and coal cause a stack to get burnt up that is the “arrows of the dog” and so obligated only for half damage, but on the same page when the camel loaded with linen goes into a store, and the linen catches fire, and the store is burnt, that is obligated in full damage even though it also is the “arrows of the camel.”

"I don't need no man" school of feminism. By Dr Kelley Ross. My mom told me: “To marry a nice Jewish girl." "Nice" and "Jewish" are two separate conditions.

American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. We also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. "I don't need no man" school of feminism. So here, in response to the question, "No kids! What are you going to do when you're old?" we see an older woman relaxing with a drink in a chair by the pool, under an umbrella, with a stack of books to read and another person, perhaps a Black gentleman, in the adjacent chair. Of course, not everyone can afford this kind of retirement; the man is liable to die before her; and she is then left alone, perhaps without any family. That is the fate of many older women, who may die, as well as live, alone. Hopefully, days will not pass before her body is discovered. We are only missing the cats to complete the picture. We do get a kind of self-satisfied, smug smile, as though this is the best kind of life. All this reinforces the sort of feminist ideology of isolation and self-sufficiency that we often get now. In response, we also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. Indeed, organizers have been discovering that "singles" events sometimes draw few, or no, men. This is a phenomenon, not just in the West, but in China, Korea, and Japan also, where marriage and even sex seem to be declining in popularity. American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. In March, 2025, a contestant on the Netflix show “Love Is Blind” broke off her engagement at the altar beause she suddenly decided that the groom was insufficiently political, with the "right" politics. He didn't even care about the fraudulent travesty, "Black Lives Matter." Truly, he is clearly better off. Next, at right, we get a purer version of "I don't need no man." What a man likes is irrelevant because a feminist is not in the business of pleasing anyone else. In fact, I don't know how often a man is liable to offer advice like this. It is more likely he will just check out if this woman represents something that "no man wants." Indeed, the "we don't care" may be a deal breaker all on its own. The "we" in this presumably means all women -- none of them are to care what a man thinks -- although it may just be the Royal We, which fits the attitude. The key thing, however, is that the woman here doesn't care what he likes or wants. She is not in the business of pleasing anyone but herself. I think this is called being "self-centered" or "narcissistic"; and I thought that it was only Ayn Rand who advocated the "virtue of selfishness." Isn't it only Capitalism that promotes the atomization of society? Would this feminist ever be able to buy this guy a Christmas or birthday present, if she never knows what he likes? Seems like she would just buy something that she likes, which will persuade the fellow that she really doesn't care about him. So we see the autism and isolation of this ideology. The accusation is always that the "patriarchy" wants women to live entirely for others, but here this is the polar opposite, to live with no concern for anyone else at all, headed towards the solitary old age and death as noted above. Or, after all, there are convents. Then, we might consider the cartoon at left. This at least concedes that a woman might be happy and fulfilled in a marriage with children. But, of course, it is balanced, at least, with the solitary and self-satisfied representative on the right. The terminology is also interesting, with each woman labelled as "complete." But we also might wonder if the implication here is that Black women marry because they are not capable of the self-sufficiency of the white woman. Sounds like a bit of racism, even as Molnar is trying to virtue-signal by showing an interracial marriage. Of course, some people are happy being alone; and there can be communities of people without children or even marriage. Which is why I mention convents. "Retirement" communities try to create little societies where people can be happy even while family and others are dying, or senile, around them. Perhaps the woman above is not by a pool at her own home but by the common pool of such a place. They play bingo or string beads for amusement. However, retirement communities are an "end of life" provision. The woman on the right, with her pizza and coffee, doesn't look ready for retirement. Instead, she is the ideal of solitary contentment. But, for most people, this is exceptional; yet it is the ideal promoted by this kind of feminism, and by Leiney Molnar. It is the sort of thing that is contrary, not only to most religious traditions, but to the principles of Darwinian Evolution. In other words, solitary self-satisfaction is not a good survival or reproductive strategy. Indeed, with some animals, like tigers, the females mate, conceive, and raise the young on their own. This is also a provision in feminist ideology, where "single motherhood" is just as "complete" as anything else. Unfortunately, human beings are not tigers; and we know that children raised by single mothers disproportionately suffer from a multitude of social and developmental problems, not the least of which is a greater incidence of criminal activity. Also, most single mothers are not professional white women but live at much lower income levels, say, from waitressing (where the IRS taxes tips, which are gifts, as income - which Trump has promised to stop), if not no income. Darwinian survival is no small consideration. Married women are the safest people in modern society, despite the Left wishing to portray marriage as hellscapes of domestic abuse. No, lowlife boyfriends are the threat of domestic violence, including against children, and Lesbian relationships can be just as violent as heterosexual ones. The former may be more common in low income circumstances, especiallly