The problem I generally see is too much confidence in mystical knowledge.

Rationalism vs. Empiricism vs. Mysticism  

While I think that there is a kind of knowledge that is not from reason and not from empirical observation, still that does not seem to be carte blanche  permission to assume all mystic experiences are a valid source of information. And even if it was, it would only apply to ones own experience. You would not be able to depend on someone else mystical experiences as a source of information for yourself on how to live your life.
There is a kind of sneaky attempt to get people to believe in the mystic experiences of other people by calling it אמונת חכמים faith in the wise. They pick some charismatic insane teacher with mystic delusions and decide to call him wise.


We don't have prophecy anymore. And in any case prophecy seems to be a source of information separate of mystical experience.   Furthermore there is such a thing as סוף הוראה the end of the period when it is possible to make a halachic decision.
This may not seem like a big deal to most people. But from where I come from what I see a lot is people that are depending of the mystic experiences of some loving, lunatic leader deny the other areas of information. To them the only source of valid knowledge is the mystical experiences of their beloved leader.
Though they will use pragmatic reasoning in their daily lives but as for any major decision they will go only with the mystical experiences of their leader.


Why this came up is that I don't think knowledge of morality comes from mystic experience. There are some principles of morality that I think we know by reason. דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה. Others we need Torah to reveal to us. And to understand Torah we depend on the Sages of the Mishna.  We no longer have prophecy and mystic experiences can't cancel the Law of Moses, nor alter its meaning.
Sadly by means of Kabalah learning that is exactly what people do do. Yet people are looking for spiritual wholeness. Where can you find that except by mystical experience?
Though there are substitutes, they do not seem  numinous unless you endow them with numinous meaning and content.

I any case I had a few issues to bring up about this. One is the Rambam. לא הצם והמתפלל הוא הנרצה אלא היודעו. "Not he who fasts and prays is acceptable to God, but rather one who knows Him."   The kind of knowledge of God that the Rambam is talking about is explained in other places in the Guide. It is a kind of knowledge that comes by learning Torah Physics and Metaphysics. He is not talking about mystic knowledge.


The problem I generally see is too much confidence in mystical knowledge. This leads members of cults to all kinds of terrible sins.
  It is not that there is no mystical knowledge. Just that there seems to be too much confidence in other people's mystical knowledge  and that one is supposed to be convinced that they are "tzadikim" and that is supposed to overrule the basic common sense  explanation of the Torah  and common sense in other areas.

 The idea of authority is something we all use. We believe our Physics textbooks without doing every experiment and calculation ourselves. But mystic knowledge can't override the basic explanation of the Written and Oral Law.  When people think their leader has mystical knowledge that can override common sense morality that is when they get into problems.
And I think this was the problem the Gra was addressing when he signed the excommunication. I think he thought that over confidence in mystic knowledge was held to override the Oral and Written Law and he wanted to put a stop to this phenomenon (with zero success as far as I can tell).

I should write a whole new essay on this because I have not  even gotten to the issues that are bothering me which are the Rambam's idea of knowledge of God. What can this means?
Does it mean the Infinite Light? That seems unlikely. After all the Sefer Yetzira itself calls it אור נברא Created Light. This is because the Sefer Yetzira is trying as it should to preserve Divine simplicity.
Or is it Devekut? Or mystical experience of God's light? I clearly need to deal with this at some future date.

songs for God

h1mp3  [h-1 in midi format] h1 nwc   h2 mp3 [h2 midi  h2 nwc]  h3 mp3 [h3 midi  h3 nwc] h4 mp3 [h4 midi h4 nwc]  h6 mp3 [h6 midi  h6 nwc] h7 mp3 [h7 midi h7 nwc] h9 mp3[h9 midi  h9 nwc] h11 mp3 [h11midi h11 nwc] h69 mp3 [h69 midi h69 nwc]  q65 f minor mp3 [q65 midi q65 nwc] h24 mp3  [h24 in midi format] h27 midi   h27 nwc

Sex in the Five books of Moses is not symmetrical. A woman can be married to only one man. A man can be married to many women.  ניאוף  adultery is when a man has sex with a woman who is married to another man. That gets the death penalty. It is in two lists in Leviticus  that go though the עריות.
Sex outside of marriage is  not ניאוף-adultery. It comes under the category of פילגש concubinage.

There were a good number of people in the Old Testament that had concubines. One well known such person was Calev ben Yefuna (the friend of Joshua, the disciple of Moses). [כלב בן יפונה ] He was not considered a sinner because he had a few wives and few concubines. In the Five Books of Moses he is praised with a kind of praise that is not applied to anyone  else in the Torah, וימלא אחרי השם "He was filled with God." People might not think this is good but they cant call it "sin" in Biblical terms. And when pastors do so they are just displaying their lack of education.

I forget where the list of Calev's wives and  girl friends was. I think it should be in Chronicles one where it lists the people from the tribe of Yehuda that came into Israel. One of them was Calev because Moshe told him and his buddy Joshua that they would merit to enter the land of Israel.
There  are lots of sins in the Bible but typically they have nothing to do with what pastors call sin. And what pastors call commandments are often highly sinful.

If you want to know what the Bible calls a sin just open a Five Books Of Moses and take a look at when it says, "God spoke to Moses saying speak unto the children of Israel say unto them thou shalt not do such and such a thing. and if you do so this and this is the punishment." There are lots of examples. You might say that if God says not to do something that has to count as a sin. There are of course no pastors in the world which do this simple process. It is really not complicated. But instead they have to fish around for other things to call sins.

On the other hand I can see why people just don't jump to the Five Books of Moses. They are afraid of groups that claim to be following these laws. And that is justifiable.  people that claim to be teaching Torah are mainly "Torah scholars that are demons תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאים . So that leaves anyone that wants to keep the Law of Moses in a bind. There is no where to go learn how in a practical sense to keep the Torah. If the people that claim to be teaching it are demons, that limits the options.
In real life, we encounter people that are supposedly teaching Torah that are  demons. I think I have probably met quite a few of them.

