Some questions in Bava Mezia 101a

The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.


השאלה המרכזית בבבא מציעא קא ע''א צוין על ידי שותף הלמידה שלי. מדוע משנה הגמרא מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי (פירושו האריס לא כמו החוכר). שאלה נוספת היא מה היא הרלוונטיות של ברייתא אל המשנה? ברור שהברייתא חולקת על המשנה לגבי דעתו של ר' יהודה. אז איזו מסקנה אפשרית אתה יכול להסיק מן הברייתא אל המשנה? השאלה הבאה צריכה להיות זו. תן לנו לומר שאנחנו יכולים ללמוד משהו מן הברייתא אל המשנה. ברור הגמרא גורסת כי אנו יכולים לעשות זאת. אז אנחנו צריכים ללמוד אחד משני דברים. אפשרות א 'יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל ולהשאיר את החוק של ר' יהודה בנוגע לאריסות בישראל במקומו. או אפשרות שנייה, אומרים ר" יהודה רק מדבר על שדה מסוים ולהשאיר אין קניין במקום. מסיבה כלשהי גמרא עושה השינויים הבאים: יש קניין גם שדה מסוים ולאחר מכן היא משנה משהו שאין צורך לשנות,היינו מקבל לאו כחוכר
אבל יתרה מכך לרש''י ולרמב''ם יש דרך אחרת להסביר את הגמרא מתוספות. מסיבהלא ידועה לי רש''י ורמב''ם חושבים שהמסקנה קיימת גם אם אין קניין וזה בדיוק מה הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לומר. וחוץ מזה, מה כוונת יש קניין? זה נראה להשתנות לפי הגמרא שאתה לומד בכורות, גיטין, או בבא מציעא. הדרך שהגמרא בבבא מציעא מבינה יש קניין היא שאם ישראלי קונה את השדה בחזרה, אז הוא מחויבת בתרומה ומעשר. אז מה ההבדל בין יש קניין לאין הקניין? שניהם מחזיקים תבואה שגדלה ברשותו של אינו יהודי וסיומו של העבודה היה בידי אינו יהודי אז התבוה אינה חייבת בתרומה. ושניהם מחזיקים אם הישראלי קונה את הקרקע בחזרה ואז תבואה מחויבת.

I am no philosopher but from the little that I know it seems to be that the school of thought of Kelly Ross [The Kant Friesian School]  is very important. The thing that I think is important about it is that the specific approach of Kelly Ross is an expansion  of Leonard Nelson. [However to give credit where credit is due I have the impression that in Poland they do learn the approach of Leonard Nelson]

The thing is that I am not saying that that is the only thing in philosophy which looks important to me. I also think Micheael Huemer and Danny Frederik and Hegel are very important in terms of the logos that is needed to come to truth and justice. That is I think that philosophy is not just important for it's conclusions but also as a way of life--the need to search for the truth.

LT Hobhouse and Bradly repudiated the meta-physical theory of the state which was more or less started by Hegel. They might be right about that. It seems to me that in terms of the state and its function Thomas Jefferson has things right.

Bava Mezia 101a

The main issue in Bava Mezia 101a was noted by my learning partner (D Bronson) why does the Gemara change to the sharecropper is not like the renter.But there are a lot more questions that are there but they are no easy for me to explain simply. One issue is what is the relevance of the Braita to the Mishna? Obviously the Braita disagrees with the mishna concerning the opinion of R> Yehuda. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the Braita to the Misha. The next question ought to be this: let us say that we can learn something from the braita to the Mishna as clearly the Gemara holds that we can do. So we have to learn one of two things: 1 there is possession and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in Israel in its place. Or 2 say R Yehuda is only talking about a specific field and leave there is no possession in place. For some reason the Gemara changes to there is possession and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change.
These seems to be questions with no answers I can imagine. But furthermore Rashi and the Rambam have a different way of explaining the Gemara than Tosphot and Tosphot. Tosphot is clear but for some reason rashi and the Rambam think the conclusion of the gemara holds even if there is possession which is exactly what the Gemara says is impossible to say. And besides that what does there is possession means? This seems to vary according to which gemra you are learning behorot, Gitin, bava mezia .... The way that at least the Gemara looks to be in Bava Mezia is there is possession but if a Israel buys they field back then it is obligated in truman and maasar --and so what is the difference between there is possession of there is no possession. They both hold crops that grew in the possession of a gentile and were finished in the hands of a gentile are no obligated in truma. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

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The main question in בבא מציעא קא ע''א was noted by my learning partner. Why does the גמרא change to מקבל לאו כחוכר דמי that means the אריס is not like the חוכר. Another question is what is the relevance of the ברייתא to the משנה?  Obviously the ברייתא disagrees with the משנה concerning the opinion of  ר' יהודה. So what possible conclusion can you draw from the ברייתא to the משנה? The next question ought to be this. Let us say that we can learn something from the ברייתא to the משנה. Clearly the גמרא holds that we can do so. So we have to learn one of two things. אפשרות א' יש קניין ללא יהודי בארץ ישראל and leave the law of ר' יהודה concerning אריסות in ישראל in its place. Or אפשרות שנייה say ר' יהודה  is only talking about a specific field and leave אין קניין in place. For some reason the גמרא changes to יש קניין and also to a specific field and then changes something that there is no need to change. מקבל לאו כחוכר.
But furthermore רש''י and the רמב''ם have a different way of explaining the גמרא than תוספות. For some reason רש''י and the רמב''ם think the conclusion of the גמרא holds even if אין קניין which is exactly what the גמרא says is impossible to say. And besides that, what does יש קניין means? This seems to vary according to which גמרא you are learning בכורות , גיטין, או בבא מציעא.  The way that at least the גמרא looks to be in בבא מציעא is יש קניין, but if a ישראלי buys the field back, then it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. So what is the difference between יש קניין לאין קניין. They both hold תבואה that grew in the possession of a אינו יהודי and were finished in the hands of a אינו יהודי אז אינה חייבת בתרומה. And they both hold if the Israeli buys it back then the crops are obligated.

