Hanuka has a lot to do with going against idolatry. it is reminder that God, the first cause is not a form nor body. That is the formulation of the Middle Ages but a better way to put it would be God has no form nor substance. These two categories apply to all physical things but they are not applicable to God. God is not confined to categories that he has created. He is not a composite of form nor substance. [the rebellion against Antiochus was because of rejecting idolatry]. And as the Rambam points out, anything can be an object of idolatry inanimate things animals people stars etc.

בעניין הגמרא בדף ערכין י''ד ע''א רציתי לענות על מה שהראב''ד שואל על הרמב''ם ( רמב''ם הלכות ערכין פרק ד' הט''ו). שאלת הראב''ד היא מהגמרא המאוחרות בדף י''ד ע''ב. שם רב פפא אומר במקרה שהקרקע סלעית (טרשים), הקרקע והעצים מתקדשים לחוד ונגאלים לחוד. אחר כך ממשיכה הגמרא עוד קצת ואז מבקשת שיתקדשו יחד ויפדו יחד. ואז הגמרא עונה שזה מקרה כשהוא בא עם טענה (סיבה מיוחדת). הראב''ד מבין את הגמרא הזה שהיא מתייחסת לרב פפא. השאלה היא על רב פפא, והתשובה היא עבור רב פפא. אולם הרמב''ם מבין גמרא זה שהיא מתייחסת לרב הונא, והשאלה היא רק על סוף דברי רב הונא ששם הוא אומר שהקרקע והעצים נפדים כל אחד לחוד. והגמרא עונה על השאלה ולכן רב הונא בסדר. ולכן הרמב''ם פוסק כרב הונא, והראב''ד פוסק כרב פפא

Concerning the blog post I wrote a few days ago about the Gemara in Arachin page 14a ('רמב''ם הלכות ערכין פרק ד')I wanted to answer what the Raavad asks on the Rambam. The question of the Raavad is from the later gemara on page 14b where Rav Papa says in a case where the ground is rocky, the ground and trees are sanctified separately, and redeemed separately. Then the gemara continues on a little bit more, and then asks, "Why not let them be sanctified together, and redeemed together?" Then the Gemara answers, "It is a case when he comes with a special reason." The Raavad understands this Gemara to refer to Rav Papa. The question is on Rav Papa, and the answer is for Rav Papa. However, the Rambam understands this gemara to refer to Rav Huna. The question is only on the end of the statement of Rav Huna where he says the ground and trees are redeemed separately. And the gemara answers it's question, and so Rav Huna is okay.Thus the Rambam decided the law like Rav Huna and the Raavad like Rav Papa.----------------------------Concerning the blog post I wrote a few days ago about the גמרא in ערכין page י''ד ע''א I wanted to answer what the ראב’’ד asks on the רמב’’ם. question of the ראב’’ד is from the later גמרא on page י''ד ע''ב where רב פפא says in a case where the ground is rocky the ground and trees are sanctified separately and redeemed separately. then the גמרא continues on a little bit more and then asks let them be sanctified together and redeemed together. Then the גמרא answers it is a case when he comes with a special reason. the ראב’’ד understands this גמרא to refer to רב פפא. the question is on רב פפא and the answer is for רב פפא. However, the רמב’’ם understands this גמרא to refer to רב הונא. The question is only on the end of the statement of רב הונא where he says the ground and trees are redeemed separately. And the גמרא answers it question and so רב הונא is okay.

it is possible to decide how much a ketuba is worth from the fact that the Torah says one homer of land is redeemed by fifty shekels. One homer is thirty seah and one seah is fifty by fifty square cubits. So a homer is 750,000 square cubits of land. That comes to about one and a half acres. So that is the ketubah of the Torah which is also fifty shekels------------------however, the obvious question on this is that the evaluation of the Torah and the monetary value of a field are two different things.