if the boyfriends are parasitic on the women, and not the natural fathers of the children. Male lions who take over a pride, as we know, kill the cubs of the lionesses. Next, at right, we've got a woman complaining about birth control pills, while the man complains, in what we are expected to take as in a trivial and dismissive way, about condoms. Actually, the problem with condoms is that they blanket all the sexually sensitive parts of the male anatomy. This reduces sensation, which otherwise is the point of engaging is sex beyond reproductive purposes, in which condoms would be counterproductive anyway. The problem with the woman's complaint, in turn, is that she doesn't need to use the Pill for birth control. Yet the Pill was presented, and has been celebrated for years, as the easiest way to make women as casual about sex as men can be. Nevertheless, as she complains, there can be side effects, which may be serious enough that they counterindicate the use of the drug. On the other hand, some women use the Pill therapeutically, for instance to regularize their menses. Thus, the complaint here about the Pill may be valid, but it will only apply to a subset of women, while the cartoon gives us the impression that it is the general experience of all women on the Pill. So this is a misrepresentation. My first wife was suspicious of what the Pill did to her sexual libido, but she otherwise seemed to have no complaints about it. At the same time, this woman doesn't need to use the Pill. I had a girlfriend who only used a diaphram, and she seemed pleased enough with its use. There also used to be contraceptive sponges, but in 1994 these were no longer available because when the maker (Whitehall-Robins Healthcare) wanted to change factories, the FDA required that the devices be re-certified, which the maker did not want to pay for. Now I've seen that there was some contamination in the factory, and the maker didn't want to upgrade the equipment. That is not what I heard at the time. Sponges have been reintroduced, but also withdrawn again, at least three times. The loss of this device was even the subject of an episode of Seinfeld (The Sponge, S7:E9, December 7, 1995). There seemed to be little protest about the loss of the sponges from Establishment feminism. The FDA may have jerked women around, but, apparently, it is above accountability to the public. Typical for the Administrative State. The rest of the woman's complaint in the cartoon is about the horror of pregnancy. In that case, "I have to go through a traumatic abortion" (unlike Lena Dunham's infamous wish that she had had an abortion, since it sounded like a feminist sacrament), or she must tolerate destroying her life by actually having children, which, as we have seen, seems to be a fate worse than death. All this because the male is so selfish and insensitive that he doesn't want to inhibit his sexual response with a condom. Obviously, none of this will be beneficial for either of them. Finally, at left we see a celebration of divorce. But every divorce will be a failure of something, whether it is a failure of judgment, of maturity, or perhaps the moral failure of one of the partners. If the nature of the failure is not recognized, then the "new beginning" very likely will be the preparation for another failure. I know both men and women who've been through four marriages. The vibe we get from the cartoon, however, is more like that marriages are disposable and that now it is time to move on for some more fun. The moral failing in that case might well be of the woman pictured. The moral shallowness of all this is much like the advertisement we see here for a divorce lawyer: The implication is that the gentleman on the sign, unless he gets a divorce, is missing out on the busty woman standing in front of it. And perhaps she can tolerate using the Pill. This should be a clue that the problem here with feminism is part of a larger problem of which this kind of feminism is only one exemplar. The appeal about divorce is to hedonism. The dismissal of marriage and children is an expression of nihilism, whose only serious goal could be the extinction of life. None of that is possible without the rejection of the value of any religious tradition, which means that, in the West, it is fallout from atheism. The belief in ancient Greece, Rome, India, and China that reproduction is a duty to our ancestors is something that, naturally, no one believes now -- unless it is in India and China (where offerings to ancestors are still made at Ch'ing Ming). The rejection of hedonism and the diagnosis of nihilism following from atheism is, of course, characteristic of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's solution was to substitute the pursuit of power for any of the old features of religious belief. This did not improve matters. Those pursuing power murdered many millions of people in the 20th Century, although their program was often dressed up with a rhetoric of Marxist "liberation." Yet somehow "liberation" always involved luxury for the rulers and tyranny, slavery, and poverty for everyone else. Establishment feminism is, naturally, like all the political Left, mad for power. This is incompatible with hedonism, as we indeed see in the feminist anaesthesia and anhedonia that poison cultural discourse and even popular entertainment. Nevertheless, as examined above, there is a parallel appeal that offers pleasure and irresponsibility to vulnerable and gullible women. Blow off men, family, and children and you will be happy, like the Davos Supervillains telling people they will own nothing and will be happy, sitting in their corporate cubicles, in an office where there is no social life because the men expect that any interaction with the women beyond business necessities will result in a sexual harassment lawsuit. Unfortunately, many women may buy into this until youth and fertility are gone (called "hitting the wall") and they are left with the isolation that has been sold to them. Hedonism and nihilism take a toll, morally and physically. That is the end of the essay by Dr Ross. My own input to this is to mention that my Mom told me “To marry a nice Jewish girl" and that these are separate conditions.

