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31.10.25

Bava Kama page 6A I would like here to explain a question that Rav Shach [in laws of damages chapter 1 halacha 8] asks on the Rosh. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The Gemara says a burden or stone one leaves on a roof and they fall in a common wind is liable because of pit and fire. The Rosh brings “some explain” that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both fire and pit, not one or the other. the Rosh disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. Rav Shach asks on this from the fact that the stone knife or burden are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that Rav Shach by asking on the Rosh was by that trying to bring a proof to the other opinion brought in the Rosh. But then it occurred to me that Rav Shach is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the “some say” nor like the Rosh. This opinion of Rav Shach is that one is liable in this case of stone knife or burden or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. that is one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for pit. ---------------------------------------------------- בבא קמא ו' ע''אI would like here to explain a question that רב שך in ניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' asks on the רא’’ש. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The גמרא says a אבנו סכינו או משאו leaves on a roof and they fall in a רוח מצויה is liable because of pit and fire. The רא’’ש brings יש מפרשים that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both אש and בור, not one or the other. The רא’’ש disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. רב שך asks on this from the fact that the אבנו סכינו או משאו are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that רב שך by asking on the רא’’ש was by that trying to bring a proof to the יש מפרשים brought in the רא’’ש. But then it occurred to me that רב שך is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the יש מפרשים nor like the רא’’ש. This opinion of רב שך is that one is liable in this case of אבנו סכינו או משאו or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. That is, one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for בור.