I just wanted to write down a thought I had on my way back from the sea shore about the case of a married woman where there is conflicting testimony if her husband died or not. the witnesses come to court at the same time and two say yes, he died and two say no. if she got married to a witness that said yes and she also says she is sure that her husband died, she can stay married. (The Rambam holds this law applies even in a case where it is one witness against another, but the Ramban says in that case she cannot be married to anyone.) One problem with this is the question: Why should her being sure have relevance to the question? I thought to myself that this sounds like the law, “One witness is believed in questions of prohibitions.” And there is some support to this idea from Abayee in Kidushin page 66. The case there is a witness says to a husband, “Your wife had sex with someone else (and therefore she is forbidden to her husband, and must be divorced).” Rava said, “He is not believed because any question about marital relations requires two witnesses.” אין דבר שבערווה פחות משניים But Abyee said, “The one witness is believed.” The reasoning of Abayee I think must be that two witnesses are required to create marriage or to create a divorce, but not to testify about a case of prohibition that flows from the fact of marriage. [An parallel example is two witnesses on a document are different from the testimony of the validity of the doc after it was written.] Now, you might ask if I am right, then why the law is she can marry only to the witness that said her husband died? Why not anyone? This is answered in Ketuboth page 22b where the Gemara brings up this question about an answer that Abayee had for R. Yochanan and the Gemara answered that for her to marry anyone else would be a scandal. [There are different answers to this question in the Noda BeYehuda, Rav Shmuel Rozovski, Reb Aaron Kotler, and Rav Shach.] I want to add that the subject in Ketuboth pg 22 is a bit different than the Mishna about the sages against R. Menachem ben R Yose. The Rambam decided the law like the sages. But the Gemara in Ketuboth 22. there R Yochana said if two witnesses come and say her husband died and t come and say no then she should not get married but if she did, she can stay. But if two come and say if she got divorced and two disagree she should not get married and if she does she must leave. The Gemara asks what is the difference in the cases? Abayee answered both cases are with one against one. And the Torah believes one witness that says the husband died as if he is two witnesses and the other is only one so one against two is nothing. the Gemara asks then she ought to be allowed to marry at first, not just after the fact the court will allow it. answer it would be a scandal. So we see here that Abayee might be holding the permission to stat married is one witness is believed in cases of prohibition, but that would not apply when there is another witness that disagrees like the Gemara says one against one is nothing. “One witness that is contradicted by another is nothing.” I might add here that I was also thinking about the reasoning of the Rambam [laws of divorce chapter 12 law 19] who holds whether two against two or one against one she can stay married to the witness that said the husband died. The Rif, Rashi, and Rambam hold two against two is a doubt derabanan, and a doubt deranana is permitted. One against one is allowed because of the statement of Abayee. and this seems to indicate that the Rambam hold with Abayee in this particular case of one against one.-----Later I saw that Rav Shmuel Rozovski was not bothered by the fact that one witness is believed as much as he is believed a against status quo chazaka (she was married, but is she now married?) but he answers this by noticing that most f the places in shas and the Rambm that we do not believe one witness in cases of prohibitions are cases where the re is a majority against him, e.g., a woman who got pregnant and we do not know from whom. but against a status que would be different.-----------------------Later I saw that רב שמואל רוזובסקי was not bothered by the fact that one witness is believed as much as he is believed against status quo חזקה (she was married, but is she now married?). But he answers this by noticing that most f the places in ש''ס and the רמב''ם that we do not believe one witness in cases of prohibitions are cases where there is a majority against him, e.g., a woman who got pregnant and we do not know from whom. But against a חזקה would be different. ובפרט שיש כאן חזקה כנגד חזקת אשת אישש ,היינו היינו חזקה שאישה בודקת ואחר כך מסכימה להתחתן --------------------------------------I just wanted to write down a thought I had on my way back from the sea shore about the case of a married woman where there is conflicting testimony if her husband died or not. the witnesses come to court at the same time and two say yes, he died and two say no. if she got married to a witness that said yes and she also says she is sure that her husband died, she can stay married. The רמב''ם holds this law applies even in a case where it is one witness against another, but the רמב''ן says in that case, she cannot be married to anyone. One problem with this is the question why should her being sure have relevance to the question? I thought to myself that this sounds like the law “one witness is believed in questions of prohibitions.” And there is some support to this idea from אביי in קידושין page 66. The case there is a witness says to a husband “Your wife had sex with someone else.” רבא said, “He is not believed because any question about marital relations requires two witnesses.” (אין דבר שבערווה פחות משניים) But אביי said, “The one witness is believed.” The reasoning of אביי I think must be that two witnesses are required to create marriage or to create a divorce, but not to testify about a case of prohibition that flows from the fact of marriage. [A parallel example is two witnesses on a שטר are different from the testimony of the validity of the שטר after it was written.] Now, you might ask if I am right, then why the law is she can marry only to the witness that said her husband died? Why not anyone? This is answered in כתובות page 22b where the גמרא brings up this question about an answer that אביי had for ר' יוחנן and the גמרא answered that for her to marry anyone else would be a scandal. I assume that this answer was not raised by any later authorities because of the fact that רבא disagreed with אביי ---------------------------[There are different answers to this question in the נודע ביהודה, רב שמואל רוזובסקי, ר' אהרן קוטלר, and רב שך.] I want to add that the subject in כתובות 22 is a bit different than the משנה about the חכמים against ר' מנחם בן ר' יוסי. The רמב’’ם decided the law like the sages. But the גמרא in כתובות 22, ר' יוחנן said if two witnesses come and say her husband died and two others come and say “no”, then she should not get married, but if she did, she can stay. But if two come and say, “She is divorced,” and two others disagree, then she should not get married, and if she does get married, she must leave. The גמרא asks what is the difference in the cases? אביי answered both cases are with one against one. And the תורה believes one witness that says the husband died as if he is two witnesses and the other is only one so one against two is nothing. The גמרא asks then she ought to be allowed to marry at first, not just after the fact the court will allow it. Answer: It would be a scandal. So, we see here that אביי might be holding the permission to stay married is because one witness is believed in cases of prohibition, but that would not apply when there is another witness that disagrees like the גמרא says one against one is nothing. “One witness that is contradicted by another is nothing.” I might add here that I was also thinking about the reasoning of the רמב’’ם [laws of divorce chapter 12 law 19] who holds whether two against two or one against one she can stay married to the witness that said the husband died. The רי''ף, רש''י, and רמב''ם hold two against two is a doubt דרבנן, and a doubt דרבנן is permitted. One against one is allowed because of the statement of אביי. and this seems to indicate that the רמב’’ם hold with אביי in this particular case of one against one.