קשה על דעת הרמב''ם עם הכלב עם הלחם והפחם היא שקשה לראות איך זה מתאים לגמרא. הגמרא אמנם אומר שר' יוחנן סבור שאש חייבת בגלל חיצים שלו וממונו, אבל קשה לראות איך זה עוזר לרמב''ם. אם הרמב''ם היה מחזיק ישירות ורק כריש לקיש, אז הייתה לנו תשובה, אבל הוא לא. הוא מחזיק שאש חייבת בגלל חיציו. תן לי להסביר למה אם הוא יחזיק כריש לקיש זה יעזור לו. ריש לקיש אמר אש מחויבת כאשר היא רכושו של אדם. ואז גמרא שואלת עליו מהמשנה עם הכלב, הלחם והפחם. הפחם לא שייך לבעל הכלב, אז למה הוא חייב לשלם על הערימה? ריש לקיש עונה כי הכלב זרק את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה. זה אומר שהוא לא אחראי לאש בכלל, אלא בגלל קרן של שור תם או בגלל צרורות. זה בוודאי כמו הגמרא בעמוד י''ח שבו גמרא מחזיקה שהאחריות היא מצרורות או קרן התם. ולריש לקיש האחריות היא רק על מקום הפחם, לא כל הערימה כי האש לא הייתה של בעל הכלב, ובעל הפחם אינו אחראי כי שמר על הגחלים שלו. אבל הראשונים כולם החליטו שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוחנן ולכן ישנה אפשרות להיות אחראי או כאשר האש שייכת לו או שזה מקרה של חיציו. אז למה הרמב''ם סבור שאין אחריות על הערימה, אלא רק הדרך שהפחם עבר כשהכלב גרר אותו. בכל מקרה, למה זה משנה לריש לקיש אם הכלב זרק את הפחם? גם אם הוא הניח אותו בעדינות, זה עדיין קרן שור תם או צרורות. יתר על כן, איך מסביר ר' יוחנן את המשנה, שהכלב הניח את הפחם בעדינות כך שבעלי הכלב אחראי לחצי נזק לכל הערימה. אבל למה? זה עדיין לא "החצים שלו" אלא חיצים של הכלב שלו, והפחם לא שייך לו_________ כדי לענות על שאלה זו על הרמב''ם אני חושב שצריך להסתכל אחורה בדף י''ח שם עולה סוגיית כוחו של כח. נוכל לראות שהגמרא שם רואה בשאלת רבא אם תלך לפי תחילת או סוף עילות הנזק כשאלה כמו צרורות (חלוקי נחל). יש גם אם העוף שלעס את החוט שהחזיק כלי שנפל ושבר כלי אחר הוא כוח כוחו. אף שהגמרא שם לא מגיע לתשובה על כוח כוחו [מפני שהתרנגולת אולי דחפה את הכלי עד שנשבר על אבן], הרמב''ם [נזקי ממון ב' הי''ז] והתוספות כאן בדף כ''ב אכן מגיעים לתשובה. העובדה שר' יוחנן דורש שהכלב יניח את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה כדי שיהיה חצי נזק, מלמדת שכוח כוחו אינו חייב כלל (או אולי נזק רביעי כפי ששואל הראב''ד על הרמב''ם). עם זאת, כתבתי במקום אחר שאולי הרמב"ם מהחזיק כמו הרא"ש שכוח כוח הוא חייב, אבל על סמך השאלות שיש לי כאן על הרמב"ם, והעובדה שאני לא יכול לראות לו שום תשובה חוץ מלומר שהוא מחזיק כמו תוספות, אני חושב ששם יש למצוא תשובה אחרת _____________________________________________________________ עם זאת, יש שאלה לגבי גישה זו. ייתכן שר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש אם הכלב זרק את הפחם על הערימה. איננו יודעים כי הוא לא אומר דבר על המקרה הזה. אם הוא מסכים עם ריש לקיש שמקום שהפחם נחת או נישא שחייב בחצי נזק, אין ללמוד מזה (לא התוספות ולא הרמב''ם) שכוח כוחו אינו חייב נזק. שהרי אמרנו שהכלב שזורק או נושא את הפחם הוא כוח כוחו, ולכן אומר ר' יוחנן שהכלב צריך להניחו על הערימה כדי להיות אחראי. אבל זה יחול גם על המקום של הפחם. אם נזרק, אז גם מקום הפחם לא יהיה מחויב בניגוד לריש לקיש. או אולי ר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש שאם הכלב היה זורק את הפחם, זה יהיה אחראי לחצי נזק על המקום של הפחם מהסיבות רש'' הציע (קרן של שור תם או צרורות). (לפיכך, לא ניתן ללמוד מכאן על כוח כוחו.) האפשרות האחרונה כאן היא שאולי ר' יוחנן סבור שהזריקה היא כוח כוחו ולכן אינה אחראית על הערימה וגם לא על מקום הפחם, בעוד ריש לקיש חשב שהזריקה אינה כוח כוחו אלא צרורות או קרן של שור תם (מאולף)

