It occurred to me that there is a contradiction to this idea that the Rambam ignores the plea of the woman as per the case of Yibum and Truma because the majority of people in the city say she had sex only with the one we know about or the majority say otherwise. The contradiction to this idea is the betrothed woman. When she is found pregnant, we assume the child is a bastard because clearly most people in the city around her would be cause for the child to be a bastard. We do not assume she had sex only with her husband since she is only betrothed .However, the surprize is that if she says the child is from her husband we believe her even against the word of her husband. But in that case, we do not hear of people talking. But even without people talking, we assume immediately that the child is a bastard. How can any of this make sense according to what we have already seen in the Rambam in laws of Truma and Yibum? [I might mention that in the case where she has been found to not be a virgin and that would make her forbidden to her husband that if she says the sex was by force then Raban Gamliel says she is believed and that is the law. And that case is where there is a status quo and a migo on her side. However, the Rambam holds there that she is believed only as far as the ketubah goes but she is still forbidden to her husband. I might note that that is against most other rishonim that hold she is permitted, e.g., R Yona, the Ramban, the Rashba, etc. They bring the Yerushalmi Ketuboth chapter one as proof, (law one and law six). So there the Rambam does ignore her plea in terms of the question of if she is forbidden.] But the Rambam clearly learns that Yerushalmi as proof that she is forbidden, and in fact that looks to me to be the most basic and simple explanation of the Yerushalmi.------------------------------It occurred to me that there us a contradiction to this idea that the רמב’’ם ignores the plea of the woman as per the case of ייבום and תרומה because the majority of people in the city say she had sex only with the one we know about or the majority say otherwise. The contradiction to this idea is the betrothed woman ארוסה . When she is found pregnant, we assume the child is a bastard because clearly most people in the city around her would be cause for the child to be a bastard. We do not assume she had sex only with her husband since she is only ארוסה . However, the surprize is that if she says the child is from her ארוס we believe her even against the word of her ארוס. But in that case, we do not hear of people talking רינון . But even without people talking, we assume immediately that the child is a bastard. How can any of this make sense according to what we have already seen in the רמב’’ם in laws of תרומה and ייבום? [I might mention that in the case where she has been found to not be a virgin, and that would make her forbidden to her כהןhusband or if she was betrothed before three, that if she says the sex was by force, then רבן גמליאל says she is believed and that is the law. And that case is where there is a status quo and a מיגו on her side. However, the רמב’’ם holds there that she is believed only as far as the כתובה goes but she is still forbidden to her husband. I might note that that is against most other ראשונים that hold she is permitted, e.g., ר' יונה, the רמב''ן, the רשב''א, etc.They bring the ירושלמי כתובות פרק א' as proof, הלכה א' והלכה ו'. So there the רמב''ם does ignore her plea in terms of the question of if she is forbidden. the רמב''ם clearly מבין that ירושלמי as proof that she is forbidden, and in fact that looks to me to be the most basic and simple explanation of the ירושלמי.- I might mention here that Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovski of Ponovitch deal with these questions ,but I am still in the middle of trying to understand their approaches. i was thinking about these problems all day yesterday. They do not ask this question that I am bringing up here, but they do deal with these issues.I should add here that to consider "people talking" is a majority [that is that the court has to go by it] is a stretch. And in fact, when the Gemara is thinking of a majority of a city or a majority of people like when a girl goes to a well outside town, it is not a case 0f people talking. However, it is this idea of people talking equals majority is how Rav Shmuel Rozovski answer some problems in the Rambam------------------------I should add here that to consider "people talking" is a majority [that is that the court has to go by it] is a "stretch דוחק". And in fact, when the גמרא is thinking of a majority of a city or a majority of people like when a girl goes to a well outside town, it is not a case 0f רינון people talking. However, it is this idea of "people talking" equals "majority" is how ר' שמואל רוזובסקי answer some problems in the רמב''ם