In any case, what you could do is to simply learn the Five Books of Moses on your own, and then just go through the Mishna and Talmud on your own to discover how to keep the law in a practical sense. That is what I do. If there was  an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva near me I would go there but that is not an option for me now.

Learning Musar [works of ethics of the Middle Ages  like The Duties of the Heart helps to gain physical and mental health. That is what Isaac Blazer said. He was a disciple of Israel Salanter and we can trust that he knew what he was taking about. 

But this takes  a lot of faith in the wise to believe this. There are plenty of world views out there that claim that fear of God is not even a worthwhile goal. And among people that agree that fear of God and good character traits are worthwhile goals there are many opinions that learning Musar does not help and that there are better ways. From what I have seen all  of these alternative claims are false. {And many of the alternative approaches are negative and harmful.} That is based on my experience and observation.
So while learning Musar has limited capacity, at least it does something positive. It may not work magic but we can trust Israel Salanter and Issac Blazer that it has positive benefits. And it benefits far outweigh the benefits I have seen from alternative paths.

The difference between the Musar Movement and I is that I think people should spend an equal amount of time on Medieval books of Philosophy like The Guide for the Perplexed,  and Saadia Gaon's אמונות ודעות (Faiths and Doctrines). This is because I don't think good character is independent of a good world view. I think rather that good character depends on a good world view.

There will be noticed some areas in which the world view of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides are not in accord with the Kabalah. This speaks more to the detraction of kabalah as a source of information than the reverse. Mystics can be very helpful with their insights but can't change the world view of Torah. Knowledge gained by mystic experience remains mystic.
The major philosophers of the Middle Ages with the approach of the Talmud and Torah are Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, Maimonides's son Avraham, Ibn Gavirol, Isaac Abravenal,
Yehudah Abravenal . If one does not know at least what they say it hard to imagine that anything he says on the topic of Jewish world view could be valid or interesting. If one has done the homework then his views can be interesting but not before.
I should mention I hold from the natural law approach of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides-so I respect any system that I feel is striving for natural law. But I have no tolerance for systems that I think are tilting people towards evil.

Songs for the glory of God

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Most of what people worry about I think is  just a distraction. A false flag from the Dark Side to get you distracted from what you need to be thinking about. 

You need רצון razon-- a will to do things right. People need the will to stop depending on handouts and get a real vocation. And  to learn Torah.

That is when I find myself in some difficulty I think to myself what I read in the Shaari Teshuva of Rabbainy Yona--אין יסורים בלא עוון. There are not problems without sin. Based on this idea when I have a problem I often feel that the problem is not because of what other have done or want to do but rather from myself.  I believe all my problems come from the gap between the "is" and the "ought." That is the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. 

Rambam accidental sacrifices 6:11
He eats two pieces of forbidden fat in one span of forgetting. Then he knows about the first one. Then in the same span of forgetting as the second one he eats a third piece. Since knowledge divides he will be required a sin offering for the first piece and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third piece the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second piece and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.

 The case is when he remembers the first piece. So what does the Rambam mean at the end when he says when he remembers the first piece after the sin offering? See the entire law and you will see that the third case is just a continuation of the original set up. Rav Shach said the sin offering does not divide.  That means to Rabbi Yochanan [who stated this law ] only knowledge divides, not the sin offering. What this means is the case is the exact set up as we started with. Nothing has changed. He ate the two first pieces in one span of forgetting, and then remembered the first. Then he ate the third in the same span as the second.  Then he brings a sin offering for the second after he remembered the second. The third is included since it was eaten in the same span of forgetting as the second, and the sin offering does not divide.



 Rav Shach wrote is that Rabbi Yochanan holds knowledge alone divides, not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to Rabbi Yochanan the first knowledge does not divide--only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

I thought to explain the end of halacha 11 in ch 6.  The case is similar to the beginning of the halacha but with one difference, He ate the first and second piece and then remembered the second piece and then in the same span of forgetfulness of the first piece he ate the third piece. Now he brings a sacrifice for the second piece. The first and third are atoned for because they were both in the same span as the second but not the same span as each other.


My learning partner  thought if he had remembered the second piece, and then ate the third that that is not in one העלמה.

 I was thinking is that in my way piece 1 and piece 3 are in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a second ידיעה that makes it all one העלמה. in this way it is not a trivial case of all being eaten in one העלמה. The sin offering will come after the third piece was eaten and then when he remembers 1 and 3 they will be included. But I highly doubt if my learning partner will budge.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only two pieces and he eats 1 and 2 in one העלמה and then remembers 1 and brings a sin offering for 1 alone still 2 is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on 2. But if he had known about 2 before the sin offering he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained 1 and 2 are connected. And then 3 and 1 are connected. Therefore 3 is connected to 2 by means of a bridge through piece 1. he pointed out that that cant be true because then it would work for the beginning of that halacha. That is when 1 and 2 were in one span and then he remembered 1 and then ate 3 in the same span as 2. In that case only 1 and 2 are connected. And when he brings the sin offering only 1 an 2 are taken care of. SO obviously 2 can't bridge between 3 and 1. So 1 can't bridge between 3 and 2. And besides that he noted that the Gemara itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate 2 then piece two is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered 2 that makes 2 and 3 in separate העלמות. So I have to leave this entire essay out of my ideas on Shas book.





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Here is the above writings with a little Hebrew.

רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א
He eats two כזיתים of forbidden fat חלב in one span of העלמה. Then he knows about the first כזית. Then in the same העלמה as the second כזית, he eats a third כזית. Since ידיעה divides, he will be required a חטאת for the first כזית and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third כזית the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second כזית and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included, and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.