מסכת ערכין דף י''ד ע''א. רמב''ם הלכות ערכין פרק ד' הלכות ט'ו עד י''ח. אני רוצה לשתף כאן איך אני חושב שהרמב''ם הבין את הנושא בערכין דף י''ד ע''א. אבל קודם כל אני רוצה להביא את הנושא הבסיסי עצמו. אמר רב הונא אם מקדש שדה [ומובן שהעצים מקדישים עמו] אז כשהם נפדה כל אחד הוא נפדה בפני עצמו. השדה הוא נפדה בית חומר שעורים בחמישים שקלים. [חומר הוא שלושים סאה דהיינו שבעת אלפים וחמש מאות אמות.] הגמרא שואלת עליו מברייתא. אם מקדשים שלושה עצים בבית סאה (חמישים כפול חמישים אמה), השדה נקדיש יחד איתם. כשהם נפדה, העצים נכללים בפדיון השדה. לא משלמים תוספת עבור העצים. הגמרא עונה ברייתא זו כמו ר' שמעון המחזיק כל המקדש עושה זאת בעין קמצנית. הבין הרמב''ם שאמירת רב הונא ותחילת הברייתא אינם חולקים כלל. השאלה שהגמרא מעלה היא מסוף הברייתא כאשר פדיון העצים נכלל אוטומטית בפדיון השדה. שלא כמו רב הונא. והתשובה היא שהברייתא היא כמו ר' שמעון. משמעות הדבר היא שמכיוון שהוא מקדיש את השדה בעין קמצנית, פחות כסף מגיע להקדש כשהוא נפדה. אבל לר' עקיבא מי שמקדש עושה זאת בעין נדיבה ולכן כאשר השדה והעצים נפדים, יותר כסף מגיע להקדש. ניתן לראות את כל זה בלשון הרמב"ם. הוא פסק כמו רב הונא ישר ופשוט וכמו תחילת הברייתא. כלומר: אם קידש שלושה עצים לסאה אחד מקדיש את השדה יחד איתם. הרמב"ם לא מזכיר שם שכל אחד מהם הוא נפדה בפני עצמו, משום שהוא מעולם לא מציע בשום מקום שיכולה להיות אפשרות שהפדיון של אחד יכול לכלול אחר. הוא כבר כתב שכאשר השדה והעצים נקדשים יחד, הם נפדים בנפרד. יתר על כן, הרמב"ם לא רואה קושי בעובדה שכאשר מקדישים שלשה עצים, השדה נקדש איתם, אך יותר משלושה עצים או פחות, השדה אינו כלול איתם בהקדשה. עבור הרמב"ם, תחילת הבייתא אינה חולקת כלל על רב הונא. רב הונא מדבר על קידוש שדה כאשר העצים באים יחד איתו, ולרמב"ם זה הגיוני לחלוטין( על סמך בבא בתרא דף ס''ט ע''ב שכאשר מוכרים שדה באים איתה גם העצים בה). ובמקרה ההפוך, שבו הוא מקדיש עצים לרמב"ם, הגיוני שרק כמות מדויקת של שלושה עצים לבית סאה מביאים את השדה איתם. עבור הרמב"ם, אין זו קושי כלל. הקושי מהברייתא היה בנוגע למעשה הפדיון. אם כאשר פודה אחד, האם השני נכלל? מה שמקשה על ההבנה במבט ראשון הוא שרש"י מבין ששאלת הברייתא על רב הונא נובעת מתחילת הברייתא. יתר על כן, הרמב"ם מבין שכאשר רב הונא אומר שכאשר הוא מקדיש שדה, העצים באים יחד איתו, הוא מתכוון שיכולים להיות הרבה יותר או הרבה פחות משלושה עצים בכל בית סאה