The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the whole stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along? One problem with the opinion of the Rambam about the dog with the loaf and coal is that it is hard to see how it corresponds to the Gemara. The Gemara does say that R Yochanan holds that fire is also obligated because of arrows or money, but it is hard to see how that helps the Rambam. If the Rambam would hold directly and only like Reish Lakish, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of "his arrows". Let me explain why if he would hold by Reish Lakish that would help him. Reish Lakish said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then the Gemara asks on him from the Mishna with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? Reish Lakish answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox (that became wild) or because of pebbles. This is certainly like the Gemara on page 18 where Gemara holds the liability is from pebbles or horn of a tame ox. And to Reish Lakish, the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog, and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the Rishonim (medieval authorities) all decided the law is like R Yochanan, and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of "his arrows". so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to Reish Lakish if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or pebbles. Furthermore, how does R Yochanan explain the Mishna, that the dog put the coal down gently, so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the Rambam I think it is necessary to look aback on page 18 where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the gemara there considers the question of Rava about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the gemara there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the Rambam [monetary damage ch. 2 law 17] and the Tosphot here on page 22 do arrive at an answer. The fact that R. Yochanan requires that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, shows that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the Raavad asks on the Rambam). ______________________________________________________________________________________ However, I wrote elsewhere that the Rambam might hold like the Rosh that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the Rambam, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like Tosphot, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way__________________However, there is a question on this approach. It is possible that R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish if the dog threw the coal on the stack. We do not know since he says nothing about that case. If he agrees with Reish Lakish that the place the coal landed or was carried that is obligated in half damage, then neither the Tosphot nor Rambam can learn from that that force of his force is not obligated in any damage. For we were saying that the dog throwing or carrying of the coal is force of his force, and that is why R Yochanan says the dog has to put it down on the stack in order to be liable. But that would apply to the place of the coal also. If thrown, then the place of the coal also would be not obligated unlike Reish Lakish. Or perhaps R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish that if the dog would throw the coal, that that would be liable half damage on the place of the coal for the reasons Rashi gives (horn of a tame ox or pebble). (Thus, you can not learn from here about force of force.) The last possibility here is that perhaps R Yochanan holds that throwing is force of his force, and thus not liable on the stack nor the place of the coal, while Reish Lakish considered throwing not to be force of his force but rather pebbles or horn of a tame ox. Ho ______________________________________________________________________________________ ________________ The problem with the opinion of the רמב’’ם about the dog with the loaf and coal is hard to see how it corresponds to the גמרא. The גמרא does say that ר’ יוחנן holds that fire is also obligated because of money, but it is hard to see how that helps the רמב’’ם. If the רמב’’ם would hold directly and only like ריש לקיש, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of his arrows. Let me explain why if he would hold by ריש לקיש that would help him. ריש לקיש said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then גמרא asks on him from the משנה with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? ריש לקיש answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox or because of צרורות. This certainly like the גמרא on page י''ח where גמרא holds the liability is from צרורות or קרן התם. and to ריש לקיש the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the ראשונים all decided the law is like ר’ יוחנן and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of his arrows. so why does the רמב’’ם hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to ריש לקיש if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or צרורותs. Furthermore, how does ר’ יוחנן explain THE משנה, that the dog put the coal down gently so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the רמב’’ם I think it is necessary to look back on page י''ח where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the גמרא there considers the question of רבא about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the גמרא there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the רמב’’ם and the תוספות here on page כ''ב do arrive at an answer. The fact that ר' יוחנןrequire that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, show that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the ראב'' ד asks on the רמב’’ם). However, I wrote elsewhere that the רמב’’ם might hold like the רא''ש that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the רמב’’ם, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like תוספות, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way ______________________________________________________________________________________ However, there is a question on this approach. It is possible that ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש if the dog threw the coal on the stack. We do not know since he says nothing about that case. If he agrees with ריש לקיש that the place the coal landed or was carried that is obligated in half damage, then neither the תוספות nor רמב''ם can learn from that that force of his force is not obligated in any damage. For we were saying that the dog throwing or carrying of the coal is force of his force, and that is why ר’ יוחנן says the dog has to put it down on the stack in order to be liable. But that would apply to the place of the coal also. if thrown, then the place of the coal also would be not obligated unlike ריש לקיש. Or perhaps ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש that if the dog would throw the coal, that that would be liable half damage on the place of the coal for the reasons רש''יgives (horn of a שור תם or צרורות). (Thus, you can not learn from here about force of force.) The last possibility here is that perhaps ר' יוחנן holds that throwing is force of his force and thus not liable on the stack nor the place of the coal while ריש לקיש considered throwing not to be force of his force but rather pebbles or horn of a tame ox.