 "Knowledge" means his wife walked into the kitchen and asked him, "Where is the forbidden fat I left on the table? I was going to use it to grease the car wheels!"

The next day. I would like to explain רב ש''ך's answer for the רמב''ם in more detail and I would like to  answer  the problem that he raised on the רמב''ם from Chapter 8:8. I want to show how his answer helps us to understand the end of law 11 in chapter 6. רב ש''ך I am pretty sure he meant this but he did not openly say this so I think it is necessary to show what he means.

The first point רב ש''ך makes explicitly is that רבי יוחנן holds knowledge divides not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to רבי יוחנן the ידיעה ראשונה does not divide, only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

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I thought to explain the end of פרק ו' הלכה י''א.  The case is similar to the beginning of the הלכה but with one difference, He ate the כזית ראשון ושני and then remembered the כזית שני and then in the same העלמה of the כזית ראשון he ate the כזית השלישי. Now he brings a חטאת for the כזית השני. The ראשון and שני are מתכפרים for because they were both in the same העלמה as the שני but not the same העלמה  as each other.

 I went to my learning partner and tried to explain this. He said if he had remembered the כזית השני and then ate the כזית השלישי that that is not in one העלמה.

In my way כזית הראשון and כזית השלישיare in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a  ידיעה  שנייה that makes it all one העלמה. In this way it is not a trivial case of all all three כזיתים being eaten in one העלמה. The חטאת will come after the כזית השלישי was eaten and then when he remembers כזית הראשון and כזית השלישי they will be included.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only שני  כזיתים  and he eats כזית הראשון and כזית השני in one העלמה and then remembers כזית הראשון and brings a חטאת for כזית הראשון alone still כזית השני is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on כזית השני. But if he had known about כזית השני before the חטאת he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained כזית הראשון and כזית השני are connected. And then כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון are connected. Therefore כזית השלישי is connected to כזית השני by means of a bridge through piece כזית הראשון. He pointed out that that can not be true, because then it would work for the beginning of that הלכה. That is when כזית הראשון and כזית השני were in one span and then he remembered כזית הראשון and then ate כזית השלישי in the same העלמה as כזית השני. In that case only כזית השראון and כזית השני are מחוברים And when he brings the חטאת only כזית הראשון and כזית השני are taken care of. So obviously כזית השני can't bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון. So כזית הראשון can not bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית השני. And besides that he noted that the גמרא itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate כזית השני, then כזית השני is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered כזית השני that makes כזית השני and כזית השלישי in separate העלמות.

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Here is the above ideas in Hebrew

הלכות שגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה ט' והלכה י''א
אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה אחת ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית. כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  של כזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם. הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר בפרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א  שלשון "זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת" משמע אכילות נפרדות. היינו היה הניסיון לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב" הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד, ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת). ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. אחת: הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת.הנחה שנייה: כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשני זיתי חלב בהעלמה. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת החטא  שתי הכזיתים נתכפרות. אבל מה לגבי אם הוא רק זכר שכזית השנייה הייתה אסורה?  הכל נסלח. ולמעשה זה בדיוק מה שרמב''ם אומר. מה שקשה להבין כאן הוא זו, בחלקו האחרון של זה הלכה רמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת אז שני הכזיתים (הראשון ואחרון) נתכפרים. וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשון או האחרון, הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. עכשיו לתרץ את זו אני צריך להביא את ההסבר של רב שך.
) רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א הוא אוכל שני כזיתים של חלב  בהעלמה אחת. ואז הוא יודע על כזית הראשון. לאחר מכן, באותו העלמה של כזית השני, הוא אוכל כזית שלישי.  הידיעה מחלקת הראשון מן השלישי. הוא יידרש חטאת לכזית הראשון והשני ייכלל גם אם הוא לא יודע על זה עדיין. אם במקום זאת הוא הביא לשלישי  גם השני ייכלל. סוף החוק שהוא זו: אם הוא נזכר כבזית השנייה ומביא חטאת לזה, אז הראשון ושלישי יהיו כלולים, וכשהוא זוכר אותם הוא לא יידרש להקריב עוד.  אני רוצה להסביר רב ש''ך על הרמב''ם הזה בפירוט. ואני רוצה להראות  תשובה  על סוף  החוק 11 בפרק 6.
  הנקודה הראשונה שרב ש''ך עושה במפורש היא שרבי יוחנן מחזיק ידע מחלק לא כפרה. זה מפתח חשוב. כך במקרה שבו יש רק שתי חתיכות והוא אוכל ראשון ושני בפרק אחד ולאחר מכן זוכר לראשון ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת שהוא פוטר את הראשון והשני. כלומר, לרבי יוחנן  הידיעה הראשונה לא מחלקת, רק שניה ונוסף על. כלומר, אם יש לנו את אותו מקרה והוא זוכר הראשון ולאחר מכן את השני הם מחולקים באופן אוטומטי.  בטעות חשבתי להסביר את סוף  הלכה י''א. חשבתי שהמקרה דומה לתחילת ההלכה אבל בהבדל אחד, הוא אכל כזית ראשון והשני, ואז נזכר בכזית השני, ולאחר מכן באותו העלמה של כזית הראשון אכל כזית השלישי. עכשיו הוא מביא חטאת לכזית השני. הראשון ושלישי מתכפרים לפי שהם היו  באותה העלמה כשני, אבל זה לא אותו הדבר כמו עלמה אחת על כולם.
. בדרך שלי כזית הראשונה וכזית שלישית נמצא  העלמה אחת וכי העובדה שלא חלו ידיעה שנייה שעושה את זה כל עלמה אחד. בדרך זו היא לא מקרה טריוויאלי שכל השלושה כזיתים נאכלו בהעלם אחד. החטאת באה אחרי כזית השלישי נאכל, ואז כשהוא נזכר בכזית ראשון ושלישי הם ייכללו. המוטיבציה לגישה שלי היא העובדה שאם במקרה שבו יש רק שני כזיתים, והוא אוכל כזית ראשון וכזית שני בהעלם אחד ולאחר מכן זכר כזית ראשון ומביא חטאת לכזית הראשון לבד,  כזית שני כלול באופן אוטומטי משום שלא היתה ידיע שני לכזית השני. אבל אם הוא ידע על כזית שני לפני החטאת, הוא יצטרך להביא עוד חטאת כי הידיעה השנייה עושה הפרד.