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Tractate Aracahin 14. Rambam laws of evaluations chapter 4 laws 15 to 18. I would like to share here how I think the Rambam understood the subject in Arachin pg. 14 side a. (Rambam laws of evaluations chapterr; 4 laws 15 to 18) But first I want to bring the basic subject itself. Rav Huna said if one sanctifies a field [and it is understood that the trees are sanctified with it], then when they are redeemed, each one is redeemed by itself. The field is redeemed (homer barley for 50 shekels). [A chomer is 30 seah, 750,000 amot.] The gemara asks on him from a braita. If one sanctifies three trees in a beit seah (50 times 50 amot), the field is sanctified along with it. When they are redeemed, the trees are included in the redemption of the field. One does not pay extra for the trees. The Gemara answers this braita is like R. Shimon who holds one who sanctifies does so with a stingy eye. The Rambam understood that the statement of Rav Huna and the beginning of the braita do not disagree at all. The question the Gemara is raising is from the end of the braita when the redemption of the trees is included automatically in the redemption of the field- unlike Rav Huna. The answer is the braira is like R’ Shimon. That means because he sanctified the field with a stingy eye, less money comes to hedesh when it is redeemed. But to R. Akiva, one who sanctifies sanctifies with a generous eye, and so when the field and trees are redeemed, more money comes to hedesh. You can see all this in the language of the Rambam. He decided like Rav Huna straight and plain, and like the beginning of the braita. Sanctifying three trees for one seah sanctify the field along with then. The Rambam does not mention there that each is redeemed by itself because he never suggests anywhere that there could be a possibility of the redemption of one might include another. He already wrote when the field and trees are sanctified together they are redeemed separately. Furthermore, the Rambam sees no difficulty in the fact that when one sanctifies three trees, the field comes alone with them, but more than three trees or less the field is not included. To the Rambam, this does not disagree with Rav Huna at all. Rav Huna is talking about sanctifying a feild while the trees come along with it; and to the Rambam that makes perfect sense (based on Bava Batra page 69b that when one sells a feild the trees come along with it.). And in the opposite case where he sanctifies trees, to the Rambam it makes sense that only an exact amount of three trees per beit seah bring the field along with them. To the Rambam this is not difficulty at all. The difficulty from the braita was concerning the act of redemption. If when redeeming one, does the other come along? What makes this hard to understand at first glance is that Rashi understands the question of the braita on Rav Huna comes from the begining of the braita. Furthermore, the Rambam understands the when Rav Huna says when he sanctifies a field the trees come along with it he means there can be many more or many less than three trees per beit seah.--------------------------------------------------------מסכת ערכין דף י''ד ע''א 14. רמב''ם הלכות ערכין פרק ד'. I would like to share here how I think the רמב’’ם understood the subject in Arachin pg. 14 side a. But first I want to bring the basic subject itself. רב הונא said if one sanctifies a field [and it is understood that the trees are מקדיש with it] then when they are נפדה each one is נפדה by itself. The field is נפדה בית חומר שעורים for חמישים shekels. [A חומר is thirtyסאה i.e., 750,000 אמות רבועות.] The גמרא asks on him from a ברייתא. If one sanctifies three trees in a בית סאה (fifty by times fifty cubits,), the field is מקדיש along with it. when they are נפדה, the trees are included in the פדיון of the field. One does not pay extra for the trees. The גמרא answers this ברייתא is like ר' שמעון who holds one who sanctifies does so with a stingy eye. The רמב’’ם understood that the statement of רב הונא and the beginning of the ברייתא do not disagree at all. The question the גמרא is raising is from the end of the ברייתא when the פדיון of the trees is included automatically in the פדיון of the field. Unlike רב הונא. and the answer is the ברייתא is like ר' שמעון. That means because he מקדיש the field with a stingy eye, less money comes to הקדש when it is נפדה. But to ר' עקיבא one who sanctifies does so with a generous eye, and so when the field and trees are נפדה, more money comes to הקדש. You can see all this in the language of the רמב’’ם. He decided like רב הונא straight and plain and like the beginning of the ברייתא. THAT IS: sanctifying three trees for one סאה sanctifies the field along with them. The רמב’’ם does not mention there that each is נפדה by itself because he never suggests anywhere that there could be a possibility of the פדיון of one might include another. He already wrote when the field and trees are מקדיש together they are נפדה separately. Furthermore, the רמב’’ם sees no difficulty in the fact that when one sanctifies tree trees, the field comes alone with them, but more than three or less the field is not included. To the רמב’’ם this does not disagree with רב הונא at all. רב הונא is talking about sanctifying a feild in while the trees come along with it and to the רמב’’ם that makes perfect sense.(Based on בבא בתרא דף ס''ט ע''ב that when one sells a field, the trees in it come along with it.) And in the opposite case where he מקדיש trees to the רמב’’ם it makes sense that only an exact amount of three trees per בית סאה bring the field along with them. To the רמב’’ם this is not difficulty at all. The difficulty from the ברייתא was concerning the act of פדיון. If when פודה one, does the other come along? What makes this hard to understand at first glance is that רש''י understands the question of the ברייתא on רב הונא comes from the begining of the ברייתא. Furthermore, the רמב’’ם understands the when רב הונא says when he sanctifies a field the trees come along with it he means there can be many more or many less than three trees per בית סאה.