קושי על הרמב''ם מהגמרא בבא קמא כ''ג ע''א

הגמרא שואלת על המשנה . המשנה מביאה מקרה שכלב נשא כיכר עם פחם בוער לערימה והערימה נשרפה. התשלום עבור הכיכר הוא נזק מלא, והתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק. הגמרא אומרת שהסיבה היא שלא מדובר בחצים של עצמו, אלא בחצים של הכלב, אז זה חצי נזק. הגמרא שואלת אז מי משלם? תשובה: הבעלים של הכלב. הוא שואל, "למה לא הבעלים של הפחם?" תשובה: הוא שמר על הפחם שלו. לכן, הגמרא קובעת שהדין הוא שהתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק, וזה משולם על ידי בעל הכלב. אולי גם בעל הפחם ישלם אם לא ישמור על הפחם. [וכן שתוספות אומר.] אבל אנחנו לא יודעים זאת ישירות מהגמרא. כל מה שאנחנו יודעים בוודאות מהגמרא הוא שהבעלים של הכלב משלם חצי נזק עבור הערימה. אז למה הרמב''ם כותב שאין תשלום על הערימה בכלל? לאן נעלם הבעלים של הכלב? אם הרמב''ם רצה לומר שגם בעל האש משלם הוא היה יכול לכתוב את זה

A difficulty on the Rambam from the Gemara Bava kama pg 23

Furthermore, the Gemara asks on the Mishna . The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The Gemara says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The Gemara then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the Gemara holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what Tosphot says.] But we do not know that directly from the Gemara. All we know for sure from the Gemara is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the Rambam write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the Rambam wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________The גמרא asks on the משנה . The משנה brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The גמרא says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The גמרא then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the גמרא holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what תוספות says.] But we do not know that directly from the גמרא. All we know for sure from the גמרא is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the רמב''ם write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the רמב''ם wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that.

הרמב''ן אומר שיש הוכחה קלה שתחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב אינו חל על מקרה שבו ההתחלה היא בשמירה פחותה, ואחר כך בא אונס. ההוכחה שהוא מביא בדף צ''ג בבא מציעא היא הברייתא בדף מ''ה בבא קמא ארבע באים במקום הבעלים: שואל, שוכר, שומר בתשלום ושומר ללא תשלום. אם הוזהר שור שלוש פעמים, והולך והורג מישהו, נהרג השור, ושלושת מיני השומרים משלמים כופר ומחזירים ערך השור לבעלים חוץ מהשומר ללא תשלום (שלא מחזיר כלום לבעלים של השור). הגמרא החליטה שהברייתא מתייחסת למקרה שבו כל הארבעה שמרו על השור עם שמירה מינימלית. וכן, הגמרא אומר שלפי ר' אלעזר יש לשחוט בהמה שכבר הוכחה כמסוכנת והמשנה שלנו מתייחסת למקרה כזה. מצד אחד, אני יכול להבין את הרמב''ן כי השומר שכר עשה כמות מינימלית של שמירה אבל כל השומרים היו צריכים לעשות את השמירה הראויה. כך שרק השומר ללא תשלום אינו מחויב לשלם. עם זאת, נראה שקשה להבין. הסיבה שאני אומר את זה היא שחוק ההתחלה בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב הכוונה לשומר בתשלום (שומר שכר). זה לא יכול להיות השומר חינם כי בכל מקרה הוא לא חייב במקום שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז זה חייב להתייחס לשומר בתשלום. אבל הוא חייב בברייתא אף על פי שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז איך אתה יכול להחליט ממקרה שהוא חייב בתשלום, למרות שעשה שמירה מינימלית, למקרה שגם עשה שמירה מינימלית ובכל זאת להחליט שהוא לא חייב