למחרת: אמרתי להחברותא שלי את הרעיון.  אמרתי שכזית הראשון וכזית השני מחוברים. ולאחר מכן כזית שלישי וכזית ראשון מחוברים. לכן כזית שלישי מחובר לכזית שני באמצעות גשר דרך כזית הראשון.
הוא ציין כי זה לא יכול להיות נכון, כי אז זה יעבוד לתחילת ההלכה. כלומר, כאשר כזית הראשון וכזית השני היו בפרק אחד, ואז הוא נזכר בכזית הראשון ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שלישי באותה העלמה של כזית השני, במקרה שרק  הראשון והשני  מחוברים, וכשהוא מביא חטאת על  הראשון, אז כזית השני מוכלל. אז ברור כזית השני לא יכול לגשר בין  השלישי וראשון. אז כזית הראשון לא יכול לגשר בין השלישי והשני. וחוץ מזה הוא ציין כי הגמרא עצמה אומרת  גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. ויתר על כן זה שכל ישר. אם הוא אכל הראשון ואז נזכר בו ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שנייה, אז כזית השני הוא לא באותה העלמה. אז במקרה שלי גם. כשהוא נזכר כזית השני זה עושה כזית השני וכזית השלישי בהעלמות נפרדות.

I was just wondering guards need a type of acquisition [that is to pick it up or other kinds of ways that acquisition is made] to the Rambam. Others say it is enough just to say "Put it down, and I will watch it." But the Rambam also says one can obligate himself without any act of acquisition. I imagine that is just when he writes it in a document of something like that.

I wanted just very quickly to say that the idea of the Enlightenment of education being the redemption of mankind meant secular education. Also, I wanted to add that Allen Bloom thought that the main idea of the Enlightenment was to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals. But that was because he was a political philosopher. There was an equal part of the enlightenment that was directed towards education.

But this was not in the Yeshiva or religious kind of sense of education. [The Enlightenment thinkers were thinking about secular education.]

On the opposite side of things the other side of the enlightenment was towards spiritual wholeness and a revolt against reason.This side of things received its greatest expression in the Romantic period. But it began right at the start of the Enlightenment.


Each of these areas has positive values and also can decay into negative value.
It was Allen Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind that saw these two streams colliding and creating a crisis, or maybe even an explosion that would destroy both.

In Lithuanian yeshivas there is an attempt to remedy this situation with  a return to the Middle Ages. That is what we call learning Rishonim (medieval authorities). The idea here is that the Middle ages was a time when there was tremendous human effort spent of resolving the clefts between Faith and Reason. [Besides that it is true that Rishonim are on a vastly superior level than later authorities. This is not just propaganda. You can see it almost anywhere.]

But a simple return to the Middle Ages would only reproduce the exact conditions that made the enlightenment necessary and inevitable. Thus I am not in any better place than Allen Bloom to offer any answers. However, I do think the Litvak (Lithuanian) yeshivas are definitely n the right track.

My own approach is to take the Rambam's idea Torah, Physics Metaphysics and just to go with that.
That is I try have a kind of wholeness and balance between the two poles. Balance does not mean unconnected parts. I don't separate Reason and Faith. Think of car parts all lying in a pile. That is you have every single components of a car but they are not connected. That is not a car. A car has the same components, but they are all attached properly. That is the idea of Faith and Reason that I have. For me Faith and Reason are two components that are attached, and work together.

I should mention that I have a lot of reason to think that self education is important. So when I talk about Torah, Physics, and Metaphysics I am not talking about universities but rather what you do in the privacy for your own home. I got this idea from my own father. Also I should mention this was how Abraham Lincoln got his education. He was self taught. And besides that I discovered in university anyway that most of the learning had to be done on my own. The professors were there to bring me up to a higher level of expertise than what I could do on my own. But the ground work always had to be done by myself.
 When the Rambam says  Physics and Metaphysics he is referring to the two books of Aristotle by those names. However he means the  disciplines as the ancient Greeks understood them. You can see this when he says what teh sages of the Talmud call מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית they means Physics and Metaphysics as the ancient Greeks understood them. So even though he had a chance to say he means the books of Aristotle exclusively he did not say so. So he clearly meant the disciplines themselves.

I am not sure who is the "Rashba" in the Nemukai Joseph. The Rashba from Spain? Or Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham? I had to correct my paragraph on Bava Metzia 110 because the NJ brings some idea from the Rashba that disagrees with the first part of our Tosphot there. But is that the same person who in the second part of Tosphot is disagreeing with the Ri? It occurred to me the NJ could very well be meaning the regular Rashba from Spain.