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יש שני דברים שרציתי להביא כאן, האחד בעניין רשות הרבים בשבת, והשני לגבי השאלה המפורסמת ברמב''ם מתי שוכחים את כל ל''ט מלאכות וצריכים להביא ל''ט חטאות, באיזה אופן הוא זוכר שבת? (אם שכח שבת לגמרי, אז הוא מביא רק חטאת אחת. כדי להביא ל''ט, הוא צריך לזכור את שבת, אבל לשכוח כל אחד מהל''ט מלאכות) מבחינת הדבר הראשון באמת אין לי מה להוסיף אלא להביא הוכחת הגר''א שאין צריך שש מאות אלף (ששים ריבוא) כדי להיות רשות הרבים. הוכחתו היא מברכות דף נ''ח. שם עולא אמר, "לנו חוק ידוע שאין אוכלוסא בבל". "ולמדנו בברייתא שאוכלוסא אינו פחות משש מאות אלף (ששים ריבוא)." ובגמרא בערובין דף ו' ע''ב עולא אמר דרכי הסמטה במחוזא (אבולי דמחוזא) היו רשות הרבים לולא שסוגרים את השערים בלילה. עם זאת, הרא''ש רש''י ותוספות סומכים על הגמרא שאומרת שרשות הרבים צריכה להיות כמו דגלי המדבר. בדגלי המדבר שבו היו שש מאות אלף.===================== הנושא השני הוא זה. (אמר ר' יוחנן שגג בכרת והזיד בלאו חייב בחטאת. ואנחנו פוסקים ככה.) איך אפשר לעשות כל ל''ט ועדיין להיות חייב ל''ט חטאות? בוודאי שלא ייתכן שהוא יודע את העונש, אבל לא את האיסור. אני משיב שזה בדיוק מה שהרמב"ם קובע. זה בדיוק כמו קורבן הפסח. אם אדם לא מביא אותו, הוא חייב בכרת, אבל אין איסור לא להביא אותו. יש רק מצוות עשה, הציווי להביא פסח. אבל אם הוא לא מביא אותו, הוא חייב בכרת. אז, מבחינת שבת, יש מצווה עשה לזכור את השבת. אז גם אם הוא שוכח את כל 39 אבל יודע את עונש כרת שמגיע בגלל התעלמות מהמצווה עשה, הוא חייב בקורבן חטאת. זהו מקרה שבו הוא שכח שכל 39 סוגי המלאכות אסורים אבל זוכר שיש מצווה עשה לנוח מכל אחד מהם ואם לא עושה זאת העונש הוא כרת

I had two things I wanted to bring here, one about the issue of a public domain on Sabbath (one must not carry anything in a public domain onthe Sabbath) and the other about the famous question on the Rambam about when one forgets the whole 39 types of forbidden work on the sabbath, and has to bring 39 sin offerings, in what way does he remember Sabbath? {If he forgot Shabat completely then he brings only one sin offering. To bring 39, he needs to have remembered Shabat but forgot the 39.} In terms of the first thing I really have little to add except to bring the proof of the Gra that one does not need 600,000 to be a public domain. His proof is from Brachot page 58. Ula said we poskin [the law is known] that there is no multitude in Babylon. And we learn in a braita that a multitude is not less than 600,000.and the gemara in eruvin page 6 side b :Ula said, The ally ways of Mechuza (a city in Babylonia) would be a public domain if not for the fact that they close the gates at night. However, the Rosh Rashi and tosphot might be depending on the Gemaraa that says the public domain has to be like the flags of the desert. andin the flags of the desert where there were 600,000. The other issue is this. R. Yochanan said accidental karet but doing the work on purpose is liable a sin offering. And we poskin that way. But everyone how can one do all 39 and still be liable? surely it cannot be a case of his knowing the punishment but not the prohibition. I answer that that is exactly what the Rambam holds. It is just like the sacrifice of the Passover offering. If one does not bring it, he is liable karet, but there is no prohibition not to bring it. There is only a positive command (i.e.., the command to bring a Passover offering). Even so, if he does not bring it, he is liable karet. So, in terms of Sabbath, there is a positive command to remember Sabbath. So, even if he forgets all 39 types of work, but knows the punishment of karet that comes because of ignoring the positive command, he is liable a sin offering. That is a case where he forgot that all 39 types of work are prohibited but remembers that there is a positive command to rest from each one of them and if not doing so the punishment is karet.-------karet refers dying young before 50 years old according to one opinion in the Gemara