I think that Rav Nahman was not in the category of the excommunication of the Gra however I do think the excommunication was valid.
The reason is something I saw in a commentary of the Rambam Mishna LaMeleh in the beginning of laws of vows [Nedarim] where he brings the Beit Yoseph who brings the Tashbaz that a herem has a category of both a vow and an oath. There the ML himself disagrees and says it only has the category of a vow. Still the point is it is valid.
That is just like one can forbid the use of a loaf of bread on another by saying this loaf of bread is a korban [sanctified for the altar] to you"--so a herem excommunication also has that same kind of validity.

The reason this is relevant to me even though others ignore this issue is that I am horrified by how the Dark Side has taken over the religious world in Israel. I wish that the Gra and Rav Shach would have been listened to. 

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of being more strict than the letter of the law.

Rav Nahman from Uman did not think very highly of "Chumrot" which is to say being more strict than the letter of the law. I was in the same Na Nach Breslov place and they were learning the beginning of Rav Nahman's book the LM vol 1:8. He does not mention this idea there but he does go into the idea that is related. The actual place is in LM vol 2 around chapter 44 I think and also around 82.
There Rav Nahman does bring up the problem of religious authorities that are demonic for the first time -and that is a recurring theme in the LM.
I was reminded of this by reading the Commentary of Rav Joseph Karo on the Rambam where he brings the case of Shmuel the amora telling one person that he must use the oil of gentiles or he would declare him a zaken mamre rebellious elder.

I was at the Na Nach Nachma Nachman from Uman [in Israel]  place today and did some learning. Then I went to take a nap and when I woke up I had an idea that might help R. Shimshon [a grandson of Rashi].
The question that the Radvaz raised on R Shimshon was that if in the grain stack there is half tithes and half secular grain then how can one take a tithe for it. The answer is that he takes double and calls a name only on a half.
That is like this. In the Mishna in Trume 4 we have a mishna that goes like  this: המפריש מקצת ת''ום מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר One who separates only a part of truma or tithe [maisar] takes out truma from it but not to another place. RS [R. Shimshon] says the idea is that the separation is valid but he needs to complete the amount.
The is the basic background. Now the question is let's say that now the stack is half tevel and half secular. So how can he take tithe? [This question is of the Radvaz.]
The answer is this. Let's say that you have 100lbs of grain and one takes 5 lbs for tithe instead of ten. So now the stack is half tevel and half hulin. So what to do is to separate another 10 lbs and to say: "the five lbs of tevel in this ten lbs is now tithe for the rest of the 50 lbs of tevel that are in the stack." Then the stack is now completely  taken care of. but your ten lbs is now half tithe and half secular. Then you could give the whole thing to a Levi. You would lose a little bit of your own grain but tehstack would be okay.

This answer clearly helps R. Shimshon. However there is still the Rambam left to try to answer for. The problem in the Rambam is the exact same one that comes up in R Shimshon but the answer I gave for RS does not work for the Rambam. The issue is this. In Truma 3 law 7 the Rambam brings that same mishna but holds the separation is not valid at all.  But in law 6 he says one who intends to separate 1/60 but instead took 1/61 --the separation is valid but he finishes the required amount. As Rav Shach points out in the Avi Ezri we see that the difference between law 6 and law 7 is that is law 6 he intends to finish the amount. In law 7 he does not. So in law 7 the separation is not valid.
The answer for the Rambam I think is that here he talks about truma alone and in that there is no problem of amounts. If he continues the process it is valid even if he takes just 1/60-1/61. And in fact in laws of tithe the Rambam does not bring up the issue of when he intends to take more. So in that case as far as I can see he would say the same thing as I wrote up above for R Shimshon.

[The police still have my computer so I am still borrowing. I am not upset with the police because they easily could have put me away for ten years if they had wanted to. Instead they had compassion on me and that same night I was arrested, the officer Moshe Cohen asked me two questions. One was to make a search and the other he mentioned perhaps my son would be willing to sign for me. So we all went (about ten police officers) and the police actually did not search because Moshe my son answered the door and said there was nothing to search for and then they asked if he would be willing to come and sign for me and he said yes. That was one of the greatest moments in my life when I heard my son willing to stand up for. me. Still I am sad that I have not written any music or ideas in Torah.]

I had a thought also about something that Rav Shach [on laws of Truma ] I know does talk about in the Avi Ezri. [I do not recall what he said].
The mishna says one who takes only a fraction of the truma or tithe takes out truma from it but not to a different place. R. Meir said also to a different place. R. Shimshon says the idea is it is truma or tithe but he needs to finish. Example: 100 lbs tevel. He takes 5 lbs tithe. It is tithe but he takes another 5 lbs. The idea is to R Shimshon that the original stack is mixed with tevel and hulin but when he takes more tithe we says he is taking from the tevel.
 Rashi says something similar on a different topic in Gitin 47b.   Jew and gentile own crops together. Tevel and hulin are mixed to R. Yehuda Hanasi. Rashi says you take a tithe and assume you are taking tevel.

The answer for R Shimshon at this point is unclear. I tried last night to think about it but came up with nothing. I ought to mention the person that asks on R Shimshon is the Radvaz. Sometimes it takes a long time for me to come up with an acceptable answer for the baali Hatosfot.