After writing this I decided it was the Rashba from Spain. --that seems clear from Bava Metzia in ch.s 6 and 7




 I might as well tell the general public what the issue is. It is חלב. That is there are certain parts of even a kosher animal that are forbidden These are the parts that would be offered in the Temple if it would be standing. They are the areas of fat that cover the stomach and that whole region. There is some verse about this somewhere in Leviticus I think but I don't know where it is off hand. This is a very serious issue and it involves כרת. That is when the Torah says "One who does such and such a thing will be cut off from his people." On every sin like that one has to bring a sin offering if it was done by accident. This issue is so serious that Reb Shmuel Berenbaum simply never ate meat at all. He would only eat chicken on Shabat. 

songs for the glory of God

q12  [q12 in midi]

q13  [q13 in midi]

q14  [q14 in midi]

q16  [q16 in midi]

q18  [q18 in midi]

q20  [q20 in midi]

q21  [q21 in midi]

q22  [q22 in midi]

q23  [q23 in midi]

q24  [q24 in midi]
q25  [q25 in midi]

Ideas in Shas with new ideas in Sukkah and laws of sin offerings in the Rambam

Ideas in Bava Metzia with new ideas.


I was not sure whether to put in the beginning my background. But it seems relevant. It seems unlikely to me I would be able to learn Talmud at all if I had not been in two great yeshivas. [Mir in New York and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockway, New York State] But I don't want to imply that they would agree with anything I wrote. My mistakes are my own. And I think all the roshei yeshivas [teachers] in both places would have been able to write ideas a million times better than mine. But these are my own minor contributions to Torah study.


[I should mention that my learning partner knows how to learn very well so I really can't say that these books would have been impossible unless I had gone to yeshiva. In any case I certainly would not have had any idea on how to approach Gemara without those two institutions.
I also think I did not appreciate at the time how rare these good places of learning were. It was some gift that I came to places that seriously know the value of Torah and what it means to know how to learn. The idea of knowing how to learn is hard to explain. Mainly it is the difference between  Leonardo Da Vinci and finger painting. 

I wanted to present a subject in Bava Metzia  page 110 side and then Tosphot ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that they did in Babylonia in a city called Sura. In Sura there was a custom to make  a loan and as a guarantee the lender מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה (The borrower) without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the lender has already been there three years. Rav Yehuda said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field."[After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced.] According to Rabbainu Isaac in Tosphot Ravina disagrees with Rav Yehuda and says the borrower is believed. The way Tosphot understands this is that Ravina is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה (lender) says he bought it, still the borrower is believed.

Tosphot asks on the Ri (Rabainu Isaac) from a case in  Bava Batra  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to Rabbainu Isaac is this: If the Ri is  right then in the case in Bava Batra the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a "migo." Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that, but says a weaker plea, [i.e. a plea that is not believed]. Tosphot answers: it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In Bava Metzia page 80 we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an ass to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the ass died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with "He could have said..." in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "He could have said," because there are witnesses against that migo. That is: we don't know about the river, but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in Bava Batra and Bava Metzia  page 110 in Tosphot in which there are no witnesses against the migo. Rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen, he would have said so.

I suggest that this question of mine is the reason that Rabbainu Shimshon ben Abraham disagreed with the Ri in our Tosphot.







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This is the same thing as the above paragraphs but with Hebrew additions
I wanted to present a subject in בבא מציעא דף ק''י side and then תוספות ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that that did in Babylonia in a city called סורא. In סורא there was a custom to make  a loan and as a משכון the  מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה  without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the מלווה has already been there three years. רב יהודה said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field." After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced. According to רבינו יצחק הר''י in תוספות רבינא disagrees with רב יהודה and says the borrower is believed. The way תוספות understands this is that רבינא is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה lender says he bought it still the borrower is believed.

תוספות asks on the ר''י from a case in  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to הר''י is this: If the הר''י is  right then in the case in בבא בתרא the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a מיגו. Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that but says a weaker plea.  תוספות answers it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In בבא מציעא דף פ we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an חמור to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the חמור died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with he could have said in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "he could have said" because there are witnesses against that מיגו. That is we don't know about the river but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in בבא בתרא and בבא מציעא דף ק''י in תוספות in which there are no witnesses against the מיגו. rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen he would have said so. ______________________________________________________________________


רציתי להציג נושא בבא דף ק''י  מציעא דף ק''י ולאחר מכן תוספות, ואז שאלה. אני חייב לעשות הקדמה קצרה משכנתא דסורא הוא סוג של ערבות להלוואה שנעשתה בבבל בעיר הנקראת סורא. בסורא היה מנהג לעשות הלוואה וכמשכון המלווה יקבל שדה ולהיות  ולעבוד על זה ולאכול את פירותיו למספר שנים ובסופו של אותו זמן   השדה יחזור לבעלים (לווה) ללא כל התחייבות נוספת על הלווה. זה שונה מאשר נכייתא שהוא הפחתה של ההלוואה. במקרה של נכייתא השדה חוזר אבל חלק של ההלוואה עדיין נשאר. נניח שיש לנו מלווה ולווה באחד מהמקרים לעיל והמלווה אומר ההסכם היה במשך חמש שנים והלווה אומר שלוש שנים. המסמך אבד. ומלווה כבר היה שם שלוש שנים. רב יהודה אמר המלווה הוא נאמן כי אחרי שלוש שנים הוא היה יכול לומר "לקוחה היא בידי"  היינו "קניתי את השטח". להיות שהיה שם שלוש שנים הוא יהיה נאמן, אלא אם כן ראיות בניגוד מיוצרת. לדברי רבינו יצחק (הר''י) בתוספות רבינא לא מסכים עם רב יהודה ואומר הלווה נאמן. הדרך שתוספות מבין את זה היא שרבינא חולק כל הדרך. כלומר גם אם המלווה אמר שהוא קנה אותו עדיין הלווה נאמן. תוספות שואל על ר''י ממקרה בבבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א, במקרה שיש שדה שאדם אחד היה שם לשלוש שנים או יותר והוא אומר שהוא קנה אותו ובעל דין אומר שזה נגנב. אנו מאמינים מי שהיה שם שלוש שנים, כי אנחנו אומרים שאם זה נגנב הבעלים האמיתיים היו אומרים משהו בינתיים ולא לחכות שלוש שנים. השאלה מזה להר''י היא זו: אם ההר''י נכון, אז במקרה בבבא בתרא שאחד אומר שזה נגנב הוא צריך להיות נאמן כי הוא יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה להלוואה. יש לו מיגו. מאז שהוא היה יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה ולהאמין, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו גם כשהוא לא אומר את זה, אבל אומר טיעון חלש. תוספות עונה זה מיגו במקום עדים. המקרה הוא  "הוא יכול היה לומר" כאשר יש עדים נגדו ומיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן. יש שאלה. בבבא מציעא דף פ' יש לנו המקרה של מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן שנראה שונה ממקרה זה.  יש  שתי דרכים אחת עם נהר שהיה צריך להיות חצוי ואחר בלי ואדם ששכר חמור לשאת אותו. ואמרו לו לא לקחת את זה על הכביש עם הנהר. הוא לקח את זה ככה וחמור מת והוא אומר כשהוא היה שם לא היה שם הנהר כיוון שהתייבש. אנחנו לא מאמינים לו, כי אנחנו לא הולכים עם "הוא יכול היה לומר" במקרה שבו יש עדים. אז השאלה שלי היא, שעל דף 80 אנחנו לא אומרים ", הוא יכול היה לומר" כי יש עדים נגד המיגו. זה שאנחנו לא יודעים על הנהר, אבל אנחנו יודעים שהוא לקח את  הכביש הלא נכונה. זה נראה שונה מהמקרה שלנו בבא בתרא ובבא מציעא דף ק''י בתוספות שבו אין עדים נגד המיגו. אלא שהעדים נגד הטיעון עצמו. אנן סהדי שאם זה נגנב הוא היה אומר כך.