Why knowledge has to be of independent things, things independent of the mind according to H.A. Prichard? The answer: According to the philosopher H.A. Prichard, knowledge requires the object to be entirely mind-independent because the mind's state affects the nature of its presentations. If the object of knowledge were influenced by the mind, it would not be truly known but would instead be a product of the mind's modification, similar to an appearance or an illusion rather than a thing-in-itself. Therefore, for something to be known, it must be something that the mind does not alter in any way; its object must be wholly external to the mind. I think that Quantum Mechanics does not change this fact because if you do the two-slit experiment, the result does not change according to how you think. If you open one slit, the light beam acts as individual photons. If you open two slits, the light beam acts as waves and there is constructive and destructive interference. This goes against German Idealism and Kant in particular. I appreciate Kant an and Friesian school very much that built that system based on the limits of reason, but I think to make knowledge something that affects what it knows means that it knows nothing. I would like to mention here that when Physics says that a nature of light depends on how it is observed does not mean that it is subjective, but rather it means how it is measured.------I asked Dr. Kelley Ross about this.[Dr. Ross is a main representative of the Friesian School who holds knowledge has to be filtered through structures in the Mind.] His answer is: But I'm not sure what anyone means when they say that something is known by "reason." This cannot mean known by means of deduction or rational inference, because that relies on pemises. To Aristotle, premises that are first principles are not known by "reason" (logos) but by "mind" (nous). This means they are self-evident. I don't see how anyone has ever improved on that, except to falsify the self-evidence of such principles, which the Rationalists unintentionally accomplished.----Plato's equivalent are not self-evident. We are not even initially aware of them. Fries and Nelson say they are known by "reason," but, again, I'm not sure what this even means, except that they asume that it comes from a "faculty" of "reason," whose nature is speculative. Otherise, the theory of "non-intuitive" knowledge is the functional equivalent of Platonic Recollection. For Plato, phenomenal objects "participate" in the Forms, without any explanation of how that works.--- With Fries, we can say that the Forms are in the objects, but non-intuitively. The Forms are Kantian things-in-themselves, but things-in-themselves are, as it says, in themselves. As Paul says: Through a glass darkly. We might say Kant has a version of this: The synthesis of the categories that produces phenomena, also introduces the Moral Law, which is all that is left for Kant of Plato's Forms. Kant says we know the Moral Law through "reason," but this suffers from the same difficulties as any other reference to "reason," and Kant's "reason" in particular underdetermines all the moral content that Kant wants to get out of it.----- That is the end of the reply of Dr. Ross. I might add here that causality to Kant is a priori (as shown by Hume)-and so even physical observation of an object requires an a priori assumption-i.e the assumption that something is causing me to see the object. The knowledge itself that I am seeing something is not contained in the light rays.-- I would also like to add that Dr Ross points out that no one has a better answer about the nature of reason--it is a simple that has a function, but we do not know what its essense is. [The difference between the approach of Kant and Fries and the approach of GE Moore and Prichard is important even though they are close as noted by philosophers in the 1800's who were aware of Jacob Fries and yet were edging towards the approaches that became the analytic schools of Russel and GE Moore.] Robert Hanna deals with the problems of Analytic Philosophy and holds that Kant addresses all the same issues in a better way.]

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בבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''א. אביי אמר ר' מאיר ור' יהודה חלוקים בשני דברים. בזמן מעידה, ר' מאיר מחזיק נתקל פושע, ור' יהודה מחזיק נתקל לאו פושע. לאחר הנפילה, ר' מאיר מחזיק מפקיר נזקיו אינו פוטר אותו מאחריות, ור' יהודה מחזיק שהוא פטור. אבל מה הוא מייאש החפץ באמצע נפילה? גם אם נתקל פושע, מה אם יש מקרה של נפילה של אונס כמו רוח חזקה לא רגילה. או מה אם יש נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא לא מייאש את החפץ? היה נדמה לי בתחלה שיכול להיות מקרה שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס, ובכל זאת הוא לא מפקיר נזקיו, ואולי זו נושא המחלוקת? כמו כן, אולי היה אפשר לחשוב במקרה של נפילה ברשלנות, ולמרות זאת הוא מפקיר את הנזק מיד,ואלי זו נושא המחלוקת? אבל ראיתי את בית יוסף [בשלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, דין ד', ובהגהות הגר''א הערה ח'.] שאף אחד מאלה אינו המחלוקת. אז אני חושב שהמחלוקת היא שמכיוון שלר' מאיר ,נתקל פושע, אז אפילו מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא משחרר אותו מחובת תשלום פיצויים. אבל לר' יהודה, מכיוון שהמעידה היא על ידי אונס, אז מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא יהיה חייב. כמו כן הבנתי שלר' מאיר, אפילו במקרה של נפילה שהייתה על ידי אונס, למשל רוח חריגה באה והפילה דברים מן הגג, ואז הוא נטש את הדברים, הוא עדיין יהיה אחראי עד שהוא יסיר את החפצים מרשות הרבים. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרצף מחשבות זה עלה לי לאחר שראיתי את התפרת שמואל [המודפסת בגמרא] והוא אומר שלר' יהודה לנטוש את החפץ שנופל ברשלנות לא יפטור אותו מאחריות. לאחר מכן ראיתי זאת נאמר בגלוי בשלחן ערוך ובגר"א באותו דין. אז חשבתי שאולי הוויכוח הוא כאשר הנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס והוא לא נטש את החפץ, אבל השלחן ערוך (גם שם) אומר שהוא אחראי. (כלומר, שר' יהודה סבור שהוא אחראי, והחוק הוא כמו שר' יהודה.) אז, חשבתי שאולי המחולקת נמצאת במקרה שבו אפילו ר' מאיר מסכים שזו נפילה על ידי אונס כמו רוח חזקה יוצאת דופן והוא לא נטש את החפץ. ראיתי גם שם שהשלחן ערוך אומר שהוא אחראי. אז, המקום היחיד שבו אפשר שתהיה שם המחלוקת הוא אחרי נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא אכן נטש את החפץ. ר' מאיר אומר שהוא עדיין אחראי להסירו למרות שהוא הפקיר אותו, ור' יהודה אומר שאין אחריות מכיוון שיש גם שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס וגם שהוא אכן נטש את החפץ

Bava Kama page 29a. The argument between the Maharsha and almost all other achronim about the approach of Tosphot in Bava Kama page 29

Bava Kama page 29a. Abaye said R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, R. Meir holds tripping is by negligence, and R. Judah holds it is by accident. After the fall, R. Meir holds abandoning the object does not absolve him from liability, and R. Judah holds it does. But what if he abandons the object in the middle of a fall? Even if tripping is by negligence, what if there is case of a fall by accident like a strong wind (that is unexpected and it blows things off the roof that damaage things on the ground)? Or --what if there is a fall by accident, and he does not abandon the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon his property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence, and yet he abandoned the property immediately. But I saw the Beit Yoseph [in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat chapter 412, law 4, and in the note of the Gra, note 8.] that neither of these are possible. {Not like the Maharsha}. So, I think the argument is that since to R. Meir, tripping is by negligence, then even abandoning the property after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to R. Judah since the tripping is by accident, then abandoning the property after the fall would not be liable. Also, I realized that to R. Meir even a case of a fall that was by accident e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked the things down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the public domain. I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the Tiferet Shmuel [printed in the back of the Gemara], and he says that to R. Judah to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that, I saw this stated openly in the Shulchan Aruch and the Gra on that halacha. I then thought: perhaps the argument is when the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object? but the Shulchan Aruch (there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the disagreement is in a case where even R. Meir agrees it is a fall by accident (like a strong unusual wind), and he did not abandon the object, but then I saw there too the Shulchan Aruch says he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by accident, and he did abandon the object. R. Meir says he still is liable to remove it even though he abandoned it, and R Judah says there he is not liable since you have both that the fall was by accident and he did abandon the object. ---------------------------------------------------------------------בבא קמא page 29. אביי said ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, ר’ מאיר holds נתקל פושע, and ר’ יהודה holds it is by אונס. After the fall, ר’ מאיר holds מפקיר the object does not absolve him from liability, and ר’ יהודה holds it does. But what is he מיאש the object in the middle of a fall? Even if נתקל פושע, what if there is case of a fall by אונס like a strong wind. Or what if there is a fall by אונס and he does not מיאש the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by אונס, and yet he did not מפקירhis property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he הפקיר the property immediately. But I saw the בית יוסף [in שלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, law ד', and in the note of the גר''א note ח'.] that neither of these are possible. So, I think the argument is that since to ר’ מאיר ,נתקל פושע then even מפקיר נזקיו after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to ר' יהודה since the tripping is by ,אונס then מפקיר נזקיו after the fall would not be חייב. Also I realized that to ר’ מאיר even a case of a fall that was by אונס e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked things מן הגג down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the רשות הרים I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the תפארת שמואל [printed in the back of the גמרא ] and he says that to ר’ יהודה to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that I saw this stated openly in the שלחן ערוךand the Gra on that דין. I then thought perhaps the argument is when the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, but the שלחן ערוך(there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the מחלוקת is in a case where even ר’ מאיר agrees it is a fall by אונס like a strong unusual wind and he did not abandon the object by then I saw there too the שלחן ערוךsays he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by אונס and he did abandon the object. ר’ מאיר says he still is liable to remove it even though he הפקיר it and ר’ יהודה says there is not liable since you have both that the fall was by אונס and he did abandon the object.

Bava Mezia 96.