I had a period in Yeshiva in which I read every paragraph twice. This I think helped me a lot

That is I would take one paragraph of the Talmud and read it once straight through and then the Rashi and understand nothing. Then I would read the Soncino English translation and also understand nothing. Then I would read the paragraph in the Talmud once again and gain understand nothing. But then I would read the Rashi once again and then the whole thing became clear.

This reading the words twice approach helped me for all the years I was in Yeshiva from 18 until about 25.  The idea of review I saw in the Gra and I think it is good for certain kinds of learning, but not all. There were things that even saying them over  a few time s were simply way beyond my league and I found it better just to say the words and go on. Then I would hope the ideas would get into me by osmosis--which in fact often did happen.

The idea of a crisis of the Enlightenment is not the sole product of Allen Bloom. [I think the original person that noticed it was Max Weber.]
The problem of this crisis was the main subject of Allen Bloom's book The Closing of the American Mind.

I think that book is  a major masterpiece and recommend it for everyone. In any case the basic idea was there were two opposing currents of the Enlightenment. And these two opposing currents came to collide in the USA in the lifetime of Allen Bloom. That is the idea of this book in a nutshell.
This same problem was faced by Max Weber.


One part of the Enlightenment was give everyone education (i.e. enlightenment). Teach them reason, and then Utopia will result. And make governments do this. The Enlightenment  was an attempt to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals.
The other part of the Enlightenment was the intellectual revolt against  reason, a celebration of subjective will and intuition, and a neo-Romantic longing for spiritual wholesomeness.
So far I have said nothing new. Just read Allen Bloom and Max Weber.


The Middle Ages were in spirit was very different from everything that came before or after. It is a time that is almost impossible to understand. And yet one thing stands out from that time--the attempt to combine reason with spiritual wholeness.  This same attempts still continues today in Lithuanian yeshivas. We know learning Rishonim [Mediaeval authorities] has always been the bedrock of Lithuanian yeshivas. Recently this idea has gained in force by the example of some yeshivas that expressly commit to this approach and on purpose avoid Achronim (anyone after the Middle Ages). In some places you can see a similar approach  when then spend their efforts on Thomas Aquinas.  In any case Allen Bloom certainly noticed this because he mentioned in his book that some of his relatives who were observant Jews had as much and better understanding of life and the world just based on their reading the Old Testament and Talmud as others who read the New York Times. But Allen Bloom's answer was to tell people to learn the Republic of Plato and other great books. This seems to me to  lack the numinous, and holy aspect that makes something compelling as opposed to mere intellectual exercise.

The reason Allen Bloom did not think going back to the Middle Ages was a good idea was because of the very problems themselves that had produced the conditions  and problems which made the Enlightenment necessary.  What happens in practice is ad hoc justice, ad hoc adjudication. and widespread injustice. If laws are not equal for all, then they become very unequal. 

The model I have thought best is a kind of continuation of the Rambam approach. The Rambam thought learning Torah was a necessary prerequisite for learning Physics and Metaphysics. That is he saw learning (not knowing) Physics and Metaphysics as the fulfillment of the commandments to love and fear God. But that they don't accomplish this with the proper background of the Oral and Written Law. That is the approach that I take myself even though I have never seen anyone take Rambam approach  seriously. I simply decided not to wait until others wake up. [I am not claiming expertise in any of these fields. Rather it is just my claim that it is proper and important to spend time each day in each of these three areas.]

This longing for spiritual wholeness I think explains the Baal Teshuva movement, and the widespread revolt against reason in those circles and in fact the general seeking of spirituality we see since the 1960's. I certainly have seen my share of this in different cults.

cults and cult leaders

 I am certainly not the only one who has noticed the profusion of cults and cult leaders that are positively insane that are at least in name following him. Certainly everyone can see when anyone gets involved in Brelsov, they stop learning Torah for its own sake, and start following any one of the lunatic leaders. self proclaimed imitators of the real thing.

There is no good answer for this. There are areas of Torah that are important: that is, "What is it all about?" What is the meaning of it all?