A borrower of an object or animal is liable more than a paid guard because all the benefit goes to him. The Gemara in Bava Mezia 96 side a has a case where there are two borrowers of an animal, and yet the owner was with only one of the borrowers. [When the owner of the animal is with a borrower at the time the deal was agreed upon, and the animal dies, the borrower is not liable.] So, if the animal dies, then the only borrower who could be liable for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the Ramban and the Ran this might be a source for the law of the Rambam that when there are two borrowers of money on one document each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole loan just like in the case of guarantors] thus the Ramban comes to tell us the Rambam learned this from the case of the borrowers on page 96. Rav Shach (lender and borrower chapter 25, halacha 10) asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the borrowers of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other borrowers and so the first borrowers can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other borrower. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the borrowers of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each borrower is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “all the more so”. If the one borrower of the animal is liable only for his half, all the more so a borrower money is responsible only for his half even f both are signed on the loan.-------------------------------------------A שואל of an object is liable more than a שומר שכר because all theכל הנאה שלו . The גמרא in בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א has a case where there are two שואלים of an animalת and yet the owner was with only one of the שואלים. So, if the animal dies, then the only שואל who could be חייב for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the רמב''ן and the ר''ן this might be a source for the law of the רמב''ם that when there are two לווים of money on one שטר, each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole הלוואה just like in the case of guarantors]. Thus, the רמב''ן comes to tell us the רמב''ם learned this from the case of the borrowers on page צ''ו. ON THIS רב שך asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the שואלים of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other שואל and so the first שואל can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other שואל. While לווים of כסף might be liable for the whole amount. Why should we learn from שואלים of an animal to לווים of money? There is a specific reason the שואל of the animal can only be חייב for his half. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the שואלים of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each שואל is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “קו וחומר”. If the one שואל of the animal is חייב only for his half, all the more so a לווה OF money is responsible only for his half even If both are signed on the loan.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- עיין ברב שך מלוה ולווה כ''ה ה''י. שואל של חפץ אחראי יותר משומר שכר כי כל ההנאה שלו. לגמרא בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א יש מקרה שיש שני שואלים של בהמה, ובכל זאת הבעלים היה רק עם אחד מהשואלים. (כאשר בעל הבהמה נמצא עם שואל בזמן סיום העסקה, והבהמה מתה, השואל אינו חייב.) אז אם בהמה מתה, אז השואל היחיד שיכול להיות חייב על החצי שלו הוא זה שהיה לבד בלי הבעלים. לרמב''ן ולר''ן זה יכול להיות מקור לדין הרמב''ם שכאשר יש שני לווים של כסף על שטר אחד, כל אחד חייב רק בחצי. השאלה היא שאולי כל אחד צריך להיות אחראי לכל הלוואה בדיוק כמו במקרה של ערבים]. לפיכך, הרמב"ן בא לומר לנו שהרמב"ם למד זאת ממקרה השואלים בעמוד צ"ו. על כך שואל רב שך שזו לא נראית כהוכחה טובה מכיוון שהשואלים של הבהמה חייבים להיות אחראים רק לחלק אחד (כל אחד רק חצי). הסיבה לכך היא שהחלק השני של הבהמה הושאל לשואל השני, ולכן השואל הראשון אינו יכול להיות אחראי למחצית השנייה מכיוון שההנאה של מחצית זו לא הלכה אליו, אלא הלכה לשואל השני. בעוד שלווים של כסף יכולים להיות אחראים לכל הסכום. מדוע עלינו ללמוד משואלים של בהמה ללווים של כסף? יש סיבה ספציפית לכך שהשואל של הבהמה יכול להיות חייב רק למחציתו. התשובה הזמנית שלי לכך היא שבמקרה של השואלים של הבהמה, הבהמה היא חלק אחד שלם, ולכן אינה מחולקת, ובכל זאת אנו עדיין אומרים שכל שואל אחראי רק על מחציתו. אבל כשמדובר בהלוואת כסף, אין סיבה לא להתייחס לכל הסכום כמתחלק. לכן, יש לנו "קו וחומר". אם השואל האחד של הבהמה חייב רק על מחציתו, קל וחומר שלווה של כסף אחראית רק על מחציתו גם אם שניהם חתומים על ההלוואה

Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. But to my opinion, it is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality

Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality.[However, there is a difference between the function of reason recognizing contradictions and universals and objective reality. This is still not to deny the importance of Kant and Leonard Nelson who recognize these differences.]][You do not need to prove that there is reality, or that reason sees reality directly. If you do not belive in reality, then you need to bring proof, and there is no proof that could satisfy the conditions needed for such a proof.]See this from Dr. Bryan Caplan (Economics) and similar ideas from Dr. Michael Huemer (Philosophy--University of Colorado). I would like to add a further note: I have noticed that there is a close similarity between H.A. Prichard and Jacob Fries, in one respect, but quite different in others. The similarity is what Fries calls immediate non intuitive knowledge. Prichard also has something similar; --he says moral knowledge is inherent, not derived from anything, and not known by reason, nor by empirical evidence. In fact, that was his disagreement with G.E. Moore who held moral knowledge can be known by reason. But the differences are in the nature of reason. To Prichard, knowledge has to be of entities independent of the mind. [I.e., to Prichard, knowledge is of things in themselves. To Kant, knowledge is only of phenomena.] There is away to defend Kant concerning the nature of knowledge based on an idea from the intuitionists. Seeing empirical reality is not knowledge. Seeing anything is not knowledge. So no matter what you see, you have to process it and synthesise it into knowledge. A Possible objection to the Kantian approach to knowledge is that the mind must know something that is not the mind itself. The arrow goes from the mind to outside the mind. Only then can the mind reverse direction and go back to know its own properties. To self knowledge is not direct, rather it comes only as a second step. Therefore, knowledge must be of things independent of the mind.

With learning Physics, I found for me going forwards and backwards on every page was an amazing help. but eventually it got me bogged down. I try nowadays to combine several methods of learning. One way is to listen to lectures by experts that are now accessible on the internet. In years past, there was no access to anything like this unless one was enrolled in a university. I also hold strongly with the path of learning of Rav Nachman of saying the words and going on with no review until I have finished the whole book, and then review the whole book at least four times. {This comes from the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov number 76. It is also hinted at in the LeM of Rav Nachman vol. I, chapter 11. } [The forwards and backwards approach helped me get started, and also to get through my subjects at Polytechnic Institute of N.Y.U.] [The source in the Gemara in Tractate Shabat page 63 and Tractate Avoda Zara page 19a]

za98 E Minor, a midi file za98 a nwc file

Moral Objectivism

Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle, and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality: (1) There are moral propositions. (2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.") (4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth) (5) So moral values are part of reality, (which is objectivism). But: Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions. Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions.----------------------------- Moral intuition is an exercise of reason. I note that I also believe in mathematical intuitions, metaphysical intuitions, psychological intuitions, and even physical intuitions -- and that all of these are exercises of reason in the same sense, and differ from one another and from ethical intuition simply in the subject matter to which intuition is applied. Since it will make some people feel better to reflect that moral intuition is not unusual but is just like several other uses of our intellect, I will list examples of these.------------------------------ As mathematical intuitions, take "1+1=2" and "the shortest path between any two points is a straight line". As a metaphysical intuition, "The number of planets in the solar system is a contingent matter." As a psychological intuition, "Other things being equal, conscious beings will want to avoid pain." As physical intuitions, try "Forces cause motion" and "Physical causes are local; there is no action at a distance." Finally, as a moral intuition, consider "Torturing people just for the fun of it is wrong."[This is from Michael Huemer. I might mention it is also based on the idea of direct awareness. German idealism assumes we are only directly aware of empirical material things, not any a priori facts. this is based on Hume but seems false. Hume never proves this point but just keeps repeating it as if it is obvious. Why think that empirical observation is so much more reliable that direct reason? What makes observation so superior to the intellect that Hume should play down the intellect as much as possible? In fact, you will notice that even Hume turns to the intellect to justify observations; for what determines what conditions of observation are "reasonable"? Surely not observation itself, for then we would have a circular argument. [This argument is from Bryan Caplan.]

מעשר ראשון חייב בתרומה במקרה שניתן ללוי מתבואה שעדיין הייתה חייבת בתרומה. אבל בדרך כלל מעשר ראשון אינו חייב בתרומה. בעיניי הגיוני לומר שמעשר ראשון שחייב בתרומה ניתן להשתמש איתו להפריש ממנו תרומה גדולה עבור תבואה אחרת שחייבת בתרומה. אבל כשאינו חייב בתרומה, אבל עדיין חייב בתרומת מעשר, אזי אפשר להשתמש בו רק להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לדגן אחר שחייב רק בתרומת מעשר. אני חושב שההבחנה הזו היא דעת הרמב''ם והיא עונה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם בפרק ג' דין כ''א לפרק ה' דין י''ג. והרמב''ם בדין כ''א הוא כותב "אפשר להשתמש בו כתרומה עד שכולה תרומה". איך זה יכול להיות אפשרי אם המשמעות של "תרומה" שם פירושה תרומה גדולה? ברור שהמשמעות היא שהוא משמש עבור להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לתבואה אחרת עד שנותרים עשרת האחוזים האחרונים, כאשר גם הוא הופך לתרומת מעשר לחיוב שלו. גישה זו שונה מר' שמשון הסובר כי מעשר ראשון שעדיין מחויב בתרומת מעשר אך לא מחויב בתרומה, יכול לשמש כדי להפריש ממנו תרומה עבור תבואה אחרת-------הערה מאוחרת יותר. לאחר כתיבת הפסקאות לעיל שמתי לב שרב שך כותב חלק ממה שכתבתי. כלומר, הוא לוקח את המקרה שהמעשר הראשון מחויב רק בתרומת מעשר ואומר שאז רק תרומת מעשר ניתן להפריד ממנו עבור תבואה אחרת, וזו משמעותו של פרק א' דין כ''א. אני מסכים עם זה, אבל אני מוסיף שבמקרה שבו המעשר הראשון מחויב גם בתרומה גדולה וגם בתרומת מעשר, ניתן להשתמש בו עבור שתיהן עד שיישארו עשרת האחוזים האחרונים. אז בנקודה זו, צריך להפריד את האחוזים הנותרים כתרומת מעשר עבור החיוב שלו