Some people think that because someone was in fact a very great tzadik that therefore it is a great mitzvah to spread the word about him. But I feel it is not  praiseworthy to ignore the side effects.  It seems to me to display an enormous amount of irresponsibility to not care about the possible effects of such advice. Unconcern about the human consequences of a theory is not an attractive trait.  

My own approach I should mention. I think there are two aspects of Torah that are important--the "between man and his fellow man" (בין אדם לחבירו) part, and then the "between man and God" (בין אדם למקום) part.  The best example of the first that I know of is my parents. The later part is hard to say. I think there were a few tzadikim that represented different aspects of Torah best. The Gra for learning Torah  and general strictness in keeping the mizvot as they were given. 

. But all these aspects I think are important in order to narrow the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. That is to reach objective morality. 

q63  [q63 in midi format] [q63 in nwc format]
l8 A song for the God of Israel  l8 in midi [l8 nwc format ]


n1  [n1 in midi]  n1 in nwc format

orchestra [ orchestra in midi]    [orchestra in nwc format]

mathematics   [mathematics in midi format] mathematics nwc format

Exodus 4  [Exodus 4 in midi]   [exodus4 in nwc format]

Bohr's concept of Quantum Mechanics and Kant

I wrote to  Dr Ross 

Dear Dr. Ross, your ideas about the connection between Kant and the Bohr concept of  Quantum Mechanics were finally noticed by the academic world. The article in the Stanford Encyclopedia states this connection explicitly.

Sincerely, Avraham Rosenblum

Dear Mr. Rosenblum,

A number of people and sources see similarities between Kant and Bohr.  However, that depends.  The Stanford page seems to assert that Bohr is a metaphysical realist, but that isn't always what he sounds like.  If he is actually a non-realist, which is often what he does sound like, then that would not be Positivism, which makes no metaphysical judgments, but it also would not be Kant, who posits "empirical realism."  Also, the Stanford page says that Bohr somehow agrees with Kant that things-in-themselves "can't be conceived of in causal terms."  This is quite false.  Kant would say that causality applies both to phenomena and things-in-themselves, but we don't know how it applies to things-in-themselves -- although it may allow for freedom.  Also, the idea that quantum mechanics violates causality at all is questionable.  With populations, quantum mechanics is as deterministic as anything.  Schrodinger's Equation is deterministic.  So the only issue is whether the random factor that enters when we consider individuals violates causality.  Or perhaps in quantum events, like the decay of nuclei, we don't detect an efficient cause.  But a lot of this depends on what we mean by causality.  Aristotle meant a lot more than what we do now.  I discuss some confusions about causality in relation to the movie Knowing -- http://www.friesian.com/why.htm#note-2a.

Best wishes,
Kelley Ross



My note: empirical means  things that are immanent in experience (not transcendent). Realism is these things don't depend on us for their existence. 

What Dr Ross is saying here is QM does not violate locality. And that Bell's Theorem has nothing to do with locality at all. It does say the world is dependent on how we observe it just like Kant says. That is there is a subjective and objective element in the representation. The world is not solely objective. [A good way of understanding this is how Schopenhauer puts it- the representation is  half from the subject and half from the object.]


What we call non-locality is you have  an atom that disappears  here it has to appear somewhere else but it could appear far away. Locality means it cant just disappear. Causes an effects are local.

Dr Ross is in between the lines answering the objections of some people on Kant. 

I am bringing here a question on the Rambam. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a sin offering for. [i.e. a female goat or sheep.] A sin offering can only be brought for accidental sin. So here we have a case where there was a piece of forbidden fat cooking the stove. John walks in and eats it. The Peter walks in a minute later and asks where is the piece of forbidden fat I left on the stove? John has to bring a sin offering.
[For the general public let me mention of the 43 a lot concern sexual relationships between family members and the Temple. Besides that there are few others likely idolatry, and Shabat.]


If one eats a piece of forbidden fat חלב, he brings a sin offering [a female goat or sheep]. If he ate a piece and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another piece and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring a one sin offering on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two knowings. That he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first piece and then he knew about the second piece he brings two sacrifices.
That is you don't need the knowledge to be in between the two acts of eating.


From Tractate Shabat page 71Rambam 6:9. Laws of Accidental Sins.
That is to say the Rambam decided like Rabbi Yochanan that ידיעות מחלקות not like reish lakish that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two pieces  in one span of forgetfulness and then knew about the first piece. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third piece, when he brings a sin offering for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second piece. Rambam שגגות 6:11.

The Beit Joseph brings in the name of the Ri bei Rav an answer that is flimsy. And the Kiryat Sefer says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the Rambam himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the Rambam brings the exact same law of Rabbi Yochanan that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the Beit Yoseph said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say ate and ate is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one span and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately.




Rav Shach offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me even though there still seems to be some question that remains about it.



What Elazar Menachem Shach suggests is based on two premises. 1. knowledge causes a sin offering. 2. one span of forgetfulness is one sin. Thus he ate the first two pieces in one state of forgetfulness. And he knew about the first piece. So he brings a sin offering for the first piece. but since the second piece was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the sin offering takes care of both pieces.  But what about if he only remembered that the second piece was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to Rav Shach to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the Rambam says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this halacha the Rambam says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a sacrifice then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further sin offering.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" That is in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one sacrifice.

Now I think Rav Shach does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the Rambam intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate sin offerings. Just think about it. He ate the first and second piece and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it cant be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third piece. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one piece and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.

________________________________________________________________________________

I am bringing here a question on the רמב''ם. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a חטאת for. i.e. a female goat or sheep. A חטאת can only be brought for שוגג. So here we have a case where there was a כזית חלב cooking the stove. ראובן walks in and eats it. Then שמעון walks in a minute later and asks where is the כזית חלב   I left on the stove? ראובן has to bring a sin offering.


If one eats a piece of  חלב, he brings a חטאת a female goat or sheep. If he ate a כזית and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another כזית and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring  one חטאת on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two ידיעות. I mean he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first כזית and then he knew about the second כזית, he brings two חטאות.
That is you don't need the ידיעות to be in between the two acts of eating.


From שבת דף ע''א Also  'רמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק  ו': הלכה ט .
That is to say the רמב''ם decided like רבי יוחנן that ידיעות מחלקות not like ריש לקיש that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two כזיתים  in one העלמה and then knew about the first כזית. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third כזית, when he brings a חטאת for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second כזית. This is from  רמב''ם שגגות 6:11.

The בית יוסף brings in the name of the ר''י בי רב an answer that is flimsy. And the קרית ספר says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the רמב''ם himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the רמב''ם brings the exact same law of רבי יוחנן that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the בית יוסף בשם הר''י בי רב  said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one העלמה and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately. אכל חמישה כזיתים בהעלם אחת. According to the Beit Joseph that language would have to mean they are counted as one and yet there in 8:8 the law is they are counted separately.




רב שך offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me.



What רב אלעזר מנחם שך suggests is based on two premises. 1. ידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. Also העלם אחת היא חטא אחד. Thus he ate the first כזיתי חלב in one state of העלמה. And he knew about the first כזית. So he brings a חטאת for the first כזית. But since the second כזית was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the חטאת takes care of both כזיתים.  But what about if he only remembered that the second כזית was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to רב שך to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the רמב''ם says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this הלכה the רמב''ם says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a חטאת then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further חטאת.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" I mean in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one חטאת.

Now I think רב שך does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the רמב''ם intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate חטאות. Just think about it. He ate the first and second כזית and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it can't be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third כזית. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one כזית and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.


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אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית, כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  שלכזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם.  הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר ב פרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א שבהתחלה זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. היה הניסיון הזה לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת) ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. 1. הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשתי זיתי חלב  בהעלמה אחת. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הדין שהוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק זמן של שיכחה החטאת מכפרת  על שתי הכזיתים.
בחלק האחרון של זו ההלכה הרמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת, אז שתיהם, החתיכה הראשונה והחתיכה האחרונה מתכפרות וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשונה או האחרונה הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. הנה השאלה שאני רוצה להביא בשמו של השותף הלמידה שלי. "מה היא חלוקת החתיכות?" אני מתכוון במקרה האחרון שהוא אכל חתיכה וחתיכה בהעלמה אחת . ואז הוא אכל חתיכה שלישית ועדיין לא יודע. ואז הוא יודע על השנייה. לכן זה כל העלמה אחת. אין שום דבר לחלק אותן ולכן  ברור שיש רק חטאת אחת. עכשיו אני חושב רב שך  ענה על זה בדרך כלשהי. אני חושב שהוא אומר שרמב''ם מתכוון מקרה הפשוט, אבל גם אם היה איזשהו ידע שביניהם. אבל אם כן אז זה יהיה שני מעשים נפרדים ושתי חטאות נפרדות. רק תחשוב על זה. הוא אכל כזית הראשונה ושנייה, ואם מישהו היה אומר לו שהשנייה הייתה חלב,  גם אז יהיה לו ידע שיפריד לחלוטין. אז זה לא יכול להיות שהוא לא יודע שום דבר. ואז הוא אכל כזית שלישית. אז זה היתה שיכחה אחת ! אני רוצה להציע איזה סוג של תשובה שעשוי לעזור לנו. זה הוא העובדה שזה לא משנה אם הידע היה בין האכילה. זה רק משנה מה שהוא יודע. אם הוא אוכל כזית אחד, ואז עוד אחד, ואז יודע על הראשון היא העלמה אחת  או לא? בפרק ו' הלכה ט'  נראה שלא. רק הידע יחלק. אני עדיין לא יודע איך זה יעזור לנו, אבל אני מציע שאנחנו חושבים לאורך קווים אלה. אם למישהו יש רעיון כאן הייתי מברך אותו.

My basic feeling is it is possible to learn and keep Torah without being a fanatic.
But it is hard. The reason is that for every positive value there is an equal an opposite value. There is Music and anti Music. Literature and anti literature. Natural Science and pseudo science. And each anti-value tries to present itself as legitimate. So without experience and knowledge people can easily fall into cults. What makes the religious issue hard is that when one falls from holiness, he falls into unholiness, that really  bad stuff. That is not the same as falling from Rembrandt or Leonardo Da Vinci into pseudo art.

So we see why Lithuanian yeshivas are so rigid in keeping out cults and cult members. They realize how easy it is for positive value to be corrupted and fall into negative value.

Here is an idea from Steven Dutch which relates to this

The Fundamental Fallacy of Modern Philosophy might be defined as the idea that it makes sense to study structure divorced from content. This is the idea that has given us businessmen who think they can "manage" without knowing anything about what they manage, critics who claim that only the technical excellence of a work of art matters, not its content, and sociologists of science like the one with whom I corresponded who think you can study the Velikovsky affair without regard to the scientific validity of Velikovsky's ideas.


What Steven Dutch is pointing out is that content matters. Maybe external forms do also but the major issue is content, in any field. You may have heard complaints about religious fanaticism but tat totally ignores the question of what people are fanatic about. It places a Catholic nun on the same moral plane as an Islamic suicide bomber. Content matters.

And this leads to the interesting question about  a true tzadik and yet  numerous cults being formed that supposedly follow his teachings. This fact is what  causes Lithuanian yeshivas to have doubts about how to deal with this. They would like to have his books in the yeshiva because of their high value but are nervous about what they can lead to.
The higher and better something is--when it falls it falls to a more negative value.


The best approach I think is that of balance between different areas of value. And also to take one specific area to strive for excellence.  This was how my parents raised me and it makes a lot of sense to me that this is the best approach.